Academic Medical Leaders as Directors of For-Profit Health Care Corporations: the Prevalence of This "New Species" of Conflict of Interest Documented in the BMJ

The important conflicts of interest generated when academic health care leaders also serve on the boards of directors of for-profit health care corporations is suddenly less anechoic, thanks to some intrepid researchers and the British Journal of Medicine.

Background: Academic Health Care Leaders Also Serving as Directors of For-Profit Health Care Corporations

First Discovered Cases

In 2006, we first noticed that leaders of academic medicine also were serving as board members of large for-profit health care corporations.  The first example we discussed was that of Marye Anne Fox, Chancellor (equivalent to president) of the University of California - San Diego, and hence the person to whom the University of California, San Diego School of Medicine and its academic medical center report. The conflict was between this position, and her service as a member of the board of directors of Boston Scientific, a medical device manufacture, and the board of directors of Pharmaceutical Product Development Inc., a contract research organization.

Later that year, we discussed a "new species of conflict of interest."  At that time we wrote:

Medical schools and their academic medical centers and teaching hospitals must deal with all sorts of health care companies, drug and device manufacturers, information technology venders, managed care organizations and health insurers, etc, in the course of fulfilling their patient care, teaching, and research missions. Thus, it seems that service on the board of directors of a such public for-profit health care company would generate a severe conflict for an academic health care leader, because such service entails a fiduciary duty to uphold the interests of the company and its stockholders. Such a duty ought on its face to have a much more important effect on thinking and decision making than receiving a gift, or even being paid for research or consulting services. Furthermore, the financial rewards for service on a company board, which usually include directors' fees and stock options, are comparable to the most highly paid consulting positions. What supports the interests of the company, however, may not always be good for the medical school, academic medical center or teaching hospital.

Since 2006, we continued to find colorful examples of such conflicts of interest, e.g.,

- In 2006, the UnitedHealth board included multiple academic leaders, at least one of whom seemed partly responsible as a member of the board compensation committee for allowing the then UnitedHealth CEO to collect many backdated stock options (look here)
- In 2009, some attributed the problems at George Washington University's medical school that caused it to be put on probation to the conflict of interest of its provost and vice president for health affairs,  who also sat on the board of Universal Health Services, which owned the university hospital (look here)...

Through more recent years,

- In 2014, members of the AMA committee that has an outsize role in how the government fixes the pay of US doctors wer also found to be members of boards of directors of such companies as Kindred Healthcare, Hanger Inc, and Sante. (Look here.)
- In 2015, the academic physician and research unit leader nominated to be the new head of the US Food and Drug was a director of Portola Pharmaceuticals (look here)...

Look here for even more

Our Early Cross-Sectional Study

In 2007, we did a somewhat rough and ready research project based on 2005 data to determine the prevalence of such conflicts.  The results were presented in abstract form,(1) but not published as an article:

In 2005, there were 164 US health care companies in the 2005 S&P 1500, and 125 US medical schools. We identified 198 people who served on the companies' boards of directors who had faculty or leadership positions at these medical schools. Of the 125 medical schools, 65 schools had at least one faculty member and/or leader who also served on a health care corporation's board of directors. 15 schools had more than five, and 4 had more than 10 such individuals. Of the 125 schools, 7 reported to university presidents who were also directors of health care corporations, and 11 schools reported to vice-presidents for health affairs who were also such corporate directors. Four schools were lead by deans who were also health care corporate directors, and 10 schools had academic medical center CEOs who were such directors. 22 schools had at least one top leader who was also a director of a health care corporation. 36 schools reported to university boards of trustees which each included at least one director of a health care corporation, and 12 schools' own boards of trustees included at least one such director.

We concluded:

more than one-half of US medical schools had a leader or faculty member who also was a director of a major US for-profit publicly traded Bpure^ health care corporation, more than one-sixth of schools had a top leader who was also such a director, and more than one-fifth reported to boards of trustees which included such directors.

More Modern and Complete Data

Unfortunately, we never wrote a full paper about this work, although the likelihood we could have gotten it published around 2007 was very small.  It is fortunate that Anderson and colleagues did a more complete and current version of this project, which was published online this week by the British Medical Journal.(2)

Methods

Their methodology was similar to our earlier work, but more sophisticated.  They obtained data on the 2013 board members of 446 public for-profit US companies listed on New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ and classified as in the healthcare sector, including pharmaceutical, biotechnology, medical equipment and supply companies and health care providers from the companies' 2014 proxy statements.

Results

Their results were striking, suggesting even a greater prevalence of conflicted academic leaders than our preliminary results suggested

Directors were affiliated with 85 geographically diverse non-profit academic institutions, including 19 of the top 20 National Institute of Health funded medical schools and all of the 17 US News honor roll hospitals. Overall, these 279 academically affiliated directors included 73 leaders, 121 professors, and 85 trustees. Leaders included 17 chief executive officers and 11 vice presidents or executive officers of health systems and hospitals; 15 university presidents, provosts, and chancellors; and eight medical school deans or presidents.

The new study also described the direct financial relationships among the academic leaders, professors and trustees and the corporations on whose boards they served.

The total annual compensation to academically affiliated directors for their services to companies was $54 995 786 (£35 836 000; €49 185 900) (median individual compensation $193 000) and directors beneficially owned 59 831 477 shares of company stock (median 50 699 shares).

Discussion

As we have suggested, Anderson et al stated that being on the board of directors of a for-profit health care corporation creates conflicts of interest beyond those created by simply having a financial relationship with a health care company, e.g., by participating in a commercially sponsored research project or acting as a consultant to a company.

Similar to individuals engaging in consulting relationships, directors on industry boards enter a formal contract with the company and receive financial payment for services; however, they are subject to two important differences. Firstly, unlike consultants who are compensated to provide expertise on a specific issue, directors are subject to a fiduciary responsibility to company shareholders to advance the general interests of the company and increase profits. Secondly, directors are reimbursed both through larger cash fees than typical consulting contracts and through stock options, the value of which is directly tied to the financial success of the company.

They also added the reminder that,

Though the missions of academia and for profit companies can overlap, they may also diverge, specifically when the for profit mission of industry competes with the non-profit taxpayer funded clinical and research missions of academic medical and research institutions.

So,

previous guidelines have emphasized the relationships of clinicians and researchers with industry, but institutional conflicts of interest, which arise when administrators, including executive officers, trustees, and clinical leaders have a financial relationship with industry, are increasingly recognized and pose a unique set of risks to academic missions. 

Our Summary

We have written again and again on the problem of conflicts of interest affecting health care professionals, academics, and policy makers.  The worst such conflicts may occur when individuals are simultaneously leaders of large mission-oriented health care non-profit organizations, such as teaching hospitals, medical schools, or research institutes, and board members of for-profit health care corporations.  Despite our attempts to raise such issues as important, and probably important causes of health care dysfunction, they have remained anechoic.

Now a broadly based study of this no longer so "new species" of conflict of interest has appeared in one of the biggest and most prestigious medical journals.  Let us hope it will bring this issue to the forefront, and also partially counter those who have been preaching that concerns about conflicts of interest in health care are overblown.

As we have said again and again, the web of conflicts of interest that is pervasive in medicine and health care is now threatening to strangle medicine and health care.  Furthermore, this web is now strong enough to have effectively transformed US health care into an oligarchy or plutocracy.  Health care is effectively run by a relatively small group of people, mainly professional managers plus a few (lapsed?) health care professionals, who simultaneously run or influence multiple corporations and organizations.

For patients and the public to trust health care professionals and health care organizations, they need to know that these individuals and organizations are putting patients' and the public's health ahead of private gain. Health care professionals who care for patients, those who teach about medicine and health care, clinical researchers, and those who make medical and health care policy should do so free from conflicts of interest that might inhibit their abilities to put patients and the public's health first.

Health care professionals ought to make it their highest priority to ensure that the organizations for which they work, or with which they interact also put patients' and the public's health ahead of private gain, especially the private gain of the organizations' leaders and their cronies.

ADDENDUM (16 November, 2015) - Note that an abbreviated version of this post has appeared as an electronic "rapid response" to the article by Anderson et al (link here), although the published form has on it our original submission date.   

References

1. Poses RM, Smith WR, Crausman R, Maulitz R. Selling them the rope: prevalence of for-profit health care corporate dirctors among academic medical leaders. J Gen Intern Med 2007; 22 (Suppl 1): 98.
2.  Anderson TS, Good CB, Gellad WF.  Prevalence and compensation of academic leaders, professors and trustees on publicly trade US healthcare company boards of directors: cross sectional study.  Brit Med J 2015; 351:h4826.  Link here. 

12:39 PM

You Can Check Out Any Time You Like, But You Can Never Leave - Duke and UNC Allegedly Agreed Not to Hire Each Other's Faculty

We have intermittently discussed the worsening plight of physicians trying to provide clinical care as employees of large organizations.  Such corporate physicians are likely to be squeezed between professional values that put the patient first, and management that puts revenue first.   Physicians employed by large corporations may find their values increasingly at risk as these organizations adapt the tactics of the robber barons.

Now it appears that even ostensibly genteel academic medical institutions may be adapting these tactics.

Allegations of Anti-Competitive Faculty Employment Practices at Duke and University of North Carolina Medical Schools


The story first appeared with little fanfare in the (Duke) Chronicle in June.  An assistant professor at the UNC School of Medicine was interested in a position, also at the assistant professor level, at nearby Duke.

[Dr Danielle] Seaman had been in email communication with UNC’s Chief of Cardiothoracic Imaging beginning in 2011, when she expressed interest in a radiology position at the UNC School of Medicine, and the chief of the division encouraged her to apply, the case file describes. In 2012, Seaman was invited to visit the campus and toured the radiology department at UNC.

However,

When Seaman expressed interest in the assistant professor position again in early 2015, however, the chief responded in an email by saying he had just received confirmation that 'lateral moves of faculty between Duke and UNC are not permitted' as per a 'guideline' set by the schools’ deans.

In a later email, the chief also described to Seaman the reason the agreement was created—Duke had tried several years ago to recruit the entire bone marrow transplant team from UNC, and UNC was forced to pay them a large retention package to keep them.

Both emails are included in the filing by Dr Seaman's lawyers.


Imagine the nerve of medical faculty thinking they should be paid more by the current employer because another institution was willling to recruit them and pay them that much.
 
An Agreement Comfortable for the Deans, but Disadvantageous for Their Faculty

An August article in the Chronicle suggested that the top leaders of the two medical schools felt that the "no-poaching" agreement was mutually beneficial. 

According to the case file, Seaman became aware of the policy earlier this year, but the UNC chief of cardiothoracic imaging—who is unnamed in the file—believed the policy had been in place for several years after Duke had previously tried to recruit the entire bone marrow transplant team from UNC.

'The general rule was that we didn’t recruit there and they didn’t recruit at Duke—it certainly was in the years I was in the administration,' said John Burness, former senior vice president for public affairs and government relations from 1991 to 2008. 'I don’t know if it’s ever been a formal agreement, but it’s certainly been a practice over a long period of time.'

Burness—now a visiting professor of the practice in the Sanford School of Public Policy—noted that he could not recall an instance in which a faculty member from UNC was recruited to Duke during Nannerl Keohane’s tenure as president of the University from 1993 to 2004. Keohane also confirmed that during her time as president the University avoided poaching of UNC faculty.

Also,

'The question of whether Duke and UNC [or N.C. State] should attempt to recruit faculty from the other campus was always somewhat delicate,' Keohane, now Laurance S. Rockefeller distinguished visiting professor of public affairs at Princeton University, wrote in an email.

The Chronicle found a Duke Law professor who provided a comfortable rationale for the agreement between the two schools,

Despite the case file’s claims that such a policy is detrimental to faculty from both schools, Clark Havighurst—a former professor in the Duke University School of Law who taught healthcare policy and antitrust law for more than 40 years—also believes that this agreement would be beneficial to both institutions in the long run.

'You’d probably find relatively few instances where Duke and Carolina have poached each other’s faculty,' Havighurst wrote in an email. 'This is probably a matter of mutual restraint as much as explicit agreement, however, as each school or department would hesitate to irritate the faculty at the neighboring institution, thus undermining collegial and personal relations that are undoubtedly beneficial to each.'


What the soothing words about mutual benefit and collegiality leave out is that while the school administrations benefit from less disruption, they also likely benefited by being able to pay their faculty, especially junior faculty less. As Dr Seaman argued in her filing, as per the June Chronicle article,

The suit—filed June 9 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina—contends that the no-hire agreement had the “intended and actual effect” of suppressing competition and employee wages, therefore violating federal and state anti-trust laws.

An Aside, the Non-Poaching Agreement Defended by One of the Key Advocates for Market Fundamentalism in Medicine

As an aside, Professor Havinghurst turns out to be one of key architects of the transformation of the US health care from a regulated system emphasizing health care provided by individual professionals and small non-profit institutions to our current laissez faire commercialized system.  It is more than ironic that while Prof Havinghurst now scoffs at applying anti-trust law to alleged collusion by big employers, per M Gregg Bloche in the Stanford Law Review(1),

Since the mid- 1970s, market-oriented scholars have challenged a broad range of legal principles previously assumed to sustain the trustworthiness of physicians and health systems. Doctrines shielding physicians from antitrust law, insulating them from insurers' and hospitals' influence over clinical practice, and reinforcing the precept of undivided clinical loyalty to patients came under attack as protection for the medical profession at consumers' expense. These scholars, including Clark Havighurst, Richard Epstein, and Mark Hall, urge contractual ordering of clinical standards of care; relationships among physicians, hospitals, and health care payers; and physicians' conflicting obligations to patients, payers, and other third parties.

Again, Havinghurst appears to have been one of the principal, if not the principal advocate to use anti-trust law against small groups of physicians, and against the notion that physicians can promulgate their own codes of ethical conduct.  In an introduction to an article by Havinghurst in Health Affairs in 1983.(2)

For a decade or more, Clark Havighurst has been a philosophical thorn in the side of organized medicine, preaching a view of the health sphere that rejects decision making by professional self-regulation in favor of a system based on marketplace principles.

Note that in retrospect, this article seemed to stake out Health Affair's position as an important organ to promote market fundamentalism in health care. 

How convenient that Prof Havinghurst is still affiliated with Duke and in a position to defend his university's treatment of other faculty.


I urge you to scan Health Care Renewal to see how the change from professional self-regulation of ethics to the free rein of the laissez faire marketplace turned out. Look here for our first reporting on the late Dr Arnold Relman's discussion of how medicine was pressured to accept commercialization, and how that acceptance has since decimated our core values.  Look here for our discussion of the fallacy of the perfect market in health care.  Look here for a rebuttal from an authority we do  not often quote of the concept of health care as a commodity versus a calling. 

Summary

Note that the outcome of the lawsuit against Duke and UNC is unknown.  The allegations it makes are not proven.  However, I chose to discuss it because the evidence, particularly the emails reproduced in the court filing, seems pretty strong that the two schools did have an actual agreement not to compete in the hiring of faculty, and the argument that his suppressed faculty wages and opportunity is prety strong and obvious.

Academic physicians, particularly at elite institutions, may feel they are in a rarefied atmosphere separate from the hurley burley or everyday health care.  They may feel they are protected from, and can even ignore the health care dysfunction we discuss on Health Care Renewal.  They certainly may not think of themselves as "wage slaves" from the era of trusts, monopolies, and robber barons.

But this case exhibits that academic medical institutions are getting closer to the ruthless world of poorly regulated, commercialized, market fundamentalist health care.  Talk about collegiality is nice, but it seems pretty clear that the "non-poaching" agreement between Duke and UNC may have reflected collegiality among top medical school leadership, but limited their faculty salaries and individual faculty members' choices and opportunities.  This seems like another example, however soft spoken and genteel, of the leaders of health care organizations putting the interests of their own ingroup ahead of the interests of the larger organizations and the mission they are supposed to serve.

It is time for even academic physicians to realize that they are not protected from the troubles of the larger world.  If they truly believe in their professional values, if they really care about patients' and the public's health, and about medical and health care science and education, they will have to start speaking up, or they will end up wage slaves of the new health care robber barons along with nearly everyone else.   

To lighten things up at the end, the Eagles doing Hotel California live in 1977 -



"We are all prisoners here, of our own device"

References
1.  Bloche MG. Trust and betrayal in the medical marketplace.  Stanford Law Review 2002; 55: 919-954.  Link here.
2.  Havinghurst C. The doctors' trust.  self-regulation and the law.  Health Affairs 1983; 2: 64-76.  Link here.

12:11 PM

The Medical School as Hereditary Plutocracy - Retiring Board Chair Sanford Weill of Cornell Weill Medical School Names His Own Daughter as New Chair

As I have written before, sometimes you just could not have made this stuff up.

The Retiring Board Chairman Appoints His Own Daughter to Succeed Him

The most even handed reporting on this story was in Inside Higher Ed,

Leadership of the board that oversees Cornell University’s medical college is passing from father to daughter, an unusual transition of power for a higher education board.

Weill Cornell Medical College’s Board of Overseers has been chaired for the past two decades by its namesake and major donor, Sandy Weill, the former CEO of Citigroup.

His daughter, Jessica Bibliowicz, is now set to take over Weill's role. She is the founder and former CEO of a major insurance brokerage, and has also been on the board for a decade.

Let me just dissect this a bit.  Weill Cornell Medical College is a large, prestigious medical school located in New York City, and part of Cornell University.  The chair of its Board of Overseers for the last two decades as been one Sanford I Weill.  Mr Weill is a famous finance executive, formerly CEO of Citigroup from 1998 - 2003, remained chairman of the board of Citigroup through 2006, and is now chairman emeritus (look here). 

According to a Cornell press release, the new chairperson, ms Jessica Bibliowicz, is a

Cornell University graduate in 1981 and after working 18 years in financial services, Ms. Bibliowicz became CEO of National Financial Partners in 1999, a financial services firm that specializes in benefits and wealth management. The company went public in 2003 and was sold to Madison Dearborn in 2013.

 Currently,

Ms. Bibliowicz is a senior advisor at Bridge Growth Partners and serves on the board of directors of Sotheby's(NYSE: BID); Realogy (NYSE: RLGY); and the Asia Pacific Fund (NYSE: APB). She is a board director/trustee of Prudential Insurance Funds....

The Inside Higher Ed article noted that

In a statement, Cornell said, Weill Cornell Medical College engaged in a comprehensive process to select its chair of the Board of Overseers by canvassing multiple members of the board in full consultation with senior leadership. The search was headed by a group of senior trustee overseers with extensive knowledge of the institution and Weill Cornell firmly believes it has selected the best choice as chair.'

The New York Times reporting of the succession, oddly in the Dealbook blog, which is focused on finance and Wall Street, not medicine, made it seem, however, that Mr Weill handpicked his daughter to succeed him,

he increasingly felt that the time was nearing to appoint a successor.

'I felt like it was a good time for younger blood,' he said.

Ultimately, he decided upon his daughter,

The Cornell press release lauded Mr Weill, the retiring chair as providing "bold and visionary leadership," having "enduring dedication," exemplifying "benevolence and unwavering resolve to ensure a healthier future," etc, etc.  It called him a "self-made man who exemplifies the philosophy of leading by example."  It quoted the current dean of the medical school, Dr Laurie Glimcher, (whose apparent conflict of interest as a board member of Bristol-Myers-Squibb we discussed here and here) calling his accomplishments "breathtaking."  It quoted the university president, David Skorton, calling him again a "visionary."

In the Dealbook article, Dr Glimcher further praised the chairperson designate, Ms Bibliowicz, as "a person of enormous energy and passion," who will "bring her energy, her connections and her passion for medicine and medical research and education to the role."


The Inside Higher Ed article noted some vague questions about the position of chair of the board of trustees of an important medical school being passed from father to daughter,

'On the other side of the coin, within-family succession planning adds complexity to the issue -- it just raises certain questions,' [former vice president for programs and research at the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges Peter] Eckel said.

However, Mr Eckel did not really list these questions.

Later, the article referred to "nepotistic arrangements," presumably in part referring to this father - daughter transition, but then found someone to defend them. 

The Real Questions

Weill Cornell Medical College is part of a non-profit organization.  Nonprofit organizations have no owners. Non-profit organizations are formed to support particular missions, under the stewardship of boards of trustees (or directors or overseers).  These boards have three basic duties [italics added]

 Duty of care: Board members are expected to actively participate in organizational planning and decision-making and to make sound and informed judgments.
Duty of loyalty: When acting on behalf of the organization, board members must put the interests of the nonprofit before any personal or professional concerns and avoid potential conflicts of interest.
Duty of obedience: Board members must ensure that the organization complies with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations, and that it remains committed to its established mission.

Thus, the transfer of the position of chair of the board from parent to offspring, apparently directly under the control of the parent, is questionable on its face, suggesting that family interests came before the "interests of the nonprofit."  Such transfers may commonly occur on the boards of privately family held for-profit companies, but are basically unheard of for medical schools or other large academic medical nonprofit organizations, where they certainly could appear nepotistic.

That concern is amplified when neither parent or child have any appreciable background or training in the work of the nonprofit.  Neither Mr Weill nor Ms Bibliowicz seem to have any training or background in health care, biomedical research, or specifically medicine.  Yet Weill Cornell Medical School's basic mission is to train students to be physicians.  So how well either or their personal judgments about the policy and operations of a medical school are "informed" is not exactly clear.  

Further concerns are raised by the background of the father in this father daughter transaction, the part of the background that was entirely ignored by the rather fawning public discussion of the transaction in the Cornell press release, and also the NY Times Dealbook article.

In fact, Mr Weill's leadership in the past was of Citigroup during the lead up to the global financial collapse of 2008.  Citigroup, the poster child for the too big to fail bank, nearly went bankrupt, and required a huge government bailout.  Its near collapse, again apparently only prevented by government action, is widely considered to have been a major cause of the finance disaster starting in 2008.  As we noted in a 2009 blog post about Weill Cornell,   The Sellout, by Charles Gasparino, featured vivid portraits of the bad leadership that lead to the collapse, including specifically Mr Weill,

But in reality, Will never really ran anything. He was a visionary, to be sure, but one whose vision was so myopically focused on building the empire had lusted for for so long and on its share price that he ignored just about everything else. (p. 144)

Furthermore, this was Mr Weill's listing in the "key people" section of the book,

Former CEO and chairman of Citigroup, Weill created the idea of the one-stop-shopping mega-financial conglomerate, engineering a series of mergers ... and in the process created the world's largest financial company.  Famously obsessed with his firm's stock price, Weill announced his resignation in 2003 after investigators discovered he'd pressured a stock analyst, Jack Grubman, to raise his rating on AT&T, where Weill was on the board, in return for ensuring that Grubman's children got into an exclusive preschool.

Furthermore, in the Time magazine series on the "25 People to Blame for the Financial Crisis," Mr Weill is listed as  "blameworthy" because,

Who decided banks had to be all things to all customers? Weill did. Starting with a low-end lender in Baltimore, he cobbled together the first great financial supermarket, Citigroup. Along the way, Weill's acquisitions (Smith Barney, Travelers, etc.) and persistent lobbying shattered Glass-Steagall, the law that limited the investing risks banks could take. Rivals followed Citi. The swollen banks are now one of the country's major economic problems. Every major financial firm seems too big to fail, leading the government to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to keep them afloat. The biggest problem bank is Weill's Citigroup. The government has already spent $45 billion trying to fix it. 

In a post on the Baseline Scenario blog, Simon Johnson, author of another authoritative book on the financial crisis, 13 Bankers, wrote this about Citigroup leadership,

Citigroup is a very large bank that has amassed a huge amount of political power. Its current and former executives consistently push laws and regulations in the direction of allowing Citi and other megabanks to take on more risk, particularly in the form of complex highly leveraged bets. Taking these risks allows the executives and traders to get a lot of upside compensation in the form of bonuses when things go well – while the downside losses, when they materialize, become the taxpayer’s problem.

Citigroup is also, collectively, stupid on a grand scale. The supposedly smart people at the helm of Citi in the mid-2000s ran them hard around – and to the edge of bankruptcy. A series of unprecedented massive government bailouts was required in 2000-09 – and still the collateral damage to the economy has proved enormous. Give enough clever people the wrong incentives and they will destroy anything.

Physicians are supposedly rigorously trained, and tasked with upholding important ethical principles.   So did it make sense to entrust the stewardship of a premier American medical school to the man who engineered the expansion of Citigroup that turned out to be "stupid on a grand scale," in order to "get a lot of upside compensation," while leaving the "downside losses" to become "the taxpayer's problem," so that the "collateral damage to the economy has proved enormous?"   Does it make sense to allow him to choose his own daughter, who has no more medical experience than he did (which was zero), to steward the school in the future?

I wonder what Cornell medical students, or physician alumni would say, if they felt safe enough to answer the question?

As we wrote in 2009,  boards of trustees of not-for-profit health care institutions have a primary duty to uphold the institutions' missions.  Thus, one would think such boards would be selected according to their dedication to their missions.  But perhaps, in the grubby real world, there may be more important criteria, possibly such as the size of their donations to the institution.  Furthermore, those likely to donate the most  may be more likely to be richest (and perhaps most in need to making themselves appear philanthropic and public-spirited) than the most fervent upholders of patient care, teaching and research.

Maybe giving stewardship of our once proud health care institutuions to people most likely to defend their missions, rather than most likely to donate a lot of money, would result in somewhat poorer institutions which do a better job of patient care, teaching and research.

You heard it here first.  
 

1:08 PM

Health Care Academics' Unrest and Bad Health Care Leadership?

Last month we discussed a recent, large scale study of physician burnout, and wondered whether it would finally inspire some discourse about why physicians are really so upset.  In particular, we hypothesized,  based on some real, if limited data, that physician angst, dissatisfaction, burnout, etc may mainly be a response to the problems with leadership and governance of health care organization we post about on Health Care Renewal.

After that post, one of our scouts found a very interesting and relevant article from earlier this year which got little attention at the time, but deserves more.  [Pololi LH, Krupat E, Civian JT, Ash AS, Brennan RT. Why are a quarter of faculty considering leaving academic medicine? A study of their perceptions of institutional culture and intentions to leave at 26 representative U.S. medical schools. Acad Med. 2012; 87: 859-69. Link here.]

Study Design

This was a cross-sectional survey of faculty at 26 medical schools in the US, selected to be similar to the general population of medical schools in the country.  At each school, 150 faculty were randomly chosen stratified by sex and age, and then the sample was enriched to include additional minority faculty and women surgeons, for a total of 4578.

The faculty were sent a multi item survey to assess their perception of the organizational culture of their institutions, and asked about their intentions to continue in or leave their current positions and academic medicine.  Responses to each survey item were allowed to be from 1 = strongly disagree, to 5 = strongly agree.  The items on the survey were combined into various scales.  A number of items on the survey seemed to be related to issues we frequently discuss on Health Care Renewal.  These items ended up in three different scales, entitled Relatedness/Inclusion, Values Alignment, and Ethical/Moral Distress.  The survey items are listed below, grouped by issue, with the scales into which they were combined noted.

Issue: Mission-Hostile Leadership

Administration only interested in me for revenue   (Reverse coded) (Values Alignment)
Institution committed to serving the public (VA)
Institution's actions well-aligned with stated values and mission (VA)
Institution puts own needs ahead of educational/clinical missions (RC) (VA)
My values well-aligned with school's (VA)
Institution awards excellence in clinical care (VA)
Institution does not value teaching (RC) (VA)
Have to compromise values to work here (Ethical/Moral Distress)

Issue: Deceptive, Unethical Leadership

Felt pressure to behave unethically (Ethical/Moral Distress)
Need to be deceitful in order to succeed (EMD)
Others have taken credit for my work (EMD)

Issue: Generation of the Anechoic Effect by  Suppression of Free Speech, Academic Freedom, Dissent, Whistle-Blowing,

Feel ignored/ invisible (RC) (Relatedness/Inclusion)
Hide what I think and feel (RC) (R/I)
Reluctant to express opinion/ fear negative consequences (RC) (R/I)

So in summary, the survey contained quite a few questions about mission-hostile management, comprising nearly all of the Values Alignment scale, some questions about deceptive or unethical leadership, all in the Ethical/Moral Distress scale, and some about generation of the anechoic effect by suppression of free speech, academic freedom, dissent, and whistle-blowing, all in the Relatedness/Inclusion scale.

Results

The response rate was 52% (N=2381.)

Unfortunately, the article did not include the distributions of the responses to individual survey items, and only included the mean and standard error of the scale scores.  The values for the scales of most interest were:
Relatedness/Inclusion  3.56 SE= 0.022
Values Alignment  3.25 SE=0.028
Ethical/Moral Distress 2.36 SE=0.022

Note that the article did not address the degree individual items, especially those listed above, contributed to variation in the scale scores.


A small majority of faculty indicated their intentions to stay at their institutions (57%).  Of the remainder, 14% were considering leaving their school due to dissatisfaction, and another 21% were considering leaving academic medicine due to dissatisfaction.  The remainder were considering leaving due to personal/ family reasons or to retire.

The authors did complex multinomial logit modeling to assess the relationships among the various scales, demographic factors, and intention to leave.  Most relevant to us, Relatedness/Inclusion was significantly related to intention to leave the institution due to dissatisfaction (Coefficient -0.69, p lt 0.001, OR =0.50), as was Values Alignment (-0.39, p=0.04, OR=0.68), but not Ethical/ Moral Distress.  Furthermore, Relatedness/Inclusion was related to intention to leave academic medicine due to dissatisfaction (-0.48, p lt 0.001, 0.62), as was Ethical/Moral Distress (0.60, p lt 0.001, OR =1.82). The article did not address whether individual survey items, including those of most interest listed above, were related to intention to leave.  The article also did not address whether responses to the survey or intention to leave varied across faculty characteristics, medical school characteristics, or individual medical schools. 

Summary and Comments

This very large survey of faculty from multiple US medical schools showed that more than one-third were considering leaving their institutions or academic medicine due to dissatisfaction, indicating a striking prevalence of faculty distress.  Their responses to questions about perceived organizational cultural and leadership problems, including those possibly related to leadership's perceived hostility to the mission, leadership's perceived dishonesty or unethical behavior, and leadership's suppression of dissent, free speech, academic freedom, and whistle-blowing were related to their intentions to leave due to dissatisfaction.

These results suggest the hypothesis that much of faculty angst may be due to the sorts of problems with leadership and hence organizational culture that we discuss on Health Care Renewal.  Since this was a cross-sectional survey, it certainly does not offer scientific proof of this hypothesis.  Note that there is other evidence from numerous cases discussed in Health Care Renewal, qualitative studies and our much smaller study published only in abstract form that also supports this hypothesis (look here). 

One part of the author's discussion of their findings was particularly relevant:

Our findings are congruent with metaanalyses of 25 years of organizational justice research outside medicine. These studies suggest that employee perceptions of organizational justice and an ethical climate are related to increased job satisfaction, trust in leadership, enhanced performance, commitment to one’s employer, and reduced turnover.

 The scale of ethical/moral distress (see Table 1) reflects reactions to the prevailing norms and possible erosion of professionalism and increased organizational self-interest. There is a growing belief that organizations influence and are responsible for the ethical or unethical behaviors of their employees.To our knowledge, faculty perceptions of 'moral atmosphere' and 'just community' embedded in our survey have not been previously investigated in academic medicine, even though the ethical concepts of professionalism and justice can be used to guide the pursuit of excellence in the missions of medical schools. Several scholars have called for academic medicine to attend to its social justice and moral mission. Faculty perceptions
of organizational justice are pivotal to the critical issue of professionalism in medicine. The ethical/moral distress scale in the survey reported here included items such as 'the culture of my institution discourages altruism' and 'I find working here to be dehumanizing.' (See Table 1 for other items in this scale.) In that ethical/moral distress was more strongly related to intent to leave academic medicine entirely than intent to leave one’s own institution, these negative feelings among faculty must be particularly disheartening to them and may color major career decisions.

I believe that the study by Pololi et al adds to the evidence that physician distress is a symptom of a dysfunctional system in which major health care organizations have been taken over by leaders more devoted to self-interest and short-term revenue than the values prized by health care professionals and academics.  This applies obviously to academic medical institutions, but also to other organizations that might have been expected to defend such professional and academic values, such as professional associations, accrediting organizations, and health care foundations.  As we said before, if physicians really want to address what is making them burned out and dissatisfied, they will have to regain control of their own societies, organizations, and academic institutions, and ensure that these organizations put core values, not revenue generation and providing  cushy compensation to their executives, first.  

12:34 PM

Some Conflicts Grow in Brooklyn

From the New York Daily News, here is a new twist on the conflicts of interest story. This is about two leaders of Wyckoff Medical Center in my hometown of Brooklyn, NY, the hospital's chief of surgery, Dr Addagada Rao, and its CEO, Rajiv Garg.

It turns out that Dr Rao has another position, this one far away at Spartan Health Sciences University, a medical school located on the Caribbean island of St Lucia:

The $400,000-a-year chief of surgery at Brooklyn's Wyckoff Heights Medical Center heads a Caribbean medical school that hopes will funnel medical students - and their money - back to New York, the Daily News has learned.

The surgeon, Dr. Addagada Rao, is the president of Spartan Health Sciences University in sunny St. Lucia. Last year he became one of a handful of owners in hopes of bringing third- and fourth-year medical students to Wyckoff to train - and to aid its ailing coffers.

'My association with Spartan is to fulfill my lifelong goal to educate all who are able and willing to pursue a career in medicine...' Rao is quoted on the medical school's Web site.

Mr Garg also has a role at Spartan,

Garg, 49, has been Wyckoff's $500,000-per-year CEO since November and is also an investor in Spartan. He told The News he stepped down as Spartan's chief operating officer after he got the top job at Wyckoff.

Meanwhile, the Daily News alleged:

Rao, 67, is in a position to make hundreds of thousands of dollars from the dual relationships.

The ability to train in New York is a big draw for offshore medical schools - especially if the school has an established connection with a hospital, experts said.

The state has approved Spartan students to do only 12-week stints in New York hospitals. Students pay between $4,000 and $5,000 for the training.

Wyckoff - and Rao - could make far more money if the state okays a pending request for Spartan students to do their full two years training at New York hospitals.

Dr Rao was asked about these relationships, and responded,

he saw nothing wrong with having outside financial interests.

'I disclosed this to the hospital,' he said, but declined to offer further details.

Asked if the hospital's board of trustees, of which Rao and Garg are members, approved the arrangement, he said: 'That was not necessary.'

It is still a little hard for me to understand how someone could be chief of surgery at a NY hospital and simultaneously the president of a Caribbean medical school, but setting that aside...

This story illustrates another twist on conflicts of interest affecting the leaders of not-for-profit health care organizations. Many of the smaller not-for-profit hospitals, of which there are thousands in the US, may have minimal conflict of interest policies, which may be minimally enforced, without much transparency or accountability. The coziness of the leadership culture of such smaller institutions may preclude anyone within the culture from asking tough questions. The results may be total confusion as to whose interests particular leaders are serving. In particular, the interests of each hospital's patients may get lost in the shuffle. In this case, the interests of medical students may also get lost in the shuffle. Although the institutions involved may be small, and hence the conflicts may seem small in terms of their monetary value, they aggregate to contribute to the moral miasma that now is the atmosphere of health care.

1:22 PM

The Color of Money: What Sort of School Doesn't Pay Its Faculty to Teach?

A letter to the NY Times by Dr Daniel Becker in response to the recent controversy at Harvard Medical School over financial relationships among industry and faculty (see our post here) brought up an interesting point:

I take issue with the implicit assumption that faculty members who accept drug money are driven exclusively by greed; this issue is much more complicated than it may seem at first.

Harvard Medical School’s 'drug money' problem relates, in part, to a little-known fact: Harvard rarely pays the salaries of its medical faculty directly. Despite substantial revenue from tuition, most faculty members teach medical students on a volunteer basis.

Similarly, the salaries of research faculty are not paid by Harvard, but rather by grants from the National Institutes of Health, private foundations and in some instances, grants from pharmaceutical companies. If these financing sources dry up, professors are often forced to find a new job.

Wait a minute, it's a medical school, so shouldn't the faculty be paid to teach and do research? That's what faculty are supposed to do.

The above letter, although it may be a bit simplistic, fits in with other anecdotal evidence that, in fact, medical schools do not pay faculty much to teach or do research. Instead, they are mainly tasked with raising money from external sources to "cover" the academic work one would think should be central to their jobs. Failing that, they must bring in fees for their clinical work.

In 2005, we quoted the editor of JAMA as saying, "few medical schools provide adequate, if any, reimbursement for teaching time."

In 2007, we noted that it was news when Harvard Medical School pledged to actually start paying hospital-based faculty meaningful amounts for teaching medical students. Previously, they were paid an average of $30/hour for doing so. However, I have not seen any follow-up as to whether the school carried out the promise. Moreover, at that time, we noted that Harvard required its faculty "to teach or volunteer on committees 50 hours a year, but Harvard does not track how many hours doctors teach and does not actively enforce the policy." Again, one might be forgiven for thinking that a faculty member generally should spend a substantial amount of time teaching. But at Harvard, they only apparently need to spend about 2% of their time doing so.

Later in 2007, we discussed a medical school dean's revelation that his school primarily judge faculty was by how much external funding (grants, contracts, practice income, etc) they brought in, not by how well or how much they taught, or the quality and quantity of their research.

Finally, in 2009, we discussed how two-thirds of the salary of one university president seemed to come from his medical school, even though that school accounted for only one-eighth of his students.

Putting it all together, it seems that the "faculty" at some, maybe most medical schools are not faculty in the ordinary sense. There is little expectation that they teach. Instead, they are supposed to do research funded by external grants, or failing that, collect fees from direct patient care. They are judged by how much money these pursuits provide, not by the quality of their research, and certainly not the quality of their teaching. The money they provide disproportionately goes to fund parts of the university outside of the medical schools. Presumably, the pressure to bring in ever more money drives "faculty" entanglements with pharmaceutical, biotechnology, device and other corporations. If one must constantly pursue grants, now mostly available from industry, one must constantly interact with industry representatives. Under this sort of pressure, is it any wonder that "faculty" might find it hard to turn down consulting work, speakers' fees, and offers to serve on advisory boards from the same people they must please to obtain grants?

So I believe Dr Becker is right. The problem is simply not the greed of "faculty" members (although some, of course, can become greedy.) Much of the problem appears to be the greed of university administrators who see their medical schools and academic medical centers as cash cows, and see nothing wrong with hiring "faculty" who scarcely teach, as long as they keep bringing in the cash.

1:52 PM

Harvard Medical Students Against Marketing in the Guise of Medical Education

An article by Duff Wilson in the New York Times this week provided a new look at the pervasiveness of financial relationships among academic medicine and health care corporations, and the beginnings of resistance to them.

The Scope of the Relationships

Many individual Harvard Medical faculty members receive tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars a year through industry consulting and speaking fees. Under the school’s disclosure rules, about 1,600 of 8,900 professors and lecturers have reported to the dean that they or a family member had a financial interest in a business related to their teaching, research or clinical care. The reports show 149 with financial ties to Pfizer and 130 with Merck.

The rules, though, do not require them to report specific amounts received for speaking or consulting, other than broad indications like 'more than $30,000.' Some faculty who conduct research have limits of $30,000 in stock and $20,000 a year in fees. But there are no limits on companies’ making outright gifts to faculty — free meals, tickets, trips or the like.

Other blandishments include industry-endowed chairs like the three Harvard created with $8 million from sleep research companies; faculty prizes like the $50,000 award named after Bristol-Myers Squibb, and sponsorships like Pfizer’s $1 million annual subsidy for 20 new M.D.’s in a two-year program to learn clinical investigation and pursue Harvard Master of Medical Science degrees, including classes taught by Pfizer scientists.

Academic Medical Leaders' Defense of Their Relationships with Industry

Dr. Flier, who became dean 17 months ago, previously received a $500,000 research grant from Bristol-Myers Squibb. He also consulted for three Cambridge biotechnology companies, but says that those relationships have ended and that he has accepted no new industry affiliations.

So maybe it is not surprising that:

Dr. Flier says that the Harvard Medical faculty may lead the nation in receiving money from industry, as well as government and charities, and he does not want to tighten the spigot. 'One entirely appropriate source, if done properly, is industrial funds,' Dr. Flier said in an interview.

But,

That is in contrast to his predecessor as dean, Dr. Joseph B. Martin. Harvard’s rules allowed Dr. Martin to sit on the board of the medical products company Baxter International for 5 of the 10 years he led the medical school, supplementing his university salary with up to $197,000 a year from Baxter, according to company filings.

Dr. Martin is still on the medical faculty and is founder and co-chairman of the Harvard NeuroDiscovery Center, which researches degenerative diseases, and actively solicits industry money to do so. Dr. Martin declined any comment.

Note that we discussed Dr Martin's directorship of Baxter on Health Care Renewal here in 2006, and that we also found that he was on the board of biotechnology company Cytyc. Note also that we have discussed how serving on the board of a health care corporation can produce particularly intense conflicts of interest for academic medical leaders, since such board service implies not just warm and fuzzy feelings for the company, but "unyielding loyalty" to the financial interests of the company and its stockholders (e.g., see this post).

Unsurprisingly, faculty who have their own lucrative relationships with industry are all for more of the same:

Encouraging them is Dr. Thomas P. Stossel, a Harvard Medical professor who has served on advisory boards for Merck, Biogen Idec and Dyax, and has written widely on academic-industry ties. 'I think if you look at it with intellectual honesty, you see industry interaction has produced far more good than harm,' Dr. Stossel said. 'Harvard absolutely could get more from industry but I think they’re very skittish. There’s a huge opportunity we ought to mine.'

Note that Dr Stossel defended academic-industry "interaction," but did not explain why such interaction seems always to generate large money flows from industry to academic institutions and their individual faculty members. People can surely interact without paying each other.

Note further that Dr Stossel may have even more financial relationships with industry than appeared in the NY Times article. When we analyzed some of the logical fallacies Dr Stossel employed in favor of industry payments to physicians in 2007, we cited Stossel's attck on the rigorous conflicts of interest rules re-imposed on the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) in which Stossel had to disclose "having received consulting fees from ZymeQuest, owning stock options in ZymeQuest and Biogen, and having pending and issued patents, owned by Brigham and Women's Hospital, some of which are licensed to ZymeQuest." [Stossel TP. Regulating academic-industrial research relationships - solving problems or stifling progress? N Engl J Med 2005; 353: 1060-1065.] In this paean to a laissez-faire approach to conflicts of interest, Stossel also disclosed that he "is a member of the Board of Directors of Zymequest Inc, and the Scientific Leadership Advisory Board of Merck & Co. The author is a founding scientist of Critical Biologics Corporation and a consultant to Boston Scientific, Inc., and Gerson-Lehrman, Inc." [Stossel TP. Regulation of financial conflicts of interest in medical practice and medical research. Perspect Biol Med 2007; 50: 54-71. ]

Another defender of the status quo also has her own major relationships with industry:

Merck built a corporate research center in 2004 across the street from Harvard’s own big new medical research and class building. And Merck underwrites plenty of work on the Harvard campus, including the immunology lab run by Dr. Laurie H. Glimcher — a professor who also sits on the board of the drug maker Bristol-Myers Squibb, which paid her nearly $270,000 in 2007.

Dr. Glimcher says industry money is not only appropriate but necessary. 'Without the support of the private sector, we would not have been able to develop what I call our ‘bone team’ in our lab,' she said at a recent student and faculty forum to discuss industry relationships. Merck is counting on her team to help come up with a successor to Fosamax, the formerly $3 billion-a-year bone drug that went generic last year.

Note that Dr Glimcher now seems to view her role not as someone seeking to discover and disseminate the truth, but as someone seeking to develop commercial products. Again, maybe that is not surprising, since she is supposed to have an "unyielding loyalty" to the prominent pharmaceutical company on whose board she sits.

The NY Times article did not quote anybody in favor of financial relationships between academic medicine and industry who did not themselves have such relationships. I don't believe I have ever seen a defense of these relationships not authored by someone who was not already personally profiting from such relationships.

The Revolt of the Medical Students

While he documented how Harvard faculty who also lead huge pharmaceutical firms have no qualms about industry pouring money into medical academics, Mr Wilson found that medical students seem to have figured out the downside of being taught by pharmaceutical, biotechnology and device company employees:

In a first-year pharmacology class at Harvard Medical School, Matt Zerden grew wary as the professor promoted the benefits of cholesterol drugs and seemed to belittle a student who asked about side effects.

Mr. Zerden later discovered something by searching online that he began sharing with his classmates. The professor was not only a full-time member of the Harvard Medical faculty, but a paid consultant to 10 drug companies, including five makers of cholesterol treatments.

'I felt really violated,' Mr. Zerden, now a fourth-year student, recently recalled. 'Here we have 160 open minds trying to learn the basics in a protected space, and the information he was giving wasn’t as pure as I think it should be.'

Mr. Zerden’s minor stir four years ago has lately grown into a full-blown movement by more than 200 Harvard Medical School students and sympathetic faculty, intent on exposing and curtailing the industry influence in their classrooms and laboratories, as well as in Harvard’s 17 affiliated teaching hospitals and institutes.

They say they are concerned that the same money that helped build the school’s world-class status may in fact be hurting its reputation and affecting its teaching.

Note that the example, while anecdotal, shows how financial relationships could lead to biased education. The students have made surprising progress:

The Harvard students have already secured a requirement that all professors and lecturers disclose their industry ties in class — a blanket policy that has been adopted by no other leading medical school. (One Harvard professor’s disclosure in class listed 47 company affiliations.)

'Harvard needs to live up to its name,' said Kirsten Austad, 24, a first-year Harvard Medical student who is one of the movement’s leaders. 'We are really being indoctrinated into a field of medicine that is becoming more and more commercialized.'

David Tian, 24, a first-year Harvard Medical student, said: 'Before coming here, I had no idea how much influence companies had on medical education. And it’s something that’s purposely meant to be under the table, providing information under the guise of education when that information is also presented for marketing purposes.'

The students say they worry that pharmaceutical industry scandals in recent years — including some criminal convictions, billions of dollars in fines, proof of bias in research and publishing and false marketing claims — have cast a bad light on the medical profession. And they criticize Harvard as being less vigilant than other leading medical schools in monitoring potential financial conflicts by faculty members.

Unfortunately, many academics of my generation have become so used to making some extra dollars by working part-time for companies selling health care goods or services that they cannot see how these relationships have distracted them from the academic mission and their professional ideals. Maybe the rising generation of students, now living in a time when the consequences of arrogance, greed, and corruption among our leaders has become so apparent, will put professionalism ahead of personal enrichment.

10:17 AM