Turn, Turn, Turn - from Columbia/ HCA Executive, to Virginia Secretary of Health and Human Resources, to Director of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), to America's Healt Insurance Plans (AHIP)

Marilyn Tavenner's career continues to revolve, er, evolve.

Columbia/ HCA

Marilyn Tavenner worked for Columbia / HCA, now HCA, although details of her job there are sketchy.  Apparently she worked there for a long time, according to a 2015 article in the Nashville Business Journal,

Tavenner work [sic] in a variety of roles for Nashville-based HCA Holdings Inc for 25 years.

She worked long enough to earn a fairly generous pension.  As a 2012 a Washington Times article stated,

In a recent filing with the U.S. Office of Government Ethics, she reported that through a supplemental executive retirement plan at HCA, 'I will continue to receive $162,524 for life.'

There are only sketchy accounts available about what she did at HCA.  The same Washington Times article noted she left in 2006, and

'Ms. Tavenner was a senior executive at HCA who retired from the company over six years ago,' said HCA spokesman Ed Fishbough.

The only description I could find of her duties there was in a Forbes blog post by Bruce Jepsen in 2015,

Tavenner, ... had experience working for investor-owned hospitals and with insurers when she was at HCA....

What does seem certain is that her career at Columbia / HCA overlapped that of CEO Rick Scott, and included some of the time when the company performed actions that led to some serious charges.  In a 2011 Boston Globe blog post, Suzanne Gordon wrote,

While Tavenner worked for HCA, the company was busily enhancing its profit margin by defrauding the Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE systems. Terry Leap’s new book, '"Phantom Billing, Fake Prescriptions, and the High Cost of Medicine: Health Care Fraud and What To Do About It,' details HCA’s sorry history. In 2000, for example, HCA paid fines of $840 million for improperly billing the government and in 2003 HCA had to fork over another $631 million.

We discussed the billion dollar plus Columbia / HCA fraud case, which did involve corporate guilty pleas, but like most other legal settlements between the government and big health care organizations, no consequences for any individuals who authorized, planned, or implemented the bad behavior.  There were many allegations that then Columbia / HCA Rick Scott, who is now the Republican Governor of the great state of Florida, created a business culture that enabled the fraud, and even knew about it, but he was never charged with a crime.

Ms Tavenner's role in Columbia / HCA when this was happening was never clear.


Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources

After her work at Columbia / HCA, Ms Tavenner became Secretary of Health and Human Resources for the great state of Virginia.  I could find little news coverage of her time there, much less any suggestion that her previous role with Columbia / HCA might have been viewed as a problem. 

Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)

In 2010, Ms Tavenner went to work for the US Department of Health and Human Services.  In 2011, Ms Tavenner became acting administrator of CMS.


The only concerns raised about Ms Tavenner's former work with Columbia / HCA at the time she was appointed to run CMS came from the Boston Globe blog post noted above.

Although Tavenner may not have been personally involved in these scandals, it hardly seems wise to put her in charge of the government system her company helped defraud.

Nonetheless she got the position.  In 2014, a Wall Street Journal article from 2014 suggested Ms Tavenner remained cozy with here former boss, former Columbia / HCA CEO,  and now Florida Governor Rick Scott.  It recounted that a CMS contractor had been investigating a Florida nursing home chain,

Medicare investigators began looking into Florida skilled-nursing facilities in 2011 and found what they considered suspicious billing patterns at 33 homes. CMS contractor SafeGuard Services LLC was concerned about how often Florida nursing facilities were charging for the costliest physical and occupational-therapy services, according to documents. About a quarter of the 33 facilities were paid at least 20% more a day than their local rivals, a Journal analysis of Medicare data found.

Three of the 33 are owned by Plaza Health Network. Plaza Chief Executive William Zubkoff previously ran a hospital that was barred in 2006 from billing Medicare and other federal health-care programs following fraud allegations.

But then,

Some of the nursing homes contacted the Florida Health Care Association, a trade group. It asked lawmakers and Florida Governor Rick Scott, a Republican, for assistance, according to the group’s director and emails.

Gov. Scott contacted Ms. Tavenner, according to a person familiar with the investigation. The two had once worked together at hospital operator HCA Holdings Inc., where both had been executives. The governor’s office connected CMS to the Florida Health Care Association. The trade group put an owner of two of the nursing homes, William Kelsey, on the phone with Ms. Tavenner.

Mr. Kelsey told her the prepayment reviews were 'creating a real hardship on the business, staff and residents,' he recalled recently.

On Aug. 22, 2012, Ms. Tavenner ordered the agency’s antifraud officials to release payments for the 33 homes, including the two operated by Mr. Kelsey, according to emails.

A CMS spokesman said Ms. Tavenner got involved to ensure the agency was 'preserving access and quality of care.' The spokesman said Ms. Tavenner 'often discusses issues and concerns with elected officials…including Gov. Scott.'

Of course, Ms Tavenner had a previous relationship with Governor Scott due to their shared time at Columbia / HCA which probably was not like her relationships with other elected officials.  In any case, I could find no real echoes from this story, but Ms Tavenner resigned from CMS in 2015, not completely covered in glory.  A Bloomberg account of her resignation included,

 Marilyn Tavenner, the U.S. official who directed the stumbling roll-out of Obamacare as well as its recovery in recent months, will resign as head of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.

Tavenner said in an e-mail to staff that she’ll step down at the end of next month. She didn’t give her reasons for leaving.

The article suggested that she had her troubles in her role as head of CMS,

 As head of the agency, Tavenner was arguably the person most responsible for construction of healthcare.gov, the federal health insurance website that collapsed when it opened for business in October 2013. A UnitedHealth Group unit -- then run by Slavitt -- was hired to lead repairs.

In November of last year, Tavenner also acknowledged that her agency had made a mistake in its calculation of the number of people enrolled under Obamacare for 2014. About 393,000 individuals with both health and dental coverage were 'inadvertently counted twice,' she said in a letter to Representative Darrell Issa, a California Republican whose committee discovered the error.

'Tavenner had to go,' Issa said in a statement today. 'She presided over HHS as it deceptively padded the Obamacare enrollment numbers.'

On the other hand, Forbes blogger Jepsen did suggest that some in industry thought better of her than did Representative Issa.

 Tavenner, who had experience working for investor-owned hospitals and with insurers when she was at HCA, was seen as friendly to the health insurance industry and medical care providers. She had respect among lobbies and among both Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill....

The for-profit health insurance industry seemed to particularly like here,

'Marilyn leaves behind a legacy of leadership at a time of unprecedented change in our health care system,' said Karen Ignagni, chief executive of America’s Health Insurance Plans, the health insurance lobby....  'She was a thoughtful strategist and balanced manager who time and time again rolled up her sleeves to work with all stakeholders on solutions to advance patient care.'

One wonders whether some stakeholders, like AHIP, thought that she was treating them particularly well.  What the average Medicare patient or health care professional thought of her was not explored.


America's Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) (and LifePoint)

This suspicion was bolstered when Ms Tavenner, despite the negative opinions of people, even Republican people like Representative Issa, was named to be Ms Ignangni's successor.   That was announced just yesterday, July 15, 2015.  In Modern Healthcare we saw,

Marilyn Tavenner, the former head of the CMS who stepped down just six months ago, will now lead the country's dominant health insurance lobbying group.

The board of America's Health Insurance Plans on Wednesday named Tavenner as the group's next president and CEO. She replaces Karen Ignagni, who served as AHIP's top lobbyist for 22 years....

This job transition was covered in media outlets, but so far, only Modern Healthcare raised any doubts,

Her decision to head to AHIP raises uncomfortable questions about the dynamics between Washington politics and business. Tavenner will now be representing and lobbying on behalf of some of the country's largest health insurers—the same companies who are regulated by the CMS and are devoting more of their business to Medicare and Medicaid in the form of privatized managed care.

For her role in these dynamics, she likely will be well paid,

Tavenner is primed for a big pay raise as the top leader of AHIP. Ignagni made more than $2 million as AHIP's CEO in 2013. Tavenner made $165,300 last year, according to government records. She is also expected to make more than $300,000 in cash and stock as a board member of LifePoint Health, a for-profit hospital chain based in Brentwood, Tenn. Tavenner joined LifePoint's board in April.

Conclusions

So now Marilyn Tavenner shows she is securely within that club of insiders that run health care in the US.  Some celebrate the US health care "free market," in which one might expect for-profit insurers will fight with provider organizations, like for-profit hospital chains, over payment policies, overseen by government's impartial regulators.  Yet it appears that many of these organizations' leaders come out of the same pool of insider managers, and that individuals can lead or govern organizations that are supposed to be negotiating at arm's length.  For example, note that now Ms Tavenner is leading a for-profit insurance lobbbying group while governing a for-profit hospital chain.

One might think that such arrangements might not be good for the organizations that are supposed to be at arm's length.  One might think such arrangements might be worse for patients, health care professionals and the public at large.  If the large organizations that are supposed to be competing and negotiating in the market are led out of a single cozy in group, maybe instead of competing and negotiating they will mainly be about benefiting their leaders.

As we wrote before,...

 the constant interchange of health care insiders among government, large health care corporations, and the lobbying and legal firms which represent them certainly suggests that health care, like many other sectors, seems to be run by an amorphous group of insiders who owe allegiance neither to government nor industry.

However, those who work in government are supposed to be working for the people, and those who work on health care within government are supposed to be working for patients' and the public health.  If they are constantly looking over their shoulders at potential private employers who might offer big checks, who indeed are they working for?

Attempts to turn government toward private gain and away from being of the people, by the people, and for the people have no doubt been going on since the beginning of government (and since the Constitution was signed, in the case of the US).  However, true health care reform  would require curtailing the severe sorts of conflicts of interest created by the revolving door.

Real heath care reform would require  multiyear cooling off periods before someone who worked in the commercial world can get a job in a government whose work has direct effect on his or her previous employer or industry sector, and before someone who worked in government whose work had direct effect on a particular economic sector can accept a job for a company in that sector.

But real reform might spoil the party for those who transit the revolving door, so don't expect such reform to come easily.... 

12:51 PM

Just the Latest Legal Settlement for HCA

Last month, we posted about investigative reports that suggesting that for-profit hospital chain HCAwas pushed by its private equity owners to put short-term revenue ahead of good patient care.  A legal settlement announced this week corroborates these concerns. 

As reported by television station WRCB in Chattanooga, TN,

HCA Inc., one of the nation's largest private hospital chains, has agreed to pay $16.5 million to settle alleged violations of the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act (also known as the Stark law), the False Claims Act, and other federal and state laws and regulations in connection with the operation of its subsidiary, Parkridge Medical Center, Inc., in Chattanooga.
In addition, Parkridge Medical Center has entered into a comprehensive five-year Corporate Integrity Agreement with the Office of Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS-OIG) to ensure its continued compliance with federal health care benefit program requirements.
As alleged in the settlement agreement, during 2007, HCA, through its subsidiaries Parkridge and HCA Physician Services (HCAPS), entered into a series of financial transactions with a physician group, Diagnostic Associates of Chattanooga, through which it provided financial benefits intended to induce the physician members of Diagnostic to refer patients to HCA facilities.
The financial benefits included lease of office space from Diagnostic at a rental rate well in excess of fair market value to meet the mortgage obligations of the Diagnostic members and release of Diagnostic members from a separate lease obligation. These financial arrangements violated the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act and the Anti-Kickback Statute – laws designed to protect patients as well as the integrity of government-funded health care benefit programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, TRICARE, and TennCare.

The issue here were allegations that HCA and its subsidiaries were paying physicians extra so that they would refer patients to an HCA hospital. Obviously, physicians are supposed to put each patient's interests ahead of extraneous considerations, and hence should make referral decisions based on the patients needs, and the likely benefits and harms of the referral, not the amounts the physicians might make from such payments.

Referrals for particular services can be very lucrative for hospitals.  So this settlement seems to provide more evidence that to get profitable referrals, HCA was willing to subvert physicians' values by paying physicians to induce to make what might have been the wrong decisions for individual patients.  Of course, in this situation some physicians were hardly blameless, since they were also willing to set aside their values to receive the payments that generated those referrals.

This fits with the thesis we advanced last month.  While hospitals are supposed to have a mission to put care of the sick ahead of all else, it appears that for-profit hospitals, and especially those owned by private equity are more likely to put short-term revenue ahead of patient care.

As an aside, while this settlement provides useful information, do not think of it as a solution to the immediate problem. 

As we have frequently asserted, it is doubtful that the relatively small payment and the relatively unlikely to be enforced corporate integrity agreement imposed in this settlement will change the company's behavior, in the absence of any negative consequences for the people who authorized, directed or implemented the bad behavior.  HCA once made a $1.7 billion fraud settlement, at the time the biggest such settlement ever made (see this post).  However, the company's CEO at the time, Rick Scott, left the firm with a golden parachute and no negative consequences, and is now Governor of Florida.  If that previous huge settlement did not deter the more recent bad behavior in the absence of any penalties for company executives, why should we expect that the current comparatively tiny settlement also in the absence of such penalties will have any effect?

As we have now said many, many times, we will not deter unethical behavior by health care organizations until the people who authorize, direct or implement bad behavior fear some meaningfully negative consequences. Real health care reform needs to make health care leaders accountable, and especially accountable for the bad behavior that helped make them rich.

Furthermore, as I wrote last month, we need to challenge the notion that direct health care should ever be provided, or that medicine ought to be practiced by for-profit corporations. Before market fundamentalism became so prominent, many stated prohibited the corporate practice of medicine, and the American Medical Association forbade the commercialization of medicine. It is time to heed that wisdom. I submit that we will not be able to have good quality, accessible health care at an affordable price until we restore physicians as independent, ethical health care professionals, and until we restore small, independent, community responsible, non-profit hospitals as the locus for inpatient care.

1:33 PM

Paging Doctor EBDITA - How Private Equity May Push Hospitals to Put Revenue Ahead of Patient Care

Issues raised by the increasing influence of private equity firms in the direct care of patients were illuminated by a series of articles about the for-profit hospital chain HCA.

Quality Problems

The articles highlighted a series of concerns about quality problems affecting the chain's patients. 

Cardiac Overtreatment

First, a New York Times article described problems in the care of cardiac patients. 

HCA, the largest for-profit hospital chain in the United States with 163 facilities, had uncovered evidence as far back as 2002 and as recently as late 2010 showing that some cardiologists at several of its hospitals in Florida were unable to justify many of the procedures they were performing. Those hospitals included the Cedars Medical Center in Miami, which the company no longer owns, and the Regional Medical Center Bayonet Point. In some cases, the doctors made misleading statements in medical records that made it appear the procedures were necessary, according to internal reports.

More specifically, at one hospital, cardiac catheterizations seemed to occur to often: "about half the procedures ... were determined to have been done to patients without significant heart disease." Two patients at another hospital had severe adverse effects after cardiac procedures that seemed unnecessary in retrospect. There were "incidents at Bayonet Point where patients were treated for multiple lesions, or blockages, even when 'the second lesion (or third) did not appear to have significant disease....' [In] 'several cases'  ... patients were treated even though their arteries did not have significant blockages." Then,

HCA brought in an external company, CardioQual Associates of Franklin, Mich., in 2004 to examine medical records from Bayonet Point. In a confidential memo prepared in December 2004 and reviewed by The Times, CardioQual concluded that as many as 43 percent of 355 angioplasty cases, where doctors performed invasive procedures to open up a patient’s arteries, were outside reasonable and expected medical practice. Worse, the investigation revealed that some physicians had indicated in medical records that the patients had blockages of 80 to 90 percent when a later, more scientific analysis of a sampling of cases revealed the blockages had ranged from 33 to 53 percent.

Possible Undertreatment of Acute Illness

Then, a second NY Times article found that

HCA decided not to treat patients who came in with nonurgent conditions, like a cold or the flu or even a sprained wrist, unless those patients paid in advance. In a recent statement, HCA said that of the six million patients treated in its emergency rooms last year, 80,000, or about 1.3 percent, 'chose to seek alternative care options.'

Of course, the problem with this approach is that it is not always possible to tell how severe an acute illness is without a more complete evaluation than can be done in emergency department triage. There is anecdotal evidence that HCA turned away some patients who actually had serious illness:

Regulators in several states have taken HCA hospitals to task over screening out patients too aggressively, including situations where the screening missed serious conditions.

In early 2010, an uninsured patient who entered HCA’s TriStar Skyline Medical Center in Nashville, complaining of 'pain when breathing,' was sent away. An hour and a half later, at another hospital, the same patient was found to have pneumonia, according to the results of a Medicare investigation. Regulators cited Skyline for having 'failed to ensure that an appropriate medical screening examination was conducted.'

This year, the Office of Inspector General fined HCA’s Northside Hospital in St. Petersburg, Fla., $38,000 for sending home a feverish patient with an artificial heart valve. Two days later, the patient reappeared with the flu and severe respiratory problems. The following day, he died.

Undertreatment of Bed Sores

The second Times article also suggested that decreased nurse staffing at HCA hospitals lead to worse treatment of bed sores (decubitus ulcers):

Experts say there is often a direct correlation between bedsores and the quality of hospital staff levels. 'Staffing is critical,' said Courtney H. Lyder, the dean at the UCLA School of Nursing and an expert on wound care. 'When you see high levels of wounds, you usually see a high level of dysfunctional staff,' he said.

HCA owned eight of the 15 worst hospitals for bedsores among 545 profit-making hospitals nationwide, each with more than 1,000 patient discharges, tracked by the Sunlight Foundation using Medicare data from October 2008 to June 2010. HCA’s West Houston Medical Center and CJW Medical Center in Richmond, Va., landed near the top of the list.

HCA says it has increased its nursing staff at its hospitals each year over the last five years. But an examination of lawsuits shows bedsore problems have been persistent at several HCA facilities. In Portsmouth Regional Hospital in New Hampshire, a 60-year-old woman died in 2009 after her bedsores went untreated for three days and became infected, according to a wrongful-death lawsuit filed in the spring of 2011 in federal court against the hospital.

One HCA hospital

was cited twice by Florida regulators, in 2008 and 2010, for having inadequate numbers of nurses on its staff to oversee wound care for patients. During the 2010 examination, regulators noted that Memorial had less than the equivalent of two full-time nurses who specialized in wound care to treat the 132 patients who required aid.

'The system of treatment for wound care places patients at risk for additional medical complications,' the examiners said.

So, in summary, there is reason for concern about overtreatment of cardiac disease, and undertreatment of acute illness and bedsores at HCA hospitals. However, no hospital and no doctor is perfect. Everyone makes mistakes, and many decisions can be questioned in retrospect. Instead

Putting Money Ahead of Quality

Instead, the articles suggested they were part of a pattern in which concerns about short-term revenue trumped concerns about patient care.

Cardiac Procedures to Generate More Revenue

The article about cardiac care noted that one of the physicians who allegedly was doing too many cardiac procedures

was highlighted by the hospital in a 2009 business plan as being the most profitable doctor at the facility. 'Our leading EBDITA MD,' the plan described him. (Ebitda, or earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, is a measure of corporate earnings.)

On the other hand, according to the Tampa Bay Times, some of the doctors whom HCA suspended for doing too many percutaneous cardiac revascularization procedures charged that the issue was that

far from concern over the cost of stents — Bayonet Point was upset that stents were replacing more expensive bypass surgeries.

The first NY Times article also suggested that HCA executives did their best to keep the issue quiet so as not to affect revenue. First,

HCA declined to provide evidence that it had alerted Medicare, state Medicaid or private insurers of its findings, or reimbursed them for any of the procedures that the company later deemed unnecessary, as required by law.

Also,

HCA also declined to show that it had ever notified patients, who might have been entitled to compensation from the hospital for any harm.

The Times uncovered internal HCA communications suggesting that obfuscation was deliberate:

In January 2005, David Williams, who was then the chief executive of Bayonet Point, wrote in an e-mail: 'Clearly, we have protected ourselves under the peer review umbrella and have released very little information.' The recipients of his message included Dan Miller, who then oversaw HCA’s hospitals in western Florida, and Charles R. Evans, a Nashville executive who was president of all of HCA’s hospitals on the eastern side of the country.

In his response, Mr. Evans thanked Mr. Williams for the update and asked for a 'summary as to the business impact.'

Furthermore, as the last sentence above indicated, review of internal emails suggested that executives were more worried about revenue than quality of care or patient outcomes:

A review of those communications reveals that rather than asking whether patients had been harmed or whether regulators needed to be contacted, hospital officials asked for information on how the physicians’ activities affected the hospitals’ bottom line.

Avoiding Caring for Poor Patients in the Emergency Department

On the other hand, the impetus for triaging away apparently less acutely ill patients from the Emergency Department was to avoid such patients who could not pay. The second NY Times article noted there was a way for supposedly less ill patient to get Emergency Department treatment,

Patients whose ailments were not deemed urgent were told to go somewhere else, like a free clinic, or that they could be treated if they paid the co-payment for their insurance or around $150 in cash.

In addition, there is reason to think that HCA management pushed health care professionals to put off increasing numbers of patients, regardless of their clinical problems,

Several former emergency department doctors at Lawnwood Regional Medical Center in Fort Pierce, Fla., said they frequently had felt compelled to override the screening system in order to treat patients.

Also,

'Physicians had a really, really hard time with it,' said Dr. J. Patrick Pearsall, who worked for an emergency physician group based in Houston that worked in HCA hospitals. When the doctors failed to meet the hospital’s goals for how many patients should be considered emergencies, 'they really started putting pressure on.'

One emergency room doctor who worked at an HCA Florida hospital said doctors had been told they had targets to hit. The doctors’ concerns about the screening policy were acknowledged in an e-mail reviewed by The Times that was sent to the doctors at the hospital in early 2008 by an outside company that worked in the emergency room.

The doctors were told HCA’s regional executives were 'quite intent on pursuing this program at least for the time being and fully expects us to comply. Their expectations are that approximately 15 percent of all patients are to be screened and of those screened no more than 35 percent overridden.'

Keep in mind that variations in patient populations over time and across geographic areas means that the proportions of more and less severely ill patients showing up at individual Emergency Departments will vary substantially. Pressuring health care professionals to turn away a minimum percentage of people will make it very likely that at some times severely acutely ill patients will not be seen.

So it appears that at HCA, patients sometimes were overtreated, and sometimes were undertreated, and that executives trying to increase revenue may have been more responsible for both than simple human error.

Finally, there is reason to think that the take-over of HCA by private equity (that is, leveraged buy-out) firms further increased the for-profit corporation's emphasis on short-term revenue leading to worsening quality of care.

Private Equity Pushed for Even More Short-Term Revenue

The second NY Times article first noted,

During the Great Recession, when many hospitals across the country were nearly brought to their knees by growing numbers of uninsured patients, one hospital system not only survived — it thrived.

In fact, profits at the health care industry giant HCA, which controls 163 hospitals from New Hampshire to California, have soared, far outpacing those of most of its competitors.

The big winners have been three private equity firms — including Bain Capital, co-founded by Mitt Romney, the Republican presidential candidate — that bought HCA in late 2006.

HCA’s robust profit growth has raised the value of the firms’ holdings to nearly three and a half times their initial investment in the $33 billion deal.

The financial performance has been so impressive that HCA has become a model for the industry.

Note that the private equity firms extracted a considerable amount of cash from HCA at the time they turned it back into a publicly held for-profit corporation:

In 2010, buoyed by robust growth in profit, HCA was able to issue billions of dollars in debt that was used to pay funds overseen by the three buyout firms nearly $1 billion in dividends — each. In the spring of 2011, in one of the most closely watched public offerings since the financial crisis, HCA became a public company once again. Its three buyout owners each sold another $500 million worth of stock, allowing them to recoup all their initial investment.

By thus increasing the new public corporation's debt load, they further increased pressure on its executives to bolster short-term revenue.

However,

As HCA’s profits and influence grew, strains arose with doctors and nurses over whether the chain’s pursuit of profit may have, at times, come at the expense of patient care.

Summary:  Why No Hospital Should be For-Profit?

Among all developed countries, I believe only the US has such a high proportion of for-profit hospitals, and physicians employed by for-profit corporations to take care of patients.

However, in summary, this case shows there is evidence that
- The management of one for-profit hospital chain was pushed to focus even more on short-term revenue by a leveraged buy-out engineered by private equity firms
- This focus lead management to pressure health care professionals to increase revenue, even if that required over- or under-treating patients
- The resulting over- and under-treatment likely harmed patients.

As a Tampa Bay Times editorial put it,

the allegations suggest a disturbing pattern of endangering patients, and they again expose the weaknesses of a health care system driven by volume and profit rather than efficiencies and patient outcomes.

In a column in Forbes, Steve Denning warned,

The hospitals owned by private equity are making money in the short-term at the expense of Medicare and the economy. But when the private equity firms depart, as they plan to do, they leave the hospitals with a load of debt, dispirited doctors and nurses, and a bankrupt Medicare system, with serious questions as to whether overall care has been maintained, let alone improved.

The current bonanza for private equity from milking Medicare is a bubble that cannot be sustained.

We have noted how health care organizations have increasingly been "financialized," lead by executives who put short-term revenue generation ahead of all other goals, including good patient care. Furthermore, hospitals are increasingly likely to be formally for-profit, and hence likely to be lead by such executives. Worse, hospitals are increasingly likely to be owned by private equity firms, further increasing the emphasis on short-term money making. Even worse, physicians are now more frequently employed by such organizations, which may pressure them to do what it takes to increase revenue, no matter what the effect on patients' and the public's health.

The probably effects on the quality of care, access, and costs are obvious.

In my humble opinion, before the health care bubble bursts, we need to challenge the notion that direct health care should ever be provided, or that medicine ought to be practiced by for-profit corporations. Before market fundamentalism became so prominent, many stated prohibited the corporate practice of medicine, and the American Medical Association forbade the commercialization of medicine. It is time to heed that wisdom. I submit that we will not be able to have good quality, accessible health care at an affordable price until we restore physicians as independent, ethical health care professionals, and until we restore small, independent, community responsible, non-profit hospitals as the locus for inpatient care.

As Todd Hixon wrote, surprisingly in Forbes,

I believe a big part of the answer lies in changing the idea that health care should be a path to riches. There are professions, like university teaching and research, where a big part of the motivation is helping people and gaining respect in the community. If we could shift the balance for health care providers in that direction, solving problems like the one manifest at HCA would be a lot more possible.

True health care reform will require an end to market fundamentalism in health care.

Note - See also comments by Paul Levy in the Not Running a Hospital Blog.

11:33 AM