Time to "Look for the Union Label?" - "First US Doctors' Strike in Decades," at University of California Student Health

The First US Doctors' Strike in Decades

A few news media outlets in California have reported on what has been up to now a very rare event - a strike by physicians.  An initial summary was in an article in the San Diego Union - Tribune, whose title was

First U.S. Doctors' Strike in Decades

A handful of doctors providing medical services to students at UC San Diego — and their colleagues at nine other University of California campuses — went on strike Tuesday.

It's the first time in 25 years that fully licensed doctors are picketing a U.S. employer, according to the Union of American Physicians and Dentists, which represents the physicians at the UC schools.

The work stoppage began at 7:30 a.m. and is scheduled to last one day. It involves 150 health center doctors who manage the primary care and mental health needs of students.

A second article in the Union-Tribune suggested that the point of contention between the union and the University of California administration was not primarily wages,

Collective bargaining has not gone smoothly for UC student services doctors who voted to join the Union of American Physicians and Dentists in November 2013. The two sides have not been able to agree on a contract. Union members voted for the one-day strike after accusing the university system of refusing to provide key financial information that would aid their negotiations.

An article in the East Bay Express clarified that, 

The central unfair labor practice complaint centers on the university's refusal to disclose basic financial data to doctors as part of the negotiations, according to Dr. Jeff Nelson, a UC Berkeley physician and a member of the bargaining team.

'We have asked UC for financial information as to where their funding sources are and what kind of finding they have, and they're not giving that, even though as a public institution, they're required to,' Nelson told me this morning at a rally outside the Tang Center where UC Berkeley students receive health services. Citing the $3.1 billion fundraising campaign UC Berkeley completed last year, he added: 'They have an awful lot of money.'

Without the financial statistics the union has requested, UAPD can't fairly negotiate and settle a contract, said Sue Wilson, a UAPD spokesperson. 'We have a right to certain information that we need in order to bargain a contract.' For example, she said, the union has sought information about the recently approved 20 percent salary increases for chancellors, but hasn't had any luck getting the details it requested. Wilson said the union has also filed an unfair labor practice charge regarding UC's recent decision to require UAPD doctors to contribute more money to their pensions, despite the fact that university officials originally said they would make those changes through the contract negotiations. 'It shows a lack of respect,' she said.

Apparently, the striking doctors want more money not for salaries, but to improve services to patients, as discussed in the second Union-Tribune article,

Dr. Amol Doshi, one of the staff physicians who didn’t report to work Tuesday, said his decision to join the union and to strike came down to disagreements with management over how student health services is run. 

He said only about 15 minutes is provided for each patient, regardless of whether that student has one or several medical issues that need to be addressed.

'We feel like our professional autonomy is being compromised in how we can take care of our patients. We feel that the number of patients that we’re asked to see, many of whom have mental health concerns, require more time and more staffing,' Doshi said.

The East Bay Express noted the UC administration's response did not deal with the substance of these issues,

Reached for comment today, a UC Berkeley spokesperson referred me to the UC Office of the President. Shelly Meron, a spokesperson for that office, dismissed the union's complaints in a phone interview this morning.'"They say this is about unfair labor practice charges. We believe this is simply a negotiation tool.'  Meron said the president's office does not comment on the specifics of unfair labor practice charges and declined to answer questions about the union's claims regarding financial disclosures and the pension policy.

Note that so far this story has been reported nationally only in one small item by Reuters.

Unions as One Method to Address the Plight of the Corporate Physician

So, to summarize, a small group of unionized physicians employed by the student health services of the University of California called a one day strike to protest infringements of their autonomy, particularly requirements that they see patients too quickly for what they believe to be the patients' good, and failure to provide budgetary information relevant to the university's financial capacity to provide better services.  The physicians suspect the university has sufficient money to do so, especially given generous raises given to university managers.

The issues these physicians seem to be facing are familiar aspects of the plight of the American corporate physician.  To recap the background, decades ago, most US physicians worked as solo entrepreneurs, or for small, physician owned groups.  Those few who were employed worked for small non-profits, like the local teaching hospital, or local or US government.  That has all changed.

Now increasing numbers of physicians are employed by increasingly large non-profits, such as hospital systems, or for-profit corporations. A 2013 Medscape article reported that the then current rate of employment was over 50%.

As such these physicians often report ultimately to managers, administrators, bureaucrats, and executives (MABEs).  Many of the people they report do may not be physicians or health care professionals.  Instead, they are likely to be generic managers, trained in business and management schools, with no direct experience in health care, and unclear commitment to its value.  (The 2013 Medscape article cited above included results of survey suggesting the top complaint of employed physicians was being "bossed around by less-educated admins.")

Worse, many generic managers have bought into the primacy of short-term revenue over all other considerations, including patients' and the public's health.  Examples of mission hostile management in health care thus now abound.

In parallel, most top corporate leaders have received increasingly generous compensation, far more generous than non-management employees, including health care professionals get, and that compensation seems to rise regardless of the quality of health care their organizations provide, or even their organizations' financial performance.  (For example, see this post.) 

In the media, and even the medical and health care literature, the rise of the employed, corporate physician has been celebrated, or at least accepted as inevitable. For example, see this post on a Forbes blog by a non-physician pundit with the title, "Physicians want employment, not Marcus Welby MD," implying that choice was completely voluntary.   This attitude may be a product of the long domination of market fundamentalism in the US, in which markets are seen as the solution to all social problems, so neither the outcomes of the "free market" or corporate management are to be questioned. 

However, one would think that contemporary employed physicians are increasingly in a predicament, caught between their professional oaths to put individual patients first, and their generic manager bosses pushing to increase revenue no matter what.  Yet for the corporate physician, protest might jeopardize their livelihood, or worse.  Such physicians may feel captive of the restrictive clauses, such as confidentiality agreements and non-disparagement clauses, in the contracts they signed, possibly often under pressure and without adequate legal counsel.  For example, a 2013 Medscape article was entitled, "Can you speak out without getting fired or being labeled a troublemaker?"  The answer was at best, only sometimes. 

Even in the limited coverage of the California student health doctors' strike, there were references to some of these issues.  These included  what could be mission-hostile management (shrinking visit times regardless of patient needs), and excess compensation to top management (particularly, the Chancellors' pay raises.)   The anechoic nature of the strike, that is, the lack of media coverage so far, seems to reflect the now prevailing market fundamentalist dogma that is generally hostile to workers' rights and organization. 

Nonetheless, the doctors of the University of California student health services did organize, and now they have taken the unheard of step of calling a strike.  That this did not happen sooner is a testament to the enormous power, enforced by billions in public relations and marketing, of the dogma of market fundamentalism.  However, given that most physicians are now employees, and have not been having an easy time of it, this strike may be just the beginning.

In any case, organization of employed workers, collective bargaining, and even strikes, while being anathema to market fundamentalists, may be much better for society than even more radical responses to the ongoing plight of workers.  Remember, it was robber baron capitalism not much different from today's market fundamentalism, that inspired not only the rise of trade unions, but unfortunately, the rise of Marxism and ultimately Communism.

So maybe we should start looking for the "union label" more often in health care.



ADDENDUM (2 February, 2015) - See also post entitled, "Why Physicians Must Unionize" on the On Health Care Technology blog.

11:40 AM

What Big Drug and Biotechnology Companies Will Not Tell Us - Transparency International on Corporate Reporting

Drug companies are entrusted to provide pure, unadulterated medicines.  Increasingly drug companies are now entrusted with doing research, including experimental studies, on human beings, and providing education to doctors and patients.  Ordinarily, trust requires confidence in transparency. However, a new report suggests that large multinational drug and biotechnology companies are not very transparent.

Transparency International just released a report on the transparency, or lack thereof, of the 124 biggest multinational corporations.  The report detailed how well these companies disclosed their internal anti-corruption programs, their subsidiaries, affiliates, and joint ventures, and their financial data broken down by the countries in which they operate.  In summary, the overall results for disclosing anti-corruption programs were mediocre, and for disclosing organizational structure and country-by-country financial data, they were dismal.

The report is highly relevant to health care.  It included the biggest multinational health care corporations, all drug and/or biotechnology companies: Abbott Laboratories, (based in the US), Amgen (US), AstraZeneca (UK), Gilead Sciences (US), GlaxoSmithKline (UK), Johnson and Johnson (US), Merck and Co (US), Novartis (Switzerland), Novo Nordisk (Denmark), Pfizer (US), Roche Holding (Switzerland), Sanofi (France), Teva Pharmaceutical Industries (Israel).

The report has so far received little media coverage.  In the US, several news services provided brief  summaries.  Somewhat more substantial articles came from Reuters, the Wall Street Journal's Risk and Compliance Journal, and CNBC.  None gave specifics about health care.  Coverage from other countries, e.g., Germany by Deutsche Welle, and the UK by the Guardian, was more detailed but also did not specifically mention health care.

Therefore, I will summarize the rationale and assessment methods used by Transparency International for its three dimensions of transparency, and then show results from the 13 health care corporations.

Disclosure of Anti-Corruption Programs

The rationale for addressing this area was:

Global companies have legal and ethical obligations to conduct their business honestly. This requires
commitment, resources and the ongoing management of a range of risks – legal, political and reputational – including those associated with corruption. The implementation of a comprehensive range of anticorruption policies and management systems is fundamental to efforts to prevent and remediate corruption within organisations.

Transparency International believes that public reporting by companies on their anti-corruption programmes allows for increased monitoring by stakeholders and the public at large, thereby making companies more accountable

Evaluation of disclosure of anti-corruption programs was

based on 13 questions, which are derived from the UN Global Compact and Transparency International Reporting Guidance on the 10th Principle against Corruption. This tool, based on the Business Principles for Countering Bribery, which were developed by Transparency International in collaboration with a multi-stakeholder group, includes recommendations for companies on how to publicly report on their anticorruption programmes.

Note that the project addressed only reporting of anti-corruption programs, not their implementation or effectiveness.

For this and the other two dimensions of transparency, responses were converted into a 0% to 100% scale, with 100% being the best possible result.

Organizational Transparency

The rationale was:

As many of the recent corporate scandals have shown, acts of corruption are very often aided by the use of opaque company structures and secrecy jurisdictions.  But the use of offshore companies and their lack of transparency are posing increasing risks for global companies as well as for their shareholders, employees and local communities.

So,

Companies can mitigate the risks posed by lack of transparency and ownership arrangements by shedding more light on their corporate structures and by making basic financial information public on a country-by-country basis. This allows stakeholders to have a clearer understanding of the extent of a company’s operations and makes the company more accountable for its activities in a given country, including assessing whether it contributes financially in a manner appropriate to its level of activity.

The measurement strategy was,

Transparency International researchers consulted publicly available documents such as annual reports and stock exchange filings for information about company subsidiaries, affiliates, joint ventures and other holdings. The information sought included corporate names, percentages of ownership by the parent company, countries of incorporation and the countries in which the companies operate.

Country-by-Country Reporting

The rationale included:

The importance of country-by-country reporting was first recognised in the extractive sector as a way to ensure that revenues from natural resources are used to foster economic and social development rather than line the pockets of kleptocratic elites.

So,

country-by-country reporting ... [is] a recognised building block for corporate transparency and as a tool for countering tax avoidance.

In addition, country-by-country reporting provides investors with more comprehensive financial information about companies and helps them address investment risk more effectively.

The items measured were disclosure of revenue/sales, capital expenditures, pre-tax income, income tax, and community contribution in each country in which the company operated.

Results for Health Care Corporations

Company                      Total  Anti-Corruption P  Org Structure  by-Country

Abbott Laboratories    40             81                           38                3
Amgen                          37             85                           25                0
AstraZeneca                37             88                           19                3
Gilead Sciences           26             54                           25                0
GlaxoSmithKline          52            96                           50               11
Johnson and Johnson  26           65                           13                0
Merck and Co               42           77                            50                0
Novartis                        38            77                           38                1
Novo Nordisk               39            81                           38                0
Pfizer                             35            92                           13                0
Roche Holding              33            62                           38                1
Sanofi                            38            77                           38                0
Teva Pharmaceutical  35            85                            19                0

Again, only one company, GlaxoSmithKline, achieved an overall score of barely better than 50%.  All the others had lower scores.  Only two companies achieved a 50% score on disclosure of organizational structure, and only one achieved a score of better than 10% for disclosing country-by-country results.  The Transparency International report noted that the health care companies got particularly bad scores for disclosing organizational structure, averaging 31%, the third worst performance by economic sector.


Summary

 The drug and biotechnology companies generally did a fairly good job disclosing what their anti-corruption programs were supposed to do.  However, note that the Transparency International report did not assess how well these programs were implemented or enforced.  That this concern is not academic is underscored by some of these companies disreputable track records.  Some have long histories of legal actions, including billion dollar plus legal settlements, some of which were of allegations of fraud or kickbacks, and some have been convicted of crimes.  See the records of, for example: Abbott Laboratories (look here and here), Amgen (here), AstraZeneca (here), GlaxoSmithKline (here), Johnson and Johnson (here), Merck (here), Novartis (here), Novo Nordisk (here), Pfizer (here), Roche (here), Sanofi (here), and Teva (here).

Moreover, the companies did not do a good job disclosing their organizational structures, and hardly any bothered to report any financial results broken down by country.

We have frequently discussed health care corporations' deceptive marketing, induction of conflicts of interest, including those of supposed "key opinion leaders" who often are marketers in academic or professional clothing, and manipulation and suppression of clinical research.  There has been an ongoing procession of legal settlements involving health care corporations, often involving allegations of, and sometimes convictions for fraud, kickbacks, bribery, or other crimes.  There have even been some cases in which drug companies have failed to assure that their products are pure and unadulterated, their most basic mission.  Thus many are distrustful of drug and biotechnology companies, and large health care organizations in general.

So, as Transparency International's report noted, to rebuild trust,

integrity must be central to these efforts. Those efforts, in turn, can only become fully credible if they are undertaken with a sustained commitment to ethical behaviour and transparency across companies’ operations.

In my humble opinion, a basic premise of true health care reform would be that health care organizations become sufficiently transparent to restore basic trust in them. 

11:44 AM

Why Did the Global Fund Fire its Inspector General?

The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria continues to struggle with the issue of health care corruption, an issue we noted here and here in 2011. 

Now as a news story in Nature put it,

It has been a rough couple of years for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the world’s largest funder of international health programmes. Since its creation in 2002, the organization, based in Geneva, Switzerland, has channelled US$24.7 billion to delivering disease-control measures such as drugs, diagnostics and bed nets, saving millions of lives. But the global financial crisis has hit the fund hard, and its troubles mounted in 2011 when allegations of corruption among its grant recipients tarnished its reputation and alarmed donors.

Last week, the Global Fund tried to move on, announcing a new leader and unveiling major changes to its funding programme.

The Nature news story suggested that the troubles of the Fund all seemed so unfair.  After all,

the fraud allegations, ... [were] largely rehashed audits already made public by the fund itself. A retrospective audit published in July this year suggests that the allegations may have been overblown. It found that, in a sample of grants worth $3.8 billion that were awarded from 2005 to 2012 in 27 countries, just 0.5% of grant funding was lost to outright fraud. Experts say that figure is not exceptional for funding programmes in poor nations that often struggle with corruption.

Yet the Nature story suggested that the Fund's intrepid new later "could signal a fresh start, and has been broadly welcomed," leaving the impression that all things may turn out well.

Firing the Inspector General

However, the Nature story left out one nagging detail.  At the same time the Fund board announced the appointment of Dr Mark Dybul as its new director, it also announced that it had fired the Fund's Inspector General.  A report in the Financial Times only included,

It also dismissed John Parsons, its inspector general. Some directors believed Mr Parsons had been too outspoken in conducting public audits that sparked criticism of relatively small amounts of mismanagement and corruption.

The impression left was that Mr Parson was mainly guilty of rocking the boat.

The New York Times version, which started by recounting the hiring of Dr Dybul, also made it sound that Mr Parsons was generating too much bad publicity,

The fund also dismissed its inspector general, John Parsons, on Thursday, citing unsatisfactory work.


Mr. Parsons and Dr. Kazatchkine had privately clashed. Mr. Parsons’s teams aggressively pursued theft and fraud, and found it in Mali, Mauritania and elsewhere. But the total amount stolen — $10 million to $20 million — was relatively small, and aides to Dr. Kazatchkine said the fund cut off those countries and sought to retrieve the money. The aides claimed that Mr. Parsons, who reported only to the board, went to news outlets and left the impression that the fund was covering up rampant theft.

The fuss scared off some donor countries....

The AP version also cited the Board's accusation that Mr Parson's performance was "unsatisfactory," but included,

The inspector general's office is supposed to function independently. It was created in 2005 at the urging of the fund's biggest donor, the United States, which has contributed $7.3 billion to date.


The board held a contentious closed-door session with Parsons on Wednesday then deliberated into the night after he stormed out.

The board chairman, Simon Bland, and the head of its audit committee, Graham Joscelyne, each said they were unconcerned whether U.S. lawmakers might perceive the firing as an infringement on the office. Joscelyne would not elaborate on what Parsons did wrong but cited several reviews of him that were not disclosed.

In its latest 6-month progress report, Parsons' office said it had a growing caseload of 142 active investigations, up more than 70 percent from just two years ago.

Summary and Comment

We posted about the allegations of corruption at the Global Fund here and here in 2011.  At that time the scope of the problem was  unclear.  Now, at least according to the latest news report, it still is not clear.  On one hand, maybe no more than 0.5% of the budget was compromised.  On the other hand, would that caseload of 142 active investigations reveal more? 

Even less clear is the reason that Investigator General Parsons was fired.  The Board did not clarify what about his performance was unsatisfactory.  The AP report implies that doing too little was not the issue.  Most disturbing is lack of any mention of a possible replacement.

As we mentioned previously, the authoritative 2006 Global Corruption Report from Transparency International stated that corruption is a major global health problem.  Furthermore, Transparency International's IACC (International Anti-Corruption Conference) in Brasilia just wrapped up.  It's final declaration included,

We call on leaders everywhere to embrace not only transparency in public life but a culture of transparency leading to a participatory society in which leaders are accountable.


We call on the anti-corruption movement to support and protect the activists, whistleblowers and journalists who speak out against corruption, often at great risk.

It is up to all of us in government, business and society to embrace transparency so that it ensures full participation of all people, bringing us together to send a clear message: We are watching those who act with impunity and we will not let them get away with it.

Yet, corruption as a global health problem is still mostly ignored. In particular, global health aid programs almost never include pro-active measures to address corruption. In this case, the Global Fund, the world's largest source of such aid, was initially pushed into defensively addressing corruption, but now seems not to be so transparent about the problem. In my humble opinion, unless more transparency soon becomes evident, donors may continue to find reasons not to support the fund.


So the leaders of the Global Fund might want to consider becoming more transparent, and making some assurances that they are not out to get whistleblowers, including their own internal watchdogs.  At this point a more pro-active approach might be too much to ask for. 

12:55 PM

Traits that "Define a Great Hospital CFO" - Honesty, Integrity, Accountability not Included

A recent article in Becker's Hospital Review entitled, "6 Traits That Define a Great Hospital CFO" [Chief Financial Officer] was most remarkable for what traits were not included.

The Six Traits

Based on interviews with a managing director of health care recruiting for a large executive search firm, and an experienced CFO of large hospital system, the included traits were:
- "Conviction," including "some type of conviction and confidence that their decision-making abilities will lead the hospital to great healthcare outcomes, a healthy population and — as a result — a more financially stable organization."
- "Nimbleness and flexibility"
- "Calm demeanor"
- "Willingness to understand the clinical aspects," in particular, the ability to "at least understand the [clinical] processes from a layperson's point of view, and the most effective CFOs have great working relationships with physicians, nurses, technicians and others."
- "Ability to think long term"
- "Sense of humor"

To be fair, I am glad to see expectations that hospital leaders, even chief financial officers, know something about clinical care, and that they have some sort of commitment to it. This seems to be in contrast to our frequent posts about how the leadership of health care organizations often seems ignorant and uncaring about the health care context and health care values. (However, the phrase above about conviction was not clearly worded. In particular, it did not explicitly suggest quality clinical care ought to be a higher priority than revenue, and could have been read to mean that good care is just a means to increase revenue.)

I am also glad that the article promoted long-term thinking. It also seems to contrast with concerns (e.g., here) about how health care leadership may put short-term revenue ahead of all other goals, also called "financialization." However, again, the article did not explicitly give long-term goals a higher priority than short-term ones.

What was Missing

However, what was more striking were the dogs that did not bark. In particular, transparency, honesty and integrity or even being law-abiding were not on the list of key traits for a CFO. This is particularly noteworthy given how often we have discussed bad behavior by large health care organizations, including various kinds of deception and dishonest behavior, as well as outright crime, such as fraud, bribery or kickbacks, etc.

Also, the list of important traits did not include responsibility or accountability.   This is also noteworthy given that rarely if ever have the leaders of these organizations taken any responsibility or paid any penalty for bad behavior occurring on their watches. Although may large health care organizations have made numerous legal settlements of accusations that include fraud, kickbacks, etc, the leadership almost never admitted wrongdoing in any of them, and almost never had to accept any financial penalty form the organization. This parallels how the US legal system has rarely sought to punish any leader of a large health care organization in such cases, suggesting that health care leaders now have developed impunity.

Given that the article appeared in Becker's Hospital Review, a leading publication for hospital leaders, its apparent cynicism about what once were considered indispensable characteristics of good leadership was disturbing.  It is also disturbing that at the time this was written, the only comment on the on-line version of the article, also the only comment to note this lack, was written by your this humble scribbler.

Summary

This may test some CFOs' sense of humor, but instead let me propose my hopes for better health care leadership. To truly reform health care we should seek reasonable leadership that draws on the collective knowledge and values of health care professionals, and that shows accountability, integrity, transparency, honesty, and ethics.  Not asking our leaders to be honest, ethical and accountable just enables the current dysfunction. 

10:51 AM

The Case of the Vanishing Graduate Medical Education Funds

While primary care falters in the US, those who teach it seem to feel increasingly poverty stricken.  Now it appears that one reason for this is an amazing example of multiple failures of transparency and accountability.  Let me work through it, begging your pardon for a little bit of "inside baseball," medical education style.  The results suggest how we desperately need some medical disciples of Sherlock Holmes.

Background

My personal experience and increasing data suggests that most medical school faculty believe that their teaching is not valued by their institutions because teaching brings in no external funds.  In 2004, Dr Catherine DeAngelis, then the editor of JAMA, wrote "few medical schools provide adequate, if any, reimbursement for teaching time."(1)  (See this 2005 post.)   This seems absurd on its face, since what are medical schools for if it is not to provide teaching. 

However, there is evidence of this mission-hostile behavior.  In 2007, we quoted from a revealing interview with Dr Lee Goldman, Executive Vice President for Health and Biomedical Sciences at Columbia University,(2) who stated that "taxpayers," faculty who "generate more [money] than they cost," are valued most, and implied that faculty who focus on teaching are regarded as "welfare recipients," who bring in less external funding, and are valued least.  In 2010, we noted the results of a large-scale survey presented by Dr Linda Pololi in which 51% of faculty felt that the administration only valued them for the money that they brought in, and half felt that their institutions did not value teaching.(3)

Yet while faculty seem to believe that educational institutions receive little if any money to pay for teaching, it is not clear why the believe something so counter intuitive, and it is less clear what money actually goes to pay for medical education.

US Government Funding for Graduate Medical Education

However, several recent publications affirm that actually a lot of money goes towards one important form of medical education, yet the specifics of the money flows are shrouded in secrecy.  In the May, 2012, SGIM Forum, Dr Mark Liebow and colleagues summarized some of what is known about federal support of graduate medical education, that is, education of interns, residents, and other house officers.(4)  There are two streams of money that flow from Medicare to US hospitals:

Direct GME (DGME) payments help hospitals pay the salaries of residents, teaching faculty, and support staff. DGME is the product of three numbers: a per resident amount that varies by hospital, adjusted annually for inflation; the number of residents in the hospital (capped for each hospital at 1997 levels); and the fraction of discharges from the hospital that are Medicare beneficiaries. The Indirect Medical Education (IME) payment is a percentage amount added on to each DRG payment. The percentage is calculated via a complex formula (the only US statute containing an exponent!), where the key factor is the ratio of interns/residents to beds (IRB ratio).

These two streams are of considerable size:

Of the $9.2 billion Medicare paid for GME in 2010, $3 billion was for DGME and $6.2 billion for IME. The money is paid to hospitals sponsoring training programs rather than to the training programs or other hospitals where training occurs. While about 1,100 hospitals receive GME payments, 66% goes to the 200 hospitals that have the largest numbers of residents.

So, the 200 largest hospitals get about $2 billion in direct GME money (and presumably about another $4 billion in indirect money). This averages then to about $10 million DGME and $20 million indirect GME per hospital.

Thus, teaching, at least the teaching of interns, residents, and other house-staff does pay, and much more than trivial amounts. (Note that these amounts are not for teaching of medical students, which ought to be supported by other funding streams.)

Why then do faculty think that teaching does not bring in any money?

The GME Money Vanishes

An article by Dr Saima I Chaudhry and colleagues in the American Journal of Medicine begins to explain, although the explanations are found between the lines.(5)

First of all, while the graduate medical education money is paid by the government to the hospitals, the government does not publish what it pays to individual hospitals:

It has been previously reported that the amount of GME funding individual hospitals receive is not publicly reported by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,....

The government also does not hold the hospitals accountable for how they spend this money, nor for the quantity or quality of education they supply in exchange for it.

Remarkably, Chaudhry et al imply that that the people who run graduate medical education teaching programs also may not know how much money their hospitals receive from the government to fund their programs. The introduction to their article noted:

It is unclear how much program directors know about the amount and flow of DME funds to their programs. Program directors' beliefs about the transparency of funding to their programs, or their desire to influence how funds are distributed to them, also are unknown.

The article reported on a survey of internal medicine residency program directors which asked about "their knowledge of D[G]ME funding for their programs, the transparency with which funds are distributed to them, and their desire to influence this disbursement." The researchers sent surveys to 372 member programs, representing 97.1% of all US internal medicine residencies. They got 268 responses, a 72.0% response rate.

The main results were that only 159/268 (59.3%) of program directors had tried to find out how much DGME money their programs received, and of those, only 84 (52.8% of those enquiring, but only 31.3% of all respondents) actually knew how much money their programs got.

Of the 92 program directors who did not even try to discover how much money their programs received, approximately 21% said that "no one would tell me," 21% said that the "information would be inaccurate," 14% said they "don't know who to ask," and 2% were "afraid to ask."

Summary

US medical school faculty, especially those in primary care, increasingly feel pressured to perform activities that they perceive brings in money from external sources. They tend to believe that their own teaching somehow does not bring in any money, and that their careers will fail if they do not put more emphasis on other activities that the institution views as more profitable.

However, literally billions of US government dollars go to support the education of house staff, including the salaries of faculty who teach interns and residents, who probably are the majority of physician faculty. Faculty probably do not know this, because the government does not publish the amounts given to individual hospitals, nor demand of the hospitals any accountability for how they spend the money they receive.

Presumably, the top executives of each hospital know how much money the government gives them. Nonetheless, the majority of physician leaders of residency programs are never told these amounts, apparently because their hospital executives kept the amounts secret. Many of those educators who have tried to find out the figures were unsuccessful. Some did not even try to find out based on beliefs that their attempts would be unsuccessful, any amounts they discovered would be inaccurate, the people who knew the amounts were hidden, or that it would be dangerous to their careers to even try.

Thus billions of dollars of money flowing from the government to fund graduate medical education seems to have vanished in an amazing example of widespread deficiencies in accountability and transparency.

There are many people who blame government for many social ills. In this case, one can blame the US Congress for not writing a law that makes the money flows transparent and hospitals accountable for providing good educational value for the money provided. One can also blame the executive branch, particularly the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) of the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for not making the money flows and the values received for them transparent.

There are a few people, including this author, who also blame the leadership of health care organizations for many of the problems besetting health care. In this case, one can blame top leadership, presumably CEOs and chief financial officers (CFOs) of hospitals for hiding the amounts of money they receive from Medicare to finance graduate medical education. One can also blame the physician leaders of residency programs for not insisting that they know the true sources of financial support for their programs, obtain budgets that reflect this support, and recognition that their faculty really do bring in external funds for their teaching of house staff (and are thus valuable "taxpayers" in Dr Goldman's parlance.)

It is amazing that such amounts of money have been flowing for years mostly in secret. The secrecy has fueled incorrect, and in retrospect, bizarre ideas about the funding of medical education, and the value of medical educators to their institutions. This secrecy, in turn, has helped suppress the morale of medical educators, support the control of managers of health care professionals, and distort the flow of money within academic institutions and to compensation for certain favored individuals.

Would our dysfunctional health care system not be better off if we demanded transparency and accountability from its leaders?  In particular, the US government should make payments to hospitals for graduate medical education completely transparent, and develop a system to hold these hospitals accountable for how they spend the money.  Meanwhile, top leaders of hospitals receiving this money should make the amounts transparent, first to the people who are supposed to be doing the education that the money pays for, and to the public at large.  This would allow those running the relevant educational programs to develop reasonable and realistic budgets, to treat their faculty with respect, and to demonstrate what value they provide for the money received. 
The ongoing anechoic effect, and related deception and secrecy fostered by leaders in health care are major reasons our health care system is so dysfunctional, that costs are so high, and access and quality so poor.  True health care reform would ensure health care leaders put the mission before their personal enrichment, and act ethically with accountability, transparency, and honesty. 
References
1.   DeAngelis CD. Professors not professing. JAMA 2004; 292: 1060-1.  Link here.
2.  Goldman L, Halm EA.  A view from the top: general internal medicine from the perspective of a chair and dean.  SGIM Forum, April, 2007.  Link here.
3.  Pololi L, Ash A, Krupat E.  Faculty Values in the Culture of Academic Medicine: Findings of a National Faculty Survey. Link here.
4.  Liebow M, Jaeger J, Schwartz MD. How does Medicare pay for graduate medical education? SGIM Forum, May, 2012.  Link here.
5. Chaudhry SI, Khanijo S, Halvorsen AJ, McDonald FS,Patel K. Accountability and transparency in graduate medical education expenditures. Am J Med 2012; 125: 517-522. Link here.

1:02 PM

Got Problems? Better Have Answers!

John Commins, for HealthLeaders Media:  Your Hospital is Not Invisible.

"It doesn't matter if your hospital is in midtown Manhattan or Manhattan, KS. It doesn't matter how many licensed beds you have or how high you scored with HealthGrades. If you've got problems at your hospital—from labor disputes, to HIPAA violations, to dirty sheets—you'd better be prepared to have answers for the government, public advocacy groups, plaintiffs' attorneys, and the news media."

Just ask 88-bed Sheridan (WY) Memorial Hospital.

1:57 PM

An eBay For Purchasers and Providers

BIlling itself as a "health services exchange," Open Health Market offers discounted, fixed, packaged pricing for an episode of health care.  

Discounts.  Fixed pricing.  Packaged services.  Easy access.  Transparent quality data. 

From the article:   "...this concept goes flying over the head of four out of five" U.S. hospital executives. "I'm stunned at how difficult it is for most of them to get their minds around it."

Stunned?  Really?

More here at Open Health Market's website.

7:20 PM

SGIM Urges "Chuck the RUC"

This week, Society of General Internal Medicine (SGIM) members received the 5 August, 2009, Update in Health Policy that urged we "chuck the RUC," (quoted in its entirety below, italics added for emphasis):

Who will assign the value of primary care services? Chuck the RUC!

How does Medicare determine physician payment rates? The answer to this question is a core element of the ongoing debate about health care reform. Changing how Medicare sets payment rates for physicians is especially critical since Medicare rates also guide the rates set by private insurers. Since 1992, Medicare has paid physicians according to the Resource Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS), a fee schedule that multiplies relative values for physician services by a conversion factor to determine the amount of payment. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has historically used the Relative Value Scale Update Committee, or RUC, as the sole source of recommendations. This committee within the AMA performs broad reviews of the RBRVS every five years. Twenty three of the RUC's twenty nine members are appointed by major national medical specialty societies, including those that account for high percentages of Medicare expenditures for procedures. All meetings are closed and discussions are confidential. The over-representation of procedure-driven subspecialties and under-representation of generalist physicians in the RUC has contributed to the current undervalued cognitive services (especially for primary care) and over-valued reimbursement for procedures. In March 2007, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) identified the RUC process as a major reason for undervalued primary care services and a significant contributor to the crisis in primary care. MedPAC has recommended that an independent expert panel of economists, technology experts, physicians and private citizens be created to supplement the RUC's recommendations to CMS regarding fee schedules. Health reform discussions have included moving MedPAC into the executive branch and giving it authority to review and recommend Medicare payment policy, thus reducing the RUC's influence. Not surprisingly, both the AMA and the American College of Surgeons have opposed this proposal. Groups representing primary care physicians, including SGIM, are in favor of this proposal which could ensure fair and unbiased assignment of work RVUs to all the service codes used by physicians. We believe that this will correct the payment inequalities of the current fee scale and ultimately renew trainees' interest in primary care. In the coming weeks, SGIM may ask you to act on this issue and contact your legislators to urge them to support these transformative proposals for primary care. Please monitor your e-mail for action alerts and be prepared to act.

We have previously posted (most recently here in considerable detail) about the perverse incentives given US physicians by the payment schedule dictated by the US Medicare system. These incentives have been largely responsible for the increasingly dire status of primary care/ generalist care in the US. Revisions to the Resource-Based Relative Value System (RBRVS) disproportionately reward physicians for performing procedures and diagnostic tests instead of talking with, examining, thinking about, diagnosing, recommending decisions for, and counseling patients. The US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) uses the RBRVS Update Committee (RUC) de facto as its sole source for advice on revising the system. The RUC is dominated by representatives of medical societies whose members predominantly perform procedures and do diagnostic tests. The RUC is secretive. The identities of its individual members are difficult to ascertain. Its proceedings are secret.

Thus, the RBRVS updating process run by the RUC is opaque, unaccountable, and not representative of patients and "cognitive" physicians. The result of this process has been perverse incentives that have driven up health care costs without obvious improvements in quality or outcomes.

I applaud SGIM for being the first medical society to challenge how the RUC controls payments to physicians, and the perverse incentives the RUC process has generated.

As the Update above says, meaningful health care reform in the US will not occur unless we address the perverse incentives that drive up costs without improving care.

8:30 AM

The RUCkus Continues: Former Medicare Administrator Calls the "RUC Process" "Incredibly Flawed," and the AMA Chair Says He's "Inaccurate"

We have posted frequently about the role of the RBRVS Update Committee (RUC) in fixing the rates at which Medicare pays physicians. These payment rates have been much more generous for procedures than for "cognitive" services, (that is, services including interviewing and examining patients, making diagnoses, forecasting prognoses, recommending tests or treatments, and counseling patients.) Several authors have suggested that how the RUC fixes payment rates is a major cause of the decline of primary care. (See our previous posts on this here, here, here, here, here, here, and here and important articles by Bodenheimer et al,[1] and Goodson.[2])

An Interview with a former Medicare administrator

Health Affairs just published an interview(3) with Kerry Weems, a recent administrator of the US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) under the Bush administration, who had some remarkable criticism for the RUC.

Iglehart: The last question I wanted to ask you relates to the Specialty Society Relative Value Scale Update Committee [RUC] of the American Medical Association. The AMA formed the RUC to act as an expert panel in developing relative value recommendations to CMS. The twenty-nine-member committee essentially determines, through the relative values it establishes for the codes that form the basis of Medicare payments, how much doctors will earn from providing services to beneficiaries. In recent years the RUC has come under criticism based on the view that its specialty- dominated composition undervalues primary care services and, in some instances, overvalues specialty services. I have two questions, Kerry, regarding the RUC. You have been in government for twenty-six years; have you ever heard of an administration that has seriously questioned the RUC process, and whether CMS ought to somehow internalize it or delegate it to another body?

Weems: I think there is a general consensus that the RUC has contributed to the poor state of primary care in the United States. In many ways the supposition behind the RUC process, behind the whole relative value scale, is incredibly flawed. It's an input measurement system, so it asks, What's the cost of my inputs, and that's how I'm going to price my outputs. It has no relationship to perhaps the market value of what you might buy. So because it's highly procedure based, it's prejudiced against just standard primary care evaluation and management [E&M] visits, because in an E&M visit it's hard to document what happens in the same way that it is when you remove a mole, or perform some other procedure.

So the process itself is flawed. I don't think that we can make a change without a statutory change giving us the ability to do that. But it's something that is drastically needed. You know, it's funny that we talk about better coordination of care and creating the medical home. Well, the place where this can occur is in an E&M visit, which has been highly undervalued by the RUC.

Iglehart: You say that the RUC process is seriously flawed and needs to be overhauled. Was there ever any discussion during the eight years of the George W. Bush administration about doing that?

Weems: There were a number of discussions, but it's a hard nut to crack. Those discussions never ripened to the point where we could say we've got something better.

Iglehart: But you'd anticipate under the Obama administration that those discussions will continue?

Weems: Sure. And, you know, you can even see the early attempts at trying to crack that. Representative [Pete] Stark [D-CA] introduced last year the so-called CHAMP [Children's Health and Medicare Protection Act] bill, in which he proposed to develop a new payment approach that would have provided more money to primary care physicians. He split it up into several different categories. This probably wasn't the right approach, but again, he was trying to work through the problem, trying to provide more money for primary care. His heart was in the right place.

There are a number of important points here.

First, a former CMS administrator charged that the RUC has a substantial role in the decline of primary care in the US. Such charges have been made by well-reputed academics who have analyzed the role of the RUC from the outside. But as we have said before, aspects of what the RUC does are obscure, especially because the proceedings of RUC meetings are not made public. But now someone more directly involved has made the same charges.

Second, a former CMS administrator has called the "RUC process ... incredibly flawed." Even the second Bush administration felt these flaws were sufficient to have "a number of discussions," but found "it's a hard nut to crack." Hence he said that although there is something fundamentally wrong with the "RUC process," the government could not easily fix it.

Yet RUC leadership has repeatedly said that the RUC is merely a private advisory committee which gives recommendations to CMS using its rights to free speech and to petition the government. (Note also that above, Inglehart first said that the RUC was formed as "an expert panel" to make "recommendations." But then he said the committee "determines ... how much doctors will earn.") If the RUC is simply an advisory committee, and CMS did not like the advice the RUC was giving, why couldn't CMS leaders simply ignore the RUC?

Weems' remarks do not make sense if the RUC is merely an outside private group providing advice. But they do make sense if the RUC is acting like a government agency.

So this interview once again raises the question: why does CMS rely exclusively on the RUC to update the RBRVS system, apparently making the RUC de facto a government agency, yet without any accountability to CMS, or the government at large?

A response by the Chair of the Board of the AMA

Within days of this interview, Dr Rebecca Patchin, the Chair of the Board of Trustees of the American Medical Association (AMA), wrote a response to the Weems interview. (Amazingly, the response appeared as a blog post on the Health Affairs Blog.)

First, she implied that a former CMS administrator did not know what he was talking about when it came to the RUC.

In the interview, inaccurate statements were made about the role of the AMA/Specialty Society RVS Update Committee (RUC), which advises CMS regarding the relative levels of reimbursement for different medical procedures performed by physicians.

Now I feel like I am in good company. The leaders of the RUC have charged that I made inaccurate statements about the RUC as well (see post here).

However, Dr Patchin failed to identify any particular statements by Kerry Weems or his interviewer as inaccurate, much less provide any evidence to that effect. Note that while the RUC leaders also charged me with making inaccurate statements, they did not specify any particular statements as inaccurate, much less produce evidence in support of their contentions.

Next, Dr Patchin wrote:

Every time the RUC has been asked to review payments for E&M (evaluation and management) codes, the RUC has sent CMS recommendations that would lead to higher payments.

This may be so, but it ignores an important issue. While the RUC may have made some recommendations to increase payments for cognitive services, it has made many more recommendations to increase payments for procedural services. Furthermore, while payments for individual procedures went up, and the volume of procedures also went up, the global budget for physicians' services, called the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR), resulted in across the board cuts. Since raises for procedures were larger and more frequent than raises for cognitive services, the net effect was that payments for procedures increased relative to cognitive services.

Even more important, it begs that question: what has the RUC done at times when no one asked it "to review payments for E&M ... codes?" After all, the RUC leadership has argued again and again that it is only a private advisory committee (and see below for another such argument). As such, it should be able to choose how often it deals with payments for cognitive services. It should not have to wait to be asked to review them. So why wasn't the RUC reviewing these payments more frequently?

Then, Dr Patchin reiterated:

To clarify: The RUC makes recommendations to CMS, and then CMS makes its payment decisions.

and again,

Bottom line: the RUC makes recommendations, CMS makes payment decisions.

This, once more, begs the questions. Why didn't the RUC make more recommendations to improve payments for cognitive services? Why doesn't CMS get recommendations about payments to physicians from sources other than the RUC? Why doesn't CMS make the process for setting physicians' payments, and updating and revising the RBRVS system more broad-based and transparent? Why did the administrator of CMS feel unable to change or ignore the "RUC process?"

I don't have the capacity to find out the answers to these questions. Answering them might take some investigative reporting, or even a Congressional investigation. Given that physicians' payments are key incentives driving the health care system, and that payments favoring procedures are likely to be a major cause for rising volume and costs of procedures, which, in turn, is likely to be a major reason our health care system is so expensive, why do we know so little about how these payment rates are set?

References

1. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. Link here.
2. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310. Link here.
3. Iglehart JK. Doing more with less: a conversation with Kerry Weems. Health Aff 2009; http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.28.4.w688/DC1

7:06 AM

A Letter from the RUC, and My Reply

The vast amounts spent in the US on health care have not translated into access for many patients, consistently excellent quality of care, and signiticantly improved outcomes. While we spend all this money, the primary care and generalist practitioners on the front lines are increasingly embattled and disgruntled, and their numbers are rapidly thinning. One problem may be the pattern of fees paid to physicians. Fees paid to physicians not only influence costs directly, but provide incentives for physician decision making about what tests and treatments patients receive. We have posted several times, most recently in February, 2009, here, about how the US Medicare system sets fees paid to physicians.

Since health care reform is now a hot topic in the US, there has been increasing discussion of the plight of primary care and generalist practitioners, but little consideration of how it arose. What we wrote in February was (with updated links):

As we have discussed, the US Medicare system determines what it pays physicians using the Resource Based Relative Value System (RBRVS). This system determines the pay for every kind of medical encounter according to a complex formula that is supposed to account for physicians' time and effort, physicians' practice expense, and the cost of malpractice insurance. The components of physicians' effort assessed are, in turn, technical skill and physical effort; the required mental effort and judgment; and stress due to the potential risk to the patient.

To keep the system, which was started in 1990, current, requires addition of new kinds of encounters, which means encounters involving new kinds of procedures, and updating of the estimates of various components, including physicians' time and effort. To do so, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies almost exclusively on the advice of the RBRVS Update Committee (RUC). The RUC is a private committee of the AMA, touted as an "expert panel" that takes advantage of the organization's First Amendment rights to petition the government. Membership on the RUC is allotted to represent specialty societies, so that the vast majority of the members represent specialties that do procedures and focus on expensive, high-technology tests and treatments. However, the identities of RUC members are secret, as are the proceedings of the group.

This opaque and unaccountable process has resulted in increases outstripping inflation in fees paid for procedures, while fees paid for "cognitive" medicine, i.e., for primary care, and for services that involve diagnosis, management of acute and chronic disease, counseling, coordination of care, etc, but not procedures, have lagged inflation. The effects of the RUC have been amplified by the unexplained tendency of commercial managed care and health insurance to track the RBRVS system when making their own payments to physicians.

For further details about the RUC, see these posts on Health Care Renewal (here, here, here, here, and here) and important articles by Bodenheimer et al,(1) and Goodson.(2) By the way, why the US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies de facto exclusively on the RUC to control the RBRVS system, and why the AMA made the RUC into a secret organization apparently beholden only to the organization's proceduralist members are unanswered questions.

The next month, Dr William L Rich III, and Dr Barbary Levy, the Chair and Chair-Elect of the RUC, wrote me a letter to "point out several blatant inaccuracies within your blog entry that severely misrepresent the nature and work of the AMA / Specialty Society RVS Update Committee (RUC)." They then asked me to "retract or correct the inaccurate statements within the aforementioned blog immediately." However, the letter did not specify the supposedly inaccurate statements within the blog post. So, my email response noted that "the letter contains no detail about the alleged 'inaccurate statements.' If you define them, we will certainly consider your views." I never got a reply to this message, therefore thinking the matter to be closed, and I saw at that time no reason to make the exchange public.

Apparently, the matter was not closed. A few days ago, two anonymous comments were appended to the post. They stated that my letter had appeared on the AMA web-site, here. So it is now public. The comments did not say, and I have so far not been able to find out when the letter was posted, and what its context is within the AMA web-site, including any indication that I had already replied to it in private.

Despite these irregularities, however, given that the AMA apparently has chosen to make the letter public, I believe I ought to respond publicly.

"Blatant Inaccuracies?"

Dr Rich and Dr Levy wrote:

We would like to take this opportunity to point out several blatant inaccuracies within your blog entry that severely misrepresent the nature and work of the AMA / Specialty Society RBRVS Update Committee (RUC). We request you retract or correct the inaccurate statements within the aforementioned blog immediately.

First, as I noted above, the letter never specified which of my statements the letter writers considered "blatant inaccuracies." If there are any specific statements of fact in the post above (or any other post I write) that can be shown to be inaccurate, I will correct or retract them. However, I do not believe the letter by Dr Rich and Dr Levy demonstrated any particular statements of mine to be blatantly inaccurate.

The Obscurity of the RUC Membership

The letter stated:

The RUC does not operate in the shadows.

One of my major criticisms of the RUC was that it is opaque. Before I wrote my first post on the RUC, I tried to determine its membership by searching the AMA web-site, easily available AMA publications, and the web. I could find lists of past members, but no current list. In addition, I asked RUC staff by email whether they could provide me the list, or an easy way to access it. They would or could not do so, and the highest ranking staffer I contacted wrote, "we do not give out the RUC members' contact information. We attempt to shield the RUC from lobbying by industry or others." Only after these inquiries did I dub the RUC membership "secret."

Dr Rich and Dr Levy suggested that it is not quite secret. It stated that "a list of the individual members of the RUC is published in the AMA publication, Medicare RBRVS 2009: The Physicians Guide." This publication is available from the AMA here for a mere $71.95. However, the book is not on the web, or in my local or university library, and I have no other way to easily access it.

Additionally, although the letter stated, "any individual may solicit AMA staff directly or a specialty society to learn the names of the members of the RUC," the letter was not accompanied by any communication from AMA staff containing this information.

Thus, to date, I still do not know who the members of the RUC are. If the letter authors had wanted to show that the membership of the RUC was not meant to be obscure, they could easily have sent me the list with their letter, appended a copy of the pages of the book which contained the list, or asked their staff to provide this information. They chose not to do so. So, while the RUC membership may not be exactly secret, it remains obscure, only barely public, and relatively inaccessible.

The Secrecy of RUC Proceedings

Furthermore, to support its contention that "the RUC does not operate in the shadows," the letter stated that

any individual may attend a RUC meeting upon: (1) the invitation of and notification by a relevant specialty society; (2) an express invitation by the chair of the RUC; or (3) the approval of a written request to attend; and a review of conflicts and potential conflicts of interest.

This does not mean that RUC meetings are open, or that their proceedings are public. Instead, as Goodson(2) noted, RUC "meetings are closed to outside observers except by invitation of the chair." Furthermore, he stated, "proceedings are proprietary and therefore not publicly available for review."

The letter also personally invited me to attend "the next meeting of the RUC, which will take place April 23-26, 2009 in Chicago." In retrospect, this invitation did not appear serious, since it was never repeated or expanded after my email reply to the March letter.

Nor did the invitation include any assurance that I could make anything about this meeting public. I had learned from a previous RUC attendee who will remain anonymous that attendees are obligated to sign non-disclosure agreements. Signing such an agreement might jeopardize my further ability to write anything of substance about the RUC. Furthermore, making all meeting attendees sign non-disclosure agreements effectively makes the meeting secret.

The RUC and Primary Care

Dr Rich and Dr Levy asserted that:

Your publication irrationally and unreasonably paints the RUC as the perpetrator of all physician payment policies that have negatively affected primary care.

Furthermore, they argued that the RUC has been good for primary care and cognitive practice:

The RUC has made several recommendations that positively benefit cognitive and non-procedural physician specialties.

My opinions about the RUC's influence on payments to physicians, and the decline of primary care and generalist and cognitive practice are hardly original. My previous posts were clearly based on evidence and discussion from references 1-4. Let me summarize these arguments, using direct quotes from these references, which perusal of the original articles would reveal are not taken out of context.

Primary and generalist practice is threatened by the current payment system.

From Bodenheimer et al(1):

Incomes of primary care physicians are well below those of many specialists, and the primary care–specialty income gap is widening.

... the lower income of primary care physicians is a major factor leading U.S. medical students to reject primary care careers.

Primary care practice is not viable without a substantial increase in the resources available to primary care physicians.

From Goodson(2):

Medicine's generalist base is disappearing as a consequence of the reimbursement system crafted to save it—the resource-based relative value scale.

Current reimbursement incentives substantially favor procedures and technical interventions and offer financial advantages for expensive care, thereby encouraging specialty services.

The continued and sustained incentives for medical graduates to choose higher-paying specialty careers and for those physicians in specialty careers to increase income through highly compensated professional activities have been associated with the dwindling of the generalist workforce. The lack of incentives for medical graduates to choose generalist careers in internal medicine, family medicine, and pediatrics has had a profound effect on the workforce mix and, ultimately, US health care expenditures.

The RUC has been the major influence on the physician payment system leading to these problems.

From Bodenheimer et al(1):

In summary, the RUC process favors increases in procedural and imaging reimbursement for 3 reasons: specialty society influence in proposing RVU increases, the specialist-heavy RUC membership, and the desire of RUC specialists to avoid increases in evaluation and management RVUs. With their ability to create new codes and influence RVU updates, many procedural specialists can influence fees in a way that observers find to substantially overvalue procedural and imaging services. Moreover, high fees may encourage physicians to increase the volume of profitable services, leading to even higher income gains and greater spending growth.

From Goodson(2):

The RUC has powerfully influenced CMS decision making and, as a result, is a powerful force in the US medical economy. Furthermore, by creating and maintaining incentives for more and more specialty care and by failing to accurately and continuously assess the practice expense RVUs, the decisions of CMS have fueled health care inflation. Doing so has affected the competitiveness of US corporations in the global market by contributing to years of double-digit health care inflation that have consistently increased the costs of manufacturing and business in the United States over the last decades.

The current mechanism fails to provide sufficient checks and balances and is skewed and dysfunctional.

The resource-based relative value scale system originally developed to achieve full value for cognitive services currently threatens the sustainability of the generalist base. As a result, a large portion of the population will lose access to the continuous and personalized care provided by generalist physicians whose repertoire of clinical skills and interventions coupled with access to specialty and diagnostic services are essential for ensuring efficient and effective health care delivery.

Dr Rich and Dr Levy are entitled to their opinions, but I would argue that there is considerable evidence and opinion suggesting that the current dysfunctional physician payment system is a major cause of the decline of primary care and cognitive practice, and simultaneous rise in health care costs and decline in health care access in the US. Furthermore, there is also considerable evidence and opinion suggesting that the RUC has singular responsbility for the dysfunctionality of the payment system and how it is skewed in favor of procedures as opposed to cognitive services and primary care.

Summarizing: the Opacity of the RUC, and its Negative Effects on Primary Care and Cognitive Services

So, I stand by my statement that the RUC process is opaque. Instead of saying "the identities of RUC members are secret, as are the proceedings of the group," I would be willing to now say, "the identities of the RUC members are obscure and difficult to ascertain, and the proceedings of the group are secret." That is not much of an improvement.

If the RUC leadership wants to make its membership transparent, all it needs to do is post it on the web. If it wishes to make its proceedings transparent, all it needs to do is publish them as well. If it makes such changes, I would happily and publicly applaud them.

If the RUC leadership wants to show that their members are not influenced by individual conflicts of interest, transparency about the committee's membership would inspire more trust than making the information as obscure as possible.

Furthermore, there may be more reason to be concerned about the effects of institutional rather than individual conflicts of interest on the RUC. Most RUC members appear to represent specialty societies. Rothman et al claimed that industry funding of professional medical societies is "pervasive."(5) If the RUC leadership wants to show that their committee as a whole is not affected by institutional conflicts of interest of its specialty societies, it ought at least to disclose the relationships of those societies and their leaders with companies that stand to profit from increasing utilization of the specific services whose use is influenced by the incentives which the RUC largely determines.

Finally, if there is a "wedge between cognitive and procedural specialties" it was driven a long time ago, particularly by a payment system that progressively favored the latter over the former, and by a bureaucratic burden that fell disproportionately on the former. But blaming the messenger is a time-honored, if not necessarily honorable tactic.

References

1. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. Link here.
2. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310. Link here.
3. Ginsburg PB, Berenson RA. Revising Medicare's physician fee schedule - much activity, little change. N Engl J Med 2007; 356: 1201-1203.
4. Newhouse JP. Medicare spending on physicians - no easy fix in sight. N Engl J Med 2007; 356: 1883-1884.
5. Rothman DJ, McDonald WJ, Berkowitz CD et al. Professional medical associations and their relationships with industry: a proposal for controlling conflict of interest. JAMA 2009; 301: 1367-1372. Link here.

11:35 AM

Was a Private Equity Takeover of Bausch and Lomb Meant to Conceal Its Legal Settlements of Cases of Eye Infections?

This week, the Associated Press reported on yet another way health care corporations may keep information that reflects poorly on their products out of public view. The story involved fungal eye infections that particularly afflicted users of a specific contact lens cleaning solution:

More than 700 lens wearers in the United States and Asia say they were exposed to a potentially blinding infection known as Fusarium keratitis while using ReNu with MoistureLoc, a new-formula multipurpose solution for cleaning, storing and moistening soft contact lenses.

Sometimes, the damage was irreparable. Seven people in Florida, Maryland, New York, Oregon, Tennessee and West Virginia had to have an eye removed. At least 60 more Americans needed vision-saving corneal transplants.

The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention confirmed 180 cases in 35 states from June 2005 through September 2006, when the agency's dedicated surveillance stopped, according to Dr. Benjamin Park, a CDC epidemiologist. CDC continued to hear of sporadic, unconfirmed cases in the months after MoistureLoc was withdrawn, Park said.

'Surveillance usually captures the tip of the iceberg and sometimes it captures a larger tip than other times,' Park said in an interview.

Among out-of-court settlements reached in May was a potential bellwether case brought by Andrea Martin, a Broadway actress and comedienne whose eye was scarred. In Colorado, a corneal transplant ended a race-car driver's career. In Baltimore, a chimney-sweep business owner who lost an eye got hooked on painkillers.

Leading eye doctors and government scientists concluded that MoistureLoc, launched in 2004 with novel disinfectant and moisturizing ingredients, was the only lens solution that contributed to the outbreak. Yet the mechanics of how it caused the problem are still not fully clear.

AP alleged that Bausch and Lomb kept the cases out of public view by using a previously unknown (at least to me) strategy:

Contact lens maker Bausch & Lomb Inc. had an overriding reason for going private in 2007: It wanted to handle a devastating recall of its flagship lens cleaner, its chief executive said, 'without a lot of outside distraction.'

Over the past year, away from the glare of public scrutiny, the optical products company has quietly settled nearly 600 fungal-infection lawsuits — with dozens more individual claims yet to be resolved. The cost so far: Upward of $250 million.

With some fungal lawsuits still unresolved, the prospect of Bausch & Lomb's health care nightmare being aired in court has not entirely faded — which heartens some lawyers and doctors.

'The truth has been very carefully buried, and it appears to have been buried going back to the beginnings of the outbreak,' said Dr. Arthur Epstein, who was chairman of the American Optometric Association's contact lens and cornea section during the highly publicized crisis.

'All settlements were predicated on silence about the clinical findings and blame and so forth. My hope was that what actually happened would become part of public record in a courtroom. That way, we'd be able to learn from it and move on and make sure it never happened again.'

When Bausch & Lomb was acquired by private equity firm Warburg Pincus for $3.67 billion in October 2007, Chief Executive Ronald Zarrella said the deal would allow the company 'to pursue the growth path we were on ... without a lot of outside distraction.'Zarrella retired last year.

'hey can do all this out of the public eye — guys like me aren't sitting there scrutinizing the financial impact of every single settlement,'said analyst Jeff Johnson of Robert W. Baird & Co. in Milwaukee. 'you can completely focus on your brand and on doing what's right by the patient.'

So, if I understand this correctly, after Warburg Pincus took the company private, it was no longer required to file certain reports with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), including reports that would have had to acknowledge the multiple settlements the company made of cases alleging adverse effects of its contact lens solution. What is striking is the allegation by the AP that "taking the company" private was a strategy meant to conceal the settlements of these cases, (rather than a strategy implemented to fulfill other aims, which had the side effect of diminishing reporting of these cases' results.)

Again, I am hardly an expert, but relatively opaque private equity firms like Warburg Pincus seem to have become increasingly influential in the US economy, and to have an increasing role in health care. In 2007, we had posted how private equity firms running nursing homes, including Warburg Pincus, seemed to contribute to the opacity of their operations. More recently, we posted about how leaders of private equity, and of other kinds of firms in the finance arena, seem to also increasingly be leaders to which medical schools report.

One final note... A quick tour through the Warburg Pincus website reveals how involved the firm is in health care. The firm claimed that as a "direct equity investor in healthcare for more than 30 years, Warburg Pincus has invested more than $4 billion in approximately 120 healthcare companies." Furthermore, the firm seems quite intertwined with the leadership of academic medicine. It has a Life Sciences Advisory Board, of which three of four members are current leaders in academic medicine. The most prominent, Dr Michael Rosenblatt, Dean of the Tufts University School of Medicine, did not disclose this relationship in several versions of his biography published on the university web-site. (See the Tufts administration version here, and the Tufts Medical Center version here.)

Oh, what a tangled web we have weaved in health care, a web that continually frustrates transparency and makes it hard to figure out who was responsible for what when things go wrong.

8:29 AM