What Revolving Door? - An Unprecedented Endorsement of a Political Appointment by the "Gold Standard" Medical Journal

An Unprecedented Endorsement 

It's deja vu all over again.  In the spring of 2015, the New England Journal, the most prestigious US medical journal, published a remarkable series of opinion pieces extrolling physician-industry collaborations, and minimizing the significance of resulting conflicts of interest.  More remarkable was the extent that the articles' argument were bolstered by logical fallacies (look here).

Doubling down, the New England Journal of Medicine appeared to make its first ever endorsement of a nominee for federal office.  On October 28, 2015, the NEJM published an editorial with the almost campaign slogan like title, "Califf for the FDA," which enthusiastically endorsed the current presidential nominee to be Commissioner of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). (1)   It began, [with italics added for emphasis]

Robert M. Califf, M.D., has been nominated to be the next head of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); he currently serves as Deputy Commissioner for the Office of Medical Products and Tobacco. We think his confirmation as commissioner should proceed as quickly as possible. Because the FDA oversees the safety and, in some spheres, the efficacy of products that constitute about 25% of our economy, the country needs a strong and experienced leader who can keep the FDA focused on its mission.

And the editorial concluded,

Califf's experience, his proven leadership abilities, his record of robust research to guide clinical practice, and his unwavering dedication to improving patient outcomes are unsurpased qualifications for the post of commissioner of the FDA; we strongly endorse his nomination and urge the Senate to act favorably on it. 

I have never seen this journal, known primarily for publishing research and scholarly opinion on medicine and health care, publicly render an opinion about a nomination for a federal position, let alone such an enthusiastic one.  A quick search of the journal revealed that it had taken no position and made no comment about the nominations of the last three US FDA Commissioners, (Dr Margaret Hamburg, Dr Andrew von Eschenbach, Dr Lester Crawford, and Dr Mark McClellan, look here) who were nominated by one Democratic and one Republican President.

Dismissing Concerns about Conflicts of Interest

This fervid endorsement came in the face of some controversy about the nomination, particularly about Dr Califf's previous ties to industry (see this post ).  He has participated in many industry sponsored clinical research projects.  For example, a 2013 JAMA disclosure statement included 13 commercial research sponsors of his work.  It also noted his consultative relationships with 32 commercial firms.  We discovered he also had a "board level" conflict of interest, having been a director of Portola Pharmaceuticals, for which he received over $250,000 in 2014 (see this proxy statement).  He also had been paid for "educational activities" in previous years, possibly including "drug talks," at least per one blogger.  So in my humble opinion, the nomination of Dr Califf could potentially become one of the most significant health care revolving door cases to affect US government.


Such consideration may have influenced Senator Bernie Sanders (I - Vermont), who is currently running for President.  In early October he announced he would oppose the Califf nomination.

Furthermore, since our post but before the publication of the NEJM editorial, there have been new revelations.   Dr Califf twithdrew as authors from several papers that had been accepted for publication, seemingly violating norms for declaring authorship of scholarly works, (see the Boston Globe here).   Dr Califf was revealed to have been a board member of and consultant to Faculty Connection LLC, which advises academic researchers "who want to work with industry" about regulatory submissions (see Intercept.com here)

Yet the Editor of the New England Journal of Medicine dismissed concerns about Dr Califf's industry relationships,

a few concerns have been expressed about his associations with industry, and these concerns may have caused some to withhold support for his nomination.

Like Califf, we believe that our actions should be driven by data, not innuendo. Since 2005, Califf has reported, as an investigator, the outcomes of seven clinical trials sponsored solely by industry in primary publications in major general medical journals. Of these trials, four had a negative outcome (i.e., not favoring the intervention), two favored the intervention, and one, with a factorial design, had a mixed outcome. Given this performance, it is impossible to argue that Califf has a pro-industry bias.

This opinion may yet carry the day.  The New York Times reported that

Dr Robert M Califf ... coasted through a confirmation hearing on Tuesday, with  most members of a Senate committee - including some who have been skeptical about his ties to the pharmaceutical industry - seeming set to support his candidacy.

This occurred despite one more major revelation that appeared since the editorial was published, but before the hearing.  A large pharmaceutical company clinical trial which Dr Califf ran had been criticized as biased in favor of the company's drug by the FDA's own staff and consultants. (see POGO here).  And it occurred despite calls by various organizations for the nomination to be turned down, including by Public Citizen and the AIDS Healthcare Foundation (see Medscape here).

Missing the Main Point

However, the NEJM editorial seemed to miss the main point.  It revolved around the claim that

It is impossible to argue that Califf has a pro-industry bias.

This was based apparently on an informal evaluation by Dr Drazen of seven of Dr Califf's 1200 publications.  So at best this was about the question of pro-industry bias in research publications. 

However, the controversy is about Dr Califf's nomination as the head of the US government agency that oversees the pharmaceutical, device and biotechnology industries, among others, and tries to assure the safety and effectiveness of drugs, biologics and medical devices, among other responsibilities.  The overriding issue is about the risk that his decision making in these capacities could be biased.  The real issue is the revolving door, not bias in research.

As we have repeated very recently, the revolving door can be veiwed as a species of conflict of interest.   Government officials who can look forward to extremely lucrative employment in health care industry may be much more inclined to seem friendly to the industry while in office.  Government officials who were previously paid by industry, and who benefited from financial interactions with industry, are likely to maintain their industry mindset and be mindful of their industry friends.  But the concern here is not that this risks biasing future research.  The risk is that a person who previously enjoyed close ties, including close financial ties to industry is at risk of putting the interests of industry over those of citizens and patients while running a US government agency charged with regulating that industry and protecting the health and safety of those citizens and patients.

Worse, some experts have suggested that the revolving door is in fact corruption.  As we noted here, the experts from the distinguished European anti-corruption group U4 wrote,

The literature makes clear that the revolving door process is a source of valuable political connections for private firms. But it generates corruption risks and has strong distortionary effects on the economy, especially when this power is concentrated within a few firms.

  Dr Drazen's editorial never directly addressed that issue.  It is one that should still be a concern.

Mission-Hostile Management?

Finally, the effect of the Califf nomination on the FDA has generated considerable public comment.  The effect of the New England Journal of Medicine's unprecendented editorial endorsement of the nomination has generated almost no discussion.  Only on the 1BoringOldMan blog was there note of the past industry ties of the current NEJM editor inspired their own controversies, and asked "since when is the editorship of the NEJM a position from which to weigh in on such matters?" (look here).

Using the editorship to so weigh in could not only obfuscate the debate about the nomination.  It could threaten the mission of a proud medical institution. The NEJM claims a

reputation as the 'gold standard' for quality biomedical research and for the best practices in clinical medicine.

It claims its editorials are

thoughtful, carefully reasoned analyses and interpretations [which] help you crystallize your own opinions on current topics and findings

Yet the blanket and unprecedented endorsement of the current FDA nominee appears otherwise.  We have previously argued that the earlier NEJM opinion pieces on conflicts of interest were based on logical fallacies more than "thoughtful, carefully reasoned analyses and interpretation."  In the Editor's apparent haste to defend industry-physician relationships, he risks the reputation and mission of once what was really a gold standard.

 Reference

1.  Drazen JM. Califf for the FDA.  N Engl J Med 2015;  DOI: 10.1056/NEJMe1513828 (link here)  

9:02 AM

Health Care Renewal Bloggers in Print on Conflicts of Interest and Health Care Corruption

Not to toot our own horn too loudly, but in the last week, Health Care Renewal bloggers have appeared in print three times.

Prevalence of Board Level Conflicts of Interest

We recently posted on a British Medical Journal article on the prevalence of what we originally termed "a new species of conflicts of interest," that is, conflicts of interest involving membership in boards of directors of for-profit health care corporations.  A shortened version of this just appeared as a (not very) "rapid response" in the BMJ here.  (Note though that the official date of the response was October 3.)

The New England Journal Series Calling for Rethinking the Problem of Conflicts of Interest

After the New England Journal of Medicine published an editorial and three commentaries earlier this year suggesting that concerns about conflicts of interest in health care may have been overblown, we pointed out that many of their arguments were supported by logical fallacies.  The Canadian Medical Association Journal has been publishing a series of news articles about the issue.  The latest one, published on November 17, 2015, ended by quoting HCR blogger Roy M Poses MD.

Health Care Corruption

On November 16, 2015, the Corporate Crime Reporter published a front page interview, "Roy Poses on Corruption in American Healthcare,"  The interview is listed here,  and summarized here but the full transcript apparently is not available online, but only in print and via subscription.  (Link to interview updated on 19 November, 2015).  

12:27 PM

Academic Medical Leaders as Directors of For-Profit Health Care Corporations: the Prevalence of This "New Species" of Conflict of Interest Documented in the BMJ

The important conflicts of interest generated when academic health care leaders also serve on the boards of directors of for-profit health care corporations is suddenly less anechoic, thanks to some intrepid researchers and the British Journal of Medicine.

Background: Academic Health Care Leaders Also Serving as Directors of For-Profit Health Care Corporations

First Discovered Cases

In 2006, we first noticed that leaders of academic medicine also were serving as board members of large for-profit health care corporations.  The first example we discussed was that of Marye Anne Fox, Chancellor (equivalent to president) of the University of California - San Diego, and hence the person to whom the University of California, San Diego School of Medicine and its academic medical center report. The conflict was between this position, and her service as a member of the board of directors of Boston Scientific, a medical device manufacture, and the board of directors of Pharmaceutical Product Development Inc., a contract research organization.

Later that year, we discussed a "new species of conflict of interest."  At that time we wrote:

Medical schools and their academic medical centers and teaching hospitals must deal with all sorts of health care companies, drug and device manufacturers, information technology venders, managed care organizations and health insurers, etc, in the course of fulfilling their patient care, teaching, and research missions. Thus, it seems that service on the board of directors of a such public for-profit health care company would generate a severe conflict for an academic health care leader, because such service entails a fiduciary duty to uphold the interests of the company and its stockholders. Such a duty ought on its face to have a much more important effect on thinking and decision making than receiving a gift, or even being paid for research or consulting services. Furthermore, the financial rewards for service on a company board, which usually include directors' fees and stock options, are comparable to the most highly paid consulting positions. What supports the interests of the company, however, may not always be good for the medical school, academic medical center or teaching hospital.

Since 2006, we continued to find colorful examples of such conflicts of interest, e.g.,

- In 2006, the UnitedHealth board included multiple academic leaders, at least one of whom seemed partly responsible as a member of the board compensation committee for allowing the then UnitedHealth CEO to collect many backdated stock options (look here)
- In 2009, some attributed the problems at George Washington University's medical school that caused it to be put on probation to the conflict of interest of its provost and vice president for health affairs,  who also sat on the board of Universal Health Services, which owned the university hospital (look here)...

Through more recent years,

- In 2014, members of the AMA committee that has an outsize role in how the government fixes the pay of US doctors wer also found to be members of boards of directors of such companies as Kindred Healthcare, Hanger Inc, and Sante. (Look here.)
- In 2015, the academic physician and research unit leader nominated to be the new head of the US Food and Drug was a director of Portola Pharmaceuticals (look here)...

Look here for even more

Our Early Cross-Sectional Study

In 2007, we did a somewhat rough and ready research project based on 2005 data to determine the prevalence of such conflicts.  The results were presented in abstract form,(1) but not published as an article:

In 2005, there were 164 US health care companies in the 2005 S&P 1500, and 125 US medical schools. We identified 198 people who served on the companies' boards of directors who had faculty or leadership positions at these medical schools. Of the 125 medical schools, 65 schools had at least one faculty member and/or leader who also served on a health care corporation's board of directors. 15 schools had more than five, and 4 had more than 10 such individuals. Of the 125 schools, 7 reported to university presidents who were also directors of health care corporations, and 11 schools reported to vice-presidents for health affairs who were also such corporate directors. Four schools were lead by deans who were also health care corporate directors, and 10 schools had academic medical center CEOs who were such directors. 22 schools had at least one top leader who was also a director of a health care corporation. 36 schools reported to university boards of trustees which each included at least one director of a health care corporation, and 12 schools' own boards of trustees included at least one such director.

We concluded:

more than one-half of US medical schools had a leader or faculty member who also was a director of a major US for-profit publicly traded Bpure^ health care corporation, more than one-sixth of schools had a top leader who was also such a director, and more than one-fifth reported to boards of trustees which included such directors.

More Modern and Complete Data

Unfortunately, we never wrote a full paper about this work, although the likelihood we could have gotten it published around 2007 was very small.  It is fortunate that Anderson and colleagues did a more complete and current version of this project, which was published online this week by the British Medical Journal.(2)

Methods

Their methodology was similar to our earlier work, but more sophisticated.  They obtained data on the 2013 board members of 446 public for-profit US companies listed on New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ and classified as in the healthcare sector, including pharmaceutical, biotechnology, medical equipment and supply companies and health care providers from the companies' 2014 proxy statements.

Results

Their results were striking, suggesting even a greater prevalence of conflicted academic leaders than our preliminary results suggested

Directors were affiliated with 85 geographically diverse non-profit academic institutions, including 19 of the top 20 National Institute of Health funded medical schools and all of the 17 US News honor roll hospitals. Overall, these 279 academically affiliated directors included 73 leaders, 121 professors, and 85 trustees. Leaders included 17 chief executive officers and 11 vice presidents or executive officers of health systems and hospitals; 15 university presidents, provosts, and chancellors; and eight medical school deans or presidents.

The new study also described the direct financial relationships among the academic leaders, professors and trustees and the corporations on whose boards they served.

The total annual compensation to academically affiliated directors for their services to companies was $54 995 786 (£35 836 000; €49 185 900) (median individual compensation $193 000) and directors beneficially owned 59 831 477 shares of company stock (median 50 699 shares).

Discussion

As we have suggested, Anderson et al stated that being on the board of directors of a for-profit health care corporation creates conflicts of interest beyond those created by simply having a financial relationship with a health care company, e.g., by participating in a commercially sponsored research project or acting as a consultant to a company.

Similar to individuals engaging in consulting relationships, directors on industry boards enter a formal contract with the company and receive financial payment for services; however, they are subject to two important differences. Firstly, unlike consultants who are compensated to provide expertise on a specific issue, directors are subject to a fiduciary responsibility to company shareholders to advance the general interests of the company and increase profits. Secondly, directors are reimbursed both through larger cash fees than typical consulting contracts and through stock options, the value of which is directly tied to the financial success of the company.

They also added the reminder that,

Though the missions of academia and for profit companies can overlap, they may also diverge, specifically when the for profit mission of industry competes with the non-profit taxpayer funded clinical and research missions of academic medical and research institutions.

So,

previous guidelines have emphasized the relationships of clinicians and researchers with industry, but institutional conflicts of interest, which arise when administrators, including executive officers, trustees, and clinical leaders have a financial relationship with industry, are increasingly recognized and pose a unique set of risks to academic missions. 

Our Summary

We have written again and again on the problem of conflicts of interest affecting health care professionals, academics, and policy makers.  The worst such conflicts may occur when individuals are simultaneously leaders of large mission-oriented health care non-profit organizations, such as teaching hospitals, medical schools, or research institutes, and board members of for-profit health care corporations.  Despite our attempts to raise such issues as important, and probably important causes of health care dysfunction, they have remained anechoic.

Now a broadly based study of this no longer so "new species" of conflict of interest has appeared in one of the biggest and most prestigious medical journals.  Let us hope it will bring this issue to the forefront, and also partially counter those who have been preaching that concerns about conflicts of interest in health care are overblown.

As we have said again and again, the web of conflicts of interest that is pervasive in medicine and health care is now threatening to strangle medicine and health care.  Furthermore, this web is now strong enough to have effectively transformed US health care into an oligarchy or plutocracy.  Health care is effectively run by a relatively small group of people, mainly professional managers plus a few (lapsed?) health care professionals, who simultaneously run or influence multiple corporations and organizations.

For patients and the public to trust health care professionals and health care organizations, they need to know that these individuals and organizations are putting patients' and the public's health ahead of private gain. Health care professionals who care for patients, those who teach about medicine and health care, clinical researchers, and those who make medical and health care policy should do so free from conflicts of interest that might inhibit their abilities to put patients and the public's health first.

Health care professionals ought to make it their highest priority to ensure that the organizations for which they work, or with which they interact also put patients' and the public's health ahead of private gain, especially the private gain of the organizations' leaders and their cronies.

ADDENDUM (16 November, 2015) - Note that an abbreviated version of this post has appeared as an electronic "rapid response" to the article by Anderson et al (link here), although the published form has on it our original submission date.   

References

1. Poses RM, Smith WR, Crausman R, Maulitz R. Selling them the rope: prevalence of for-profit health care corporate dirctors among academic medical leaders. J Gen Intern Med 2007; 22 (Suppl 1): 98.
2.  Anderson TS, Good CB, Gellad WF.  Prevalence and compensation of academic leaders, professors and trustees on publicly trade US healthcare company boards of directors: cross sectional study.  Brit Med J 2015; 351:h4826.  Link here. 

12:39 PM

Turn That Door Around - A Physician Substantially Tied to the Pharmaceutical Industry Nominated to Run the FDA

It seems to be the season of the revolving door in health care.  The latest version got some media attention, because it involves one of the most important health care leadership positions in the US government, the Director of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  However, the case actually seems much more serious than what the media has recently reported.

The Basics

For an introduction, we turn to the Wall Street Journal from September 15, 2015:

President Barack Obama plans to nominate the prominent cardiologist and medical researcher Robert Califf as the next commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, the White House said Tuesday.

Dr. Califf had been named the FDA’s deputy commissioner for medical products and tobacco—effectively the No. 2 post—in February. He joined the FDA from Duke University, where he had served as a professor of medicine, a leading pharmaceutical researcher and the vice chancellor for clinical and translational research.

The new nomination got some rave reviews. For example, from the WSJ article,

Francis Collins, director of the National Institutes of Health and a scientist who has worked with Dr. Califf for years, called this 'a fantastic nomination.'

Then this in the NY Times (Sept 15, 2015):

'He’s never forgotten that at his core he’s a doctor, and he cares deeply about providing evidence to help people take better care of patients,' said Dr. Robert Harrington, professor and chairman of the department of medicine at the Stanford University School of Medicine, who worked with Dr. Califf at Duke.

Also, a MedPage Today article was entitled, "Califf Nomination for FDA Chief Gets Most High Marks," and included such testimonials as,

'He has a very good understanding of industry and academia, and think that will serve him well,' Caleb Alexander, MD, co-director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Drug Safety and Effectiveness in Baltimore, told MedPage Today....

Also, this from Dr Harlan Krumholz,

He's a broad thinker and a very creative and visionary individual. He will be an outstanding choice.

And this from Dr Sanjay Kaul,

I can't think of a more qualified person than Dr. Califf to lead the FDA at the present time. He is an accomplished leader in cardiovascular disease research whose work has resulted in therapies that save lives and improve the quality of life for millions of patients.

Is it time to break out the confetti yet?

Conflicts of Interest a Fly in the Ointment?

The only fly in the ointment was the matter of Dr Califf's ties to industry. The WSJ article included,

Diana Zuckerman, president of the National Center for Health Research, a Washington-based group focusing on medical-product safety, questioned his ties to the drug industry.

'Dr. Califf’s expertise and his close ties to the pharmaceutical industry are both well-known,' she said. 'His ties to industry have been a source of great concern to public-health experts when he was previously considered for FDA commissioner, and those ties raise important questions about this nomination.'

The MedPage Today article noted that Public Citizen's Health Research Group stated,

'During his tenure at Duke University, Califf racked up a long history of extensive financial ties to multiple drug and device companies, including Amgen, Astra-Zeneca, Eli Lilly, Johnson & Johnson, Merck Sharpe & Dohme and Sanofi-Aventis, to name a few,' Michael Carome, MD, the group's director, said in a statement. 'Strikingly, no FDA commissioner has had such close financial relationships with industries regulated by the agency prior to being appointed.'

The MedPage Today article, however, then went on to undermine those concerns, implying that only fringe people like those at Public Citizen were really worried. 

Most experts contacted by MedPage Today seemed to think Califf would not have a problem getting Senate confirmation. 'I expect him to be confirmed," said [Dr. Steven] Nissen. 'He is very well liked by people ... in both parties, and I would expect the nomination to go well.'

'All signals suggest that Dr. Califf is well-respected on both sides of the political aisle,' Jay Wolfson, DrPH, JD, senior associate dean at the University of South Florida's Morsani College of Medicine, in Tampa, said in an email.

'There are some who believe his relationship with [the drug industry] may be a problem, but most see it as a value-added factor in building a functional, more streamlined relationship with the industry in order to improve the speed with which truly effective and quality drugs and devices are made available, mitigate the excessive costs associated with pharmaceuticals, and influence policies and practices intended to improve health status.'

Note that the experts were not all named, or their expertise described, the first two paragraphs were really about Dr Califf's political support, and the third paragraph clearly reflected the views of someone who thought that the FDA needs to have a lighter regulatory touch. 

There was additional reporting about Dr Califf's conflicts of interest, but again with the effect of minimizing their importance.  The Wall Street Journal published a second article on September 18, 2015 which first reported,

From 2009 through early 2015, Dr. Califf received consulting fees of roughly $205,000 from companies including Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Co., GlaxoSmithKline PLC and one medical-device maker, records show. The payments are documented by the federal Open Payments database, and PharmaShine, a database of pharmaceutical disclosures operated by Obsidian Healthcare Disclosure Services LLC. Drug makers spent an additional $21,000 on travel, meals and other expenses for Dr. Califf, data show.

But the article provided this counterpoint,

Kevin Griffis, a spokesman for the Department of Health and Human Services, said Dr. Califf had ceased all work with drug makers once he was hired by the FDA and that he has gone through a rigorous screening process for potential conflicts of interest. Mr. Griffis said Dr. Califf had donated all the consulting fees he has received since the mid-2000s to nonprofit groups.

'Dr. Robert Califf’s professional career has been dedicated to advancing biomedical research, including the rigorous evaluation of the safety, efficacy and appropriate use of both new medical products and those already on the market,' said Mr. Griffis, assistant secretary for public affairs at HHS.

Note that Dr Califf already is at the FDA, in a position that I do not believe required Senate confirmation.  It is striking, however, how the agency's own public relations people have jumped to his defense now as a nominee who has to be confirmed by the Senate.  However, I suppose that had Dr Califf donated all this fees to a local soup kitchen, they could not be called much of a conflict of interest.  But Mr Griffis said "nonprofit groups," without specification, not "soup kitchens." And continue reading to find out more. 

A simultaneous NY Times article enlarged a bit on Dr Califf's industry relationships,

He has written scientific papers with pharmaceutical company researchers, and his financial disclosure form last year listed seven drug companies and a device maker that paid him for consulting and six others that partly supported his university salary, including Merck, Novartis and Eli Lilly. A conflict-of-interest section at the end of an article he wrote in the European Heart Journal last year declared financial support from more than 20 companies.

However the NYT article also quoted Mr Griffis about the donations to "nonprofits," and added,

A résumé studded with industry funding is not unusual in academic medicine, Dr. Califf’s supporters note. Doctors are paid consulting fees all the time, and universities routinely conduct clinical trials on behalf of companies. Those contracts help support university researchers’ salaries, a standard practice. Many emphasize that it does not imply an inherent conflict.

His supporters contend that Dr. Califf’s vast experience in the clinical science world could be a major asset in his new post.

Furthermore,

Supporters and former colleagues say Dr. Califf’s background makes him perfectly suited to the job of commissioner. He has spent years improving the way clinical trials are conducted, coming up with groundbreaking trial designs for medicines against blood clots.

'His integrity in scientific matters is impeccable, and his innovation in clinical trial design is legendary,' said Dr. Steven Nissen, a cardiologist at the Cleveland Clinic, who has been an outspoken critic of both the F.D.A. and drug companies.

Even better,

Dr. Califf is often in the gym on the StairMaster before 6 a.m., said a former colleague at Duke, Dr. Adrian Hernandez. He often invites younger doctors to join him in golf and has a passion for Duke basketball that he expresses by wearing the team colors on game days.

How could anyone criticize a man who is at the gym at 6 AM?

More seriously, note that while the recent reporting may bring up questions about Dr Califf's conflicts of interest in terms of financial relationships with drug, device and biotechnology companies when he was on the Duke faculty, all the reporting also included passages minimizing the importance of these conflicts.  To minimize the issue of conflicts of interest, articles cited unnamed experts, suggesting the logical fallacy of an appeal to authority; noted that the financial ties that were criticized are standard practice in academic health care, suggesting the logical fallacy of an appeal to common practice.  The articles also cited Dr Califf's positive attributes which may have been relevant to his work at the FDA, like knowledge of research, but were not related to the question of conflicts of interest. This suggests another appeal to authority, or something of a reverse ad hominem (pro hominem?) fallacy.  It seems odd that what appear to be straightforward journalistic reports of a presidential nomination included such attempts to defend the candidate.  Note further that many of these logical fallacies appeared not in quotes from Dr Califf's supporters, but in text apparently written by journalists (e.g., "industry funding is not unusual," "in the gym on the Stairmaster," etc.)

Nonetheless, this is the state of play as of this moment.  The thrust of the media coverage suggested that Dr Califf is a brilliant physician and researcher, and while he as some ties to industry, they do not amount to much of a problem, except in the eyes of the likes of Public Citizen.


If one digs deeper, however, there is more. When Dr Califf was appointed to his current FDA position in February, 2015, and years earlier when his name was first mentioned as a possible candidate to run the FDA, evidence appeared that his ties to pharmaceutical, biotechnology and device companies were much more serious than what the recent accounts suggested.  

Where Does the Money from Industry Sponsored Research Grants Go? 

The recent coverage of Dr Califf's nomination in the NY Times dismissed his multiple corporate research grants as common practice.  Yet in the TIME coverage of  his original appointment to the FDA in February, 2015, this reminder of the significance of corporate sponsored research grants appeared.

Califf says his salary is contractually underwritten in part by several large pharmaceutical companies, including Merck, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly and Novartis.

Note that apologists for physician and academician interaction with industry often claim that industry funding of research grants that does not go directly to individuals does not cause important conflicts of interest. In one sentence, however, this article underlined how these grants support academic salaries, and hence lead to the dependency that is at the heart of conflicted relationships.

As we posted in 2007, academic medical institutions now depend on "external," including corporate research funding to support their research faculty's salaries, and via "overhead," their overall budgets.  Dr Lee Goldman, then Dean and Executive Vice President at Columbia University, called faculty who bring in a lot of grant money "tax payers," who earn gratitude, and likely bonuses and perks.  Thus Dr Califf's multiple large corporate research grants cannot be completely dismissed as conflicts of interest. 


A More Extensive List of Industry Relationships

Furthermore, a relatively obscure February, 2015, report from MDDIOnline noted that Dr Califf had more industry relationships than were reported this month,

Conflict of interest disclosures dating back to 2007 made public by the DCRI show that Califf has been paid for consulting or other services provided to a number of medical device pharmaceutical, and biotech companies, including Medtronic, Acumed, Bayer Healthcare, Merck, Novartis, Roche, GlaxoSmithKline, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Sanofi-Aventis, and Eli Lilly & Co. Califf also disclosed that he held equity in two pharmaceutical companies—Boulder-based N30 Pharmaceuticals and South San Francisco, CA-based Portola Pharmaceuticals—as recently as 2014. Califf retired from Portola’s board of directors January 26, according to a press release from the company.

A somewhat more obscure commentary by Martha Rosenberg in OpEdNews provided even more extensive listings of Dr Califf's industry relationships. And it suggested having a look at the disclosures he has made in the past in medical journal articles. A statement in a 2013 JAMA commentary was particularly telling,

Dr Califf receives research grants that partially support his salary from Amylin, Johnson & Johnson, Scios, Merck/Schering-Plough, Schering-Plough Research Institute, Novartis Pharma, Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation, Aterovax, Bayer, Roche, and Lilly; all grants are paid to Duke University. Dr Califf also consults for TheHeart.org, Johnson & Johnson, Scios, Kowa Research Institute, Nile, Parkview, Orexigen Therapeutics, Pozen, WebMD, Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation, AstraZeneca, Bayer/Ortho-McNeil, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Boehringer Ingelheim, Daiichi Sankyo, Gilead, GlaxoSmithKline, Li Ka Shing Knowledge Institute, Medtronic, Merck, Novartis, sanofi-aventis, XOMA, University of Florida, Pfizer, Roche, Servier International, DSI-Lilly, Janssen R&D, CV Sight, Regeneron, and Gambro; all income from these consultancies is donated to nonprofit organizations, with most going to the clinical research fellowship fund of the Duke Clinical Research Institute. Dr Califf holds equity in Nitrox LLC, N30 Pharma, and Portola.

These lists of corporations from which Dr Califf got salary support and consulting fees are much longer than previous lists.  He acknowledged 13 commercial research sponsors, and consulted for 32 organizations, most of which were pharmaceutical companies.  Again, given that the salary support and overhead likely supplied by corporate research grants do suggest conflicts of interest, Dr Califf may have had many more of these sorts of conflicts than current reports implied  

A Seat on a Pharmaceutical Company Board of Directors

Note that the MDDIOnline article mentioned that Dr Califf was a member of the board of directors of Portola Pharmaceuticals. That was a significant source of income.  According to the Portola Pharmaceuticals 2015 proxy statement, Dr Califf received $259,623 in cash and stock options from the company in 2014.  I cannot find anything to suggest that this payment did not go directly to him.  This position, and the money it paid were not mentioned in the recent coverage. That payment alone seems to represent a major conflict of interest.

However, being on the board of directors of a health care corporation presents a deeper conflict than that produced by a simple payment of money or stock options, no matter how large. In 2006, we discussed corporate directorships as a new and important species of conflict of interest for medical academics.  As we have previously posted, corporate directors have fiduciary responsibilities to the company and its shareholders to support its financial success.  They are supposed to "demonstrate unyielding loyalty to the company's shareholders" [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.]   Thus corporate directors have a much more significant commitment to the corporation than do corporate consultants, or researchers supported by corporate grants. 

Where Did Those Donated Consulting Payments Go?

Also note that the disclosure statement in the JAMA article mentioned that most of the consulting payments Dr Califf received went to the clinical research fellowship of the Duke Clinical Research Institute (DCRI).  Dr Califf was the first director of DCRI, 

So, while Dr Califf apparently did donate the consulting fees to a non-profit organization, that organization actually was part of Duke, and an organization that Dr Califf once led. It appears likely that Dr Califf benefited at least indirectly in terms of institutional gratitude and reputation from these consulting fees that he donated to his own institution.  So it appears that Dr Califf's donations of his consulting fees did not reduce the conflicts of interest generated by these fees to the extent suggested by the current FDA spokesperson and current media reports. 

Payments for "Educational Activities" 

Finally, perusal of disclosures of Dr Califf's commercial relationships made by the Duke Clinical Research Institute for the years 2010-2015 showed that he received payments for "educational activities" in 2011 from Amylin.  Information about earlier years is not available on this site, but in 2009, Dr Daniel Carlat wrote this about Dr Califf's then rumored candidacy for leadership of the FDA in the Carlat Psychiatry Blog,

look at these industry disclosures. He took money—lots of money--from 18 different pharmaceutical or device firms. Most of this was not for research, but for consulting and speaking, including CME. If Dr. Califf believes that it is ethical for physicians to help drug companies market their products, that’s his own business. But to elevate him to a position in which he is the country’s chief watchdog over unsafe medications and foods seems a dangerous move. With money from 18 drug companies padding his bank account, he will presumably spend most of his FDA career recusing himself from crucial decisions. Not a good idea.

There has been no mention of Dr Califf being a paid speaker for pharmaceutical companies in any of the recent reporting.  Dr Carlat implied that Dr Califf was paid to speak to further marketing objectives of pharmaceutical companies, that is, was giving "drug talks."  Since the publication of "Dr Drug Rep" in the New York Times in 2007, authored by Dr Carlat, the public has learned that such talks mainly include content provided by the pharmaceutical companies, and are meant by the companies as marketing exercises.  From that case we also learned that physicians who deviate from the marketing message do not last long on speakers' bureaus.  (See posts here and here.)

Paid speakers may be regarded by pharmaceutical companies as paid "key opinion leaders," KOLs, who serve a marketing function in the guise of academics. As noted here and here, the companies buying their services may believe they have bought the services of sales people.    Evidence about key opinion leaders actually performing like marketers has come from documents revealed during litigation (e.g., see this recent example of a huge monetary settlement made of charges that GlaxoSmithKline, a major multinational drug company committed fraud among other things, and in the course of its unethical activities used key opinion leaders as marketers).   Also, see the Neurontin marketing plan (see post here), and the Lexapro marketing plan (see post here) for examples of how company keaders view key opinion leaders as marketers.

So the revelation that Dr Califf received corporate payments for "education" suggests a bigger commitment to corporate marketing objectives than has previously been revealed.  

Summary

So, looking at not only current media reports, but media reports from earlier this year, and also proxy statements, the fine print of journal articles, and old blog posts, it appears that Dr Robert Califf really did have very substantial financial interactions with the drug, device and biotechnology industry.  These interactions likely underwrote his salary and his standing with the leaders of his former employer, Duke University.  Dr Califf seemed to be a paid speaker for drug companies on at least two occasions, suggesting that the companies may have put him in a covert marketing role, or viewed him as a paid key opinion leader.  Finally,  Dr Califf served on the board of directors of one drug company, a much deeper commitment than being a sponsored researcher or consultant.

Thus Dr Califf really appears to be one of the most, if not the most drug, device and biotechnology industry connected individual ever nominated to lead the agency that is the most important regulator of the US drug, device and biotechnology industry.  Some of his connections, particularly his previous membership on a pharmaceutical company board, and his previous roles as a paid pharmaceutical speaker, suggested not only financial relationships, but commitments to companies' financial and marketing goals.  These appear to be major conflicts of interest vis a vis Dr Califf's current leadership position at the FDA, and his nomination to be the ultimate leader of this regulatory agency.  This is the revolving door writ large.

As we have said very recently,  the revolving door can be veiwed as a species of conflict of interest.  Government officials who can look forward to extremely lucrative employment in health care industry may be much more inclined to seem friendly to the industry while in office.  Government officials who just came from industry are likely to maintain their industry mindset and be mindful of their industry friends.

Worse, some experts have suggested that the revolving door is in fact corruption.  As we noted here, the experts from the distinguished European anti-corruption group U4 wrote,

The literature makes clear that the revolving door process is a source of valuable political connections for private firms. But it generates corruption risks and has strong distortionary effects on the economy, especially when this power is concentrated within a few firms.

Furthermore, the ongoing and increasing revolving door phenomenon clearly suggests excess coziness between industry and government, now to the extent that industry and government leaders of health care are becoming interchangeable.  This suggests that health care is increasingly run by this cozy ingroup, who very likely put their own interests ahead of those of patients and the public.

The continuing egregiousness of the revolving door in health care shows how health care leadership can play mutually beneficial games, regardless of the their effects on patients' and the public's health.  Once again, true health care reform would cut the ties between government and corporate leaders and their cronies that have lead to government of, for and by corporate executives rather than the people at large.

ADDENDUM (28 September, 2015) - This post has been republished on the Naked Capitalism blog,  and OpEdNews.

ADDENDUM (28 September, 2015) - See also more detail on Dr Califf's activities on the Portola board on the PEU Report blog. 

5:28 PM

Round and Round It Goes - Former US Secretary of Health and Human Services Joins Humacyte Board

The latest example of the health care revolving door was made barely public just before the US Labor Day holiday.  Per the Triangle Business Journal,

Humacyte Inc., a biotechnology company based in Research Triangle Park, has beefed up its board of directors by adding former U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius and life sciences industry veteran Dale Sander.

The 11-year-old Humacyte develops novel human tissue-based investigational products that are being developed for potential commercialization for applications in regenerative medicine and vascular surgery. Sebelius adds a significant amount of heft to the company’s now eight-person board.

From 2009 to 2014, she served as the 21st Secretary of the HHS, leading the effort to pass and implement the Affordable Care Act. She’s also been named by Forbes as one of the 100 most powerful women in the world.

Prior to serving as secretary of HHS, Sebelius served as governor of Kansas, two terms as the Kansas insurance commissioner and four terms in the Kansas legislature.

'Secretary Sebelius is undoubtedly one of the most distinguished health care industry leaders of our time and we are honored to have her join our organization,' said Carrie Cox, chair and chief executive officer of Humacyte, in a statement. 'Her tenure in the public sector, and deep understanding of the rigors of the regulatory process and policy will provide unique perspective and insight to support our goals to improve care for Humacyte’s first application for patients with End Stage Renal Disease.'

Comments

I will just raise a tired, ironic eyebrow in response to a lawyer, politician, and government leader with no direct biomedical or health care training or experience, and no apparent health care industry experience being called a "distinguished health care industry leader."

The big issue here is, of course, the revolving door.

It now seems that any randomly selected top US government official who has responsibilities directly related to health care could turn out to be a past or future health care corporate lobbyist, consultant, board member, or executive.  The revolving door is now well established between the US government and the country's huge and growing corporate health care sector.  Recent (2015) examples include:
-  a former Director of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services who was a Columbia/ HCA executive and who became the CEO of America's Health Insurance Plans (a trade and lobbying group) (look here)
-  various officials involved trade agreements (that heavily affect health care) who came from or went to industry (look here).
-  some US Food and Drug Administration officials who were involved in the lax regulation of amphetamines in "natural" products who came from or went to the "natural" supplements industry (look here).
- Etc, etc, etc

But the latest example is a big one, since it involves the top US health care official, the Secretary of the DHHS.

As we have said endlessly, the ongoing and increasing revolving door phenomenon clearly suggests excess coziness between industry and government, now to the extent that industry and government leaders of health care are becoming interchangeable.  This suggests that health care is increasingly run by this cozy ingroup, who very likely put their own interests ahead of those of patients and the public.

This is at best crony capitalism, and makes a mockery of that famous sentence in President Lincoln's Gettysburg Address:

government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.

The revolving door is clearly a kind of conflict of interest.  Government officials who can look forward to extremely lucrative employment in health care industry (regardless of their actual experience in health care or the health care industry) may be much more inclined to seem friendly to the industry while in office.  Government officials who just came from industry are likely to maintain their industry mindset and be mindful of their industry friends.

Worse, some experts have suggested that the revolving door is in fact corruption.  As we noted here, the experts from the distinguished European anti-corruption group U4 wrote,

The literature makes clear that the revolving door process is a source of valuable political connections for private firms. But it generates corruption risks and has strong distortionary effects on the economy, especially when this power is concentrated within a few firms.

Finally, the revolving door on its currently massive scale starts to look like corporatism (or corpocracy), "the organization of society by major interest groups."  One variant of corporatism prominent in the last century was fascism (on the model of Mussolini in Italy).  Of course, many of us in the US ought to see corporatism as antithetical to how our government and society is supposed to function - supposed to function.

Thus, the revolving door in health care seems like it ought to bear scrutiny.    Yet most examples of the revolving door are very anechoic, being noted mainly in the business media, and usually barely there.  I have seen almost no notice of it in the health care, health policy, or medical literature.  (For example, so far Ms Sebelius' new job has appeared in a corporate press release and a single article in a local business newspaper, as far as I can tell.)

So once more with feeling...  The continuing egregiousness of the revolving door in health care shows how health care leadership can play mutually beneficial games, regardless of the their effects on patients' and the public's health.  Once again, true health care reform would cut the ties between government and corporate leaders that have lead to government of, for and by corporate executives rather than the people at large

9:17 AM

Who Benefits? - Rising Generic Drug Prices and the Case of Mylan's Conflicted Property Purchases

Rising Generic Drug Prices

Health care costs in the US continue their seemingly inexorable rise.  Even the parts of health care that used to seem reasonably priced now are affected.  As Ed Silverman discussed on PharmaLot

prices for many generic drugs have been climbing, prompting concerns that a low-cost staple of the U.S. health care system might soon strain budgets.

Generic drugs, like practically every other part of US health care, have become big business.  As a Forbes article pointed out, the industry is becoming more consolidated, and more likely to suffer from manufacturing and regulatory issues.  However, there may be other reasons for increasing generic drug costs.

Case: Mylan Purchased Properties Developed by its Own Board Vice Chair

A recent Wall Street Journal scoop on the big generic pharmaceutical company Mylan suggested that maybe such companies are now suffering from the same leadership and governance ills we have been finding throughout US - and indeed global - health care.  Furthermore, to understand the impacts of such health care dysfunction, one must consider the incentives that underlie them, that is, who benefits?

The story concentrated on some dodgy deals involving the company and firms linked to the Vice Chairman of its board of directors.  The first part of the story was:

Generic-drug maker Mylan NV moved into new headquarters in December 2013 after buying vacant land in an office park near Pittsburgh and erecting a five-story building for about 700 employees.

The company hasn’t publicly disclosed that the office park’s main developer is Rodney Piatt, Mylan’s vice chairman, lead independent director and compensation-committee chief. The new headquarters was a big boost for the mixed-use real-estate development, called Southpointe II, where all the land has been sold and some of the last buildings are now rising.

Securities regulators require public companies to tell shareholders about any significant transactions with directors, executives or other 'related persons.' Members of boardroom compensation committees have special duties under securities and tax laws to avoid dealings that compromise their independence.

Mylan, now fighting a three-way takeover battle in the pharmaceutical industry, says there was no need to disclose Mr. Piatt’s connection to the $60 million real-estate project because he and the company avoided any direct dealings with each other.

The day before Mylan announced plans to build the new headquarters, a company managed and partly owned by Mr. Piatt sold a 7-acre site for $1 to an entity owned by a business partner in Southpointe II, according to property records reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. The partner’s firm sold the same land to Mylan for $2.9 million later the same day.

Also,

Real-estate records show a similar transaction in May. Mylan paid $9.2 million to buy an adjacent 11 acres from Mr. Miller, whose firm previously bought the land for $10 from a company partly owned by Mr. Piatt.

'Mr. Piatt was not a party to either transaction' involving Mylan and 'had no direct or indirect material interest in the transactions,' says a Mylan spokeswoman.

She adds that Mr. Piatt didn’t make a profit on either sale to Mylan because Mr. Miller separately arranged to buy out Mr. Piatt at cost and then sold the land directly to Mylan. Mr. Piatt didn’t return calls seeking comment.

Note however that

Securities rules require disclosure of any transaction of more than $120,000 where a related person will have a direct or indirect material interest, regardless of whether the person makes a profit.

In the case of compensation-committee members, related-party transactions can jeopardize the independence required of them under tax and securities rules. That can threaten the tax-favored status of some executive-pay programs and require executives to disgorge some of their gains on stock sales.

Some securities-law and corporate-governance experts say Mylan should have been more transparent about the real-estate transactions or handled them differently.

'The optics are terrible,' says Charles Elson, director of the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware and a director at HealthSouth Corp. and Bob Evans Farms Inc. 'Pittsburgh is a big town with no shortage of real estate. Either they could have gone somewhere else, or [Mr. Piatt] could have relinquished the directorship and eliminated the conflict.'

Just to emphasize the questions about Mr Piatt's independence,

The new headquarters is named the Robert J. Coury Global Center, after Mylan’s executive chairman. Mr. Coury, 54, was chief executive from 2002 to 2012.

A few months after the project’s approval by local officials, Mr. Piatt signed a pension amendment that increased the value of Mr. Coury’s promised benefits by 40%. His overall pension of $48.8 million is 11th-largest among executives at U.S. publicly traded companies, according to Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp.

Further muddying the waters,

During construction, Mylan hired project-management firm RIZ Consulting & Management Inc. to oversee the general contractor and architect. RIZ has the same business address and phone number as Mr. Piatt’s real-estate company, and he is listed as the contact person for RIZ in the local chamber of commerce’s membership directory.

RIZ’s president also is a top executive at Mr. Piatt’s company, and some employees of Mr. Piatt’s company worked for RIZ on the project, according to state records, construction documents and the minutes of permit meetings. RIZ’s president didn’t return calls seeking comment.

'They set it up that way because [Mr. Piatt] sits on the board of Mylan,' says Jeff Yates, a project manager with PJ Dick Inc., the general contractor for the Mylan headquarters project. 'It was kind of a conflict of interest, [so] RIZ was a separate company set up to be the owner’s rep.'

We often discuss how health care is tangled in a vast web of conflicts of interest.  The kinds of apparent conflicts of interest in play in this case are somewhat different from those we frequently discuss, but still seem part of this web.

In the last few days, other Pittsburgh newspapers have jumped into the fray, and found their own experts to question these deals.  Per the Post-Gazette,

'It doesn’t pass the smell test'” said Mel Fugate, a management professor at Southern Methodist University.  Mr. Fugate said that while the SEC places legal requirements on which transactions must be disclosed, the legal obligations are 'the lowest hurdle of them all.'

'This smells bad … even if they can prove legally there are no conflicts' he said.

Again, as noted above the law in certain instances may define conflicts of interest more narrowly than ethical definitions.  For example, the Institute of Medicine defined conflicts of interest in medicine: occurring "when an individual or institution has a secondary interest that creates a risk of undue influence on decisions or actions affecting a primary interest."

The Tribune weighed in,

'The whole thing stinks,' said Douglas Branson, a University of Pittsburgh law professor and an expert in corporate governance. 

Board members'have to serve the best interest of the corporation,' he said. 'You can't be both a seller and buyer — that's the classic definition of conflict of interest.

So here we see serious allegations of conflicts of interest affecting the Vice Chair of the Mylan board, and perhaps affecting another board member and former CEO.  These conflicts suggest that company operations could have been manipulated for these individuals' benefits.

Other Questions about Mylan's Leadership and Governance

Yet these are not the only examples of questions about Mylans' leadership and governance, questions which suggest that managers and board members may have been putting personal gain ahead of the larger interests of the corporation, its shareholders, and the patients who take its drugs


A Pittsburgh Business Journal article noted the "allegations of impropriety" raised by the current case, but also hinted at larger problems with the leadership and governance of Mylan.


Current CEO's Invalid MBA

Per the Pittsburgh Business Journal

Mylan (Nasdaq: MYL) has had ethics questions in the past. An MBA awarded to CEO Heather Bresch was withdrawn in 2008 following an investigation that found she didn’t complete the necessary course credits.

However, that finding did not apparently affect her ongoing career trajectory at Mylan

Former CEO's Use of Company Jet to Help Son's Rock Music Career

The Pittsburgh Business Journal also stated,

And in 2012, the Wall Street Journal found that [former CEO] Coury transported his son to rock concerts on the corporate jet, which was allowed as part of his employee benefits package.

That WSJ article emphasized,

 Nina Devlin, a spokeswoman for Pittsburgh-based Mylan, said Mr. Coury's employment contracts have allowed outside personal activities, 'including those related to his son Tino's career.' She said Mr. Coury isn't required to use the corporate jets but his employment contracts for the past decade have allowed personal use by him and his family.

Thus these contracts apparently allowed valuable Mylan resources to be expended in support of the former CEO's son's career, even though Tino did not apparently have any direct role in the company. Note that these revelations also apparently did not affect Mr Coury's career trajectory with the company, nor did those below.

Transactions Between Former CEO's Brothers and Mylan

That same WSJ article also found,

 This wasn't the only business relationship between the elder Mr. Coury and his brothers. Coury Investment Advisors, a company in which two of his brothers, Gregg and Paul, are principals, has served as a broker for Mylan's employee-benefit plans. Various insurers paid them $597,000 in the past three years for Mylan-related business, according to U.S. Labor Department filings.

That appeared to be another conflict of interest, benefiting different members of the former CEO's family.

However, that is still not the whole story.  A quick look through our magic files, and Google, revealed some other pieces.

Mylan Settled Allegations of Inflated Pricing

In 2010, we briefly posted about a settlement by Mylan of charges it falsely inflated prices for several drugs.
As is usual in such settlements, none of the people who authorized, directed or implemented the actions leading to this settlement apparently suffered any negative consequences, including the top managers on whose watch they occurred. 

Mylan Fired Executive Allegedly for Filing Whistleblower Lawsuit Against Another Company

In June, 2014, the Pittsburgh Tribune reported,

 When Mylan Inc. learned that its vice president of marketing had filed a whistleblower lawsuit against his previous employer, it fired him, the man alleged in a federal lawsuit filed Tuesday.

Note that the lawsuit was against Cephalon, not Mylan.  Rocking the boat, or blowing the whistle apparently are not rewarded at Mylan.

Current CEO Named US Patriot of the Year, then Moved Mylan to Netherlands

In 2014, some wondered how Heather Bresch, still the Mylan CEO, could have claimed to be ultra-patriotic while she was planning to move her company out of the US.  In 2011, Esquire listed Ms Bresch in an article on "Americans of the Year: Patriots." They were apparently particularly impressed that she had called for more inspections on foreign drug companies whose products are imported into the US. However, in 2014, per Ron Fournier in the National Journal.

This story is about a gilded class of people and corporations enriched by the new American economy while the rest of its citizens pay the tab. The protagonists could be any number of institutional elites, but this column happens to be about a Democratic senator from West Virginia, Joe Manchin, and his daughter, Heather Bresch, the chief executive of Mylan, a giant maker of generic drugs based outside Pittsburgh.

Her company's profits come largely from Medicaid and Medicare, which means her nest is feathered by U.S. taxpayers. On Monday, Bresch announced that Mylan will renounce its United States citizenship and instead become incorporated in the Netherlands – leaving this country, in part, to pay less in taxes.

This is the sort of story that makes blood boil in populists – voters from the Elizabeth Warren wing of the Democratic Party to libertarians who follow Rand Paul and including tea party conservatives. These disillusioned souls, growing in numbers, hate hypocrites who condemn the U.S. political system while gaming it.

Later, Ms Bresch's father, Senator Manchin, said what his daughter did should be illegal, again per another Ron Fournier article in the National Journal, whose title says it all:

Senator Manchin: What My Daugher Did Should be Illegal

Nonetheless, late in 2014, Bloomberg reported that not only would Mylan go ahead with the inversion, but it would pay the excess taxes personally incurred by its own executives due the transaction.  Such taxes were meant as a negative incentive to discourage such maneuvers.  Even so, top managers seemed to be able to pay themselves to avoid the effect of these incentives, and of course any resulting personal financial losses.


Summary

 The latest story about Mylan seemed to show a leading board member financially benefiting from transactions between the company over which he was supposed to exercise stewardship and his own company.  Other stories showed Mylan executives seeming to gain outsized benefits for themselves or their family members from Mylan beyond conventional salaries and corporate benefits packages. Of course, since Mylan is not just any company, but a very large generic drug company, putting top hired managers and boards of directors first may mean putting patients second.  The cost of these managers' and boards' interests may be at the expense of patients, and the public at large.

Thus perverse incentives enable mission-hostile management and ultimately health care dysfunction.

So once again, when considering how US, and global health care has become so dysfunctional, it makes sense to think about who is benefiting from the current dysfunction.  It very often is organizational insiders, particularly top hired managers, and sometimes those who are supposed to keep an eye on them. 

 Thus, like hired managers in the larger economy, health care managers have become "value extractors."  The opportunity to extract value has become a major driver of managerial decision making.  And this decision making is probably the major reason our health care system is so expensive and inaccessible, and why it provides such mediocre care for so much money. 

One wonders how long the people who actually do the work in health care will suffer the value extraction to continue?
As we have said far too many times - without much impact so far, unfortunately - true health care reform would put in place leadership that understands the health care context, upholds health care professionals' values, and puts patients' and the public's health ahead of extraneous, particularly short-term financial concerns. We need health care governance that holds health care leaders accountable, and ensures their transparency, integrity and honesty.

But this sort of reform would challenge the interests of managers who are getting very rich off the current system.

As Robert Monks said in a 2014 interview,

People with power are very reluctant to give it up. While all of us recognize the problem, those with the power to change it like things the way they are.

So I am afraid the US may end up going far down this final common pathway before enough people manifest enough strength to make real changes.

6:29 PM

How Institutional Conflicts of Interest Exacerbate the Anechoic Effect - the Example of ASCO Fearing "Biting the Hand that Feeds You"

As we recently discussed (here, here, here and here), in May, 2015, the New England Journal of Medicine, arguably the world's foremost medical journal, published an editorial and a three-part commentary arguing that current concerns about the effects of financial conflicts of interest (COI) on health care are overblown(1-4).  On June 1, the Wall Street Journal published a report on the 2015 meeting of the American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) that provided a vivid example of why these concerns should not be dismissed.

Questioning Drug Prices at the ASCO Meeting

The main issue in the article was:

In a sign of growing frustration with rising drug prices, a prominent cancer specialist on Sunday sharply criticized the costs of new cancer treatments in a high-profile speech at one of the largest annual medical meetings in the U.S.

'These drugs cost too much,' Leonard Saltz, chief of gastrointestinal oncology at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, said in a speech heard by thousands of doctors here for the annual meeting of the American Society of Clinical Oncology.

The notion that health care prices are high and are rising continuously in the US should hardly be novel for regular Health Care Renewal readers.  We have been writing about it for a while, starting in 2005.

We first posted about high drug prices in July, 2005, with the example of BilDil.  This was a brand-name combination drug that included two compounds that were already cheaply available in generic form, advertised as a uniquely convenient therapy for congestive heart failure.  We were aghast that the price of the combination drug might be $5.40 - $10.80 a day (in 2005 dollars), over three times the cost of the two drugs in generic form.

But only a few days later we noted that three cancer costs had yearly costs in the five figures, and one, Erbitux, cost as much as $100,000.  Most amazingly we noted that Thalidomid was priced at $25,000  a year.  Yet it was just the infamous thalidomide, the drug initially marketed as a tranquilizer that caused severe birth defects after it was initially sold in Europe.  The drug was still available in generic form in South America for about seven cents a pill.

Since then, the ridiculously high prices of many tests and treatments, but most notably new drugs and devices, has been so widely covered our discussion has been limited to special cases.   For example, consider just a few headlines from April to May, 2015.

How Much Would You Pay for an Old Drug? If You Have MS, a Fortune (Bloomberg)

Pharmaceutical Companies Buy Rivals' Drugs, Then Jack Up the Prices (WSJ)

How Marketing Exclusivity Led to Higher Drug Costs and Questionable Benefits (WSJ)

Runaway Drug Prices (NY Times)


Drug Prices as a Taboo Topic

However, despite this wide attention to the problem, the speech at ASCO was notable.  Back to the WSJ...

Dr. Saltz’s speech was unusual because it was made at the meeting’s plenary session, where the field’s most significant scientific research is presented and which all meeting participants are expected to attend. An estimated 25,000 doctors and scientists attended this year’s meeting.

One would think that the high price of drugs, especially cancer drugs, would be a fit subject for discussion at a plenary session of ASCO, however,

It is unprecedented for plenary speeches, which typically address scientific and medical issues, to substantially take on the topic of drug costs, said Alan Venook, a professor of medicine at the University of California San Francisco who planned the meeting’s scientific session and invited Dr. Saltz to speak.

The prominent venue for the speech was also unusual because, like many medical meetings, ASCO is sponsored by pharmaceutical companies and often focuses on highlighting advancements in drug development, said Dr. Venook. He said discussing drug prices there is 'uncomfortable' because it could be seen as 'biting the hand that feeds you.'

Doctors are also reluctant to antagonize the drug industry because they need pharmaceutical firms to invest in developing new medicines for patients, he said.

'It’s a tough balancing act for ASCO where the meeting is largely funded by pharma,' Dr. Venook said in an interview. 'You can’t have a [plenary] talk trashing pharma, but you can have a talk by a respected person questioning it.'

So because pharma gives ASCO a lot of money, at best, only the most distinguished ASCO members can gently question pharma, but cannot criticize, much less "trash" the source of their mammon.


This is thus a succinct example of why financial conflicts of interest in medicine and health care can be bad.  The incredibly high prices of cancer drugs should be a fit topic for discussion at a meeting run by a society of medical oncologists.  But those in charge of the meeting and the society are afraid to initiate such a discussion, and even more afraid of appearing to criticize the companies that charge these prices, because the society has become dependent on money from these very same companies.  So this is further an example of how conflicts of interest can create the anechoic effect - the notion that certain topics in medicine and health care are taboo, because discussing them might trouble the powers that be, and particularly the moneyed interests that now dominate medicine and health care. 

In a succinct response to the NEJM series (1-4) soft pedaling concerns about conflicts of interest, the British Medical Journal ran a commentary by a former NEJM national correspondent, and two former NEJM editors.(5)  It stated,

The NEJM has now sought to reinterpret and downplay the importance of conflicts of interest in medicine by publishing articles that show little understanding of the meaning of the term. The concern is not whether physicians and researchers who receive industry money have been bought by the drug companies, as Drazen writes, or whether members of guideline panels or advisory committees to the US Food and Drug Administration with ties to industry make recommendations that are motivated by a desire for financial gain, as Rosenbaum writes. The essential issue is that it is impossible for editors and readers to know one way or the other.

In this case, we seem not to be talking about the possibility that health care professionals "have been bought by the drug companies,"  but how drug companies essentially "buying" a professional organization has apparently heretofore prevented medical professionals from discussing a vital issue that could have major effects on patients.

Following the Money

In case there is any question about the money involved and its sources, one only needs to go to some publicly available in formation supplied by ASCO (mostly because of reporting requirements imposed on all US non-profit organizations of a certain size).  

The latest (2014) annual report from ASCO reveals that the organization only gets 16.1% of its revenue from member dues.  Thus a ostensible membership organization gets only about a sixth of its funding from members' dues.

Yet the organization has become quite wealthy.  Its most recent (2013) US Internal Revenue Service 990 Form reveals that it owns over $55 million in real estate, and has over $104 million in investments (presumably as an endowment.)  The organizations' leaders are also doing very well. Its CEO, Allen Lichter MD, got $804,775 in total compensation in 2012.  Eleven other managers, of which three are health care professionals (one MD, one RN, one PharmD), got at least $220,000 in total compensation.  Five of them got more than $300,000. 

The source of all that money seems mainly to be pharmaceutical and other health care corporations that sell goods and services for cancer care.  US non-profit organizations are not forced by law to reveal the details of their financial support.  However, the ASCO annual report does list 23 pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, and one for-profit cancer hospital chain as contributing at least $1 million each in total to the non-profit over time.  The report lists 37 pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical device companies as current corporate donors, and also 10 other for-profit health care related corporations as current corporate donors.

In addition to these apparently marked institutional conflicts of interest, ASCO leaders may have their own individual conflicts of interest.  I do not have the resources to search all relationships affecting meeting organizers and ASCO officers and trustees, and the organization does not post conflicts of interest affecting its leadership and governance in a prominent place. However, Dr Alan Venook, who confessed to his discomfort about inviting a talk that might be perceived as biting the hand that feeds the finances of ASCO, is or has been on advisory boards for Thershold Pharmaceuticals,  Mirna Therapeutics, and GlobeImmune.  For a 2014 presentation, he gave the following disclosures: "Research support from Genentech/Roche, BMS, Lilly, Novartis; H. Lenz: Consulting, advisory boards and research support from Genentech/Roche, BMS and Merck."  Furthermore, the current chair of the ASCO Board of Directors, Julie M Vose, MD, is also on the Medical Advisory Board of EmergingMed Inc, and the Clinical Advisory Board of Bullet Biotechnology.

Summary

The New England Journal of Medicine recently launched a counter-attack against the "pharmascolds" who are allegedly slowing the pace of medical progress by their excessive and puritanical concerns about financial conflicts of interest.  Yet the arguments that COIs could be bad for health care are logical, and based on at least some reasonably good evidence.  (See the article by Steinbrook et al in the BMJ mentioned above[4], the accompanying BMJ editorial[5] just to start and then the 2009 Institute of Medicine report.)

Moreover, we have encountered a lot of vivid cases suggesting that conflicts of interest can have adverse influences on health care.  In this most recent one, we see at least one prominent if conflicted organizational insider admitting that institutional, and perhaps individual conflicts of interest have made discussion of at least one big health care and health care policy topic taboo.  This seems to corroborate our previous discussion that the anechoic effect - that certain topics in health care are taboo - may be generated by conflicts of interest of the people who ought to discuss them, or of those to whom those people may have to answer.

True health care reform requires full disclosure of conflicts of interest for honesty's sake, and marked reduction of conflicts affecting those who make health care decisions on behalf of individual patients, and health care policy decisions that affect patients' and the public's health.  If we allow conflicts of interest to continue, we will have difficulty even discussing the most severe problems affecting health care, because those generating the topics are benefiting from the circumstances that enable such problems.

ADDENDUM (1 July, 2015) - This post was republished on 28 June, 2015, on the Naked Capitalism blog. 

ADDENDUM (20 July, 2015 ) - This post was republished on July 12, 2015 in OpenHealth News.

References

  1.Drazen JM.  Revisiting the commercial-academic interface.  N Eng J Med 2015; ; 372:1853-1854. Link here.
2. Rosenbaum L.  Reconnecting the dots - reinterpreting industry-physician relations.  N Eng J Med 2015; 372:1860-1864.  Link here.
3. Rosenbaum L. Understanding bias - the case for careful study.  N Engl J Med 2015;  372:1959-1963.  Link here.
4.  Rosenbaum L.  Beyond moral outrage - weighing the trade-offs of COI regulation. N Engl J Med 2015; 372: 2064-2068.  Link here.
5. Steinbrook R, Kassirer JP, Angell M.  Justifying conflicts of interest in medical journals: a very bad idea.  Brit Med J 2015; 350: h2942.  Link here. 
6. Loder E. Revisiting the commercial-academic interface in medical journals.  Brit Med J 2015; 350: h2957.  Link here.

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