"The Scourge of Managerialism" - Generic Management, the Manager's Coup D'Etat, Mission-Hostile Management Rolled Up, as Described by Some Men from Down Under

I just found an important article that in the June, 2015 issue of the Medical Journal of Australia(1) that sums up many of ways the leadership of medical (and most other organizations) have gone wrong.  It provides a clear, organized summary of "managerialism" in health care, which roughly rolls up what we have called generic management, the manager's coup d'etat, and aspects of mission-hostile management into a very troubling but coherent package.  I will summarize the main points, giving relevant quotes.

Recent Developments in Business Management Dogma Have Gravely Affected Health Care

Many health practitioners will consider the theory of business management to be of obscure relevance to clinical practice. They might therefore be surprised to learn that the changes that have occurred in this discipline over recent years have driven a fundamental revolution that has already transformed their daily lives, arguably in perverse and harmful ways.

These Changes Have Been Largely Anechoic

these changes have by and large been introduced insidiously, with little public debate, under the guise of unquestioned 'best practice'.

See our previous discussions of the anechoic effect, how discussion of facts and ideas that threaten what we can now call the managerialist power structure of health care are not considered appropriate for polite conversation, or public discussion

Businesses are Now Run by Professional Managers, Not Owners

The traditional control by business owners in Europe and North America gave way during the 19th century to corporate control of companies. This led to the emergence of a new group of professionals whose job it was to perform the administrative tasks of production. Consequently, management became identified as both a skill and a profession in its own right, requiring specific training and based on numerous emergent theories of practice.

These Changes Were Enabled by Neoliberalism (or Market Fundamentalism, or Economism)

Among these many vicissitudes, a decisive new departure occurred with the advent of what became known as neoliberalism in the 1980s (sometimes called Thatcherism because of its enthusiastic adoption by the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom). A reaction against Keynesian economic policy and the welfare state, this harshly reinstated the regulatory role of the market in all aspects of economic activity and led directly to the generalisation of the standards and practices of management from the private to the public sectors. The radical cost cutting and privatisation of social services that followed the adoption of neoliberal principles became a public policy strategy rigorously embraced by governments around the world, including successive Liberal and Labor governments in Australia.

Note that this is a global problem, at least of English speaking developed countries.  The article focuses on Australia, but we have certainly seen parallels in the US and the UK.  Further, note that we have discussed this concept, also termed market fundamentalism or economism.

Managerialism Provides a One-Size Fits All Approach to the Management of All Organizations, in Which Money Becomes the Central Consideration

The particular system of beliefs and practices defining the roles and powers of managers in our present context is what is referred to as managerialism. This is defined by two basic tenets: (i) that all social organisations must conform to a single structure; and (ii) that the sole regulatory principle is the market. Both ideas have far-reaching implications. The claim that every organisation — whether it is a mining company, a hospital, a school, a professional association or a charity — must be structured according to a single model, conforming to a single set of legislative requirements, not so long ago would have seemed bizarre, but is now largely taken for granted. The principle of the market has become the solitary, or dominant, criterion for decision making, and other criteria, such as loyalty, trust, care and a commitment to critical reflection, have become displaced and devalued. Indeed, the latter are viewed as quaint anachronisms with less importance and meaning than formal procedures or standards that can be readily linked to key performance indicators, budget end points, efficiency markers and externally imposed targets.

Originally conceived as a strategy to manage large and increasingly complex organisations, in the contemporary world, no aspect of social life is now considered to be exempt from managerialist principles and practices. Policies and practices have become highly standardised, emphasising market-style incentives, devolved budgets and outsourcing, replacement of centralised budgeting with departmentalised user-pays systems, casualisation of labour, and an increasingly hierarchical approach to every aspect of institutional and social organisation.

We have frequently discussed how professional generic managers have taken over health care (sometimes referred to as the manager's coup d'etat.)  We have noted that generic managers often seem ill-informed about if not overtly hostile to the values of health care professionals and the missions of health care organizations.

Very Adverse Effects Result in Health Care and Academics

In the workplace, the authority of management is intensified, and behaviour that previously might have been regarded as bullying becomes accepted good practice. The autonomous discretion of the professional is undermined, and cuts in staff and increases in caseload occur without democratic consultation of staff.   Loyal long-term staff are dismissed and often humiliated, and rigorous monitoring of the performance of the remaining employees focuses on narrowly defined criteria relating to attainment of financial targets, efficiency and effectiveness.

The principles of managerialist theory have been applied equally to the public and the private sectors. In the health sector, it has precipitated a shift in power from clinicians to managers and a change in emphasis from a commitment to patient care to a primary concern with budgetary efficiency. Increasingly, public hospital funding is tied to reductions in bed stays and other formal criteria, and all decision making is subject to review relating to time and money. Older and chronically ill people become seen not as subjects of compassion, care and respect but as potential financial burdens. This does not mean that the system is not still staffed by skilled clinicians committed to caring for the sick and needy; it is rather that it has become increasingly harder for these professionals to do their jobs as they would like.

In the university sector, the story is much the same; all activities are assessed in relation to the prosperity of the institution as a business enterprise rather than as a social one. Education is seen as a commodity like any other, with priority given to vocational skills rather than intellectual values. Teaching and research become subordinated to administration, top-down management and obsessively applied management procedures. Researchers are required to generate external funding to support their salaries, to focus on short-term problems, with the principal purpose being to enhance the university's research ranking. The focus shifts from knowledge to grant income, from ideas to publications, from speculation to conformity, from collegiality to property, and from academic freedom to control. Rigid hierarchies are created from heads of school to deans of faculties and so on. Academic staff — once encouraged to engage in public life — are forbidden to speak publicly without permission from their managers.

Again, we have discussed these changes largely in the US context.  We have noted how modern health care leadership has threatened primary care.  We have noted how vulnerable patients become moreso in the current system, e.g., see our discussions of for-profit hospices.  We have discussed attacks on academic freedom and free speech, the plight of whistle-blowers, education that really is deceptive marketing, academic institutions mired in individual and institutional conflicts of interest, and the suppression and manipulation of clinical research.  We have noted how health care leaders have become increasingly richly rewarded, apparently despite, or perhaps because of the degradation of the health care mission over which they have presided.

The Case Study

The article provided a case study of the apparent demise of the Royal Australasian College of Physicians as a physician led organization, leading to alleged emphasis on "extreme secrecy and 'commercial in confidence," growth of conflicts of interest, risk aversion on controversial issues.  When members of the organization called for a vote to increase transparency and accountability, the hired management apparently sued their own members.

Authors' Summary

Whether the damage done to the larger institutions — the public hospitals and the universities — can be reversed, or even stemmed, is a bigger question still. The most that can be said is that even if the present, damaging phase of managerial theory and practice eventually passes, its destructive effects will linger on for many years to come.

My Summary

I now believe that the most important cause of US health care dysfunction, and likely of global health care dysfunction, are the problems in leadership and governance we have often summarized (leadership that is ill-informed, ignorant or hostile to the health care mission and professional values, incompetent, self-interested, conflicted or outright criminal or corrupt, and governance that lacks accountability, transparency, honesty, and ethics.)  In turn, it appears that these problems have been generated by the twin plagues of managerialism (generic management, the manager's coup d'etat) and neoliberalism (market fundamentalism, economism) as applied to health care.  It may be the many of the larger problems in US and global society also can be traced back to these sources.

We now see our problems in health care as part of a much larger whole, which partly explains why efforts to address specific health care problems country by country have been near futile.  We are up against something much larger than what we thought when we started Health Care Renewal in 2005.  But at least we should now be able join our efforts to those in other countries and in other sectors.   

ADDENDUM (30 October, 2015) - This post was republished on the Naked Capitalism blog.  See the comments, which are particularly interesting and important.  

Reference

1.  Komesaroff PA, Kerridge IH, Isaacs D, Brooks PM.  The scourge of managerialism and the Royal Australasian College of Physicians.  Med J Aust 2015; 202: 519- 521.  Link here.

Musical Diversion

We have to leaven this dismal post with the 1980 live version of "Down Under" by Men at Work

2:48 PM

All the President's Trade Negotiators - Revolving Doors, Regulatory Capture, and Health Care Corporate Friendly Trade Agreements

This week's spectacle in Washington, DC was a nearly unanimous Democratic minority in the Senate blocking a proposal for expedited consideration of multinational trade agreements favored by the Republican majority, but also by the Democratic President and his trade negotiators (look here).  Democrats mainly based their actions on perceptions that the trade agreements favored multinational corporations  over people.

While trade agreements may seem to be another, albeit international species of wonkery, these agreements could have major effects on patients' and the public's health.  Since these concerns have been essentially ignored by the US medical and health care literature, (although they have appeared in UK journals, Australian, and New Zealand journals in English), they I will discuss them below. Worthy of further discussion is the possibility that these potential threats to health care and public health may arise not just from ideological disagreements, but also from health care corporations' increasing capture of government, facilitated by the conflicts of interest generated by the revolving door. 

Corporate Friendly Trade Agreements

The US has been negotiating two major multinational trade agreements, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic  Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) for years. 

In a March, 2014, commentary, renowned economist Joseph E Stiglitz summarized the objections to the these proposed trade agreements.  His greatest fears were that such agreements

will benefit the wealthiest sliver of the American and global elite at the expense of everyone else.

This seems surprising, since most people think of trade agreements solely in terms of their effects on tariffs, not a big concern for health care and public health professionals.  However, Stiglitz noted

Tariffs around the world are already low. The focus has shifted to 'nontariff barriers,' and the most important of these — for the corporate interests pushing agreements — are regulations. Huge multinational corporations complain that inconsistent regulations make business costly. But most of the regulations, even if they are imperfect, are there for a reason: to protect workers, consumers, the economy and the environment.

What’s more, those regulations were often put in place by governments responding to the democratic demands of their citizens. Trade agreements’ new boosters euphemistically claim that they are simply after regulatory harmonization, a clean-sounding phrase that implies an innocent plan to promote efficiency. One could, of course, get regulatory harmonization by strengthening regulations to the highest standards everywhere. But when corporations call for harmonization, what they really mean is a race to the bottom.

 In the US, and other developed countries, there are lots of regulations that have major effects on health care and public health.  Changes in these regulations, or their implementation, could have major effects again on health care and the public health.  So those interested in health care and public health ought to be concerned about how such trade agreements could affect such regulation.

International Tribunals Could Trump National Law
One of Stiglitz's concerns was  that the trade agreement would allow international tribunals that could override national law, particularly law promoting public health:

What we know of ... particulars [of the TTP] only makes it more unpalatable. One of the worst is that it allows corporations to seek restitution in an international tribunal, not only for unjust expropriation, but also for alleged diminution of their potential profits as a result of regulation. This is not a theoretical problem. Philip Morris has already tried this tactic against Uruguay, claiming that its antismoking regulations, which have won accolades from the World Health Organization, unfairly hurt profits, violating a bilateral trade treaty between Switzerland and Uruguay.

In fact, Philip Morris has also used such tribunals to overturn Australian laws meant to discourage smoking for public health purposes.  The details of the Philip Morris case summarized in May, 2015 in an article by Lauren Carasik in  Foreign Policy, show the major public health implications of such trade tribunals,

In 2011, Australia passed a tobacco-control law to discourage smoking. It required cigarettes to be sold in plain packages with prominent warnings, with brand information relegated to the bottom of the box. Touted as 'one of the most momentous public health measures in Australia’s history' by the country’s health minister, the law was meant to deter a habit that will ultimately kill 1.8 million current Australian smokers, according to a recent study. After the country’s highest court upheld the constitutionality of the anti-smoking law, tobacco giant Philip Morris claimed that it violated the company’s corporate rights and launched a suit using a little-known provision called investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). The case is pending, as is a similar case against Uruguay. A similar tobacco-control measure in New Zealand is on hold pending the outcome of these cases.

So these examples suggest that national laws meant to promote the public health could be challenged in these trade tribunals by multinational corporations based on these laws' postulated effects on corporate profits, regardless of the laws' public health rationale or legality in their own countries. 


Furthermore, a letter to the Lancet(1) noted,

Investor state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions allow investors to sue governments if policy changes or even court rulings substantially affect the value of their investment, yet do not allow governments to sue investors for breaching the right to health.   ISDS processes constrain governments' abilities to regulate on the basis of the precautionary principle, or even to implement health policies on the basis of established evidence. These processes can have a chilling effect on efforts to address key health issues, such as alcohol, the obesity epidemic, and climate change. In New Zealand, the fear of costly ISDS litigation is already constraining government regulation on tobacco plain packaging.

Thus, creation of such international tribunals could favor financial concerns of multinational corporations over individual countries' governments' attempts to promote health care or public health. So, while these undemocratic tribunals are touted as a way to reduce non-tariff trade barriers, an editorial in the British Medical Journal(2) asserted,

Yet these barriers are some of our most prized social and environmental standards, including regulations on food safety, pesticide residues, and toxic chemicals....

Not only would these tribunals we able to override national laws, their operation would lack procedural safeguards.  Demonstrating that opposition to these trade agreements is also multinational, an article in the UK Independent in October, 2014, noted,

Critics say the tribunals, held under the so-called Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system, subvert democratic justice, giving power over foreign citizens to big companies. Hearings are held in private, in international courts at the World Bank in Washington DC, bypassing the legal system of the country being sued, meaning details are often impossible to uncover. In some cases the very existence of the case is not made public.

In addition, per the article in Foreign Policy,

Critics like Global Trade Watch, a division of Public Citizen, a consumer advocacy organization, say the ISDS system is anti-democratic. Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) called for the ISDS language to be stripped out of the deal, writing in the Washington Post in February, 'If a final TPP agreement includes Investor-State Dispute Settlement, the only winners will be multinational corporations.' The problem is that the ISDS system lacks many procedural safeguards fundamental to the rule of law. The tribunals, run by the World Bank and the United Nations, are three-judge panels composed of highly paid private lawyers picked from a limited pool by states and corporations; individual lawyers can switch between serving as judges and advocates on behalf of corporations in different cases. And there is no comprehensive code of judicial conduct guiding the panelists on matters such as conflicts of interest.

Although the panels adjudicate disputes worth millions or even billions of dollars, they are not accountable to any elected body. Moreover, there is no system of precedent binding judges to an established body of decision-making, making it difficult for the parties to discern the applicable standards and their likelihood of success. And finally, there are no appeals, either within the ISDS system or externally, on the merits of decisions. An annulment is only possible for limited procedural errors, and those proceedings are heard before a different panel drawn from the same pool of professionals.

Under the system, states are deprived of the right to resolve these disputes since corporations can proceed directly to the tribunals without exhausting domestic remedies. But this privilege is not reciprocal: Corporations are not subject to suit in the tribunals by those harmed by their actions. Foreign companies are thus granted expanded rights without corresponding responsibilities.

Finally, in May, 2015, the United Nations special rapporteur on promotion of a democratic and equitable international order suggested that the proposed international tribunals would undermine human rights and violate the UN charter (per this Guardian article).

Further criticism of the tribunals came from the UK Labour party Shadow Health Secretary (as of April, 2014) who felt it would leave British general practitioners "powerless to resist legal challenges from US health giants with huge financial resources in the event of a contractual dispute (per the Independent).

To summarize thus far:  international trade agreements being pushed by the US government could set up trade tribunals that could reverse national laws meant to protect health and safety.  Such tribunals would not follow the procedures used, for example, in US courts, and could not be held accountable by individual governments.  Various aspects of these tribunals, and recent actions involving tribunals already set up by earlier trade agreements suggest the process may be heavily biased in favor of the financial interests of multinational corporation, and against patients' and the public's health.  Thus, health care and public health professionals ought to be alarmed about new agreements that could set up new tribunals, or expand the reach of existing tribunals.


Intellectual Property Rights vs Access to Health Care

Another set of problems affecting patients' and the public's health  are provisions in trade agreements favoring corporate "intellectual property" over access to drugs, devices and health care.  Stiglitz wrote in 2014,

America has been fighting to lower the cost of health care. But the TPP would make the introduction of generic drugs more difficult, and thus raise the price of medicines. In the poorest countries, this is not just about moving money into corporate coffers: thousands would die unnecessarily. Of course, those who do research have to be compensated. That’s why we have a patent system. But the patent system is supposed to carefully balance the benefits of intellectual protection with another worthy goal: making access to knowledge more available. I’ve written before about how the system has been abused by those seeking patents for the genes that predispose women to breast cancer. The Supreme Court ended up rejecting those patents, but not before many women suffered unnecessarily. Trade agreements provide even more opportunities for patent abuse.

To date, most of the details of the proposed trade agreements have been kept secret, but as noted on the PLoS Medicine blog in December, 2013, by Reshma Ramachandran and David Carroll,

Last month, Wikileaks posted the complete Intellectual Property (IP) Chapter of the secretly-negotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) confirming public health advocates’ worst fears of the agreement’s impact on patients worldwide.

In particular,

The Wikileaks posted text revealed that the USTR and Obama Administration have decided to aggressively prioritize the interests of multinational pharmaceutical and medical companies over patients worldwide and at home. In fact, according to emails submitted to Intellectual Property-Watch under the Freedom of Information Act, the USTR has actively solicited the input of industry groups, giving them special access to the negotiating text while consumer and health groups have had to resort to requesting special meetings with negotiators. 

So,

Indeed, the recently leaked TPP chapter reflect these corporate interests as evidenced by the still-included provisions. In the text, the USTR has proposed a number of provisions that will further strengthen patents and data exclusivity for pharmaceuticals. Such provisions will bar the entry of generic competition into the market allowing for brand-name drug companies to retain their monopoly market and set drug prices at exorbitantly high prices. These provisions include:

- Lowering patent standards allowing for “evergreening” or the granting of patents for newer forms of existing medicines including new formulations or minor modifications even in the absence of a therapeutic benefit

- Mandating that surgical, therapeutic, and diagnostic methods must be patented making medical practitioners in TPP member states liable for infringement and restricting their choices for treatment

- Imposing data exclusivity on all pharmaceuticals, including biologics with the minimum period for this class to be set at 12 years (despite the fact that the White House is publicly in favor of a 7 year data exclusivity period and the FTC has stated that there is no need for any data exclusivity period at all) thereby not allowing drug safety regulators from accessing clinical data to grant market approval for generic and biosimilar drugs

-  Adjusting patent term periods to account for “unreasonable delays” including patent prosecution periods ranging from two years to more than four years extra further delaying generic drug entry into the market

- Adjusting patent term periods for regulatory approval periods allowing for patent extensions for both new pharmaceutical products as well as methods for producing or using new pharmaceutical products halting any potential innovation

- Linking patent status and drug marketing approval causing drug regulatory authorities to take on the additional task of early patent enforcement, allowing for bogus patents to be a barrier to generic drug registration Such proposals go beyond current U.S. and international law including the World Trade Organization’s Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement.

Additionally, the TPP has the potential to jeopardize millions of lives in the participating countries by driving up the costs of medicines significantly. Even in the United States, there has been a public outcry from physicians regarding the high cost of medicines. Earlier this year, over 100 oncologists came together to write a perspective piece in the journal Blood calling the prices of brand-name cancer drugs “astronomical, unsustainable, and perhaps even immoral.” The United States health care system has in fact greatly benefited from the entry of generic competition. On May 9, IMS Health released a report entitled Declining Medicine Use and Costs: For Better or Worse?, which found that many Americans had forsaken much needed doctor visits, medicines, and other treatments as they struggled to afford health care. In light of this, it is appalling that U.S. negotiators would continue to push provisions that would further exacerbate the cost burden of healthcare for patients not only abroad, but at home. 

Public Citizen particularly criticized the provision for patenting procedures,

Medical procedure patents raise healthcare costs. Health providers, including surgeons, could be liable for the methods they use to treat patients. Essentially, except for when a surgeon uses her bare hands, surgical methods would be patent eligible subject matter under the U.S. proposal.

Additional concerns about the potential of new trade agreements to increase the price of medicines and health care, and limit access to them, came, per Ramachandran and Carroll, from Doctors Without Borders, the American Association of Retired Person, and the International Federation of Medical Students.  More recently, such concerns were stated by amfAR re access to and costs of HIV medications (reported on Vox), and were restated by Doctors Without Borders (reported by the National Journal).

Perhaps more US health care professionals and public health advocates would be speaking out if they understood the problem.  However, concerns about how new proposed trade agreements could affect health care and public health have been notably anechoic in the US.  I could find absolutely no discussion of them in any moderate or large circulation US health care or medical journal.  There has been discussion in English language medical and and health care journals, but in journals that are relatively obscure, or published outside of the US, for example, see articles by Greenberg and Shiau(3), and Thow et al(4).  Note that the former wrote,

academic public health has failed to appreciate the serious risks of the TPP[A] and has not responded to its threats. 

Keeping concerns that the new trade agreements could threaten patients' and the public's health out of public discussion may be just the latest example of what we have called the anechoic effect, because it looks like it may be no accident that these proposed trade agreements favor multinational corporations over patients' and the public's health.  There is evidence that at least the US governmental process for negotiating these agreements was heavily influenced by the interests of these corporations, but not by the interests of patients or citizens. 

Revolving Doors, Regulatory Capture Generate the Momentum

There are thus strong reasons for health care and public health professionals to oppose the rush to approve the new trade agreements (the TTIP and TPP).  Despite these concerns, and the increasingly vocal opposition from many US legislators, the current administration has forged ahead with its proposal to "fast-track" their approval, only to be suddenly blocked, and by its supposed compatriots in the Democratic party.  There are lots of explanations for this, but two that got only a little notice but seem particularly germane to Health Care Renewal are the influences of the revolving door and cultural regulatory capture.

The case for these was best made by a November, 2013 article in the Washington Post by Timothy B Lee,

the U.S. negotiating position also had an unmistakeable bias toward expanding the rights of copyright and patent holders.

Those positions are great for Hollywood and the pharmaceutical industry, but it's not obvious that they are in the interests of the broader U.S. economy. To the contrary, critics contend that the rights of copyright and patent holders have been expanded too much. Those concerns do not seem to have swayed the trade negotiators in the Obama administration.

Two major factors contribute to the USTR's strong pro-rightsholder slant. An obvious one is the revolving door between USTR and private industry. Since the turn of the century, at least a dozen USTR officials have taken jobs with pharmaceutical companies, filmmakers, record labels, and technology companies that favor stronger patent and copyright protection.

A more subtle factor is the structure and culture of USTR itself. In its role as a promoter of global trade, USTR has always worked closely with U.S. exporters. That exporter-focused culture isn't a problem when USTR is merely seeking to remove barriers to selling U.S. goods overseas, but it becomes problematic on issues like copyright and patent law where exporters' interests may run directly counter to those of American consumers.

Lee provided extensive examples of how US trade officials transited the revolving door to and/or from the pharmaceutical industry.

On May 3, 2004, the United States and Australia signed a bilateral trade agreement. The agreement included a section on intellectual property that had numerous provisions favorable to pharmaceutical manufacturers. For example, it barred generic drug makers seeking approval for their drugs from citing safety or efficacy information originally submitted by brand-name drug makers for a period of five years after the information is submitted, making it more difficult for generic drug makers to enter the market.

The lead American negotiator was Ralph Ives, who was promoted to Assistant USTR for Pharmaceutical Policy soon after the negotiations concluded. He was aided by Claude Burcky, Deputy Assistant USTR for Intellectual Property. Less than three months after the Australia agreement was signed, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that both men would take jobs at pharmaceutical or medical device companies. Their new employers stood to benefit from some of the pro-patent-holder provisions of the treaty. Ives took a job at AdvaMed, a trade group representing medical device manufacturers. Burcky moved to the pharmaceutical and medical device company Abbott Labs.

Since then, Abbott has hired two other USTR veterans, Andrea Durkin and Karen Hauda, according to the women's LinkedIn pages. Another USTR official, Kira Alvarez, has gone through the revolving door twice over the last 15 years. Her LinkedIn profile indicates that she served at USTR from 2000 to 2003, spent four years at the pharmaceutical giant Eli Lilly, and then returned to USTR in 2008 as Deputy Assistant USTR for Intellectual Property Enforcement. She was there for five years before she took a job at AbbVie, a pharmaceutical firm that spun off from Abbott earlier this year.

According to his official biography at the site of the Biotechnology Industry Associaiton, Joseph Damond 'was chief negotiator of the historic U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade agreement' during his 12 years at USTR. He then spent five years at the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America before moving to BIO. Justin McCarthy went through the revolving door in the other direction. According to a USTR press release, McCarthy was responsible for intellectual property issues at the pharmaceutical company Pfizer from 2003 to 2005 before he was hired at USTR. He now works at a lobbying firm.

Lee also suggested that the US Trade Representative has been culturally captured by industry through its use of advisory panels made up of industry members, but not, for example, clinicians, public health advocates, or interested members of the public.

The agency has established 16 industry trade advisory committees to provide advice about the complex issues USTR deals with in the course of its negotiations. As the name suggests, the ITACs are designed to gather feedback from industry groups. There are no public interest groups, academics, or other non-industry experts on ITAC 15, which focuses on "intellectual property" issues.

And that matters because groups with ITAC seats have access to confidential information about the U.S. negotiating position that isn't available to the public. Sherwin Siy, an attorney at the advocacy organization Public Knowledge, has had multiple meetings with USTR representatives during the course of the TPP negotiations. But he says it was difficult to give USTR meaningful feedback because he didn't know what positions U.S. negotiators were advocating.

'They're willing to sit in a room with us and listen to our objections and our issues and be very polite,' Siy says. But 'whether or not that actually means anything is at best a black box.'

When USTR wants technical advice on transposing U.S. law into international agreements, it naturally turns to the industry representatives on the ITACs. And it stands to reason that the advice the agency receives in response would be a bit one-sided. Where U.S. law is ambiguous, industry groups naturally gravitate toward interpretations of U.S. law that favor their employers' interests. And because public interest groups and independent experts aren't allowed to see proposed language (aside from occasional leaks), the agency may not even realize that it is exporting a warped interpretation of U.S. law.

The pro-industry cultural bias has caused consternation among even well-known libertarians, as Lee noted,

'USTR sees itself as an advocate for U.S. exporter interests,' says Bill Watson, a trade expert at the Cato Institute. 'It's trying to negotiate market access for particular U.S. industries that ask for it. That bias leads USTR to think that because U.S. companies want more IP protection abroad, it's in their interest to negotiate that.'

So it seems quite clear that the US agency that negotiates the new international trade agreements may be staffed by people who came from affected industries, including pharmaceutical, device and biotechnology companies, and privileges advice from such companies.  Thus the agency appears to suffer from conflicts of interest due to the revolving door, and from regulatory capture induced by its bias in favor of advice from industry over that from clinicians, public health advocates, or interested members of the public.  This suggests why it appears that this government agency has actively been promoting trade agreements that favor industry interests over patients' and the public's health.

It may be that top US executive branch officials, all the way up to the President of the US, have been very ill-served by relying on an agency subject to such conflicts of interest and regulatory capture.

Summary

We have frequently written about the revolving door phenomenon, and its effect on government agencies and officials who regulate and control many aspects of health care. Recently, we wrote about how the revolving door risks corruption, and can lead to regulatory, and even state capture.

In 2011, we even wrote about how the revolving door may affect US trade negotiations, and thus important aspects of aspects of global health care.

Government officials affiliated with all major political parties have been known to transit the revolving door.  The recent cases we have documented have tended to be more about the party that currently controls the executive branch, of course.  But now, we seem to have documented how the revolving door has lead to a supposedly liberal president proposing trade agreements that seemed heavily biased towards corporate rather than popular interests, and thus suffered an embarrassing defeat at the hands of his party compatriots in the legislature.  The president seems to have been particularly ill-served by employees of the executive branch whose previous or potential revolving door transits have made them sing the tunes of industry rather than of the people they are supposed to be serving.  This suggests that in the long run, nobody but the participants in the revolving door ultimately benefits from their rotary transitions.

Instead, as we have said many times before, the constant interchange of health care insiders among government, large health care corporations, and the lobbying and legal firms which represent them certainly suggests that health care, like many other sectors, seems to be run by an amorphous group of insiders who owe allegiance neither to government nor industry.

However, those who work in government are supposed to be working for the people, and those who work on health care within government are supposed to be working for patients' and the public health.  If they are constantly looking over their shoulders at potential private employers who might offer big checks, who indeed are they working for?

Attempts to turn government toward private gain and away from being of the people, by the people, and for the people have no doubt been going on since the beginning of government (and since the Constitution was signed, in the case of the US).  However, true health care reform  would require curtailing the severe sorts of conflicts of interest created by the revolving door.

Real heath care reform would require  multiyear cooling off periods before someone who worked in the commercial world can get a job in a government whose work has direct effect on his or her previous employer or industry sector, and before someone who worked in government whose work had direct effect on a particular economic sector can accept a job for a company in that sector.

ADDENDUM (19 May, 2015) - This post was republished in OpEdNews.

ADDENDUM (29 May, 2015) - This post was republished in OpenHealth News.

References

1.  Freeman J, Keating G, Monasterio E at al.  Call for transparency in new generation trade deals. Lancet 2015; 385: 605-605, link here.
2.   Hilary J.  The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and UK healthcare.  Brit Med J 2014; 349: g6552, link here.
3.  Greenberg H, Shiau S. The vulnerability of being ill-informed: the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement and global public health.  J Pub Health 2014; 36: 355-357, link here. 
4.  Thow AMT, Gleeson DH, Friel S. What doctors should know about the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement.  Med J Aust 2015; 202: 165-167, link here.

9:30 AM

Why Did the Global Fund Fire its Inspector General?

The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria continues to struggle with the issue of health care corruption, an issue we noted here and here in 2011. 

Now as a news story in Nature put it,

It has been a rough couple of years for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the world’s largest funder of international health programmes. Since its creation in 2002, the organization, based in Geneva, Switzerland, has channelled US$24.7 billion to delivering disease-control measures such as drugs, diagnostics and bed nets, saving millions of lives. But the global financial crisis has hit the fund hard, and its troubles mounted in 2011 when allegations of corruption among its grant recipients tarnished its reputation and alarmed donors.

Last week, the Global Fund tried to move on, announcing a new leader and unveiling major changes to its funding programme.

The Nature news story suggested that the troubles of the Fund all seemed so unfair.  After all,

the fraud allegations, ... [were] largely rehashed audits already made public by the fund itself. A retrospective audit published in July this year suggests that the allegations may have been overblown. It found that, in a sample of grants worth $3.8 billion that were awarded from 2005 to 2012 in 27 countries, just 0.5% of grant funding was lost to outright fraud. Experts say that figure is not exceptional for funding programmes in poor nations that often struggle with corruption.

Yet the Nature story suggested that the Fund's intrepid new later "could signal a fresh start, and has been broadly welcomed," leaving the impression that all things may turn out well.

Firing the Inspector General

However, the Nature story left out one nagging detail.  At the same time the Fund board announced the appointment of Dr Mark Dybul as its new director, it also announced that it had fired the Fund's Inspector General.  A report in the Financial Times only included,

It also dismissed John Parsons, its inspector general. Some directors believed Mr Parsons had been too outspoken in conducting public audits that sparked criticism of relatively small amounts of mismanagement and corruption.

The impression left was that Mr Parson was mainly guilty of rocking the boat.

The New York Times version, which started by recounting the hiring of Dr Dybul, also made it sound that Mr Parsons was generating too much bad publicity,

The fund also dismissed its inspector general, John Parsons, on Thursday, citing unsatisfactory work.


Mr. Parsons and Dr. Kazatchkine had privately clashed. Mr. Parsons’s teams aggressively pursued theft and fraud, and found it in Mali, Mauritania and elsewhere. But the total amount stolen — $10 million to $20 million — was relatively small, and aides to Dr. Kazatchkine said the fund cut off those countries and sought to retrieve the money. The aides claimed that Mr. Parsons, who reported only to the board, went to news outlets and left the impression that the fund was covering up rampant theft.

The fuss scared off some donor countries....

The AP version also cited the Board's accusation that Mr Parson's performance was "unsatisfactory," but included,

The inspector general's office is supposed to function independently. It was created in 2005 at the urging of the fund's biggest donor, the United States, which has contributed $7.3 billion to date.


The board held a contentious closed-door session with Parsons on Wednesday then deliberated into the night after he stormed out.

The board chairman, Simon Bland, and the head of its audit committee, Graham Joscelyne, each said they were unconcerned whether U.S. lawmakers might perceive the firing as an infringement on the office. Joscelyne would not elaborate on what Parsons did wrong but cited several reviews of him that were not disclosed.

In its latest 6-month progress report, Parsons' office said it had a growing caseload of 142 active investigations, up more than 70 percent from just two years ago.

Summary and Comment

We posted about the allegations of corruption at the Global Fund here and here in 2011.  At that time the scope of the problem was  unclear.  Now, at least according to the latest news report, it still is not clear.  On one hand, maybe no more than 0.5% of the budget was compromised.  On the other hand, would that caseload of 142 active investigations reveal more? 

Even less clear is the reason that Investigator General Parsons was fired.  The Board did not clarify what about his performance was unsatisfactory.  The AP report implies that doing too little was not the issue.  Most disturbing is lack of any mention of a possible replacement.

As we mentioned previously, the authoritative 2006 Global Corruption Report from Transparency International stated that corruption is a major global health problem.  Furthermore, Transparency International's IACC (International Anti-Corruption Conference) in Brasilia just wrapped up.  It's final declaration included,

We call on leaders everywhere to embrace not only transparency in public life but a culture of transparency leading to a participatory society in which leaders are accountable.


We call on the anti-corruption movement to support and protect the activists, whistleblowers and journalists who speak out against corruption, often at great risk.

It is up to all of us in government, business and society to embrace transparency so that it ensures full participation of all people, bringing us together to send a clear message: We are watching those who act with impunity and we will not let them get away with it.

Yet, corruption as a global health problem is still mostly ignored. In particular, global health aid programs almost never include pro-active measures to address corruption. In this case, the Global Fund, the world's largest source of such aid, was initially pushed into defensively addressing corruption, but now seems not to be so transparent about the problem. In my humble opinion, unless more transparency soon becomes evident, donors may continue to find reasons not to support the fund.


So the leaders of the Global Fund might want to consider becoming more transparent, and making some assurances that they are not out to get whistleblowers, including their own internal watchdogs.  At this point a more pro-active approach might be too much to ask for. 

12:55 PM

"More Marketing Than Science" - An Anonymous Confession About Deceptive Marketing Published in the British Medical Journal

The British Medical Journal just published an anonymous article by a pharmaceutical company insider that explained once again how pharmaceutical companies turn research studies, apparently scholarly articles, and medical education into stealth marketing efforts.  (See Anonymous.  Post-marketing observational studies: my experience in the drug industry.  Brit Med J 2012; 344: 28.  Link here.)

We have previously discussed examples of health care corporate insiders confessing their individual efforts to turn medical research and education into marketing.  For example, peruse this.  We have also discussed how documents made public through litigation have revealed marketing plans for specific drugs that used apparently academic, educational, or scholarly publications and venues to market without revealing this transformation.  For example, see the Neurontin marketing plan (see post here), and the Lexapro marketing plan (see post here).  We have also discussed numerous examples of manipulation of particular research studies by those with vested interests, and outright suppression of studies whose results did not favor such vested interests.

Yet I suspect majorities of health care academics and professionals, health care policy makers, and the public at large do not realize, or would not admit that the evidence base for making health care decisions, and the general academic and professional discourse has been so corrupted.  So it is worthwhile to review once again how an insider summarized this corruption.

Research Studies Designed Primarily as Marketing Vehicles

In general, the anonymous author suggested that at least some studies were done for marketing, not scientific purposes:

some of the studies I worked on were not designed to determine the overall risk:benefit balance of the drug in the general population. They were designed to support and disseminate a marketing message.

Whether it was to highlight a questionable advantage over a 'me-too' competitor drug or to increase disease awareness among the medical community (particularly in so called invented diseases) and in turn increase product penetration in the market, the truth is that these studies had more marketing than science behind them.

Furthermore, the studies were supervised not by physicians or scientists, but by marketers in the marketing department,

Although the medical department developed the publication plans, designed the study, performed the statistical analysis, and wrote the final paper (which when published was passed on to marketing and sales to be used as marketing material), the marketing team responsible for that product were directly involved in all stages. They also closely supervised the content of other educational 'scientific' materials produced in the medical department and intended for potential prescribers. Instructions from marketing to the medical staff involved were clear: to ensure that the benefits of the drug were emphasised and the disadvantages were minimised where possible.

Manipulation of Research Design, Implementation, or Analysis

The author described how the marketers manipulated research studies so they would produce the results desired from a marketing perspective, regardless of their underlying truth,

Since marketing claims needed to be backed-up scientifically, we occasionally resorted to 'playing' with the data that had originally failed to show the expected result. This was done by altering the statistical method until any statistical significance was found. Such a result might not have supported the marketing claim, but it was always worth giving it a go to see what results you could produce. And it was possible because the protocols of post-marketing studies were lax, and it was not a requirement to specify any statistical methodology in detail. On the other hand, the studies were hypothesis testing (such as cohort studies, case-control studies) rather than hypothesis generating (such as case reports or adverse events reports), so playing with the data felt uncomfortable.

Other practices to ensure the marketing message was clear in the final publication included omission of negative results, usually in secondary outcome measures that had not been specified in the protocol, or inflating the importance of secondary outcome measures if they were positive when the primary measure was not.

So to summarize, the marketers would control the statistical analyses, promoting multiple analyses to attempt to come up with the "right" result that would support the marketing message (although the more kinds of analyses one tries, the more likely one is likely to come up with false results by chance alone). Presumably the marketers did not care whether or not the results were really true, which is perhaps why even they felt "uncomfortable" in some circumstances.

They would also foster the suppression of negative results, and the dredging of data for extra outcome measures when analysis showed no advantage in terms of the real primary outcomes. Suppression of negative results could be viewed as plain lying. Deliberate analysis of multiple end-points again risks identifying random error as true results.

The Role of Key Opinion Leaders

The author described how key opinion leaders, that is, health care professionals thought to be especially influential on practice or policy, were hired to become marketers presumably without revealing this intention.

Every big international observational study had a large advisory board. This was critical since the success of a newly launched drug in the market would depend on how many key opinion leaders were part of the study. Not only would they add credibility to the results, but they would also be key in influencing decision makers and other prescribers. In regional studies with thousands of patients, the study’s advisory board was formed by at least one key opinion leader from each country in that region, ensuring that areas important in terms of possible sales were covered. The contributions of the key opinion leaders to the study were always positive, but in my experience more directed towards designing new studies to answer their specific clinical questions rather than critically appraising our results and conclusions. In general, the relationship was amicable. We took them to the best hotels and restaurants during our advisory board meetings, and they appeared as authors in our research. Later, they would act as the company’s 'ambassadors,' giving conferences, teaching doctors, or talking to the media about the benefits of the drug.

Note that even the anonymous author could not bring him or herself to call the key opinion leaders salespeople, or marketers, but used the ambiguous wterm "ambassadors." Nonetheless, the role of key opinion leaders described would clearly be that of marketers or salespeople. However, it is extremely doubtful that any of these KOLs felt they had to declare that they were paid salespeople when presenting at conferences, teaching doctors, or talking about the media.

I would suggest that their actions would therefore fit Transparency International's definition of ethical corruption, "abuse of entrusted power for private gain." The KOLs are entrusted to be professional, and in many cases, scholarly. Using a professional or scholarly guise to act as a salesperson appears to be abuse of that entrusted power, in my humble opinion. In nearly every case, KOLs are paid, often handsomely, by the companies whose products they are selling. Thus, key opinion leaders acting as described by the anonymous author appear to be ethically corrupt.

Summary

The evidence of unethical marketing practices by commercial health care firms is mounting. Although I am most familiar with evidence from the US, there is mounting evidence that these practices are global, often done by companies that are not US based, and meant to influence practice and policy world-wide.

As the evidence mounts, it becomes increasingly clear that many such marketing practices are corrupt, at least in an ethical sense. Whether they may break laws in particular countries is a question for someone else.

The latest BMJ article is a reminder how skeptical the shrinking group of health care professionals who do not have conflicts of interest, are not biased in favor of particular products, and who put patients' interests first must be about ALL published research, scholarly publications, and apparently educational activities. Advocates of true evidence-based medicine must be extremely careful to try to use the least biased and manipulated parts of the evidence-base.

The mounting evidence suggests that at a minimum, all research reports, scholarly articles, media reports, conferences, and educational programs should provide full, detailed disclosure of all conflicts of interest. Perhaps having to make a declaration like "I am paid 50,000 Euros a year by the marketing department of company X to help market drug Y" before a supposedly educational talk would make some health care professionals think twice about such relationships.

However, even such detailed disclosure may not be sufficient to hamper marketing practices that now appear overtly corrupt. In my humble opinion, it is time to consider a global ban on the funding or influencing of human research by companies and other organizations which stand to gain financially according to the results of the research, or whose products and services are subject of such research. It is also time to consider a global ban on the funding or influencing of health care education by such organizations.

However, so many people are making so much money from the current practices that I doubt such proposals would get much support, or even public notice beyond this humble blog.

9:41 AM