What Big Drug and Biotechnology Companies Will Not Tell Us - Transparency International on Corporate Reporting

Drug companies are entrusted to provide pure, unadulterated medicines.  Increasingly drug companies are now entrusted with doing research, including experimental studies, on human beings, and providing education to doctors and patients.  Ordinarily, trust requires confidence in transparency. However, a new report suggests that large multinational drug and biotechnology companies are not very transparent.

Transparency International just released a report on the transparency, or lack thereof, of the 124 biggest multinational corporations.  The report detailed how well these companies disclosed their internal anti-corruption programs, their subsidiaries, affiliates, and joint ventures, and their financial data broken down by the countries in which they operate.  In summary, the overall results for disclosing anti-corruption programs were mediocre, and for disclosing organizational structure and country-by-country financial data, they were dismal.

The report is highly relevant to health care.  It included the biggest multinational health care corporations, all drug and/or biotechnology companies: Abbott Laboratories, (based in the US), Amgen (US), AstraZeneca (UK), Gilead Sciences (US), GlaxoSmithKline (UK), Johnson and Johnson (US), Merck and Co (US), Novartis (Switzerland), Novo Nordisk (Denmark), Pfizer (US), Roche Holding (Switzerland), Sanofi (France), Teva Pharmaceutical Industries (Israel).

The report has so far received little media coverage.  In the US, several news services provided brief  summaries.  Somewhat more substantial articles came from Reuters, the Wall Street Journal's Risk and Compliance Journal, and CNBC.  None gave specifics about health care.  Coverage from other countries, e.g., Germany by Deutsche Welle, and the UK by the Guardian, was more detailed but also did not specifically mention health care.

Therefore, I will summarize the rationale and assessment methods used by Transparency International for its three dimensions of transparency, and then show results from the 13 health care corporations.

Disclosure of Anti-Corruption Programs

The rationale for addressing this area was:

Global companies have legal and ethical obligations to conduct their business honestly. This requires
commitment, resources and the ongoing management of a range of risks – legal, political and reputational – including those associated with corruption. The implementation of a comprehensive range of anticorruption policies and management systems is fundamental to efforts to prevent and remediate corruption within organisations.

Transparency International believes that public reporting by companies on their anti-corruption programmes allows for increased monitoring by stakeholders and the public at large, thereby making companies more accountable

Evaluation of disclosure of anti-corruption programs was

based on 13 questions, which are derived from the UN Global Compact and Transparency International Reporting Guidance on the 10th Principle against Corruption. This tool, based on the Business Principles for Countering Bribery, which were developed by Transparency International in collaboration with a multi-stakeholder group, includes recommendations for companies on how to publicly report on their anticorruption programmes.

Note that the project addressed only reporting of anti-corruption programs, not their implementation or effectiveness.

For this and the other two dimensions of transparency, responses were converted into a 0% to 100% scale, with 100% being the best possible result.

Organizational Transparency

The rationale was:

As many of the recent corporate scandals have shown, acts of corruption are very often aided by the use of opaque company structures and secrecy jurisdictions.  But the use of offshore companies and their lack of transparency are posing increasing risks for global companies as well as for their shareholders, employees and local communities.

So,

Companies can mitigate the risks posed by lack of transparency and ownership arrangements by shedding more light on their corporate structures and by making basic financial information public on a country-by-country basis. This allows stakeholders to have a clearer understanding of the extent of a company’s operations and makes the company more accountable for its activities in a given country, including assessing whether it contributes financially in a manner appropriate to its level of activity.

The measurement strategy was,

Transparency International researchers consulted publicly available documents such as annual reports and stock exchange filings for information about company subsidiaries, affiliates, joint ventures and other holdings. The information sought included corporate names, percentages of ownership by the parent company, countries of incorporation and the countries in which the companies operate.

Country-by-Country Reporting

The rationale included:

The importance of country-by-country reporting was first recognised in the extractive sector as a way to ensure that revenues from natural resources are used to foster economic and social development rather than line the pockets of kleptocratic elites.

So,

country-by-country reporting ... [is] a recognised building block for corporate transparency and as a tool for countering tax avoidance.

In addition, country-by-country reporting provides investors with more comprehensive financial information about companies and helps them address investment risk more effectively.

The items measured were disclosure of revenue/sales, capital expenditures, pre-tax income, income tax, and community contribution in each country in which the company operated.

Results for Health Care Corporations

Company                      Total  Anti-Corruption P  Org Structure  by-Country

Abbott Laboratories    40             81                           38                3
Amgen                          37             85                           25                0
AstraZeneca                37             88                           19                3
Gilead Sciences           26             54                           25                0
GlaxoSmithKline          52            96                           50               11
Johnson and Johnson  26           65                           13                0
Merck and Co               42           77                            50                0
Novartis                        38            77                           38                1
Novo Nordisk               39            81                           38                0
Pfizer                             35            92                           13                0
Roche Holding              33            62                           38                1
Sanofi                            38            77                           38                0
Teva Pharmaceutical  35            85                            19                0

Again, only one company, GlaxoSmithKline, achieved an overall score of barely better than 50%.  All the others had lower scores.  Only two companies achieved a 50% score on disclosure of organizational structure, and only one achieved a score of better than 10% for disclosing country-by-country results.  The Transparency International report noted that the health care companies got particularly bad scores for disclosing organizational structure, averaging 31%, the third worst performance by economic sector.


Summary

 The drug and biotechnology companies generally did a fairly good job disclosing what their anti-corruption programs were supposed to do.  However, note that the Transparency International report did not assess how well these programs were implemented or enforced.  That this concern is not academic is underscored by some of these companies disreputable track records.  Some have long histories of legal actions, including billion dollar plus legal settlements, some of which were of allegations of fraud or kickbacks, and some have been convicted of crimes.  See the records of, for example: Abbott Laboratories (look here and here), Amgen (here), AstraZeneca (here), GlaxoSmithKline (here), Johnson and Johnson (here), Merck (here), Novartis (here), Novo Nordisk (here), Pfizer (here), Roche (here), Sanofi (here), and Teva (here).

Moreover, the companies did not do a good job disclosing their organizational structures, and hardly any bothered to report any financial results broken down by country.

We have frequently discussed health care corporations' deceptive marketing, induction of conflicts of interest, including those of supposed "key opinion leaders" who often are marketers in academic or professional clothing, and manipulation and suppression of clinical research.  There has been an ongoing procession of legal settlements involving health care corporations, often involving allegations of, and sometimes convictions for fraud, kickbacks, bribery, or other crimes.  There have even been some cases in which drug companies have failed to assure that their products are pure and unadulterated, their most basic mission.  Thus many are distrustful of drug and biotechnology companies, and large health care organizations in general.

So, as Transparency International's report noted, to rebuild trust,

integrity must be central to these efforts. Those efforts, in turn, can only become fully credible if they are undertaken with a sustained commitment to ethical behaviour and transparency across companies’ operations.

In my humble opinion, a basic premise of true health care reform would be that health care organizations become sufficiently transparent to restore basic trust in them. 

11:44 AM

You Say You Want Some Revolutions? - Famed Academic Physician Dr Milton Packer's Endless Alternating Turns as Drug Company Spokesperson and FDA Advisor

Last week, we noted  we again discussed the web of conflicts of interest that is draped over medicine and health care, and seems responsible for much of our current health care dysfunction.  We have discussed examples of conflicts of interest affecting clinical research, clinical teaching, clinical care, and health care policy.  Each time I think we must have cataloged all the useful examples, a striking new one appears.

Only a few days later, yet another new variant has in fact appeared.

A New Kind of Revolving Door

A new version of the "revolving door" apparently was first noted by Public Citizen, and then reported by Ed Silverman at Pharmalot. 

The usual version of the revolving door occurs when a person transitions from a full-time job in industry to a government position which has regulatory authority or other influence over that same industry, or vica versa.  We have discussed various health care manifestations of that revolving door here.

The new version, as described by Mr Silverman, in its manifestation at the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is:

the agency allows some experts who serve on its advisory panels to also make presentations at other meetings of these same panels on behalf of drug makers. By allowing some people to wear different hats within a short amount of time, the advocacy group charges the FDA creates the potential for bias to creep into the proceedings.

The Public Citizen letter to the FDA summarized the problem,

In particular, a sponsor’s use of an individual who serves, or has recently served, as a voting member of an FDA advisory committee to present its case before that member’s colleagues on the committee takes advantage of the special collegiality existing among members in order to improve a company’s chances of a favorable vote. Furthermore, such a revolving door raises concerns about the objectivity of committee members who accept such paid arrangements, with FDA’s approval, at future hearings involving the same or a rival company.

Someone Familiar Going Round and Round

The Public Citizen letter used as an example one well-known academic physician who seemed to have made many revolutions in this sort of revolving door.  As summarized in the PharmaLot post,

As an example, Public Citizen cites a meeting this past March 27 of the FDA’s Cardiovascular and Renal Drugs Advisory Committee, which was held to review an application for a Novartis drug called serelaxin to treat acute heart failure. And Milton Packer, who chairs the department of clinical sciences at UT Southwestern, appeared as a paid speaker on behalf of Novartis.

In his opening remarks, Packer disclosed that Novartis paid for his time and travel, according to the advocacy group. But because he is also considered to be a ‘special government employee,’ which is how advisory panel members are classified, he obtained permission from the FDA to participate as a paid speaker for Novartis (see page 31 here).

However, Packer served as a temporary voting member of the same FDA advisory committee less than two months earlier. Moreover, Public Citizen says this was the sixth time, since Packer first presided as chair of this committee in 1997, that he had 'spoken on behalf of and/or served as a (presumably) paid consultant' to drug makers whose meds were being reviewed at those meetings.

The other occasions in which Packer appeared before the Cardiovascular and Renal Drugs Advisory committee involved speaking on behalf of Bristol-Myers Squibb in 2002; acting as a consultant and speaker for GlaxoSmithKline in 2003; appearing as a speaker for NitroMed in 2005; appearing as a speaker for Sanofi in 2009 and acting as a consultant on behalf of Pfizer in 2010.

In fact, the Public Citizen letter also asserted that

Dr. Packer’s presence as an FDA advisory committee member at hearings extends beyond the CRDAC, as he has also participated in at least three meetings of the Arthritis Advisory Committee and served at least once on the Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs Advisory Committee since 2005.

We note with concern that, as with his revolving-door tenure at CRDAC, Dr. Packer has similarly worked with industry in the following capacities at non-CRDAC advisory committees while intermittently serving as a recurring member of some of these same committees:

- As a consultant to Centocor for its presentation on infliximab (Remicade) to the March 4, 2003, meeting of the Arthritis Advisory Committee;
- As an 'external expert' cited by GlaxoSmithKline at the July 30, 2007, joint meeting of the Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs and Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committees to discuss the cardiac ischemic risks of the thiazolidinedione diabetes drugs, with a focus on rosiglitazone (Avandia); and
- As a consultant to Boehringer Ingelheim for its presentation concerning the drug tiotropium (Spiriva HandiHaler), made before the November 19, 2009, meeting of the Pulmonary-Allergy Drugs Advisory Committee.

Summary

Dr Milton Packer served as a presumably paid spokesperson for six different pharmaceutical companies advocating for six different drugs at meetings of the FDA Cardiovascular and Renal Drugs Advisory Committee.  Over roughly the same time period he served as the chair, acting chair, or voting member of that same committee in numerous instances.  Also, Dr Packer served as a presumably paid spokesperson for one of the same drug companies, and for two additional drug companies advocating for another three drugs at meetings of three other FDA advisory committees.  On various occasions he had also served as a member of these three committees.  Parenthetically, one of the drugs for which Dr Packer, a cardiologist, advocated, Avandia, to a non-cardiologic committee was subsequently pulled from the market because of concerns about excess cardiologic complications (look here). 

Dr Packer repeatedly went back and forth between roles as a paid advocate for drug companies and as a member or chair of federal advisory committees which could influence FDA decisions about the drugs for which he advocated and which were made by the companies that employed him.


It certainly seems that Public Citizen was right in that the sorts of transitions Dr Packer made constituted multiple conflicts of interest, and that his work for multiple drug companies was likely to have distorted the recommendations of the committees on which he served.  Rapid transitions between temporary committee memberships and paid advocacy positions before such committees does seem to be a new version of the revolving door, and newly discovered type of conflict of interest.  It seems that conflicts of interest now pervade every aspect of health care, with huge cumulative effects on clinical and health policy decision making.

Note also that the person whose conflicts of interest were used as examples by Public Citizen just appeared in Health Care Renewal in another capacity.  Earlier this month we discussed a study (PARADIGM - HF) of a new drug for congestive heart failure (sacubitril) which received prominent media attention.  After various people, not limited to yours truly, pointed out that this study seemed to have multiple flaws which undercut claims that the new drug would be a "game changer," the principal investigator of the study delivered a written whupping to a critic whose writing appeared prominently on a cardiology web-site .  The scathing comeback, however, seemed based on a volley of logical fallacies, including repetitive ad hominem attacks on the critic (look here).  The PARADIGM - HF Principal Investigator was none other than the same Dr Milton Packer whose revolving door cycles were discussed above.  Note that the company that sponsored, and largely ran and designed PARADIGM - HF, and which paid Dr Packer to serve as Principal Investigator, was the same Novartis for whom Dr Packer was a spokesperson in the first example above. 

We wondered whether Dr Packer's conflicts of interest contributed to confused, illogical thinking and his apparently logically fallacious response to his critic.  Now it appears that Dr Packer has been immersed much more deeply in conflicts of interest than were apparent a few days ago.  So should he be regarded mainly as a heart failure "expert," or mainly as a paid marketer and public relations man for drug companies?  Obviously, he is both, but the mixture is not so clear.  The concern is all the more important because Dr Packer has become such a prominent medical academic.

So once again, again, again,...  we call for all conflicts to be disclosed in the interests of honesty.  Beyond that, as we have been saying for years, patients' and the public's health would benefit from an aggressive effort to reduce conflicts of interest affecting clinical and health policy decision making.    

12:24 PM

Twilight of the Anechoic Effect? - New England Journal of Medicine Article Discusses Previously Taboo Topic of Bad Corporate Health Care Leadership

We have often complained of the anechoic effect, that the issues we discuss on Health Care Renewal often do not seem to be considered topics of polite conversation.  Any discussion that might question the brilliance, integrity, dedication, or selflessness of the leaders of health care organizations seems particularly taboo. 

So a major aim of this blog has been to discuss the numerous publicly available examples of leadership that is ill-informed, uncaring about or hostile to the values of health care professionals, incompetent, self-interested, conflicted, or outright corrupt, and of governance that lacks accountability, transparency, integrity, honesty, or ethics.  We have postulated that such problems with leadership and governance are not only causes, but the major causes of the increasing dysfunction of our health care system.  That discussing these issues is simply not done in many contexts, including academic health care, medical and health care journals, and health policy fora has only accelerated health care dysfunction.

The New England Journal on Punishing Health Care Fraud

Therefore, I note with some surprise that the New England Journal of Medicine just published an article (online first) that implicitly challenged the leadership of some large health care organizations. [Outterson K. Punishing health care fraud - is the GSK settlement sufficient.  N Engl J Med 2012; 367: 1082 - 1085.  Link here.]

The article summarized the record settling legal settlement agreed to by GlaxoSmithKline (see this post).  It noted that the company pleaded guilty to three criminal charges.  It then noted that while this was the largest recent legal settlement by a pharmaceutical company, "it would be a mistake to assume that GSK was an outlier in the global pharmaceutical and medical-device industries. Indeed, many of the major companies have settled with the Department of Justice in recent years."  It included a table of the largest pharmaceutical company settlements with the US government from 2009 to now.

Based on this background, the article dared to question whether such settlements deter bad behavior:

But questions remain about the efficacy of fines and corporate integrity agreements in deterring corporate misbehavior. The 2012 fines against Abbott Laboratories and GSK represent a modest percentage of those companies' revenue. Companies might well view such fines as merely a cost of doing business — a quite small percentage of their global revenue and often a manageable percentage of the revenue received from the particular product under scrutiny. If so, little has been done to change the system; the government merely recoups a portion of the financial fruit of firms' past misdeeds.

Even more daring was its challenge to top executives of pharmaceutical corporations,

One partial solution would be to impose penalties on corporate executives rather than just the company as a whole. Boston whistleblower attorney Robert M. Thomas, Jr., embraces this approach: 'GSK is a recidivist. How can a company commit a $1 billion crime and no individual is held responsible?'

A Taboo Broken

Having blogged on Health Care Renewal for nearly eight years, I recall very few, if any instances in which leaders of health care organizations were described as deserving punishment, or perhaps even guilty of crimes within large circulation medical journals, and within the New England Journal of Medicine, the most prominent US journal in particular. While discussion of misbehavior within health care organizations has slowly been seeping into the medical and health care literature, delicate phrasing has often been employed that leaves unclear whether top executives have any accountability for this behavior. (For example, while the Lancet editorial on the GSK settlement condemned "GSK's fraud," accused GSK of "actively encouraging off-label prescription," and asserted that "GSK and other drug companies have come adrift from standards of the societies they seek to serve," it never said anything about GSK's leaders or whether they in paticular had anything to do with the company's bad behavior. [Anon. Moral decaly at GSK reaps record US$# billion fine. Lancet 2010; 380: 2. Link here.])

So it is a big step for the NEJM to publish an article that suggests corporate executives might deserve penalties. I hope that this publication might lead to a bit of discussion of these issues within the larger medical and health care communities, the vast majority of whom have likely never heard of this blog and may have never seen anything other than an occasional news article in local media questioning the leadership of large health care organizations.

Things are Even Worse

Unfortunately, I need to end with the observation that the problems are even worse than what the NEJM article implies. Legal settlements of allegations of bad behavior by large health care organizations are much more numerous than those mentioned in this article (look here for examples).

Many of the largest and most prestigious organizations actually have histories of multiple settlements, guilty pleas, and related legal and governmental findings. For example, look here for Pfizer's record, here for Johnson and Johnson's record, here for Abbott's record, and here for Wellpoint's record. Pfizer was even found by a jury to be a racketeering influenced and corrupt organization (RICO)(see post here).

Despite these records of recidivism, no leaders of these companies have paid any individual penalties, and none of these organizations have had any restructuring or leadership changes imposed. This is even more disturbing when this kid-glove treatment of misbehavior by big health care organizations is contrasted with the severe penalties imposed on individuals or leaders of small companies found guilty of health care fraud (look here).

You Heard It Here First

However, in 2003 we first published documentation of individual physicians' concerns that ill-informed, incompetent, self-interested, or even corrupt leadership was threatening their core values [Poses RM. A cautionary tale: the dysfunction of American health care. Eur J Int Med 2003; 14: 123-130. Link here.] Furthermore, since 2008 we have been stating that corporate fines do not deter bad behavior.

It is not that law enforcement does not have the power to seek penalties on individuals. As we noted here, a Supreme Court case from 1943 empowered the government to seek penalties against responsible corporate officers (the "responsible corporate officer doctrine") who were in a position to stop a fraud that resulted in a guilty plea or conviction, particularly for the selling of misbranded or adulterated drugs into interstate commerce under the US Food and Drug Act.  (This was exactly the situation dealt with by the GSK settlement.)  Despite a threat made in 2010 by the chief counsel of the Inspector General's office of the US Department of Health and Human Services to use such legal authority to "get high level executives out of companies," nothing of the sort has happened.

So now that it is no longer taboo to question the pretensions of some leaders of health care organizations to near divine purity, let me state as I did in 2008,

As long as health care leaders can shrug off the consequences of unethical behavior merely as acceptable costs of doing business, absent any serious attempts to get health care organizations to enforce internal codes of ethical behavior or to avoid hiring ethically challenged leaders, the procession will likely continue. The effects will be continually rising costs, declining quality, shrinking access, and rising numbers of demoralized health professionals.

As I wrote in 2009,

Until bad leadership of health care organizations leads to negative consequences for those practicing it, health care leadership can be expected to continuously degrade.

12:19 PM

Continuing Dissection of the Infamous Study 329

On the 1BoringOldMan blog, semi-anonymous blogger Mickey has been dissecting in detail the infamous Study 329 that GlaxoSmithKline used to promote Paxil (Seroxat, paroxetine) as safe and effective for children and adolescents, when the study data, rigorously analyzed, showed that was not the case.  Study 329 was an important part of the US Department of Justice case against GSK that resulted in a record $3 billion settlement (see this post). 

The posts so far are:
A Pretty Rotten Era  
A Movement
To Make Distortion Possible
The Lesson of Study 329: the Basics
The Lesson of Study 329: Efficacy Drifts to Trends and 2s
The Lesson of Study 329: Conventions and Protocols
The Lesson of Study 329: Uh-oh
The Lesson of Study 329: Data Transparency
The Lesson of Study 329: the Authors

This does not seem to be the end of the series, but the last post yesterday did have a striking conclusion:

But, for the moment, I am stuck on the piece that is, to me, the most fundamental lesson from this story, and unfortunately many similar stories in the industry-funded clinical trial literature that fills our journals. The authors of this study did not function as physicians, clinicians, scientists, or even authors. Some were there because of their previous credentials. Others were there to build up future credentials. But they weren’t there to do what they presented themselves as doing. Researchers are practicing medicine too. I might be seen as naive to see this as the center of this story. If that’s the case, I’ll go to my grave being naive. Medicine has been my life, and this isn’t Medicine.

There’s no place or tradition for physicians, particular physicians in high places, taking part in this kind of bullshit – particularly all the while claiming otherwise. The fact that it has been a widespread practice isn’t an excuse. That’s also an even stronger indictment. There are many principled neuroscientists working in this difficult area of medical science who’ve been tarnished by this kind of pseudoscience. There are many psychiatrists and other practitioners who’ve actually trusted these deceitful articles. And there are untold numbers of patients who’ve been medicated un-necessarily or even directly harmed by this and other capricious advise coming out of these studies – this one in particular. Rather than functioning as the advisers of ill people, these were physicians who actively participated in capitalizing on patients’ illness.

However, despite the seriousness of these concerns, and their corroboration in the Justice Department document that pushed GSK to settle for so much money, my alma mater, Brown University, where Dr Martin Keller, the lead author of Study 329, was Chair of Psychiatry, has consistently refused to revisit the study, and consistently failed to publicly refute the accusations against Dr Keller, nor to accept them and take appropriate action.  The University supposedly conducted an internal investigation of the matter, but has not seen fit to make it public.  When asked again about this, Brown's new President, Christina Paxson, referred the inquiry to the public relations people:

'The recent announcement by the U.S. Department of Justice did not suggest that any further reviews of the paper by the university are immediately warranted,' Darlene Trew Crist said in a written response. 'We have no further statement to make at this time.'

Given the seriousness of the allegations, and the University's mission:

The mission of Brown University is to serve the community, the nation, and the world by discovering, communicating, and preserving knowledge and understanding in a spirit of free inquiry, and by educating and preparing students to discharge the offices of life with usefulness and reputation.

the logic of the administration's refusal to have a public discussion of this case escapes me. As I have said before (in 2008!), the appearance of continued stonewalling, now going on for years, can easily be interpreted to imply that the institution has something really big and bad to hide.

Also see comments by Alison Bass on the Alison Bass blog, and by Dr Howard Brody on the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma blog.

ADDENDUM (4 September, 2012) - There have been two additional posts on the 1BoringOldMan blog on Study 329:
the lesson of Study 329: the hurdles…
the lesson of Study 329: naked Emperors, fractious Queens…

ADDENDUM (4 September, 2012) - See also this post on the Alison Bass blog.

ADDENDUM (5 September, 2012) - See this post on the retirement of Dr Keller by Ed Silverman on PharmaLot.

ADDENDUM (10 September, 201) - See the final two posts in the 1BoringOldMan series:
the lesson of Study 329: “we’re only as sick as our secrets”…
the final lesson of Study 329: epilogue…

His conclusion in the next to last post of the series:

Something terrible happened in psychiatry, an alliance between the pharmaceutical industry and a number of our leaders who allowed their academic credentials to be used for commercial purposes. It happened on a large scale, and in the process shamed all of us, whether we were involved or not. Many of the people we looked to to guide us fell into the role of key opinion leaders – a marketing term that meant that they could influence what we did and how we practiced. And in that new role, medical degrees, academic positions, the methods of science, and psychiatric experience became little more than marketing tools in a commercial campaign. Such was the case with Study 329 – an article that has become exemplary because it is now so painfully well known – a symbol for the failings of an era. It needs to be retracted simply because it was wrong on purpose – and we all know it. And yet no involved person, institution, or organization highlighted in that last paragraph has swallowed their pride, or guilt, or denial, or arrogance and called for retraction.

[Italics and bold typeface added for emphasis]

12:34 PM

Giant GSK Settlement Provides Reminder of the Pervasiveness of Stealth Marketing

The latest  and biggest legal settlement involving health care to hit the news, that of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and the US government, has many familiar elements. As summarized by the New York Times,

In the largest settlement involving a pharmaceutical company, the British drugmaker GlaxoSmithKline agreed to plead guilty to criminal charges and pay $3 billion in fines for promoting its best-selling antidepressants for unapproved uses and failing to report safety data about a top diabetes drug, federal prosecutors announced Monday. The agreement also includes civil penalties for improper marketing of a half-dozen other drugs.

As was the case for nearly every other legal settlement we have discussed,

No individuals have been charged in any of these cases.

Thus, how well even such a large settlement will deter future wrong-doing is not clear.

Nonetheless, the documents released with it provide good documentation about how pervasive systematic, deceptive stealth marketing campaigns have become in health care. 

In particular, the official "complaint" filed by the US Department of Justice emphasized all these elements in the stealth marketing of paroxetine (Paxil, Seroxat in the UK) to adolescents.

Manipulation of Clinical Research

We have frequently discussed how health care corporations, particularly pharmaceutical, biotechnology and device companies, now sponsor  the majority of clinical research.  Their control of the design, implementation, analysis and dissemination of clinical research allows manipulation that increases the likelihood that the results will be favorable to their vested interests, usually the products and services they sell. 

We have previously discussed the manipulation of Study 329 to promote the marketing of Paxil (look here and here).  However, the US DOJ document makes these concerns more official.  It included:

Manipulation of Study Endpoints

Study 329 was a randomized controlled trial of Paxil vs imipramine vs placebo for depression in adolescents. The two primary endpoints pre-specified to the US Food and Drug Administration were "the degree to which a patient's Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression ('HAM-D') total score changed from baseline"; and "the patient's 'response' to medication, as defined as (a) a 50% or greater reduction in the patient's HAMD-D score, or (b) a HAM-D score of less than or equal to 8." However, initial analysis by GSK failed to show that Paxil improved either of these two end-points. The company concluded "it would be commercially unacceptable to include a statement that efficacy had not been demonstrated, as this would undermine the profile of [Paxil]."

So the analysis emphasized secondary outcomes, the "Study 329 investigators later added several additional efficacy measures not specified in the protocol. Paxil separate statistically from placebo on certain of these measures." Adding numerous post-hoc measures increased the likelihood of finding a difference on at least one due to chance alone.

Manipulation of Data

Initial analysis of the data suggested that patients given Paxil experienced 11 serious adverse events, including five that appeared related to suicidal ideation or action. When the FDA later reexamined the data, "upon closer examination the number of possible suicide-related events among the Study 329 Paxil patients increased beyond the five patients GSK described in the JACAAP article as having 'emotional lability.' While collecting saftey information for the FDA, GSK admitted that there were four more possible suicide-related events among Paxil patients in Study 329. In addition the FDA later identified yet another possible suicide-related event in the Study 329 Paxil patients, which was also not among the 11 serious advents listed in the JAACAP article. Thus, altogether, 10 of the 93 Paxil patients in Study 329 experienced a possible suicidal event, compared to one in 87 patients on placebo. This is a fundamentally different picture of Paxil's pediatric safety profile than the one painted by the JAACAP article...." 

Manipulation of Dissemination

The report describing the results of Study 329 (Keller MB, Ryan ND, Strober M et al.  Efficacy of paroxetine in the treatment of adolescent major depression: a randomized controlled trial.  J Am Acad Child Adolescent Psychiatry 2001; 40: 762-772.  Link here. ) was written under the control of GSK. "In April 1998, GSK hired Scientific Therapeutics Information, Inc (STI) to prepare a journal article about Study 329. GSK worked closely with STI on the article by providing a draft clinical report to 'serve as a template for the proposed publication.'"

The published report of Study 329 "mischaracterized the results." "Although the ... article identified the study's two primary endpoints in the abstract, the article did not explicitly state that Paxil failed to show superiority to placebo on either of the primary efficacy measures." Also, "the article did not explicitly identify the two protocol-specified primary outcome measures - or that Paxil failed to show superiority to placebo on these two measures. Instead the article claimed that there were eight efficacy measures and that Paxil was statistically superior to placebo on four of them." In addition, "while the article listed the five protocol-defined secondary endpoints, the text of the article omitted any discussion regarding three of the secondary measures on which Paxil failed to statistically demonstrate its superiority to placebo and instead focused on the five secondary measures that GSK added belatedly and never incorporated into the Study 329 protocol. The article claimed that these finve secondary measures had been identified 'a priori,' therefore incorrectly suggesting that all secondary endpoints had been part of the original study protocol." In other words, the final published articles contained multiple outright falsehoods about the drug's efficacy that exaggerated that efficacy.

Furthermore, initial analysis showed that patients given Paxil had more serious adverse events than others. An initial draft of the study article stated, "serious adverse events occurred in 11 patients in the paroxetine group, 5 in the imipramine group, and 2 in the placebo group." These included "headache during down-titration(1 patient), and various psychiatric events (10 patients): worsening depression (2); emotional lability (e.g., suicidal ideation/ gestures, overdoses), (5); conduct problems or hostility (e.g., aggressiveness, behavioral disturbance in school) (2); and mania (1)." As noted above, the number of suicide related events was actually double that noted in this draft as "emotional lability."  However, the published version of the report "falsely state[d] that only one of the 11 serious adverse events in Paxil patients was considered related to treatment...."  Nor did it mention the true number of events related to suicidal ideation or action.

The article only "listed at most five possibly suicidal events among Paxil patients, brushed those off as unrelated to Paxil, and conclude that treating children with Paxil was safe."

Later, GSK marketing materials described the results of the study thus,

This 'cutting-edge,' landmark study is the first to compare efficacy of an SSRI and a TCA with placebo in the treatment of major depression in adolescents. Paxil demonstrates REMARKABLE Efficacy and Safety in the treatment of adolescent depression."

Thus the conrol exerted by GSK over the published article, despite its apparent academic authorship, enabled it to promote a drug that was not efficacious and had major adverse events as remarkably safe and effective, a totally deceptive result that would mislead any health care professional who used the article to guide clinical practice. 

Suppression of Clinical Research

GSK sponsored two other studies of Paxil in pediatric populations, Studies 377 and 701. As stated in the Department of Justice's Criminal Complaint against GSK,

GSK Did Not Publicize the Results of Studies 377 and 701
43. GSK learned the results of Study 377 in 1998 and the results of Study 701 in 2001. Paxil failed to demonstrate efficacy on any of the endpoints of either study.
44. GSK did not hire a contractor to help write medical articles about the results of Studies 377 and 701, as it had with Study 329.
45. GSK did not inform its sales representatives about the results of Studies 377 and 701.

Thus, GSK managed to conceal the fact that the majority of the studies it sponsored about Paxil used for adolescent patients showed no evidence that the drug worked, again seriously distorting the evidence-base on which clinicians made decisions, and doubtless leading to the use of a dangerous, ineffective drug by numerous vulnerable patients.

Bribing Physicians to Prescribe

GSK's sales representative reflected in their call notes their use of money, gifts, entertainment and other kickbacks to induct doctors to prescribe GSK drugs....

One really creative way to pay physicians to be exposed to marketing:

For example, in or about 2000 or 2001, GSK used 'Reprint Mastery Training Programs' or 'RMTS' to further promote drugs by purporting to pay physicians to train sales representative to review reprints of studies. Although the training was purportedly for the representatives, in fact, the sales force was already familiar with the materials. GSK typically paid physicians $250 to $500 to review the reprints.

Thus GSK simply paid physicians to use its drug, a practice characterized as kickbacks in the official complaint.  An article in the Guardian noted that the US Attorney involved in the case put it even more bluntly,

The sales force bribed physicians to prescribe GSK products using every imaginable form of high-priced entertainment, from Hawaiian vacations [and] paying doctors millions of dollars to go on speaking tours, to tickets to Madonna concerts.

Use of Key Opinion Leaders as Disguised Marketers

GSK also created a group of national 'key opinion leaders' ('KOLs') who were paid generous consulting fees. GSK selected many of these physicians based on their prescribing habits and influence within the community and used the speaker fees paid to these physicians to induce and reward prescribing of GSK's products. GSK used these individual to communicate marketing messages focused on the drug's marketing campaigns at the time, including off-label uses. Some physicians on GSK's speaker's board have been paid more than a million dollars for speaking on behalf of the company and recommending its drugs.

Thus key opinion leaders were paid specifically to market drugs, and as a reward, a bribe for prescribing drugs.

Consulting Fees as Kickbacks

In general,

In order to induce physicians to prescribe and recommend its drugs, GSK paid kickbacks to health professionals in various forms, including speaking or consulting fees, travel, entertainment, gifts, grants, and sham advisory boards, training,....

In particular,

During 2000 and 2001 at least, GSK also utilized events termed 'advisory boards' or consultant meetings and forums to disseminate its promotional message. Although these boards were purportedly composed of 'thought leaders' for the purpose of obtaining advice from the physicians, in fact, the 'advisory boards' were little more than promotional events coupled with financial inducement to prescribing and influential physicians.

Also,

GSK typically paid the physician between $250 and $750 to attend each local 'advisory' meeting. The payments did not reflect the value of services. The physician was not required to do anything but show up. GSK had no legitimate business reason to hire thousands of 'advisors' to 'consult' with the company about a single drug.

Manipulation of Continuing Medical Education

GSK also used so-called CME and CME Express programs and other sham training for marketing purposes, and to promote off-labe uses for the GSK prescription drugs.

Furthermore,

These CME programs purported to be independent eduaction free of company influence, but in fact functioned as GSK promotional programs disguised as medical education. GSK maintained control and influence over the purportedly independent CME programs through speaker selection, and influence over content and audience, among other things. Although third party vendors were usually also involved, they served only as artificial 'firewalls' that did not insulate the program from GSK's influence.

Summary

The legal documentation of the GSK settlement demonstrated how one drug company used an integrated, systematic campaign incorporating deception and bribery to sell drugs. Its elements included manipulation and suppression of the clinical research it sponsored, paying key opinion leaders to be disguised drug marketers, outright payments to physicians to prescribe drugs, and manipulation, again using payments to physicians, of supposedly independent continuing medical education. 

Note that while I summarized the elements of the stealth marketing campaign to sell Paxil, particularly for use in pediatric patients, the US government complaint also documents similar activities used to sell other drugs.  Furthermore, other stealth marketing campaigns have come to light through legal action, and many other instances of manipulation and suppression of clinical research, use of KOLs as disguised marketers, kickbacks and bribes, and manipulation of CME have been documented.

This means that any claims that:
- commercially sponsored clinical research provides clear, unbiased data that should drive clinical decisions
- health care professionals and academics paid as consultants by commercial health care firms are not influenced by these payments, and can provide clear, unbiased opinions
- commercially sponsored medical education provides clear, unbiased teaching
unfortunately must be viewed with extreme skepticism. This is particularly unfortunate given that most clinical research is now supported by commercial sponsors, and the majority of influential academics in medicine get some form of payments from the health care industry (look here).

Of course, there are some physicians who consult for commercial firms who actually provide clinical or scientific advice or assistance, and some commercially sponsored activities are honest. But we must wonder what garden path all those advocates for increasing industry "collaboration" to promote "innovation," and who regard conflicts of interest as "inevitable" and "manageable" are taking us down (e.g., look here and here).

Although the current settlement will require a huge payment, as I have said many times before (as early as 2008, here), do not expect such settlements to deter future bad behavior like that listed above.  The cost of the settlement will actually be spread among all company shareholders, all company employees, and likely patients and taxpayers.  However, the settlement will entail no specific negative consequences to the people who authorized, directed, or implemented the bad behavior.  In particular, executives whose remuneration was swollen by proceeds from the sales of affected drugs, and the health care professionals who willingly accepted what the US Attorney called bribes will not pay any sort of penalty.  The bad behavior listed above was doubtless personally very profitable for some people.  Unless people who indulge in such behavior face the possibility of penalties worse than their expected gains, expect such bad behavior to continue.

In fact, as the New York Times reported,

critics argue that even large fines are not enough to deter drug companies from unlawful behavior. Only when prosecutors single out individual executives for punishment, they say, will practices begin to change.

'What we’re learning is that money doesn’t deter corporate malfeasance,' said Eliot Spitzer, who, as New York’s attorney general, sued GlaxoSmithKline in 2004 over similar accusations involving Paxil. 'The only thing that will work in my view is C.E.O.’s and officials being forced to resign and individual culpability being enforced.'

True health care reform would strive to eliminate important conflicts of interest affecting clinical research and medical education.  Specifically, it would prevent corporations that sell health care products or services from controlling clinical research meant to evaluate these products or services.  It would seek to eliminate serious conflicts of interest affecting health care professionals.  Finally, it would prevent vested interests from controlling medical education.  Not that I expect any such reform in the near future, it would be too threatening to those who have personally benefited from the current system.

Hat tip to Dr Howard Brody whose Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma blog scooped me on the details of the settlement relevant to study 329.

ADDENDUM (11 July, 2012) - see also this post on the 1BoringOldMan blog.

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