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Showing posts with label Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital. Show all posts
The Ebola virus epidemic in Africa is hopefully winding down.  The uproar, if not panic, over Ebola virus in the US has been eclipsed by the latest  internet craze.  However, we are still learning from the echoes of the brief, and thankfully very localized US experience with Ebola.

In particular, the country's response to the virus should continue to inspire unease about how our supposedly market based, managerially focused health care non-system can handle real public health threats.

Background - Ebola at Texas Health Presbyterian

Starting on October 2, 2015, we discussed numerous concerns about whether problems with leadership or management at Texas Health Presbyterian hospital, part of the Texas Health Resources system, contributed to the poor outcomes of its Ebola patients.  First, InformaticsMD raised questions about whether a badly designed or implemented electronic health record at the hospital enabled the initial misdiagnosis of Eric Duncan, the first patient to present with the Ebola virus on US soil.  These questions were reinforced when hospital managers gave conflicting responses on this issue.  He expanded on these questions here.

A week later, I wrote about the "mystery of the discharged Ebola patient," asking:  why don't we know yet exactly what happened when our Ebola patient zero first appeared?  I wondered then whether a decision by management to shift the health system's emphasis from acute care to "population health management," whatever that is, might have lead to problems addressing what was a severe, acute medical problem (albeit with public health implications.)    About a week later, I wrote about the questions raised by inconsistencies in hospital managers' statements, about Mr Duncan's clinical status and the failure to initially accurately diagnose his infection, about the hospital's readiness to handle Ebola patients, and about whether hospital professional staff may have been silenced by administrators, and if so, why?


By late November, 2014, a Texas Health Presbyterian nurse had gone public with accusations that the initial care of Mr Duncan had been chaotic; Mr Duncan had died; and two nurses who cared for him after he was admitted after his second emergency visit to Texas Health Presbyterian had contracted Ebola infections; but no new Ebola cases had been diagnosed in the US, and Ebola was starting to fade from the media.   At that time, I wrote that the three questions above remained unanswered.  However, Texas Health Resources, the parent system for Texas Health Presbyterian, had hired Burton-Marsteller, a big public relations firm, and  managers of both companies generated considerable verbiage, but no specific answers and no real enlightenment.  Hospital managers had already pointed their fingers elsewhere, at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for inadequate guidelines, unnamed third parties for exploiting the crisis, and the media for sensationalizing it. Hospital managers had sponsored a pep rally, but the health professionals who appeared there either seemed to stick to talking points, or remained "tight lipped."   The hospital settled a lawsuit filed by Mr Duncan's relatives, and Micahel Barden, the THR president, submitted to an interview in which he boasted of a "high level of communication" and asserted the system had "maintained the trust level," but did not supply any specifics.

Since November, 2014, no further specifics have appeared about what happened at Texas Health Presbyterian.

The Public Relations Burnishing of Texas Health Resource Management

Instead, since October, 2014, a series of events and media reports seemed more about burnishing the management of Texas Health Resources, and particularly its CEO, Barclay Berdan, than about learning from the problems that occurred when the US first encountered the Ebola virus.

On November 29, 2014, Modern Healthcare published an interview with Mr Berdan including leading questions like:

Has this Ebola crisis caused you to take a broader look at hospital-acquired infections?

How were you able to maintain high staff morale throughout this crisis?

The answer to that last question was particularly upbeat:

It was really important to make sure that we had a high level of communication and that we maintained trust inside the organization while we were in many cases being attacked from the outside, as the world moved from science to political science to social science to superstition and fear. That helped us keep the morale of the organization up and to keep people focused on the fact that we had a lot of patients to take care of.

Even though our patient census dropped by 20%, we told everybody we weren't going to reduce staffing. We were going to keep people working at their regular rates and times. We kept everybody really focused on this challenge, that we had to stay strong and get through this period of time.

Note that this implied communications had always been good, trust had always been maintained, and morale had never declined. There were no followup questions, particularly whether staff morale could have seemed good because dissent had been silenced? 

On December 5, 2014, the D Healthcare Daily reported on an event in which Mr Berdan participated, and treated him as an honored expert.  Berdan was quoted, for example,

The best thing you can do—if you’re a local hospital, if you’re a rural hospital or an urban hospital—is to try and figure out how to manage the safety of your employees, the safety of your institution, the safety of patients who may present with, in this case, a disease that already causes people great fear.

The article trumpeted how selflessly Berdan has led THR to teach other hospitals about Ebola, with the underlying assumption that it had valuable lessons to teach:
 
THR has shared what it’s learned with other hospitals, both in North Texas and across the country. It held a webinar with 1,200 medical professionals to share what it learned and changed....

On December 5, 2014, D Healthcare Daily also noted that at the event, an award was given to caregivers who dealt with ebola at Texas Health Presbyterian, but who accepted the award on their behalf? 

Barclay Berdan, CEO of Texas Health Resources, was center-stage on Tuesday at the Sheraton downtown, flanked by more than a dozen staffers representing the 100-plus caregivers who helped treat the three Ebola patients in October.

The Dallas Regional Chamber presented the caregivers of Texas Health Presbyterian Dallas with the Courage of Public Service Award, an annual recognition that honors groups or officials who 'demonstrated significant leadership on important issues.'

After Berdan gave his little speech, next up on stage were:

Texas Health Resources Board Chair Anne Bass and Presbyterian Hospital Board Chair Stan Rabin walked up first,... 

Although the actual caregivers were supposedly being honored, airtime and coverage went to board chairs.

Then last month (February, 2015), it began again. Another interview with Mr Berdan appeared in D Healthcare Daily. It allowed Mr Berdan to pontificate on issues like the hospital system's growth plans, and to go back to the idea of population health as more important than acute care,

I think we’re looking always to find good opportunities to improve the health of the people in the communities we serve, and that’s our mission. In fact, we have really changed the scope and direction of our organization over the last four or five years from being a great acute care hospital company—you referenced all of our hospital properties in North Texas—to really being a health company.

Ebola, and the questions I raised above, were not featured. 

Finally, in the March issue (available in late February, 2015), D Magazine published, "How Texas Health Managed its Ebola Crisis," focused, of course, on CEO Barcaly Berdan. It featured a large color photograph of Mr Berdan.  It seemed to suggest that the most important issue was maintaining the reputation of the hospital system, rather than for example, being transparent about and learning from mistakes. It featured a big informal portrait of Mr Berdan, and started with how Mr Berdan managed the first news conference about Ebola, rather than, for example, the details of Mr Duncan's encounters with THR.

To Berdan, it was important to show that Presby—one of Dallas County’s largest and busiest hospitals—was safe and open for business.

The article described Berdan as an "unassuming man who speaks with confidence and fatherly authority," an "able communicator," a man whose "word is his bond," and eventually, "a battle tested CEO." It stated that "the treatment of Duncan - and the safety of the men and women who volunteered to care for him - rested squarely on his shoulders." Yet, of course, Mr Berdan's highest degree was an MBA, from University of Chicago, no less. He may have had a public relations battle, but he did not have to walk into a room containing a highly infectious Ebola patient. He actually should not have had any authority over the actual treatment of Mr Duncan. That should have been in the hands of the patient's doctors and nurses.

The article obliquely addressed the unanswered questions, but did provide substantive answers. Why was Mr Duncan not diagnosed accurately?

Privacy laws prevented the hospital from discussing the care provided Duncan until he permitted them to....

Was the hospital prepared to take care of Ebola patients?

We were moving in parallel with the CDC's ongoing recommendations....

Were health professionals silenced? The hospital paraded four nurses in front of 60 Minutes' cameras:

On the evening of Oct. 26, wearing blue scrubs and seated in front of a jet-black background, nurses Sidia Rose, John Mulligan, Richard Townsend, and Krista Schaefer offered a poignant and moving narrative of Duncan’s treatment. It was the most substantive account offered to that point.

The final section of the article was entitled, "On the Mend." Again, the emphasis was on PR.

THR had positive momentum. Once a pin-cushion, its public reputation was improving.

The hospital settled a lawsuit with Mr Duncan's relatives for an undisclosed sum. After the settlement was announced, Mr Duncan's nephew proclaimed:

This facility is an outstanding facility, and we as humans are not perfect.

Maybe getting a big sum of money can make one more philosophical about human imperfections.

The article ended up describing how

North Texas seems to have appreciated the efforts of THR under Berdan....

It all sounded so rosy, at least for a few days.

A "PR Pawn" Strikes Back, or, Nina Pham Administers a Corrective

Only a few days after the D Magazine piece appeared, the Dallas Morning News published an article about Nina Pham, the first THR nurse to have been infected with Ebola virus after caring for Mr Duncan.  Pham had never previously been portrayed as a dissident, and had been seen in the media as a young professional gamely facing down the virus and supporting her fellow nurses.  Now, however, rather than participating further in the feel good celebration of THR and Mr Berdan, Ms Pham announced she would be suing the hospital and THR.


She says the hospital and its parent company, Texas Health Resources, failed her and her colleagues who cared for Thomas Eric Duncan, the first person in the United States diagnosed with Ebola.

'I wanted to believe that they would have my back and take care of me, but they just haven’t risen to the occasion,' Pham told The Dallas Morning News

Pham reaffirmed the contention that Texas Health Presbyterian was not prepared to care for Ebola patients.

In her 90-minute interview, Pham described working in chaotic surroundings at the hospital with ill-prepared nurses who received little guidance on how to treat Ebola and protect themselves.

In particular,

She said the extent of her Ebola training was a printout of guidelines that her supervisor found on the Web.

And


The day Duncan moved to ICU, Pham said, she and the charge nurse went in with double gloves taped to double gowns and wore double booties and a face shield. The hospital did not have hazmat-type suits, and Pham said her neck was always exposed.

'We’ve had nurses that I’ve worked with that worked in other states, and they worked in hazmat suits for flu and H1N1,' Pham said. 'Why aren’t we wearing hazmat suits for Ebola?'

After days of asking, Pham said, the nurses were given hazmat suits. She said all the decisions to upgrade the protective gear and precautions were made by the nurses 'on the fly.'

 Meanwhile, the nurses devised their own hazardous waste area. In a room adjacent to Duncan’s, the nurses set up a place to take off their protective gear and shower after caring for him. In another nearby room, they placed bags of dirty linens, towels and other soiled items.

Finally,

while she became the American face of the fight against the disease, the hospital’s lack of training and proper equipment and violations of her privacy made her 'a symbol of corporate neglect — a casualty of a hospital system’s failure to prepare for a known and impending medical crisis.'

She also contradicted much of the feel good public relations speak found in the articles above.  The D Magazine article had referred to Pham and the other nurses who care for Mr Duncan as "the men and women who volunteered to care for him."  In contrast, the Dallas Morning News article said "she did not volunteer to care for Duncan, but felt she couldn't say no."

During the crisis, Pham was seen in a video where she appeared gamely optimistic.  However,

She says that Texas Health Resources violated her privacy while she was a patient at Presbyterian by ignoring her request that 'no information' be released about her. She said a doctor recorded her on video in her hospital room and released it to the public without her permission.

While the hospital argued that Pham gave permission to make the video,


The day Pham was transferred to NIH, a notation was made in her medical file that 'she does not have the mental capability to make end-of-life decisions,' [Pham's attorney Charla] Aldous said. But PR people from Texas Health were trying to talk to her for a media release 'about how much she loves Presbyterian,' Aldous said.

Texas Health, with a PR firm’s help, developed a slogan — 'Presby Proud' — aimed at restoring the community’s faith in the beleaguered hospital.

Before Pham’s flight to Maryland on Oct. 16, she said, a doctor wearing a video camera under his protective hood came into her room and said he was filming her for educational purposes. Pham said she did not give permission for the video, which was released to the media.

'Thanks for getting well. Thanks for being part of the volunteer team to take care of our first patient,' a man’s voice said in the video. 'It means a lot. This has been a huge effort by all of you guys.'

'I could tell they wanted me to stay just because they kind of knew, they could see I was getting better. They wanted that ‘yes we cured her’ kind of attitude. They wanted a win, especially after a loss.' - Nina Pham


Charla Aldous, Pham’s attorney, put it all more simply:

Texas Health Resources 'used Nina as a PR pawn.'

Summary

So it looks like back to the drawing board for the public relations flacks who have been defending the "reputation" of Texas Health Resources, and, in my humble opinion, mainly the reputation of its CEO, Barclay Berdan.  After questions about its preparedness for and the care of Ebola patients, and about whether managers overrode and silenced health care professionals, the hospital system had put on a big public relations campaign, in concert with a big outside PR firm.  Yet all the questions have now resurfaced as one of the hospital nurses put before the public as brave yet ever loyal to "Presby" now says she was turned into a "PR pawn." 

Of course, the immediate response by the hospital and the CEO were to trot out the old talking points.  In the Dallas Morning News article, spokesman Wendell Watson said,

Nina Pham bravely served Texas Health Dallas during a most difficult time.  We continue to support and wish the best for her, and we remain positive that constructive dialogue can resolve this matter.

Later, as again reported by the Dallas Morning News, CEO Barclay Berdan tried to refute Ms Pham's contention that her privacy was violated by saying:

We adhered to HIPAA rules in determining what information to share publicly.  

But HIPAA rules are notoriously hard to interpret and implement.

Also,

We had Nina's consent to share the information about her that was released.

But she had contended she was too ill, and confused on pain relief medicines to give informed consent, and aspects of her record apparently corroborate that. 

So the questions about what was going on at THR persist.  The latest twist in the story does emphasize how important public relations has become to contemporary hospital managers.  One cannot avoid the notion that most of what went on in the C-suites of Texas Health Presbyterian and Texas Health Resources in response to the presence of three Ebola patients was about public relations, protecting the reputation of the hospital, and particularly celebrating its very well paid MBA CEO.  Of course if leaders focus on public relations, maybe they will not do such a good job supporting the health care professionals who actually care for patients, and ultimately supporting the patients' and the public's health.

So as I said a while ago about this case, the rise of generic managers who value, among other things, favorable public relations perhaps to the detriment of patient care, threatens the US' ability to care for acutely ill patients, especially in the context of new or epidemic diseases.  True health care reform would restore leadership by people who understand the health care context, uphold health professionals' values, are willing to be held accountable, and put patients' and the public's health ahead of self-interest.

12:51 PM
At my Oct. 2, 2014 post "Did Electronic Medical Record-mediated problems contribute to or cause the current Dallas Ebola scare?" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/10/did-electronic-medical-record-mediated.html) I had written:

While I have no evidence as to any role of EHRs in this seemingly strange, cavalier and incomprehensible medical decision to send this man home, resulting in potential exposure of numerous other individuals to Ebola (and I am certainly not in a position to have such evidence), I believe this possibility [that is, an EHR-related information snafu - ed.] needs to be investigated fully.
 
I then did an update:

10/3/2014 Update:

My suspicions were apparently correct.  [The hospital admitted an EHR role - ed.]

Then, the hospital retracted its admission, blur and obfuscation broke loose in the press, and the situation became foggy.  See posts by Roy Poses and myself at query link http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Ebola%20virus, including Dr. Poses' Nov. 24, 2014 post "Public Relations and the Obfuscation of Management Errors - Texas Health Resources Dodges its Ebola Questions" at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/11/public-relations-and-obfuscation-of.html.

Finally, the primary clinician involved speaks.  Do read the whole article, as it delves into behind-the-scenes issues:

ER doctor discusses role in Ebola patient’s initial misdiagnosis
By REESE DUNKLIN and STEVE THOMPSON
Dallas Morning News
Dec. 6, 2014
http://www.dallasnews.com/ebola/headlines/20141206-er-doctor-discusses-role-in-ebola-patients-initial-misdiagnosis.ece

... "[ED physician Joseph Howard Meier's] notes in the medical records say he had reviewed the nursing notes. Hospital officials told Congress that the ER physician several times accessed portions of the electronic records where the nurse had recorded Duncan’s arrival from Africa. It wasn’t clear, though, “which information the physician read,” hospital officials told Congress. 

Meier told The News he hadn’t seen the Africa notation in Duncan’s records. The physician said the hospital’s electronic medical records system contained a lot of information, which, like patients,must also be triaged.” 


Clinicians in an ED have to "triage" information from their records systems, just like patients need to be triaged?  That is a candid and astonishing (to anyone with common sense) admission.

Paper charts never had those problems in my own time working in the ED.

Further, ED charts used to be relatively brief, which is why as a Chief Medical Informatics Officer I recommended document imaging systems only in ED's, to make charts available 24/7/anywhere, and data transcriptionists to capture important data into computers later, not full EHR systems where clinicians enter data which I felt (and still feel) are inappropriate in faced-paced, high-risk settings.

(Put another way, the experiments of direct data entry by busy clinicians, and clinicians attempting to drink information from a tangled cybernetic EHR firehose, are proving a failure.)

... The “travel information was not easily visible in my standard workflow,” he said.This has now been modified very effectively.”

Modified only after near-catastrophe.  How many other "modifications" (i.e., experimental software changes) will be needed over time in this and other EHRs, I ask?  (Perhaps 10,000 such as here: http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/06/in-fixing-those-9553-ehr-issues.html?)

... The News asked Meier whether knowing Duncan’s travel history would have changed his evaluation. 

“If he told me he came from Liberia, this would have prompted me to contact the CDC and begin an evaluation for Ebola,” Meier said, “but the likelihood would have still been low since Mr. Duncan denied any sick contacts.”

Over the next few hours, Meier ordered tests, along with an IV for saline. He prescribed extra-strength Tylenol, which the nurse gave Duncan at 1:24 a.m. Meier reviewed Duncan’s vital signs. CT scans of Duncan’s head were “unremarkable,” the medical records say, showing no sign of sinusitis.

Doctors typically order CT scans to rule out more serious possibilities, such as a hemorrhage or meningitis. In his responses to The News, Meier said he ordered the CT scan because of Duncan’s headache.

Meier did not say whether the CT scan’s lack of an indication of sinusitis factored into his diagnosis. “Sinusitis is mostly a clinical diagnosis,” he said.

At 3:02 a.m., Duncan’s temperature was 103 degrees, his medical records say. Sixteen minutes later, however, Meier entered a note saying: “Patient is feeling better and comfortable with going home.” Meier told The News he hadn’t seen the higher temperature in Duncan’s chart.

Duncan was discharged at 3:37 a.m. with the diagnosis of sinusitis. His last recorded fever, at 3:32 a.m., was 101.2 degrees. Meier prescribed Duncan the antibiotic Zithromax, 250-milligram tablets, to be taken twice the first day and once daily for four more days.

I note two things:

1.  If an EHR company has hiring practices allegedly such as described via Histalk blog at my Aug. 15, 2010 post "EPIC's outrageous recommendations on healthcare IT project staffing" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/08/epics-outrageous-recommendations-on.html), where rank-novice recent college graduates suddenly become EHR experts afters some transfusion of wisdom at corporate HQ (perhaps via this alien neural interface device that imparts the Knowledge of the Ancients: http://stargate.wikia.com/wiki/Repository_of_knowledge?), then what can one expect?


The Stargate neural interface device that imparts the Knowledge of the Ancients via direct brain download.  Presto - instant EHR expert!


and

2.   I note what I am going to somewhat satirically going to call the "Silverstein EHR principle", that states:

  • When bizarre and otherwise inexplicable information-related snafus occur in hospitals, especially in fast-paced, high-risk areas, suspect bad health IT as causative or contributory as #1 in your differential diagnosis (or post-mortem, as the case may be).

-- SS
1:16 AM
Our last posts about how revenue focused, generically managed US health care (non) system would have difficulty handling the threat of the Ebola virus were in mid-October, 2014.  Yet since then we have learned little about what went wrong when a single hospital dealt with the first Ebola patient to present de novo in the US, and two of the hospital's own nurses who acquired the infection caring for him.  So since we have not learned all we should about our first brush with Ebola, there is still reason to worry that things may not go better should another person be unlucky enough to show up at a US health care facility with a previously undiagnosed Ebola infection. 

Since the US media has apparently lost interest in Ebola, it is not too early to consider why we have learned so little about the country's first experience with the virus. 

Unanswered Questions

The first three Ebola cases diagnosed in the US were initially managed at Texas Health Presbyterian hospital, the flagship hospital for Texas Health Resources (THR).  On October 15, 2014, I noted that statements by the generic managers in charge of the hospital and the system left confusion on many points:
-  How was the decision to send the index patient, Mr Eric Duncan, home after his first emergency department presentation made (given he apparently had a fever in the ED, and an ED nurse knew he came from Africa)?
-  Why did THR leaders insist they were prepared for Ebola when later evidence suggested they had not set up organized processes and lacked proper equipment?
-  Did hospital managers try to prevent health care professionals from talking about what really went on?
Furthermore, as I noted on October 9, 2014 and InformaticsMD had discussed in depth, e.g., here, whether the the electronic health record (EHR) used by THR enabled Mr Duncan to go home undiagnosed remained unclear.

However, as stated in a Dallas Morning News editorial of October 14, 2014, taking better care of future patients requires better understanding of what went wrong when Texas Health Presbyterian first had to grapple with this disease previously unknown in the US:

now the hospital can do a world of good by helping the medical community learn from its experiences. This requires complete transparency and truth-telling

Yet the response of managers at Texas Health Resources since then seemed to be more about buffing their own image and protecting their own status than transparency and truth-telling.

A Week of Obfuscation after Public Relations Takes Over

As the NY Times reported on October 15, 2014, one of the first responses by THR to all these unanswered questions was to hire "Burson-Marsteller, the global public relations firm, to help tell its side [of the story]."  Through the next week, hospital managers' provided a lot of verbiage, some warm, some heated, but little useful information to inform the medical and public health response to the Ebola threat. 


October 15 - Vague Apologies

A top THR leader, Dr Daniel Varga, the chief clinical officer, testified to congress (per the (UK) Guardian),

'Unfortunately, in our initial treatment of Mr Duncan, despite our best intentions and highly skilled medical team, we made mistakes,' Varga wrote in testimony to the US Congress. 'We did not correctly diagnose his symptoms as those of Ebola. We are deeply sorry.'

However, he failed to provide much detail about these mistakes and why they were made.

October 16 - Nonspecific Refutations

The next day, Ms Brianna Aguirre, a nurse at Texas Health Presbyterian, went public about her concerns about the hospital handled Ebola.  Per the NY Times, she described a "confused and chaotic scene" when Mr Duncan returned to the hospital, leading to inadequate isolation of Mr Duncan for three hours.  She also claimed that staff caring for Ms Nina Pham, the first nurse to acquire Ebola while caring for Mr Duncan, it turn received inadequate protective gear, and had little training in its use.

That led to an indignant but nonspecific response from hospital management, per a Dallas Morning News article,

[To] claims that Duncan remained in an area with other patients for several hours before he was placed in isolation. Hospital officials said he was isolated immediately.

Also,

[To] complaints that personal protective equipment was inadequate and left them exposed, particularly at the neck. Nurses said they had to use penetrable medical tape to try to protect themselves. The hospital defended the equipment, saying it met the CDC’s guidelines at the time. Hospital officials said that it was the CDC that recommended using tape to pinch together the necks of the protective gowns and that hoods were ordered for the staff after concerns about the tape were raised.

October 16 - Shifting Blame, to the Government, "Outsiders," and the Media

At the same time, as reported by the Los Angeles Times, hospital managers were pointing fingers elsewhere,

The hospital's response -- its second in two days -- in part shifted responsibility to the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and to the protocols the agency issued this summer to guide the handling of a patient infected by the virus, which is thought to have killed more than 4,400 people in West Africa. The hospital said the protocols changed frequently, frustrating caregivers and management.

They also implicated outside troublemakers,

The hospital also blasted 'third parties who ... are seeking to exploit a national crisis.' That was a dig at the National Nurses United union, which does not represent the Dallas hospital's nurses, but which made their complaints available to the media.

Then they blamed the media,

'Many of the comments we have seen or heard in the media are only loosely based on fact, but are often out of context and sensationalized,' the hospital statement said. 'Others are completely inaccurate.'

Finally, hospital managers resorted to indirection,

In televised interviews Thursday, Aguirre said she feared retaliation for speaking out about worker protection. An attorney accompanied her during the interviews.

“Texas Health Dallas has a strict non-retaliation policy,” the hospital statement said. “Employees are encouraged to raise issues and concerns via the chain of command.”

Left unsaid was whether the policy was enforced, and whether despite the policy there was any reason to fear retaliation.  

October 18  - More Vague Apologies and Assurances

Then, per the Dallas Morning News, the THR bought a full-page advertisement featuring its CEO's vague apologies and assurances,

Presbyterian 'is a safe place for employees and patients,' Berdan said in a full-page ad Sunday in The News.

Pitched as a 'letter to our community,' Berdan again apologized for mistakes the hospital made in Duncan’s treatment and in failing to have deployed fully its training and education programs before the virus struck. He said the hospital hasn’t determined how the nurses became infected.

October 20 - A "Tight-Lipped" Pep Rally

Finally, an blog post in the Dallas Observer noted,

On Monday afternoon, dozens of nurses, doctors and other healthcare employees convened at the front entrance of Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital to discuss the recent controversy about how the hospital handled the Ebola outbreak. Despite definitive comments in support of the hospital, Presby's nurses remained tight-lipped on what actually happened during Thomas Eric Duncan's care.

During the rally a top hospital leader provided a fitting epilogue end to the week,


'Today we want our community and our country to know that the nurses at Texas Health Presbyterian are so proud of our hospital and proud of what we do,' said Dr. Cole Edmonson, chief nursing officer at the hospital. 'There are a lot of questions being asked about what happened. And I can't answer those today. A number of reviews are underway.

So what was the point, other than to provide further cover for his fellow managers?

In any case, it seemed to work.  Since the week after THR hired Burson- Marsteller, coverage of Texas Health Resources and its role in the first US experience with domestic Ebola rapidly waned. 

More Silence Purchased, and Managers Go Unchallenged as Memories Fade

Since October, no patients have been diagnosed with an Ebola infection in the US.  The media have turned to other pursuits.  Texas Health Resources has departed the headlines. Although at the end of October, CNN noted that "the hospital has made confusing and sometimes misleading statements" that remain unexplained, in November, explanations appeared even more remote.

During this quiet period, THR seemed to purchase some more silence.  As reported by the Dallas Morning News, THR settled the lawsuit brought by the relatives of Mr Duncan, but the deal itself was "secret."  As columnist Mike Drago noted, family spokesman Josephus Weeks had

vowed,'our family will fight for transparency, accountability and answers, for my uncle and for the safety of the country we love.'

However,

We’ll never know whether the secret settlement announced Wednesday included any of the things Weeks indicated he was so determined to get.

In particular,


What the public will probably never know, thanks to the secret settlement, are the details of who said — and did — what to whom when Thomas Eric Duncan went to Presbyterian on Sept. 25.

To recap, we still do not know why Mr Duncan was sent home from the hospital after his first emergency department visit, despite a fever manifesting during that visit, and a nurse's determination that he came from Africa. We still do not know whether problems with the design or implementation of the hospital EHR enabled Mr Duncan's discharge. We still do not know why hospital managers were so certain that they were prepared for Ebola, and whether two nurses contracted Ebola because of poor training, poor equipment, lapses in established protocols, or some other reason.  We sill do not know whether hospital managers tried, and perhaps succeeded in silencing most hospital professionals' concerns about medical or management mistakes. 

Finally, in an interview published by Modern Healthcare, THR CEO Barclay Berdan felt comfortable enough to say,

It was really important to make sure we had a really high level of communication and maintained the trust level inside the organization while we were in many cases being attacked from the outside, as the world moved really from science to political science to social science to superstition and fear

The reporter did not ask whether the appearance of "trust inside the organization" might have been driven by fears about job loss, or the outside attacks could have really been appropriate skepticism?  He also did not challenge a "high level of communication" that seemed mainly devoted to obscuring specifics and preserving management's reputation.   But perhaps Mr Berdan counted on how "Ebola memories fade" to deplete interest in such questions.  

Summary


Public relations is an important tool used by generic managers to maintain control of their organizations, and hence their ability to continue living in the style to which they have become accustomed.  Aggressive use of PR may be particularly helpful when events highlight the gap between a health organization's high minded mission and its actual performance.  Perhaps Texas Health Resources' deployment of vague apologies and assurances, nonspecific but indignant refutations, and undocumented aspersions on the media and mysterious outsiders did let questions about management's  handling of the first Ebola patients diagnosed on US soil fade.

However, better medical care and public health, and future successful management of Ebola or the next unexpected infectious threat requires answers to these questions.  Health care and public health professionals, policy makers, and the public should not let health care managers put maintenance of their currently comfortable position ahead of patients' and the public's health.   

The aftermath of our first US Ebola crisis makes it clear that  we need true health care reform that focuses on the leadership of big health care organizations. In particular, we need leadership that is well-informed about health care and public health; that upholds the values of health care professionals, specifically by putting patients' and the public's health ahead of their own remuneration; is willing to be held accountable; and is honest and unconflicted.

Allowing the current dysfunction to continue, while it will be very profitable to the insiders who run the system, will continue to enable tragic outcomes for patients and the public.  


2:14 PM
At "Congressional committee releases timeline detailing how Presbyterian treated Ebola patient Thomas Eric Duncan", Dallas News, Oct. 17, 2014 there is a link that provides acccess to documents released by the U.S. House of Representatives' Energy and Commerce Committee.

These documents address the EHR issues in the care of Ebola patient Thomas Duncan I wrote of at my Oct. 2, 2014 post "Did Electronic Medical Record-mediated problems contribute to or cause the current Dallas Ebola scare?" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/10/did-electronic-medical-record-mediated.html) and others:

Congressional committee releases timeline detailing how Presbyterian treated Ebola patient Thomas Eric Duncan

By Robert Wilonsky
Dallas News
Oct. 17, 2014 

http://thescoopblog.dallasnews.com/2014/10/congressional-committee-releases-timeline-detailing-how-presbyterian-treated-ebola-patient-thomas-eric-duncan.html/

According to a timeline released moments ago by the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee, Texas Health Resources Presbyterian Hospital Dallas released Thomas Eric Duncan at 3:37 a.m. on Sept. 26 — just 35 minutes after his temperate jumped to 103 degrees.

The timeline, provided by Presbyterian officials, also shows that “obtaining the patient’s travel history was not part of the triage nurses’ process on September 25, 2014,” when Duncan initially went to the hospital. He arrived in Dallas from Liberia five days earlier. A nurse noted that he’d just come from Africa but “attached no further significance to this travel history,” according to the timeline.

Another document shows how Presbyterian prepared to deal with Ebola dating back to Aug. 1 when officials were told that all Emergency Health Records should include a travel history for every patient. In Duncan’s case, it’s not clear whether a doctor read his emergency health records.

The record does not show which information the physician read, only which information was available,” according to the timeline.

The documents are available at https://www.scribd.com/doc/243373964/Thomas-Duncan-Presbyterian-Treatment-Time-Line

The key phrase to parse is the one also quoted in the newspaper article above:  “The record does not show which information the physician read, only which information was available.”

From the timeline itself, in pertinent part:

12:33 – 12:44 a.m. RN assessment
- The primary ED nurse continues the assessment.
- She identifies his complaints as “sharp, intermittent epigastric/upper abdominal pain;
sharp, frontal headache; dizziness; lack of appetite”
- She asks about Mr. Duncan’s travel history.
- The nurse documents that Mr. Duncan “came from Africa 9/20/14"
- RN states she recalls the discussion because of how long the plane flight was. (She had personal experience with very long plane fights). Attached no further significance to this travel history.
- This information was not verbally communicated to the physician, as prompted by the EHR.

12:52 – 1:10 a.m. ED physician begins evaluation of Mr. Duncan
The ED physician accesses the EHR again. A review of the EHR shows that the physician, on several occasions, accessed portions of the EHR where the travel history was now available including:
ED Lab Results Screen
ED Triage [twice]
ED Rad Results

The record does not show which information the physician read, only which information was available.

Again, the statements that the physicians "accessed portions of the EHR where the travel history was now available" after the RN recorded it, and that "the record does not show which information the physician read, only which information was available" sound like lawyers writing to obfuscate EHR realities from our Congresspeople.

Let's examine these statements:

  • ED physicians "accessed portions of the EHR where the travel history was now available" after the RN recorded it, and
  • The record does not show which information the physician read, only which information was available

These is a fundamental semantic problem here with the word "available."  In an EHR, "available" has a far different meaning than in a paper record.

The question is:

What is the precise meaning of the word "available" as stated here?

  • (1)  Does "available" mean "present on the actual screen(s) the physicians had up at one time or another on the monitor, that made up the "portions" of the EHR they "accessed"?"  
  • In other words, was the positive travel history from Africa "illuminating the phosphor", or illuminating the LED arrays for a modern computer monitor, of an actual screen in actual eyesight of the physicians that was a subset of the "portions of the EHR" they accessed?
 Or (and I believe this quite possible):

  • (2)  Does "available" mean that the travel history was available as data on disk or on RAM, and thus potentially on a screen for a physician to see, but that the specific screen never actually illuminated the LED arrays on the physicians' monitors? (E.g., such screen(s) were a component or subcomponent of the EHR "portions" they accessed, but the specific screen(s) in those "portions" had to be navigated to in order to see the travel data.)
  • In other words, was the case that the travel information taken by the nurse never appeared visually to the physicians, but only resided in the computer as data where it was invisible as intangible bytes on a disk or in RAM?  (This does not happen with a paper chart - the paper is tangible.)
  • Further, was there a meaningful alert drawing the physician to a screen that did then present the travel data to them?

There is no way to know by parsing the words, but based on their semantic blur I suspect the second scenario.

Unfortunately, what  really is essential to understand the EHR interaction are screenshots of precisely the screens viewed by the physicians, not "available" to the physicians.

Note that, for example, my Windows System Event log is "available" to me at all times in "portions" of Windows I may look at - by right-clicking "My Computer" and clicking the "manage" menu item that appears -  and only then if I actually then navigate to find it.  

Of course, EPIC and the other EHR sellers do not make the actual EHR screens available to the public - they are considered "protected IP."

Perhaps it's time for EPIC and the Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital to show Congress their screens.

Assuming they even know what screens to show.  EHR audit trails of user activity are notoriously imprecise. 

-- SS

10/21/14 Addendum:

At Health Data Management (http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/news/Epic-Stands-By-Integrity-of-EHR-System-at-Dallas-Hospital-49039-1.html),  Carl Dvorak, president of Epic Systems Corporation, is quoted as saying "... obviously it [the travel history - ed.] was on the opening screen of the physician’s workflow.”

I say:  prove it.  And as above, prove the doctors actually "put the data up into the screen LEDs."

Show the screens (before the hospital changed them, I add).

Show the audit trail.

This EPIC statement makes no sense, considering the hospital's initial claims as I wrote about earlier:

http://www.wptz.com/health/urgent-ebola-texas-hospital-flaw/28381038

(CNN) -- The Texas hospital treating the first person diagnosed with Ebola on American soil says a "flaw" in its electronic health records prevented doctors from seeing the patient's travel history. Patient Thomas Eric Duncan told the nurse he'd been in Africa, but that information was entered into a document that isn't automatically visible to physicians, Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital Dallas said in a statement Thursday.

However, the screens and the audit trail are the only way to authenticate the EPIC claims.

-- SS

9:44 AM
You can guess my opinion on the answer.

Introduction

News and opinions about Ebola virus are swirling around the US, fueled by a tragic epidemic in West Africa, and fears that more infections could appear here.  On October 6, 2014, I posted my concerns that despite a tremendous amount of confidence expressed by government officials and health care leaders, our dysfunctional health care system might have trouble containing Ebola virus.  Less than two weeks later, my concerns do not seem so extreme.  The first patient to be diagnosed with Ebola virus in the US has died.  Two nurses who cared for him now have the virus.

There seem to be millions of words on paper and on the internet about Ebola appearing every day.  So I certainly do not want to try to deal with the problem in all its aspects.  I do want to revisit a particular set of issues from my October 6 post: the hazards posed by generic management deluded by business school dogma running health care institutions in the time of Ebola.  In particular, my focus is the management of the US hospital at which one patient died, and two nurses were infected, based on what has come out since October 6.

The Incoherence of Hospital Leaders

On October 6, we noted that the hospital, Texas Health Presbyterian, part of the Texas Health Resources hospital system, had issued conflicting and confusing statements about why the first Ebola patient, Mr Thomas Eric Duncan, was sent home from the hospital when he first presented.  The first specific statement by hospital managers was that there had been a problem with the hospital's electronic health record (EHR), as had been suspected by my fellow Health Care Renewal blogger, InformaticsMD.  Then the hospital retracted that statement, but provided no explanation with which to replace it.

Since then, there have been more inconsistencies in statements made by hospital managers.

Fever or No Fever?

First hospital managers said Mr Duncan arrived without a fever, but then review of his medical records indicated his temperature was as high as 103 degrees F while he was in the hospital, a fever high enough that it might reasonably have prompted admission given his other symptoms, even if Ebola was not a concern.  (See this Dallas Morning News story.)

Readiness for Ebola Patients?

Hospital managers assured the public they were ready for Ebola virus patients, e.g., in the Dallas Morning News story of September 30, 2014

When Ebola arrived, they were ready.

The staff at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital of Dallas did a run-through just last week of procedures to follow if the deadly virus landed in Dallas.

'We were prepared,' Dr. Edward Goodman, an epidemiologist at Texas Health Presbyterian, said Tuesday in a news conference. 'We have had a plan in place for some time now in the event of a patient presenting with possible Ebola. We are well-prepared to deal with this crisis.'

Presbyterian said it is following recommendations from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Texas Department of Health in responding to the patient, described as being 'critically ill' at the hospital in northeast Dallas.

All precautions are being taken to protect doctors, nurses and others in the hospital, officials said.

Sadly, this statement soon seemed, as one politician once said, inoperative. an October 14 Washington Post article described how hospital health professionals had to essentially make up their procedures as they went along.


The hospital that treated Ebola victim Thomas Eric Duncan had to learn on the fly how to control the deadly virus, adding new layers of protective gear for workers in what became a losing battle to keep the contagion from spreading, a top official with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention said Tuesday.

'They kept adding more protective equipment as the patient [Duncan] deteriorated. They had masks first, then face shields, then the positive-pressure respirator. They added a second pair of gloves,' said Pierre Rollin, a CDC epidemiologist.

Also,

He said the hospital originally had no full-body biohazard suits equipped with respirators but now has about a dozen. Protocols evolved at the hospital while Duncan was being treated, he said: 'Collecting samples, with needles, then you have to have two people, one to watch. I think when the patient arrived they didn’t have someone to watch.'

Worse, in the last 24 hours, there have been reports by anonymous people said to be nurses at Texas Health Presbyterian that the hospital was clearly not ready, per the Los Angeles Times,

The nurses' statement alleged that when Duncan was brought to Texas Health Presbyterian by ambulance with Ebola-like symptoms, he was 'left for several hours, not in isolation, in an area' where up to seven other patients were.  'Subsequently, a nurse supervisor arrived and demanded that he be moved to an isolation unit, yet faced stiff resistance from other hospital authorities,' they alleged.

Duncan's lab samples were sent through the usual hospital tube system 'without being specifically sealed and hand-delivered. The result is that the entire tube system … was potentially contaminated,' they said.

The statement described a hospital with no clear rules on how to handle Ebola patients, despite months of alerts from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta about the possibility of Ebola coming to the United States.

'There was no advanced preparedness on what to do with the patient. There was no protocol. There was no system. The nurses were asked to call the infectious disease department' if they had questions, but that department didn't have answers either, the statement said. So nurses were essentially left to figure things out on their own as they dealt with 'copious amounts' of highly contagious bodily fluids from the dying Duncan while they wore gloves with no wrist tape, flimsy gowns that did not cover their necks, and no surgical booties, the statement alleged.

'Hospital officials allowed nurses who interacted with Mr. Duncan to then continue normal patient-care duties,' potentially exposing others, it said.

In response, the official hospital statement (authored by one Wendell Watson, "a Presbyterian spokesman," according to the AP) contained vague assurances, but no specific responses to the allegations,

'Patient and employee safety is our greatest priority, and we take compliance very seriously,' the hospital said in a statement. 'We have numerous measures in place to provide a safe working environment, including mandatory annual training and a 24-7 hotline and other mechanisms that allow for anonymous reporting. Our nursing staff is committed to providing quality, compassionate care, as we have always known, and as the world has seen firsthand in recent days. We will continue to review and respond to any concerns raised by our nurses and all employees.'
So while hospital officials (and local and national politicians and government leaders) kept up reassuring statements that our sophisticated, high-technology hospitals were totally ready to deal with a disease like Ebola, the reality appeared far different. 

Other Inconsistencies

According to a USA Today story, other inconsistencies included hospital statements about the date Mr Duncan's diagnosis was confirmed, and whether or not the hospital was diverting ambulances.

Were Health Professionals Silenced?

Of course, given the suddenness of the arrival of Ebola in the US, the acuity of the first patient, and the general atmosphere of panic, initial confusion in public statements however critical the information they were meant to contain may be, is understandable.

However, there are now allegations that hospital management was not merely confused, but trying to keep critical information secret, and the allegations do not seem incredible.

In a Washington Post story on October 12, about how many US hospitals seem not well prepared for Ebola infected patients, appeared this from Bonnie Castillo, director of Registered Nurse Response Network, part of the union, National Nurses United,

Castillo said the union has been trying to contact nurses at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital, where Thomas Eric Duncan, the Liberian man diagnosed with Ebola, died Wednesday.

'That hospital has issued a directive to all hospital staff not to speak to press,' Castillo said. 'That is a grave concern because we need to hear from those front-line workers. We need to hear what happened there. … They have them on real lockdown. There is great fear. This hospital is not represented by a union. Our sense is they are afraid to speak out.'

The Los Angeles Times story included,

The Dallas nurses asked the union to read their statement so they could air complaints anonymously and without fear of losing their jobs, National Nurses United Executive Director RoseAnn DeMoro said from Oakland.

The October 14 Washington Post story noted

the labor organization National Nurses United read a statement that it said came from nurses at the hospital who 'strongly feel unsupported, unprepared, lied to and deserted to handle their own situation.'

The AP story of October 15 stated,

The Presbyterian nurses are not represented by Nurses United or any other union. DeMoro and Burger said the nurses claimed they had been warned by the hospital not to speak to reporters or they would be fired.

The AP has attempted since last week to contact dozens of individuals involved in Duncan's care. Those who responded to reporters' inquiries have so far been unwilling to speak.
 Covering up information vitally needed by health care professionals, other institutions, the government, etc to better manage a potentially fatal disease that is already epidemic in other countries appears completely unethical.  Doing so to preserve the reputation of managers seems reprehensible.  But the implication of the recent stories is that is what happened. 

Why Hospital Managers May Not Deserve Our Trust

The US has had no recent experience with any disease like Ebola.  So that mistakes, sometimes very serious ones, were made in the management of the first Ebola patients is not a big surprise.
 
What may be a big surprise to many Americans is how untrustworthy health care leaders, and in particular the managers of Health Texas Presbyterian hospital and its parent system, Health Texas Resources now appear.  After all, USA Today published on October 14, "Texas Health Presbyterian was a respected, renowned hospital."  While even people at respected, renowned institutions make mistakes when confronted with sudden, unfamiliar problems, should not the institution's leaders at least be trusted to in their public pronouncements?

Instead, it appears that the leaders appeared tremendously overconfident, and worse, may have silenced employees from raising concerns that could have reflected badly on leadership.  This occurred in a context in which transparency was imperative so that other people who might have to deal with Ebola patients might be better prepared.


On the other hand, based on what we have been posting on Health Care Renewal for nearly 10 years, the conduct of the Texas Health Resources leaders should have come as no surprise.  On Health Care Renewal we have been connecting the dots among severe problems with cost, quality and access on one hand, and huge problems with concentration and abuse of power, enabled by leadership of health care organizations that is ill-informed, incompetent, unsympathetic or hostile to health care professionals' values, self-interested, conflicted, dishonest, or even corrupt and governance that fails to foster transparency, accountability, ethics and honesty. 

We have seen many examples of hospital executives who seemed vastly impressed by their own brilliance, egged on by board members who were themselves executives of other organizations, and by marketing and public relations functionaries dependent on these executives for their own career advancement.  In particular, we have posted examples of hospital CEOs and other top executives making millions of dollars a year based on their supposed "brilliance," or "visionary" capacity, at least according to the board members who supposed to be exercising stewardship over their institutions, and the public relations people they hired.  Such brilliance has often been asserted, but rarely been explained or justified  (The latest example was here, and much more discussion is here.)

Most such ostensibly "brilliant" hospital executives had no direct experience in clinical care, public health, or biomedical science.

Making hospital leaders feel entitled to make more and more money regardless of their or their institutions' performance seems to be a recipe for "CEO Disease," leading to disconnected, unaccountable, self-interested leaders.  Hospital leaders suffering from the CEO disease may be particularly willing to countenance suppression of any facts or ideas that might raise doubts about their brilliance.  

So the leadership of Texas Health Resources may in fact be very typical of that of large non-profit hospital systems.  THR is such a system.  A Dallas Morning News article about Mr Doug Hawthorne, the Texas Health Resources CEO who just retired in September, 2014, stated


In 1997, Doug Hawthorne helped reshape the health care industry in North Texas by leading the creation of Texas Health Resources, an alliance of Presbyterian Healthcare Resources, Harris Methodist Health System and Arlington Memorial Hospital.

By 2014,

 With more than 22,000 employees in fully owned and joint venture operations, Texas Health is one of the largest care providers in North Texas. For its 2012 fiscal year, it had $3.7 billion in total operating revenue and $5.3 billion in total assets.
For leading this system, Mr Hawthorne made a lot of money, although apparently no recent data is available on his compensation,

He was among the most highly compensated not-for-profit CEOs in the region. For 2012, the most recent information available, his base salary was about $1 million and his bonus was about $1.1 million.

It should be no surprise that to justify this compensation, Mr Hawthorne was proclaimed a visionary.  According to the Dallas/ Fort Worth Healthcare Daily, Mr Hawthorne was inducted in 2014 into the Texas Business Hall of Fame.  At that time, 

'A healthcare visionary, Mr. Hawthorne is at the helm of one of the largest faith-based, nonprofit health care delivery systems in the United States, Texas Health Resources,' the Hall said in a release announcing the induction.

Yet Mr Hawthorne had no direct patient care experience, public health experience, or biomedical or clinical science experience.  Mr Hawthorne is on the board of directors of the LHP Hospital Group Inc, a for-profit that provides capital and services to non-profit hospitals.  The official bio, posted by LHP stated his educational background only included

B.S. and M.S. degrees in healthcare administration from Trinity University in San Antonio.

Furthermore, as we mentioned earlier, the current CEO of Texas Health Resources, Mr Barclay E Berden, who has only been on the job since September 1, 2014, also was hailed by system board of trustees for his "unique leadership strengths."  His current compensation is unknown, but I would guess is likely over $1 million/year.  He highest degree is a MBA, and like his predecessor, had much experience in hospital management, but apparently none in clinical care, public health, or biomedical science. 

Summary

Texas Health Resources' recent CEOs have been paid millions, and hailed for their brilliance, despite a lack of any direct experience in health care, public health, or biomedical science.  Leaders convinced of their own brilliance may live in bubbles that prevent penetration of any ideas or facts that may challenge that brilliance, making them thus susceptible to hubris.

So should we have been surprised that the leadership of the first US hospital system to directly confront Ebola de novo seemed more concerned with polishing their supposed brilliance than with transparently providing the information that other people who have to confront Ebola in the future so greatly need?

No, but one tiny silver lining to the time of Ebola is that it may make it glaringly obvious that we need true health care reform that focuses on reforming the leadership of big health care organizations. In particular, we need leadership that is well-informed about health care and public health; that upholds the values of health care professionals, specifically by putting patients' and the public's health ahead of their own remuneration; is willing to be held accountable; and is honest and unconflicted.

Allowing the current dysfunction to continue, while it will be very profitable to the insiders who run the system, will continue to enable tragic outcomes for patients and the public.  
1:02 PM
As discussion, if not outright panic, about Ebola infections increases in the US, it is still hard to figure out what heath care professionals and the health care system need to do to protect patients and the public in a very changed world.

One pressing question is how to identify people at risk of having the infection so as to best care for them, and to protect the public from further spread of the infection, without swamping the health care system, needlessly reducing civil liberties, or spreading further panic.

To better answer question, better understanding why the first patient who was diagnosed with and then died from Ebola in the US was initially not diagnosed might help.  However, at this time, the whole thing seems mysterious. As a column published on October 7, 2014 in the Dallas Observer was entitled,


"Why Don't We Know Yet Exactly What Happened When Our Ebola Patient Zero Appeared?"
 

On this blog, InformaticsMD was the first to speculate that problems with the design and implementation of an electronic health record (EHR) might have enabled the discharge of this patient, after he presented to the emergency department with non-specific symptoms soon after returning from Liberia.  The next day, an official statement from Texas Health Resources seemed to confirm that a "flaw" in the hospital's EHR prevented adequate communication of the patient's travel history between  a nurse and a physician.  However, one day later, as InformaticsMD discussed here, the hospital reversed itself, releasing another statement that there was no "flaw" in the EHR.  That statement, however, did not explain either why the first statement came out, or anything more about the diagnostic failure.

So, as the Dallas Observer column stated,

The question of why Duncan was sent home initially instead of isolated is still the most stubborn mystery in the saga of 'Ebola Comes to Dallas.'

As columnist Jim Schultze explained, this question has implications for health care professionals and health care organizations who need to figure out how to best deal with the next patient who shows up who might or might not have Ebola.

If Duncan's dismissal from the emergency room on his first visit was a bungle, then it's reasonable to assume that everybody knows about the bungle by now and a similar goof is unlikely to happen again at any decent hospital in America. But if the handling of Duncan grew out of something more systemic, especially a business or management style or policy, then it may be less reasonable to assume the next hospital will be immune from the same issue.


In other words,

if the Eric Duncan mistake flowed from something more systemic, then we absolutely need to know what it was and how it happened so that we can look for the same problems everywhere else. If it was a non-medical problem, I can almost guarantee you it will turn out to be an issue not be unique to this hospital.

Mr Schultze is not the only one to point out the critical need to solve this mystery.  He quoted

former Boston hospital CEO, Paul Levy, called on Texas Health to open up: 'A failure by a hospital to be open about what went wrong in a major medical case such as this," Levy said, "does a major disservice to everyone else in the health care industry.'

Similarly, the editor of FierceEMR wrote,

The Texas Health situation may be setting a dangerous precedent. This is a major world health crisis for which providers worldwide are trying to prepare. If truly the mistake Texas Health made in releasing Duncan was its mistake alone, so be it.

But if there really was a design flaw, then every provider--and every vendor--needs to know about it, evaluate whether it has the same problem, and correct it.

The patients deserve no less.

So far, to date, we have heard nothing more from the managers of Texas Health Presbyterian or its parent non-profit corporation, Texas Health Resources.  It appears we need a reincarnation of Sherlock Holmes to solve this one.



Sifting a Few Clues

I am not he.  But I do believe there are some clues, however, weak, that suggest system flaws.  They can be found in an interview of the new Texas Health Resources chief operating officer (COO), Dr Jeffrey Canose, published in Healthcare Informatics a few weeks before Mr Duncan presented first to the Texas Health Presbyterian emergency department.

One of his points was that the hospital system is changing its emphasis from acute care to population health (however that may be defined),

we made the decision to become more of an integrated health system, and started to build the infrastructure for population health

Then,

The biggest challenge is to continue on our journey to increase our capabilities as a fully integrated health system; to develop the competency to be a high-performing system in the realm of population health management; to shift our focus from sick care to actually managing well-being....

Also, he referred to participation in the Pioneer ACO program as

one of our first significant efforts in shifting our focus from being acute-care-centric to being more focused on the full continuum of care

Recall Mr Schulze's point that the failure to diagnose Mr Duncan could have been due to a business management style or policy.  So maybe we have a clue that the hospital's policy to reduce emphasis on acute care, including the emergency department, might have had to do with problems in the ED leading to a diagnostic misadventure.

 In addition, Dr Canose noted,

 the electronic health record is a huge enabler to all this; the next challenge will be to enable things further, including through data mining, working with big data, and clinical and operational support

So,

around collaboration at the sharp point of redesigning patient care—... people in IT are mission-critical partners in hearing what kinds of problems we’re trying to solve, and in helping us to figure out how to drive clinical transformation and care design, and how to drive efficiency.

So maybe we have a clue that the management was very heavily intellectually invested in their health care information technology infrastructure, and perhaps thus less willing to think about how health care IT could be the cause, rather than solution of problems, such as diagnostic problems in the ED.

Finally, this may be just a hint, but Dr Canose spoke

We have a clear focus on continuing to elaborate the infrastructure we need in order to do population health management, and we’re continuing to build those capabilities over time, and explore ways we can deploy through our employed physician groups,...

This implies that many physicians who practice at Texas Health Resources hospitals are in fact its employees.  We have at times written about the perils being a corporate physician.  One is loss of autonomy, as physician employees become beholden to organizational managers.  So maybe we have a clue that physicians' loss of autonomy, perhaps the autonomy to put patients ahead of corporate policies and managerial edicts, such as those deemphasizing emergency care, could have enabled the failure to diagnose the Ebola "patient zero?"

Summary

We wrote earlier that the rise of generic managers as leaders of health care organizations degrade the US' ability to deal with Ebola.  In the mystery of the discharged Ebola patient, we seem to see the sort of managerial obfuscation that seems characteristic of many generic managers.  More transparency from the management of Texas Health Resources would surely help the US deal better with the ongoing challenge of Ebola.  In the long run, Ebola may teach us a hard lesson about the need to put health care leadership in the hands of people who understand health care, and subscribe to its mission to put patients and the public health first.   

ADDENDUM (10 October, 20140 - This post was re-posted on the Naked Capitalism blog.
2:04 PM
In the past several days the media has been abuzz with stories about the admission, then the following retraction, by a Texas hospital that and EMR "flaw" had caused a man who had been in West Africa and was infected with the Ebola virus to be sent home, instead of admitted and put into isolation.

I wrote about these matters at my Oct. 2, 2014 post "Did Electronic Medical Record-mediated problems contribute to or cause the current Dallas Ebola scare?" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/10/did-electronic-medical-record-mediated.html) and the followup October 4, 2014 post
"Dallas Hospital reverses EHR-related explanation for fumbling Ebola case" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/10/dallas-hospital-reverses-ehr-relarted.htm).

A spectrum of the healthcare IT ecosystem seems represented (see http://cci.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=ecosystem).  The technology enthusiasts and hyper-enthusiasts seem to believe the computer could have done no wrong (and usually lack medical and Medical Informatics expertise).

Some people such as myself with specific Medical Informatics experience and who know the failure modes via AHRQ, FDA, ECRI Institute etc. believe the EHR was quite likely contributory or causative of the mistake (see my April 9, 2014 post "FDA on health IT risk:  "We don't know the magnitude of the risk, and what we do know is the tip of the iceberg, but health IT is of 'sufficiently low risk' that we don't need to regulate it" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/04/fda-on-health-it-risk-reckless-or.html).

The reason I have written little after my initial two posts is that the only was to resolve the controversy is to actually examine the EHR screens, screen navigation and behavior of the EHR, if possible both before and after the hospital's stated "fix" of the problem, the EHR audit trails (automatically generated EHR accounting logs of user accesses, action taken, time, location etc.) and to examine the EHR in actual operation to evaluate it in context with the clinical setting in which it was installed.

Barring that, everything else is speculation usually biased either by the speculator's own beliefs about either the beneficence or fallibility of information technology in healthcare, and perhaps IT generally, and/or conflicts of interest.

Unfortunately, considering the health IT industry and environment, the only way I believe such an examination of the EHR can come about is via litigation.  I doubt it will come from the traditional regulators of medical devices and healthcare safety.

I do note the following of interest at Politico:

... While all EHRs difficult to use, some are set up better than others.

At Mount Sinai Hospital in New York City, information that a patient was feverish and recently flew in from Liberia would have set off an alarm, with the nurse’s screen flashing yellow and giving instructions to immediately isolate the patient, said Jason Shapiro, an emergency room physician and informatics expert at the hospital.

The nurse entering “fever” into the record would “get a hard stop. They immediately have to enter a response to a travel history question. And if there’s fever and the right kind of travel history, the whole isolation mechanism is supposed to swing into play,” Shapiro said.

... Both Mount Sinai and Texas Health Presbyterian have health records systems they purchased for hundreds of millions of dollars from Epic.


At least some users of EPIC seem to have a system configured to catch such a problem.  In my mind, this speaks the need to industry regulation, to ensure all EHRs meet basic standards of safety and reliability and are not haphazardly designed or implemented from one hospital to the next.

-- SS

10/9/14 Addendum:  

Prof. Jon Patrick of Australia, cited numerous times on this blog, relates this:

"I always talk about data capture and data reuse and the reuse is defined by the data flows required in the design of the system. EPIC might well have allowed for the the data capture but failed to deal with the data flow to properly effect the required reuse."

As may the implementers at the hospital in question also have failed at the flows supporting appropriate and fail-safe reuse in a hectic ED environment.

He adds, for further clarification:

A footnote to this point. We separate data flow from work flow. Data flow is the movement of data from context to reuse in another context, or you collect data on this screen(first context) and then you see it later on another screen (=another context).

Workflow is the route staff team members take in moving from one context to another, that is the movement from using one screen to another screen. Most often triggered by clicking a button that moves you to the chosen screen(next context).

The two are very different things and require close thinking in both cases to not trip up with unhelpful and frustrating system solutions.

Historically, Information Systems development has dealt with these issues both poorly and without adequate separate planning. In the past the focus has been on the data capture and storage, because the notion of reuse and context shifting has been left behind. This has been OK for many business systems where contexts have only small variations and workflow are simple or unimportant.

In medicine that just isn’t the case.

-- SS
12:13 PM
At my Oct. 2, 2014 post "Did Electronic Medical Record-mediated problems contribute to or cause the current Dallas Ebola scare?" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/10/did-electronic-medical-record-mediated.html) I questioned a possible role for an EMR-related mishap, including known disruptions of teamwork and suboptimal presentation of information, to have contributed to or led to the release of a man carrying the Ebola virus from a Dallas Hospital.

I then related how the press reported, the very next day, that this was indeed the case.

Now...gee whiz...the hospital changes its tune. "No, it wasn't the EMR after all!" 

See "Hospital reverses explanation for fumbling Ebola case" at http://www.dallasnews.com/news/metro/20141003-hospital-reverses-explanation-for-fumbling-ebola-case.ece. The reversal strains credibility and sounds like redirection, to my ear possibly due to inside attorney and/or EMR company attorney pressure. 

The "new explanation" itself per the new article is that:

... A written statement Thursday said hospital officials identified and corrected “a flaw in the way the physician and nursing portions of our electronic health records (EHR) interacted in this specific case.” That statement implied, without directly saying it, that the flaw left the doctor uninformed about Duncan’s travel history. In Friday’s statement, though, the hospital said, “The patient’s travel history was documented and available to the full care team in the electronic health record.” “There was no flaw in the EHR in the way the physician and nursing portions interacted related to this event,” the statement said.

Again, sounds like redirection and making the doctor (and perhaps the ED doctor's group, if they were contractors) the sole scapegoat.  


"Available to the full care team?"  "Available" in a complex computer system with myriad screens is a very relative term.  The issue seems not "how the physician and nursing portion interacted", it is "how the physician portion made the information readily apparent to the physicians and other team members, or not."
 

The problem here, I believe, still likely amounts to "information hard to find" and "suboptimal support of teamwork (situational awareness)", among others, per the AHRQ hazards taxonomy. 

See, for instance, this.  Either it is true, or not, regarding the travel history:


 (click to enlarge)

I think an impartial investigation is needed to get to the truth.  

What we have now is likely healthcare defense attorney and/or risk management "fog", a phenomenon I have both professional and (sadly) personal experience with.

One also wonders if the EHR vendor had a contractual defects non-disclosure ("gag") clause with the organization, and is now threatening suit, leading to the retraction.  (See http://cci.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=koppel_kreda for more on that issue, and of corporate "hold harmless" clauses).

Unfortunately, a comprehensive investigation would be likely to only occur in a courtroom via Discovery if others become infected.

If any reader has knowledge of details, my email address is scotsilv AT aol DOT com.

-- SS

Addendum: A medical informatics colleague, Dr. William Goossen of the Netherlands, sent me a reminder about this article on the de-professionalizing aspect of health IT:

Harris BL. Becoming de-professionalized: One aspect of the staff nurse’s perspective on computer-mediated nursing care plans. Advances in nursing science. 1990: 13, 2,  3-74.

Some content of this study - Nurses who participated in this study felt to some degree:
  • De-professionalized: being controlled by the computer, not formally planning individualized care, losing skills to develop NCP's (Nursing Care Plans).
  • De-autonomizing: - control by supervisors - linear operations of the computer and nurses felt to think like that - the system doesn't allow  free texting, - nurses must follow the rules of the computer.
  • De-individualizing: - 'one-size-fits-all' - routinized care - eliminating creativity.
  • De-expertizing: - mindlessness and losing the skills learned in school, the computer does the work.

There is a human aspect to computerization in medicine that is often overlooked, especially by the health IT hyper-enthusiasts (see http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/03/doctors-and-ehrs-reframing-modernists-v.html). 

Perhaps the ED staff at the Dallas hospital needs to be surveyed on these issues.

-- SS
8:11 AM