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Showing posts with label RUC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label RUC. Show all posts
Just last month the RUC made it back into the headlines.  Then we posted  Politico made another attempt to shed some light on this obscure committee and its outsize effect on health care. Now the watchdog organization Public Citizen has stepped into the breach, publishing a report on the RUC (Research Based Relative Value Scale Update Committee), with an accompanying press release and op-ed

Introduction - Why the RUC is Important

To explain why this issue is important, I can simply repeat what I wrote before

In 2007, readers of the Annals of Internal Medicine could read part of the solution to a great medical mystery.(1)  For years, health care costs in the US had been levitating faster than inflation, without producing any noticeable positive effect on patients.  Many possible reasons were proposed, but as the problem continued to worsen, none were proven.

The article in the Annals, however, proposed one conceptually simple answer.  The prices of most physicians' services, at least most of those that involved procedures or operations for Medicare patients, were high because the US government set them that way. Although the notion that prices were high because they were fixed to be so high was simple, how the fixing was done, and how the fixing affected the rest of the health system was complex, mind numbingly complex.

Perhaps because of the complexity of its implementation, the simplicity of the concept has not seemingly reached the consciousness of most American health care professionals or policy makers, despite the publication of several scholarly articles on the subject, efforts by humble bloggers such as yours truly, a major journalistic expose in the Wall Street Journal in 2010,  another major expose in Washington Monthly in 2013, congressional hearings in 2013, and yet another major expose in Politico in 2014.  The lack of much public discussion of this issue despite its importance and the above attempts to start discussion seemed to be a prime example of what we have called the anechoic effect, that important causes of health care dysfunction whose discussion would discomfit those who are currently personally profiting from the current system rarely produce many public echoes.  (For a review of what is known to date about how the offputtingly named Resource Based Relative Value Scale Update Committee (RUC) works, and previous attempts to makes it central role in fixing what US physicians are paid public, see the Appendix.)

Once Again...  the Public Citizen Report

The latest report draws on the earlier exposes and journal articles, and repeats again all but one of the major points in the Washington Monthly 2013 article.  Here are the points with quotes from the new report.

The RUC is Well Hidden

After describing the RUC as "secretive" in its introduction, the report reviewed the specifics:

most of its proceedings occur behind closed doors and without public scrutiny. Minutes from each of the RUC’s three annual meetings are not made publicly available. Additionally, when the RUC votes each spring to assign work RVU values to CPT codes, the voting results are not released to the public.

Also,

One critical piece of information that is not disclosed to anybody (including RUC members) is any indication of how each member of the RUC voted.

The RUC Fixes Prices

The RUC has enormous power in setting health care prices,...

The Government Enables the RUC to Fix Prices

The key data point in the formula that is used to set Medicare payment rates is largely determined by a secretive committee that is managed and funded by the American Medical Association....

Also,

CMS is not required to accept the RUC’s recommendations. In fact, the RUC is insistent that its role in the process is only to exercise its right to petition the government. However, studies have demonstrated that CMS accepts RUC recommendations at overwhelmingly high rates.

The Government Fixed Prices are Endorsed by the Private Sector

The RUC’s influence over physician payments extends well beyond Medicare payments because private insurers also use the Medicare payment framework as a baseline for determining their payments. Private insurance companies often set their payments based on the underlying Medicare fee schedule.

The Price Fixing Drives Up Costs and the Use of Services

The RUC has been accused of overstating many of the factors used to determine a physician payment.

Also,

When the RUC has recommended adjusting the values that determine physician payments, it has been more than five times as likely to increase pay for a procedure as decrease it.

These Incentives Cripple Primary Care

To the extent that the RUC’s members are biased towards their own specialties, this results in the overvaluing of specialty procedures at the expense of primary care. Because there are significantly more specialty procedures than primary care procedures, the overvaluation of specialty and procedural services has caused U.S. specialists’ pay to rise much more rapidly than primary care physicians since the formation of the RUC.

Higher pay to specialists creates greater incentives for medical students to practice specialty or procedural medicine, resulting in a shortage of primary care physicians.

These Incentives Benefit Big Corporations, not just Medical Specialists

This was the only issue not directly addressed in the 2014 Politico article or in the new Public Citizen report.  (But see our 2013 post.)

Anechoic So Far

So in some sense the Public Citizen report on the RUC sang the same old song.  However, as the report itself noted, previous attempts to inspire action about the RUC have generated no echoes.  Thus, maybe it should be no surprise that so far there has been no press coverage of the Public Citizen report (at least as far as I could tell by using my usual search techniques as of this morning). 

Of course, as we have discussed ad infinitum, that which discomfits those who are making so much money from our current health care system often manages to create few echoes, that is, what we have dubbed the anechoic effect.

This is all the more interesting because there are aspects of the RUC that could outrage both left- and right-wingers.  First of all, the RUC is a major component in a system of government price fixing.  Enabled by the RUC, CMS fixes the prices of medical care.  Many on the right, but particularly those of the more libertarian or free market fundamentalist persuasion say they hate government price fixing.

Second of all, the RUC exemplifies regulatory capture.  The report quoted

 Thomas Scully, an administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services under President George W. Bush, also has been highly critical of the RUC, and particularly the power the AMA has over the process. 'The idea that $100 billion in federal spending is based on fixed prices that go through an industry trade association in a process that is not open to the public is pretty wild,' Scully said in 2013.

Again, many on the right, and also, probably many on the left worry about regulatory capture.

Third, the RUC represents a particular species of regulatory capture, crony capitalism.  This was not emphasized in the report, but we have written before about how many RUC members have personal financial ties to health care corporations, and how these constitute conflicts of interest (look here).  The Washington Monthly noted that RUC members are sponsored by medical societies that in turn have institutional conflicts of interest involving big health care corporations, and that the way the RUC sets prices could benefit such health care corporations (look here.)  Both left- and right-wingers say they loathe crony capitalism, although the left emphasizes the undue influence of big business, and the right emphasizes the bad actions of government resulting from it.

Yet very few on the right or left seem to have noticed, much less have become outraged by the RUC

The new Public Citizen report suggested

The most important policy change is for CMS to stop relying on the AMA to maintain the existing system for determining the value of Medicare payments to physicians.

Maybe this time someone will listen.  As I have written too often, I hope the latest attempt by Public Citizen to make the RUC less anechoic will succeed in increasing awareness of the RUC and its essential role in making the US health care system increasingly unworkable.  Of course, such awareness may disturb the many people who are making so much money within the current system.  But if we do nothing about the RUC, and about the ever expanding bubble of health care costs, that bubble will surely burst, and the results for patients' and the public's health will be devastating.



APPENDIX - Background on the RUC

 We have frequently posted, first here in 2007, and more recently here,  here, here, and here, about the little-known group that controls how the US Medicare system pays physicians, the RBRVS Update Committee, or RUC.

Since 1991, Medicare has set physicians' payments using the Resource Based Relative Value System (RBRVS), ostensibly based on a rational formula to tie physicians' pay to the time and effort they expend, and the resources they consume on particular patient care activities. Although the RBRVS was meant to level the payment playing field for cognitive services, including primary care vs procedures, over time it has had the opposite effect, as explained by Bodenheimer et al in a 1997 article in the Annals of Internal Medicine.(1) A system that pays a lot for procedures, but much less for diagnosing illnesses, forecasting prognoses, deciding on treatment, and understanding patients' values and preferences when procedures and devices are not involved, is likely to be very expensive, but not necessarily very good for patients.

 

As we wrote before, to update the system, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies almost exclusively on the advice of the RBRVS Update Committee. The RUC is a private committee of the AMA, touted as an "expert panel" that takes advantage of the organization's First Amendment rights to petition the government. Membership on the RUC is allotted to represent specialty societies, so that the vast majority of the members represent specialties that do procedures and focus on expensive, high-technology tests and treatments.
 

However, the identities of RUC members were opaque for a long time, and the proceedings of the group are secret.  As Goodson(2) noted, RUC "meetings are closed to outside observers except by invitation of the chair." Furthermore, he stated, "proceedings are proprietary and therefore not publicly available for review."
 

In fact, the fog surrounding the operations of the RUC seems to have affected many who write about it. We have posted (here, here, here, and here) about how previous publications about problems with incentives provided to physicians seemed to have avoided even mentioning the RUC. Up until 2010, after the US recent attempt at health care reform, the RUC seemed to remain the great unmentionable. Even the leading US medical journal seemed reluctant to even print its name.
 

That changed in October, 2010.  A combined effort by the Wall Street Journal, the Center for Public Integrity, and Kaiser Health News yielded two major articles about the RUC, here in the WSJ (also with two more spin-off articles), and here from the Center for Public Integrity (also reprinted by Kaiser Health News.) The articles covered the main points about the RUC: its de facto control over how physicians are paid, its "secretive" nature (quoting the WSJ article), how it appears to favor procedures over cognitive physician services, etc.
 

In 2011, after the "Replace the RUC" movement generated some more interest about this secretive group, and its complicated but obscure role in the health care system, the current RUC membership was finally revealed.  It was relatively easy for me to determine that many of the members had conflicts of interest (beyond their specialty or sub-specialty identity and their role in medical societies that might have institutional conflicts of interest, and leaders with conflicts of interest).  
 

Then that year a lawsuit was filed by a number of primary care physicians that contended that the RUC was functioning illegally as a de facto US government advisory panel.  It appeared that things might change.  However, it was not to be.  A judge dismissed the lawsuit in 2012, based on his contention that the law that set up the RBRVS system prevented any challenges through the legal system to the mechanism used to set payment rates.  The ruling did not address the legality of the relationship between the RUC and the federal government.  The eery quiet then resumed, only punctuated briefly in early 2013, when a Senate committee held hearings with no obvious effect.      

References
1. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. (Link here.)
2. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310. (Link here.)
12:02 PM
Introduction

We just discussed how a major story in Politico has once again drawn attention to the opaque RUC (Resource Based Relative Value System Update Committee) and its important role in determining what physicians are paid for different kinds of services, and hence the incentives that have helped make the US health care system so procedurally oriented.  (See the end of our last post for a summary of the complex issues that swirl around the RUC.)

The Politico article covered most of the bases, but notably omitted how the RUC may be tied to various large health care organizations, especially for-profit, and how the incentives it creates may benefit them. When the RUC membership first became public in 2011 due to efforts by Wall Street Journal reporters, I used internet searches to find that nearly half of the RUC members had conflicts of interest (look here).  Most of them were part-time paid consulting relationships, paid speaking engagements, and memberships on advisory boards involving drug, device, biotechnology and occasionally health insurance companies, or personal stock holdings in such companies.

In preparing my latest post, I found that to its credit, the AMA now makes the RUC membership more accessible (look here, free registration required.)  So I decided to check whether the current RUC roster still seems so conflicted.

As I did in 2011, I ran internet searches on all new RUC members since 2011, and updated searches on the continuing members.  Results are below.  Information new since 2011 is highlighted thus.  Note that I believe all the listed relationships are or were actual, but cannot rule out errors, especially given some RUC members have common names.  Any corrections are welcome.


The RUC Members and Their Financial Relationships

- Barbara S Levy, MD

Chair, RVS Update Committee
Federal Way, WA 2000

Consultant/Advisory Boards: Conceptus; AMS; Covidien; Halt Medical; Gynesonics; Idoman Medical (hysteroscopic surgery and sterilization, endometrial ablation, electrosurgery, vaginal hysterectomy) per UptoDate


-Margie Andreae MD
American Academy of Pediatrics
Ann Arbor, MI

Chief Medical Officer of Integrated Revenue Cycle and Billing Compliance, University of Michigan Health System, per University of Michigan Health System


- Michael D. Bishop, MD
American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP)
Bloomington, IN 2003

- James Blankenship, MD
American College of Cardiology (ACC)
Danville, PA 2000

Lecture fees from Sanofi-Aventis per New England Journal of Medicine
Financial relationships with  The Medicines Company, Abbott Vascular, Conor Med Systems, Portola Pharmaceuticals, Schering Plough, AGA Medical, Astra Zeneca, Abiomed, Bristol Myers Squibb, Tryton Medical, Kai Pharmaceutical, Novartis (Grants or Research Support) per Society for Cardiovascular Angiography and Interventions Disclosure Summary


- Robert Dale Blasier, MD
American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (AAOS)
Little Rock, AK 2008

-Albert Bothe Jr MD
CPT Editorial Board
Danville PA

Executive Vice President and Chief Medical Officer, Geisinger Health Systems, per Geisinger


- Ronald Burd, MD
American Psychiatric Association (APA)
Fargo, ND 2006

-C Scott Collins MD
American Academy of Dermatology
Rochester, MN


- Thomas P Cooper MD
American Urological Association
Everett, WA

General Partner, Aperture Venture Partners LLC, (health care focused venture capital firm) , per Aperture
Member, Board of Directors, Kindred Healthcare, per Kindred
Member, Board of Directors, Hanger Inc (orthotic and prosthetic care), per Hanger
Member, Board of Directors, IPC/ the Hospitalist Company, per IPC



-Anthony Hamm DC
Health Care Professional Advisory Committee
Goldsboro, NC


- David F. Hitzeman, DO
American Osteopathic Association (AOA)
Tulsa, OK 1996


- Charles F. Koopmann, Jr., MD
American Academy of Otolaryngology-Head and Neck Surgery (AAO-HNS)
Ann Arbor, MI 1996

- Robert Kossmann, MD
Renal Physicians Association (RPA)
Santa Fe, NM 2009

Member of Advanced Renal Technologies Advisory Board, Network 15 Medical Advisory Board, Baxter Home Dialysis Advisory Board, Fresenius Medical Advisory Board per Renal Physicians Association

- Walter Larimore, MD
American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP)
Colorado Springs, CO 2009

-Alan E Lazaroff MD
American Geriatrics Society
Denver, CO


- J. Leonard Lichtenfeld, MD
American College of Physicians (ACP)
Atlanta, GA 1994

Member, Physician Advisory Board, Aetna per Aetna 
Deputy Chief Medical Officer, American Cancer Society, per ACS

- Scott Manaker, MD, PhD
Practice Expense Subcommittee
Philadelphia, PA 2010

Consultant to Pfizer and Johnson and Johnson. Owns stock in Neose Technologies, Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, and Rohm and Haas per Chest

-William J Mangold Jr MD
American Medical Association
Tuscon, AZ

Vice President, Board Developer Inc (health care management consulting firm), per Board Developer
Senior Advisor, ADVI (health care management consulting firm), per ADVI
Member, Board of Directors, Sante (post-acute health care company), per Sante


-Geraldine B McGinty MD
American College of Radiology,
New York, NY


- Gregory Przybylski, MD
American Association of Neurological Surgeons (AANS)
Edison, NJ 2001

Stock Ownership: United Healthcare (300 shares); Scientific Advisory Board: United Health Group (B, Spine Advisory Board) per NASS meeting

- Marc Raphaelson, MD
American Academy of Neurology (AAN)
Leesburg, VA 2009

personal compensation for activities with Jazz Pharmaceuticals and Medtronics as a speakers bureau member or consultant per AAN

- Sandra Reed, MD
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)
Thomasville, GA 2009


GlaxoSmithKline Consulting, $1750 in 2009, $1500 in 2010 per ProPublica Dollars for Docs search through here

David H Regan MD
American Society of Clinical Oncology
Portland, OH

Payment from Cephalon in 2009 for $2200, per ProPublica search 



-Chad A Rubin MD
American College of Surgery
Columbia, SC


-Joseph R Schlecht
Pimrary Care Seat
Jenks, OK 


- Peter Smith, MD
Society of Thoracic Surgeons (STS)
Durham, NC 2006

Eli Lilly, Consulting, $1500 in 2009, $1990 in 2010 per Pro Publica Dollars for Docs search through here
Advisor or consultant to Bayer per Medscape

-Samuel D Smith MD
American Pediatric Surgical Association
Little Rock, AK


-Stanley Stead MD
American Society of Anesthesiologist
Encino, CA


J Allan Tucker MD
College of American Pathologists
Mobile, AL


- James Waldorf, MD
American Society of Plastic Surgeons (ASPS)
Jacksonville, FL 2008

- George Williams, MD
American Academy of Ophthalmology (AAO)
Royal Oak, MI 2009

Advisory Team, RetroSense Therapeutics
Shareholder and consultant for ThromboGenics Ltd. and holds intellectual property on the use of plasmin per Review of Opthamology
Alcon Laboratories, consultant, lecturer; Allergan, consultant, lecturer; Macusight, consultant, equity owner; Neurotech, consultant; Nu-Vue Technologies, equity owner, patent/ royalties; OMIC- Ophthalmic Mutual Insurance Company, employee; Optimedica, consultant, equity owner; Thrombogenics, consultant, equity owner per AAO meeting

Pfizer, “Professional Advising,” $5534 in 2009 per Pro Publica Dollars for Docs search through here
Member, Medical and Scientific Committee, Pixium Vision Inc, per Pixium 
Member, Board of Directors, Macusight Inc, per BusinessWeek.  


Summary 

The membership of the RUC continues to have a considerable number of apparent financial conflicts of interest.  By my count, in 2014, nearly half, 15/31 members had such conflicts.

Again, most of the conflicts were financial ties such as part-time paid consulting relationships, paid speaking engagements, and memberships on advisory boards involving drug, device, biotechnology and occasionally health insurance companies, or personal stock holdings in such companies.  A number of members who had such ties known in 2011 have several more such ties in 2014. 

In 2014, new kinds of conflicts of interest that appear even more intense have appeared.  Several members are now known to also be members of the boards of directors of for-profit health care corporations, including biotechnology, device, health care provider, and health care management services companies. 

We have been writing about the severe conflicts of interest presented by service on the boards of  health care corporationa.  In 2006 we first discussed a newly discovered species of conflict of interest in health care, in which leaders of medical or health care organizations were simultaneously serving on boards of directors of health care corporations.
 
We posited these conflicts would be particularly important because being on the board of directors entails not just a financial incentive.  It ostensibly requires board members to "demonstrate unyielding loyalty to the company's shareholders" [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.]  Of course, after the global financial collapse of 2008 made us sadder and a little wiser, we realized that many board members actually seem to have unyielding loyalty to their cronies among top management.  However, in any case, the stated or actual interests of a member of the board of a health care corporation, like a pharmaceutical company or medical device company, could be very different and at odds with the mission of an academic medical institution or a non-profit ostensibly dedicated to improving health care quality, like in this case, the RUC of the American Medical Association.

Also, one new RUC member is apparently a top executive of a health care management services company, and another new RUC member is apparently a general partner of a health care venture capital firm. Again, such leadership roles create responsibilities that could be very much at odds with a leadership role in a very influential committee run by a physicians' society.

Finally, two new members are top executives of large, although admittedly non-profit hospital systems.  One member is now known to be a full-time executive of a large, non-profit disease specific patient advocacy organization.  While hospital systems' interests may overlap those of physicians, modern  hospital systems are often run by generic managers who put revenues ahead of all else.  Furthermore, in pursuit of revenues, hospital system leaders may be very interested in increasing utilization of the most lucrative, usually high-technology and procedural services, and thus in structuring physicians' incentives accordingly.  While disease-specific patient advocacy goups' interests may also overlap those of doctors, they may tend to be more interested in their diseases than all others.

By the way, note that AMA and RUC leaders often defend the RUC as purely physician run organization, e.g., the testimony of the RUC leader, Dr Barbara Levy, at a Senate hearing, per MedPage Today in 2011, (see this post),

The RUC is an independent group of physicians from many specialties, including primary care, who use their expertise on caring for Medicare patients to provide input to CMS [the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services],' RUC chair Barbara Levy, MD, said in a statement. 

But now it is clear that the RUC includes corporate executives and board members, and top hospital system executives.  These people may have MDs, but their loyalties appear divided.

We have questioned the tremendously influential role the RUC plays in setting the incentives that drive the US health care system.  Now it appears that the RUC membership remains conflicted.  Almost half work part-time for drug, device, biotechnology, and health insurance companies.  Several are in the top leadership and/or governance of various health care corporations and large non-profit hospital systems.  Thus it seems that the incentives that drive are health care system are under the influence of people who may put corporate or organizational revenue ahead of patients' and the public's health.

As we wrote before, the prevalence of conflicts of interest among RUC members highlight the need for a more accountable, transparent and honest system to manage how the government pays physicians, and a need for more transparency and accountability in the relationship among the government, health care insurance, and physicians.

As a first step, I submit that all RUC members who are executives or board members of for-profit health care corporations or large hospital systems step down from the RUC, or resign these positions.
11:58 AM
It has been a year since we wrote about the RUC, the American Medical Association's Relative Value System Update Committee.  There is only one thing new since then.  Politico just made another attempt to shed some light on this obscure committee and its outsize effect on health care. 

To summarize the events so far, all I need to do is cut and paste from our last post on the topic, from July, 2013...

In 2007, readers of the Annals of Internal Medicine could read part of the solution to a great medical mystery.(1)  For years, health care costs in the US had been levitating faster than inflation, without producing any noticeable positive effect on patients.  Many possible reasons were proposed, but as the problem continued to worsen, none were proven.

Prices are High Because They are Fixed That Way

The article in the Annals, however, proposed one conceptually simple answer.

The prices of most physicians' services, at least most of those that involved procedures or operations for Medicare patients, were high because the US government set them that way. Although the notion that prices were high because they were fixed to be so high was simple, how the fixing was done, and how the fixing affected the rest of the health system was complex, mind numbingly complex.

Perhaps because of the complexity of its implementation, the simplicity of the concept has not seemingly reached the consciousness of most American health care professionals or policy makers, despite the publication of several scholarly articles on the subject, efforts by humble bloggers such as yours truly, a major journalistic expose in the Wall Street Journal in 2010,  another major expose in Washington Monthly in 2013, and congressional hearings in 2013.  The lack of much public discussion of this issue despite its importance and the above attempts to start discussion seemed to be a prime example of what we have called the anechoic effect, that important causes of health care dysfunction whose discussion would discomfit those who are currently personally profiting from the current system rarely produce many public echoes.  (For a review of what is known to date about how the offputtingly named Resource Based Relative Value Scale Update Committee (RUC) works, and previous attempts to makes it central role in fixing what US physicians are paid public, see the Appendix.)


Politico's Turn


Now an article by Katie Jennings in Politico brings up some of the issues about the RUC that we have dealt with again and again. These included six of seven major points discussed in the Washington Monthly article, and that have been discussed multiple times on Health Care Renewal.  I will list the seven points, with supporting quotes for the first six from the Politico article.  (Our post in 2013 on the Washington Monthly article had supporting quotes for the last point.) 


The RUC is Well Hidden


 And yet even many doctors are not aware of the hidden hand of the AMA-run committee in perpetuating this costly crisis. The panel, with very little transparency or public discussion, continues....
Also

RUC meetings were closed, invitations had to be approved by the AMA, the charter had not been made public and there were no minutes or public documentation of what was said at the meetings. (Last year, under pressure, the RUC announced it would post meeting minutes on the AMA website.)

The RUC Fixes Prices


a secretive committee run by the American Medical Association (AMA) ..., with the assent of the government, has enormous power to determine Medicare prices by assessing the relative value of the services that physicians perform.

The Government Enables the RUC to Fix Prices

the role of the AMA’s secret committee [dates] back to 1992, when the U.S. government sought to overhaul the entire Medicare fee system and decided it didn’t have the right personnel to conduct extensive surveys of physicians. So the federal agency tasked with overseeing the program, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, enlisted the AMA and the committee it had formed to determine what’s known as the relative value of physician work, meaning the amount of time, effort and skill that goes into performing a procedure. Each procedure had a corresponding code in the AMA’s Current Procedural Terminology coding system, which the government had already adopted nearly a decade before, in 1983, as the standard for physician billing and reimbursement for Medicare.

Also,
Above all, the RUC appeared to be dictating solutions to the government. Since 1992, the RUC has submitted more than 7,000 recommendations to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The agency has accepted 87.4 percent of the recommendations, according to a study published in Health Affairs.


The Government Fixed Prices are Endorsed by the Private Sector

Because Medicare fees are the baseline for the rest of the pricing in the health care system, this has had a broad effect,...

The Price Fixing Drives Up Costs and the Use of Services

For decades the committee has ... [set prices] done so in a way that has skewed Medicare fees in favor of expensive specialists over ordinary general practitioners like Fischer, who are the nation’s first line of defense against serious illness. Because Medicare fees are the baseline for the rest of the pricing in the health care system, this has had a broad effect, contributing to a situation where primary care doctors are in general underpaid, underappreciated — and in critically short supply as medical students flock to where the money and opportunity are.


These Incentives Cripple Primary Care

And because the 31-member committee was – and still is — made up of a majority of specialists who typically sought to maximize their own share of the pie (26 of the 31 are appointed by the major national medical associations), it was no surprise who the losers turned out to be. 'The specialists know what the game is,' said Dr. Robert Berenson of the Urban Institute in DC, who was a member of the RUC in the early 1990s. 'The [RUC’s] basic method of relying on a specialty society to give a non-biased appraisal … is fundamentally a flawed concept.' Dr. Grant Rodkey, the first chair of the committee that came to be known as the RUC, described the scene of the inaugural meeting as 'reminiscent of a group of dogs on leash eyeing a platter with a not-too-generous bone,' in a 1997 interview in the Bulletin of the American College of Surgeons.


These Incentives Benefit Big Corporations, not just Medical Specialists


This was the only issue not directly addressed in the 2014 Politico article.  (But see our 2013 post.)


What to Do and What Will Happen?


The Politico article concluded on an optimistic note, suggesting that increased transparency about what Medicare pays physicians might help.

One key moment came in a court ruling this year: For 35 years until last April, all the Medicare billing practices of physicians had been kept private by a court injunction granted to the AMA. But after an appeals court ruled that such information must be made public, the 2012 billing data was released, showing that the top 1 percent of doctors, mostly specialists, accounted for an outsized portion —14 percent — of Medicare billing.

Or perhaps Congress might ride to the rescue,

Today ironically, the renegade primary care doctors see hope on Capitol Hill—and in the Obamacare law that so many on Capitol Hill have demonized. In April, seeking to avoid impending cuts to physician Medicare reimbursements, Congress passed the “Protecting Access to Medicare Act.” The new law expands on a provision already included in the Affordable Care Act that gives the secretary of Health and Human Services greater authority to identify and correct misvalued Current Procedural Terminology codes. Spurred by Congressman McDermott — who told me in an email that he still wants “major changes that make the RUC’s process more transparent” — Congress also commissioned a report from the Comptroller General to study the process by which the RUC provides recommendations to the government on Medicare fees.


And there is even one - one out of very many - health care insurance companies that might finally deviate from the Medicare fee schedule as influenced by the RUC,

Even some medical insurers, like CareFirst in the Washington, D.C. region, have begun to rebel against the old system and to push the savings that might come from paying primary care physicians more. As long as I can remember, family physicians and general internists have been financially at the low end of the totem pole,' even though they’re the ones who perform the critical if unglamorous work of preventing serious illnesses, former CareFirst Chairman Michael Merson told The Washington Post recently.

But there have been only tiny changes in the RUC since the Washington Monthly article last year, and actually since we first wrote about the RUC in 2007.

The AMA, of course, fails to see anything wrong with the RUC.  On the AMA Wire blog appeared an  anonymous but apparently official post that sought to refute most of the the points made in the Politico article.

Well Hidden

The title of the blog post included the phrase "and it's no secret," but as far as I can tell, the AMA post never directly addressed the secrecy issue, especially involving the secrecy of RUC proceedings, whose location on the AMA website is not obvious to me.  I must admit that the list of members of the RUC is no longer secret, but can be found here (with a log-in, but no subscription required, and minus any biographical information, or conflict of interest disclosures).

Price Fixing

The AMA blog post stated

the RUC does not control the Medicare payment system, nor does it set rates for medical services

That is true as far as it goes, but totally ignores how the RUC's determination of the relative values indirectly sets payment rates.

Government's Uncritical Acceptance of the RUC's Recommendations

The AMA blog post included,

The RUC's recommendations are thoroughly reviewed by government officials who have the final say.

That failed to acknowledge how rarely the government officials have altered the RUC's findings in the past.

Effects on Primary Care

The AMA blog post stated

The RUC values all physicians’ cognitive work and role tackling the growing number of Americans with long-term health problems that need continuous care. The committee’s work reflects the continued importance of services that all doctors—including primary care physicians—perform.

Again, this ignores the small representation of primary care physicians, and of physicians who perform only cognitive, as opposed to procedural services on the RUC, and the data, starting with the Annals of Internal Medicine article from 2007, that suggests the RUC's updates favor procedural services.

Presumably as long as the leadership of the AMA sees no problems with the RUC, not much is likely to change.    

Summary

So since 1992, the RUC has had an outsize role controlling what Medicare pays physicians, and hence physicians' pay in general.  Over this time, the playing field has become increasingly tilted in favor of procedural services and away from cognitive services, especially primary care.  The result is that the US has the most expensive health care system in the world, but hardly the best health care or health care results in the world. 

Economists have beaten us over the head with idea that incentives matter.  The RUC seems to embody a corporatist approach to fixing prices for medical services to create perverse incentives for physicians to do more procedures, and do less conversing with and examining patients, examining the best clinical research evidence about their problems, and rigorously thinking about how best to help them.  More procedures at higher prices helps physicians who do procedures.  It may help even more the corporations that provide the devices and drugs whose use is necessitated by such procedures, and the hospitals who can charge a lot of money as sites for performance of procedures.  It may even help insurance companies by driving ever more money through the health care system, and thus allow rationalization for higher administrative expenses as a function of overall money flow.

Yet incentives favoring procedures over all else may lead to worse outcomes for patients, and more costs to patients and society.  If we do not figure out how to make incentives given to physicians more rational and fair, expect health care costs to continue to rise, while access and quality continue to suffer.

Since we started writing about the RUC in 2007,  there have been some small changes in the RUC.  It has slightly more primary care representation, and its membership is no longer secret.  That is, however, about it.

As I wrote last time, hopefully the Politico article, added to all the other attempts to shine light on the RUC, will succeed in increasing awareness of the RUC and its essential role in making the US health care system increasingly unworkable.  Of course, such awareness may disturb the many people who are making so much money within the current system.  But if we do nothing about the RUC, and about the ever expanding bubble of health care costs, that bubble will surely burst, and the results for patients' and the public's health will be devastating.


ADDENDUM (28 August, 2014) - This post was re-posted on the Naked Capitalism blog, and on the NBCH Newsletter blog

APPENDIX - Background on the RUC

 We have frequently posted, first here in 2007, and more recently here,  here, here, and here, about the little-known group that controls how the US Medicare system pays physicians, the RBRVS Update Committee, or RUC.

Since 1991, Medicare has set physicians' payments using the Resource Based Relative Value System (RBRVS), ostensibly based on a rational formula to tie physicians' pay to the time and effort they expend, and the resources they consume on particular patient care activities. Although the RBRVS was meant to level the payment playing field for cognitive services, including primary care vs procedures, over time it has had the opposite effect, as explained by Bodenheimer et al in a 1997 article in the Annals of Internal Medicine.(1) A system that pays a lot for procedures, but much less for diagnosing illnesses, forecasting prognoses, deciding on treatment, and understanding patients' values and preferences when procedures and devices are not involved, is likely to be very expensive, but not necessarily very good for patients.

 

As we wrote before, to update the system, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies almost exclusively on the advice of the RBRVS Update Committee. The RUC is a private committee of the AMA, touted as an "expert panel" that takes advantage of the organization's First Amendment rights to petition the government. Membership on the RUC is allotted to represent specialty societies, so that the vast majority of the members represent specialties that do procedures and focus on expensive, high-technology tests and treatments.
 

However, the identities of RUC members were opaque for a long time, and the proceedings of the group are secret.  As Goodson(2) noted, RUC "meetings are closed to outside observers except by invitation of the chair." Furthermore, he stated, "proceedings are proprietary and therefore not publicly available for review."
 

In fact, the fog surrounding the operations of the RUC seems to have affected many who write about it. We have posted (here, here, here, and here) about how previous publications about problems with incentives provided to physicians seemed to have avoided even mentioning the RUC. Up until 2010, after the US recent attempt at health care reform, the RUC seemed to remain the great unmentionable. Even the leading US medical journal seemed reluctant to even print its name.
 

That changed in October, 2010.  A combined effort by the Wall Street Journal, the Center for Public Integrity, and Kaiser Health News yielded two major articles about the RUC, here in the WSJ (also with two more spin-off articles), and here from the Center for Public Integrity (also reprinted by Kaiser Health News.) The articles covered the main points about the RUC: its de facto control over how physicians are paid, its "secretive" nature (quoting the WSJ article), how it appears to favor procedures over cognitive physician services, etc.
 

In 2011, after the "Replace the RUC" movement generated some more interest about this secretive group, and its complicated but obscure role in the health care system, the current RUC membership was finally revealed.  It was relatively easy for me to determine that many of the members had conflicts of interest (beyond their specialty or sub-specialty identity and their role in medical societies that might have institutional conflicts of interest, and leaders with conflicts of interest).  
 

Then that year a lawsuit was filed by a number of primary care physicians that contended that the RUC was functioning illegally as a de facto US government advisory panel.  It appeared that things might change.  However, it was not to be.  A judge dismissed the lawsuit in 2012, based on his contention that the law that set up the RBRVS system prevented any challenges through the legal system to the mechanism used to set payment rates.  The ruling did not address the legality of the relationship between the RUC and the federal government.  The eery quiet then resumed, only punctuated briefly in early 2013, when a Senate committee held hearings with no obvious effect.      

References
1. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. (Link here.)
2. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310. (Link here.)

11:17 AM
We have frequently discussed how perverse incentives are spread around health care.  In the US, the physicians are paid according to a system that provides strong incentives for doing procedures, (see our posts about how the RUC has encouraged this bias towards procedures.)   Since physicians are the most influential "deciders" about the care of individual patients, these incentives encourage overtesting and overtreatment with the highest technology, driving up costs and subjecting patients to increased risks of adverse events.  The recent health care reform law, however, essentially encouraged a version of capitated payment, which might very well provide incentives for undertreatment and undertesting.  For years, Dr Robert Centor has argued logically and forcefully for paying physicians for the time they spend on behalf of payments, very analogous to how lawyers and many other professionals are paid.  This might provide much more neutral, less perverse incentives than would existing or other proposed physician payment schemes.  Dr Centor argued again for this seemingly reasonable and logical idea on his DB's Medical Rants blog.  The big question is why this idea has been so anechoic?
12:00 PM
This week, Society of General Internal Medicine (SGIM) members received the 5 August, 2009, Update in Health Policy that urged we "chuck the RUC," (quoted in its entirety below, italics added for emphasis):

Who will assign the value of primary care services? Chuck the RUC!

How does Medicare determine physician payment rates? The answer to this question is a core element of the ongoing debate about health care reform. Changing how Medicare sets payment rates for physicians is especially critical since Medicare rates also guide the rates set by private insurers. Since 1992, Medicare has paid physicians according to the Resource Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS), a fee schedule that multiplies relative values for physician services by a conversion factor to determine the amount of payment. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has historically used the Relative Value Scale Update Committee, or RUC, as the sole source of recommendations. This committee within the AMA performs broad reviews of the RBRVS every five years. Twenty three of the RUC's twenty nine members are appointed by major national medical specialty societies, including those that account for high percentages of Medicare expenditures for procedures. All meetings are closed and discussions are confidential. The over-representation of procedure-driven subspecialties and under-representation of generalist physicians in the RUC has contributed to the current undervalued cognitive services (especially for primary care) and over-valued reimbursement for procedures. In March 2007, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) identified the RUC process as a major reason for undervalued primary care services and a significant contributor to the crisis in primary care. MedPAC has recommended that an independent expert panel of economists, technology experts, physicians and private citizens be created to supplement the RUC's recommendations to CMS regarding fee schedules. Health reform discussions have included moving MedPAC into the executive branch and giving it authority to review and recommend Medicare payment policy, thus reducing the RUC's influence. Not surprisingly, both the AMA and the American College of Surgeons have opposed this proposal. Groups representing primary care physicians, including SGIM, are in favor of this proposal which could ensure fair and unbiased assignment of work RVUs to all the service codes used by physicians. We believe that this will correct the payment inequalities of the current fee scale and ultimately renew trainees' interest in primary care. In the coming weeks, SGIM may ask you to act on this issue and contact your legislators to urge them to support these transformative proposals for primary care. Please monitor your e-mail for action alerts and be prepared to act.

We have previously posted (most recently here in considerable detail) about the perverse incentives given US physicians by the payment schedule dictated by the US Medicare system. These incentives have been largely responsible for the increasingly dire status of primary care/ generalist care in the US. Revisions to the Resource-Based Relative Value System (RBRVS) disproportionately reward physicians for performing procedures and diagnostic tests instead of talking with, examining, thinking about, diagnosing, recommending decisions for, and counseling patients. The US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) uses the RBRVS Update Committee (RUC) de facto as its sole source for advice on revising the system. The RUC is dominated by representatives of medical societies whose members predominantly perform procedures and do diagnostic tests. The RUC is secretive. The identities of its individual members are difficult to ascertain. Its proceedings are secret.

Thus, the RBRVS updating process run by the RUC is opaque, unaccountable, and not representative of patients and "cognitive" physicians. The result of this process has been perverse incentives that have driven up health care costs without obvious improvements in quality or outcomes.

I applaud SGIM for being the first medical society to challenge how the RUC controls payments to physicians, and the perverse incentives the RUC process has generated.

As the Update above says, meaningful health care reform in the US will not occur unless we address the perverse incentives that drive up costs without improving care.
8:30 AM
We have posted frequently about the role of the RBRVS Update Committee (RUC) in fixing the rates at which Medicare pays physicians. These payment rates have been much more generous for procedures than for "cognitive" services, (that is, services including interviewing and examining patients, making diagnoses, forecasting prognoses, recommending tests or treatments, and counseling patients.) Several authors have suggested that how the RUC fixes payment rates is a major cause of the decline of primary care. (See our previous posts on this here, here, here, here, here, here, and here and important articles by Bodenheimer et al,[1] and Goodson.[2])

An Interview with a former Medicare administrator

Health Affairs just published an interview(3) with Kerry Weems, a recent administrator of the US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) under the Bush administration, who had some remarkable criticism for the RUC.


Iglehart: The last question I wanted to ask you relates to the Specialty Society Relative Value Scale Update Committee [RUC] of the American Medical Association. The AMA formed the RUC to act as an expert panel in developing relative value recommendations to CMS. The twenty-nine-member committee essentially determines, through the relative values it establishes for the codes that form the basis of Medicare payments, how much doctors will earn from providing services to beneficiaries. In recent years the RUC has come under criticism based on the view that its specialty- dominated composition undervalues primary care services and, in some instances, overvalues specialty services. I have two questions, Kerry, regarding the RUC. You have been in government for twenty-six years; have you ever heard of an administration that has seriously questioned the RUC process, and whether CMS ought to somehow internalize it or delegate it to another body?

Weems: I think there is a general consensus that the RUC has contributed to the poor state of primary care in the United States. In many ways the supposition behind the RUC process, behind the whole relative value scale, is incredibly flawed. It's an input measurement system, so it asks, What's the cost of my inputs, and that's how I'm going to price my outputs. It has no relationship to perhaps the market value of what you might buy. So because it's highly procedure based, it's prejudiced against just standard primary care evaluation and management [E&M] visits, because in an E&M visit it's hard to document what happens in the same way that it is when you remove a mole, or perform some other procedure.

So the process itself is flawed. I don't think that we can make a change without a statutory change giving us the ability to do that. But it's something that is drastically needed. You know, it's funny that we talk about better coordination of care and creating the medical home. Well, the place where this can occur is in an E&M visit, which has been highly undervalued by the RUC.

Iglehart: You say that the RUC process is seriously flawed and needs to be overhauled. Was there ever any discussion during the eight years of the George W. Bush administration about doing that?

Weems: There were a number of discussions, but it's a hard nut to crack. Those discussions never ripened to the point where we could say we've got something better.

Iglehart: But you'd anticipate under the Obama administration that those discussions will continue?

Weems: Sure. And, you know, you can even see the early attempts at trying to crack that. Representative [Pete] Stark [D-CA] introduced last year the so-called CHAMP [Children's Health and Medicare Protection Act] bill, in which he proposed to develop a new payment approach that would have provided more money to primary care physicians. He split it up into several different categories. This probably wasn't the right approach, but again, he was trying to work through the problem, trying to provide more money for primary care. His heart was in the right place.

There are a number of important points here.

First, a former CMS administrator charged that the RUC has a substantial role in the decline of primary care in the US. Such charges have been made by well-reputed academics who have analyzed the role of the RUC from the outside. But as we have said before, aspects of what the RUC does are obscure, especially because the proceedings of RUC meetings are not made public. But now someone more directly involved has made the same charges.

Second, a former CMS administrator has called the "RUC process ... incredibly flawed." Even the second Bush administration felt these flaws were sufficient to have "a number of discussions," but found "it's a hard nut to crack." Hence he said that although there is something fundamentally wrong with the "RUC process," the government could not easily fix it.

Yet RUC leadership has repeatedly said that the RUC is merely a private advisory committee which gives recommendations to CMS using its rights to free speech and to petition the government. (Note also that above, Inglehart first said that the RUC was formed as "an expert panel" to make "recommendations." But then he said the committee "determines ... how much doctors will earn.") If the RUC is simply an advisory committee, and CMS did not like the advice the RUC was giving, why couldn't CMS leaders simply ignore the RUC?

Weems' remarks do not make sense if the RUC is merely an outside private group providing advice. But they do make sense if the RUC is acting like a government agency.

So this interview once again raises the question: why does CMS rely exclusively on the RUC to update the RBRVS system, apparently making the RUC de facto a government agency, yet without any accountability to CMS, or the government at large?

A response by the Chair of the Board of the AMA

Within days of this interview, Dr Rebecca Patchin, the Chair of the Board of Trustees of the American Medical Association (AMA), wrote a response to the Weems interview. (Amazingly, the response appeared as a blog post on the Health Affairs Blog.)

First, she implied that a former CMS administrator did not know what he was talking about when it came to the RUC.

In the interview, inaccurate statements were made about the role of the AMA/Specialty Society RVS Update Committee (RUC), which advises CMS regarding the relative levels of reimbursement for different medical procedures performed by physicians.


Now I feel like I am in good company. The leaders of the RUC have charged that I made inaccurate statements about the RUC as well (see post here).

However, Dr Patchin failed to identify any particular statements by Kerry Weems or his interviewer as inaccurate, much less provide any evidence to that effect. Note that while the RUC leaders also charged me with making inaccurate statements, they did not specify any particular statements as inaccurate, much less produce evidence in support of their contentions.

Next, Dr Patchin wrote:

Every time the RUC has been asked to review payments for E&M (evaluation and management) codes, the RUC has sent CMS recommendations that would lead to higher payments.

This may be so, but it ignores an important issue. While the RUC may have made some recommendations to increase payments for cognitive services, it has made many more recommendations to increase payments for procedural services. Furthermore, while payments for individual procedures went up, and the volume of procedures also went up, the global budget for physicians' services, called the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR), resulted in across the board cuts. Since raises for procedures were larger and more frequent than raises for cognitive services, the net effect was that payments for procedures increased relative to cognitive services.

Even more important, it begs that question: what has the RUC done at times when no one asked it "to review payments for E&M ... codes?" After all, the RUC leadership has argued again and again that it is only a private advisory committee (and see below for another such argument). As such, it should be able to choose how often it deals with payments for cognitive services. It should not have to wait to be asked to review them. So why wasn't the RUC reviewing these payments more frequently?

Then, Dr Patchin reiterated:

To clarify: The RUC makes recommendations to CMS, and then CMS makes its payment decisions.

and again,


Bottom line: the RUC makes recommendations, CMS makes payment decisions.


This, once more, begs the questions. Why didn't the RUC make more recommendations to improve payments for cognitive services? Why doesn't CMS get recommendations about payments to physicians from sources other than the RUC? Why doesn't CMS make the process for setting physicians' payments, and updating and revising the RBRVS system more broad-based and transparent? Why did the administrator of CMS feel unable to change or ignore the "RUC process?"

I don't have the capacity to find out the answers to these questions. Answering them might take some investigative reporting, or even a Congressional investigation. Given that physicians' payments are key incentives driving the health care system, and that payments favoring procedures are likely to be a major cause for rising volume and costs of procedures, which, in turn, is likely to be a major reason our health care system is so expensive, why do we know so little about how these payment rates are set?

References

1. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. Link here.
2. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310. Link here.
3. Iglehart JK. Doing more with less: a conversation with Kerry Weems. Health Aff 2009;
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.28.4.w688/DC1
7:06 AM
The vast amounts spent in the US on health care have not translated into access for many patients, consistently excellent quality of care, and signiticantly improved outcomes. While we spend all this money, the primary care and generalist practitioners on the front lines are increasingly embattled and disgruntled, and their numbers are rapidly thinning. One problem may be the pattern of fees paid to physicians. Fees paid to physicians not only influence costs directly, but provide incentives for physician decision making about what tests and treatments patients receive. We have posted several times, most recently in February, 2009, here, about how the US Medicare system sets fees paid to physicians.

Since health care reform is now a hot topic in the US, there has been increasing discussion of the plight of primary care and generalist practitioners, but little consideration of how it arose. What we wrote in February was (with updated links):



As we have discussed, the US Medicare system determines what it pays physicians using the Resource Based Relative Value System (RBRVS). This system determines the pay for every kind of medical encounter according to a complex formula that is supposed to account for physicians' time and effort, physicians' practice expense, and the cost of malpractice insurance. The components of physicians' effort assessed are, in turn, technical skill and physical effort; the required mental effort and judgment; and stress due to the potential risk to the patient.

To keep the system, which was started in 1990, current, requires addition of new kinds of encounters, which means encounters involving new kinds of procedures, and updating of the estimates of various components, including physicians' time and effort. To do so, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies almost exclusively on the advice of the RBRVS Update Committee (RUC). The RUC is a private committee of the AMA, touted as an "expert panel" that takes advantage of the organization's First Amendment rights to petition the government. Membership on the RUC is allotted to represent specialty societies, so that the vast majority of the members represent specialties that do procedures and focus on expensive, high-technology tests and treatments. However, the identities of RUC members are secret, as are the proceedings of the group.

This opaque and unaccountable process has resulted in increases outstripping inflation in fees paid for procedures, while fees paid for "cognitive" medicine, i.e., for primary care, and for services that involve diagnosis, management of acute and chronic disease, counseling, coordination of care, etc, but not procedures, have lagged inflation. The effects of the RUC have been amplified by the unexplained tendency of commercial managed care and health insurance to track the RBRVS system when making their own payments to physicians.

For further details about the RUC, see these posts on Health Care Renewal (here, here, here, here, and here) and important articles by Bodenheimer et al,(1) and Goodson.(2) By the way, why the US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies de facto exclusively on the RUC to control the RBRVS system, and why the AMA made the RUC into a secret organization apparently beholden only to the organization's proceduralist members are unanswered questions.


The next month, Dr William L Rich III, and Dr Barbary Levy, the Chair and Chair-Elect of the RUC, wrote me a letter to "point out several blatant inaccuracies within your blog entry that severely misrepresent the nature and work of the AMA / Specialty Society RVS Update Committee (RUC)." They then asked me to "retract or correct the inaccurate statements within the aforementioned blog immediately." However, the letter did not specify the supposedly inaccurate statements within the blog post. So, my email response noted that "the letter contains no detail about the alleged 'inaccurate statements.' If you define them, we will certainly consider your views." I never got a reply to this message, therefore thinking the matter to be closed, and I saw at that time no reason to make the exchange public.

Apparently, the matter was not closed. A few days ago, two anonymous comments were appended to the post. They stated that my letter had appeared on the AMA web-site, here. So it is now public. The comments did not say, and I have so far not been able to find out when the letter was posted, and what its context is within the AMA web-site, including any indication that I had already replied to it in private.

Despite these irregularities, however, given that the AMA apparently has chosen to make the letter public, I believe I ought to respond publicly.

"Blatant Inaccuracies?"

Dr Rich and Dr Levy wrote:



We would like to take this opportunity to point out several blatant inaccuracies within your blog entry that severely misrepresent the nature and work of the AMA / Specialty Society RBRVS Update Committee (RUC). We request you retract or correct the inaccurate statements within the aforementioned blog immediately.


First, as I noted above, the letter never specified which of my statements the letter writers considered "blatant inaccuracies." If there are any specific statements of fact in the post above (or any other post I write) that can be shown to be inaccurate, I will correct or retract them. However, I do not believe the letter by Dr Rich and Dr Levy demonstrated any particular statements of mine to be blatantly inaccurate.

The Obscurity of the RUC Membership

The letter stated:



The RUC does not operate in the shadows.


One of my major criticisms of the RUC was that it is opaque. Before I wrote my first post on the RUC, I tried to determine its membership by searching the AMA web-site, easily available AMA publications, and the web. I could find lists of past members, but no current list. In addition, I asked RUC staff by email whether they could provide me the list, or an easy way to access it. They would or could not do so, and the highest ranking staffer I contacted wrote, "we do not give out the RUC members' contact information. We attempt to shield the RUC from lobbying by industry or others." Only after these inquiries did I dub the RUC membership "secret."

Dr Rich and Dr Levy suggested that it is not quite secret. It stated that "a list of the individual members of the RUC is published in the AMA publication, Medicare RBRVS 2009: The Physicians Guide." This publication is available from the AMA here for a mere $71.95. However, the book is not on the web, or in my local or university library, and I have no other way to easily access it.

Additionally, although the letter stated, "any individual may solicit AMA staff directly or a specialty society to learn the names of the members of the RUC," the letter was not accompanied by any communication from AMA staff containing this information.

Thus, to date, I still do not know who the members of the RUC are. If the letter authors had wanted to show that the membership of the RUC was not meant to be obscure, they could easily have sent me the list with their letter, appended a copy of the pages of the book which contained the list, or asked their staff to provide this information. They chose not to do so. So, while the RUC membership may not be exactly secret, it remains obscure, only barely public, and relatively inaccessible.

The Secrecy of RUC Proceedings

Furthermore, to support its contention that "the RUC does not operate in the shadows," the letter stated that



any individual may attend a RUC meeting upon: (1) the invitation of and notification by a relevant specialty society; (2) an express invitation by the chair of the RUC; or (3) the approval of a written request to attend; and a review of conflicts and potential conflicts of interest.


This does not mean that RUC meetings are open, or that their proceedings are public. Instead, as Goodson(2) noted, RUC "meetings are closed to outside observers except by invitation of the chair." Furthermore, he stated, "proceedings are proprietary and therefore not publicly available for review."

The letter also personally invited me to attend "the next meeting of the RUC, which will take place April 23-26, 2009 in Chicago." In retrospect, this invitation did not appear serious, since it was never repeated or expanded after my email reply to the March letter.

Nor did the invitation include any assurance that I could make anything about this meeting public. I had learned from a previous RUC attendee who will remain anonymous that attendees are obligated to sign non-disclosure agreements. Signing such an agreement might jeopardize my further ability to write anything of substance about the RUC. Furthermore, making all meeting attendees sign non-disclosure agreements effectively makes the meeting secret.

The RUC and Primary Care

Dr Rich and Dr Levy asserted that:



Your publication irrationally and unreasonably paints the RUC as the perpetrator of all physician payment policies that have negatively affected primary care.


Furthermore, they argued that the RUC has been good for primary care and cognitive practice:



The RUC has made several recommendations that positively benefit cognitive and non-procedural physician specialties.


My opinions about the RUC's influence on payments to physicians, and the decline of primary care and generalist and cognitive practice are hardly original. My previous posts were clearly based on evidence and discussion from references 1-4. Let me summarize these arguments, using direct quotes from these references, which perusal of the original articles would reveal are not taken out of context.

Primary and generalist practice is threatened by the current payment system.

From Bodenheimer et al(1):



Incomes of primary care physicians are well below those of many specialists, and the primary care–specialty income gap is widening.

... the lower income of primary care physicians is a major factor leading U.S. medical students to reject primary care careers.

Primary care practice is not viable without a substantial increase in the resources available to primary care physicians.


From Goodson(2):



Medicine's generalist base is disappearing as a consequence of the reimbursement system crafted to save it—the resource-based relative value scale.

Current reimbursement incentives substantially favor procedures and technical interventions and offer financial advantages for expensive care, thereby encouraging specialty services.

The continued and sustained incentives for medical graduates to choose higher-paying specialty careers and for those physicians in specialty careers to increase income through highly compensated professional activities have been associated with the dwindling of the generalist workforce. The lack of incentives for medical graduates to choose generalist careers in internal medicine, family medicine, and pediatrics has had a profound effect on the workforce mix and, ultimately, US health care expenditures.



The RUC has been the major influence on the physician payment system leading to these problems.

From Bodenheimer et al(1):



In summary, the RUC process favors increases in procedural and imaging reimbursement for 3 reasons: specialty society influence in proposing RVU increases, the specialist-heavy RUC membership, and the desire of RUC specialists to avoid increases in evaluation and management RVUs. With their ability to create new codes and influence RVU updates, many procedural specialists can influence fees in a way that observers find to substantially overvalue procedural and imaging services. Moreover, high fees may encourage physicians to increase the volume of profitable services, leading to even higher income gains and greater spending growth.


From Goodson(2):



The RUC has powerfully influenced CMS decision making and, as a result, is a powerful force in the US medical economy. Furthermore, by creating and maintaining incentives for more and more specialty care and by failing to accurately and continuously assess the practice expense RVUs, the decisions of CMS have fueled health care inflation. Doing so has affected the competitiveness of US corporations in the global market by contributing to years of double-digit health care inflation that have consistently increased the costs of manufacturing and business in the United States over the last decades.

The current mechanism fails to provide sufficient checks and balances and is skewed and dysfunctional.

The resource-based relative value scale system originally developed to achieve full value for cognitive services currently threatens the sustainability of the generalist base. As a result, a large portion of the population will lose access to the continuous and personalized care provided by generalist physicians whose repertoire of clinical skills and interventions coupled with access to specialty and diagnostic services are essential for ensuring efficient and effective health care delivery.


Dr Rich and Dr Levy are entitled to their opinions, but I would argue that there is considerable evidence and opinion suggesting that the current dysfunctional physician payment system is a major cause of the decline of primary care and cognitive practice, and simultaneous rise in health care costs and decline in health care access in the US. Furthermore, there is also considerable evidence and opinion suggesting that the RUC has singular responsbility for the dysfunctionality of the payment system and how it is skewed in favor of procedures as opposed to cognitive services and primary care.

Summarizing: the Opacity of the RUC, and its Negative Effects on Primary Care and Cognitive Services

So, I stand by my statement that the RUC process is opaque. Instead of saying "the identities of RUC members are secret, as are the proceedings of the group," I would be willing to now say, "the identities of the RUC members are obscure and difficult to ascertain, and the proceedings of the group are secret." That is not much of an improvement.

If the RUC leadership wants to make its membership transparent, all it needs to do is post it on the web. If it wishes to make its proceedings transparent, all it needs to do is publish them as well. If it makes such changes, I would happily and publicly applaud them.

If the RUC leadership wants to show that their members are not influenced by individual conflicts of interest, transparency about the committee's membership would inspire more trust than making the information as obscure as possible.

Furthermore, there may be more reason to be concerned about the effects of institutional rather than individual conflicts of interest on the RUC. Most RUC members appear to represent specialty societies. Rothman et al claimed that industry funding of professional medical societies is "pervasive."(5) If the RUC leadership wants to show that their committee as a whole is not affected by institutional conflicts of interest of its specialty societies, it ought at least to disclose the relationships of those societies and their leaders with companies that stand to profit from increasing utilization of the specific services whose use is influenced by the incentives which the RUC largely determines.

Finally, if there is a "wedge between cognitive and procedural specialties" it was driven a long time ago, particularly by a payment system that progressively favored the latter over the former, and by a bureaucratic burden that fell disproportionately on the former. But blaming the messenger is a time-honored, if not necessarily honorable tactic.

References

1. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. Link
here.
2. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310. Link
here.
3. Ginsburg PB, Berenson RA. Revising Medicare's physician fee schedule - much activity, little change. N Engl J Med 2007; 356: 1201-1203.
4. Newhouse JP. Medicare spending on physicians - no easy fix in sight. N Engl J Med 2007; 356: 1883-1884.
5. Rothman DJ, McDonald WJ, Berkowitz CD et al. Professional medical associations and their relationships with industry: a proposal for controlling conflict of interest. JAMA 2009; 301: 1367-1372. Link
here.
11:35 AM