ads

,
Showing posts with label FDA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FDA. Show all posts
An Unprecedented Endorsement 

It's deja vu all over again.  In the spring of 2015, the New England Journal, the most prestigious US medical journal, published a remarkable series of opinion pieces extrolling physician-industry collaborations, and minimizing the significance of resulting conflicts of interest.  More remarkable was the extent that the articles' argument were bolstered by logical fallacies (look here).

Doubling down, the New England Journal of Medicine appeared to make its first ever endorsement of a nominee for federal office.  On October 28, 2015, the NEJM published an editorial with the almost campaign slogan like title, "Califf for the FDA," which enthusiastically endorsed the current presidential nominee to be Commissioner of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). (1)   It began, [with italics added for emphasis]

Robert M. Califf, M.D., has been nominated to be the next head of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); he currently serves as Deputy Commissioner for the Office of Medical Products and Tobacco. We think his confirmation as commissioner should proceed as quickly as possible. Because the FDA oversees the safety and, in some spheres, the efficacy of products that constitute about 25% of our economy, the country needs a strong and experienced leader who can keep the FDA focused on its mission.

And the editorial concluded,

Califf's experience, his proven leadership abilities, his record of robust research to guide clinical practice, and his unwavering dedication to improving patient outcomes are unsurpased qualifications for the post of commissioner of the FDA; we strongly endorse his nomination and urge the Senate to act favorably on it. 

I have never seen this journal, known primarily for publishing research and scholarly opinion on medicine and health care, publicly render an opinion about a nomination for a federal position, let alone such an enthusiastic one.  A quick search of the journal revealed that it had taken no position and made no comment about the nominations of the last three US FDA Commissioners, (Dr Margaret Hamburg, Dr Andrew von Eschenbach, Dr Lester Crawford, and Dr Mark McClellan, look here) who were nominated by one Democratic and one Republican President.

Dismissing Concerns about Conflicts of Interest

This fervid endorsement came in the face of some controversy about the nomination, particularly about Dr Califf's previous ties to industry (see this post ).  He has participated in many industry sponsored clinical research projects.  For example, a 2013 JAMA disclosure statement included 13 commercial research sponsors of his work.  It also noted his consultative relationships with 32 commercial firms.  We discovered he also had a "board level" conflict of interest, having been a director of Portola Pharmaceuticals, for which he received over $250,000 in 2014 (see this proxy statement).  He also had been paid for "educational activities" in previous years, possibly including "drug talks," at least per one blogger.  So in my humble opinion, the nomination of Dr Califf could potentially become one of the most significant health care revolving door cases to affect US government.


Such consideration may have influenced Senator Bernie Sanders (I - Vermont), who is currently running for President.  In early October he announced he would oppose the Califf nomination.

Furthermore, since our post but before the publication of the NEJM editorial, there have been new revelations.   Dr Califf twithdrew as authors from several papers that had been accepted for publication, seemingly violating norms for declaring authorship of scholarly works, (see the Boston Globe here).   Dr Califf was revealed to have been a board member of and consultant to Faculty Connection LLC, which advises academic researchers "who want to work with industry" about regulatory submissions (see Intercept.com here)

Yet the Editor of the New England Journal of Medicine dismissed concerns about Dr Califf's industry relationships,

a few concerns have been expressed about his associations with industry, and these concerns may have caused some to withhold support for his nomination.

Like Califf, we believe that our actions should be driven by data, not innuendo. Since 2005, Califf has reported, as an investigator, the outcomes of seven clinical trials sponsored solely by industry in primary publications in major general medical journals. Of these trials, four had a negative outcome (i.e., not favoring the intervention), two favored the intervention, and one, with a factorial design, had a mixed outcome. Given this performance, it is impossible to argue that Califf has a pro-industry bias.

This opinion may yet carry the day.  The New York Times reported that

Dr Robert M Califf ... coasted through a confirmation hearing on Tuesday, with  most members of a Senate committee - including some who have been skeptical about his ties to the pharmaceutical industry - seeming set to support his candidacy.

This occurred despite one more major revelation that appeared since the editorial was published, but before the hearing.  A large pharmaceutical company clinical trial which Dr Califf ran had been criticized as biased in favor of the company's drug by the FDA's own staff and consultants. (see POGO here).  And it occurred despite calls by various organizations for the nomination to be turned down, including by Public Citizen and the AIDS Healthcare Foundation (see Medscape here).

Missing the Main Point

However, the NEJM editorial seemed to miss the main point.  It revolved around the claim that


It is impossible to argue that Califf has a pro-industry bias.

This was based apparently on an informal evaluation by Dr Drazen of seven of Dr Califf's 1200 publications.  So at best this was about the question of pro-industry bias in research publications. 

However, the controversy is about Dr Califf's nomination as the head of the US government agency that oversees the pharmaceutical, device and biotechnology industries, among others, and tries to assure the safety and effectiveness of drugs, biologics and medical devices, among other responsibilities.  The overriding issue is about the risk that his decision making in these capacities could be biased.  The real issue is the revolving door, not bias in research.

As we have repeated very recently, the revolving door can be veiwed as a species of conflict of interest.   Government officials who can look forward to extremely lucrative employment in health care industry may be much more inclined to seem friendly to the industry while in office.  Government officials who were previously paid by industry, and who benefited from financial interactions with industry, are likely to maintain their industry mindset and be mindful of their industry friends.  But the concern here is not that this risks biasing future research.  The risk is that a person who previously enjoyed close ties, including close financial ties to industry is at risk of putting the interests of industry over those of citizens and patients while running a US government agency charged with regulating that industry and protecting the health and safety of those citizens and patients.

Worse, some experts have suggested that the revolving door is in fact corruption.  As we noted here, the experts from the distinguished European anti-corruption group U4 wrote,
The literature makes clear that the revolving door process is a source of valuable political connections for private firms. But it generates corruption risks and has strong distortionary effects on the economy, especially when this power is concentrated within a few firms.
  Dr Drazen's editorial never directly addressed that issue.  It is one that should still be a concern.

Mission-Hostile Management?

Finally, the effect of the Califf nomination on the FDA has generated considerable public comment.  The effect of the New England Journal of Medicine's unprecendented editorial endorsement of the nomination has generated almost no discussion.  Only on the 1BoringOldMan blog was there note of the past industry ties of the current NEJM editor inspired their own controversies, and asked "since when is the editorship of the NEJM a position from which to weigh in on such matters?" (look here).

Using the editorship to so weigh in could not only obfuscate the debate about the nomination.  It could threaten the mission of a proud medical institution. The NEJM claims a

reputation as the 'gold standard' for quality biomedical research and for the best practices in clinical medicine.

It claims its editorials are

thoughtful, carefully reasoned analyses and interpretations [which] help you crystallize your own opinions on current topics and findings

Yet the blanket and unprecedented endorsement of the current FDA nominee appears otherwise.  We have previously argued that the earlier NEJM opinion pieces on conflicts of interest were based on logical fallacies more than "thoughtful, carefully reasoned analyses and interpretation."  In the Editor's apparent haste to defend industry-physician relationships, he risks the reputation and mission of once what was really a gold standard.

 Reference

1.  Drazen JM. Califf for the FDA.  N Engl J Med 2015;  DOI: 10.1056/NEJMe1513828 (link here)  
9:02 AM
It seems to be the season of the revolving door in health care.  The latest version got some media attention, because it involves one of the most important health care leadership positions in the US government, the Director of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  However, the case actually seems much more serious than what the media has recently reported.

The Basics

For an introduction, we turn to the Wall Street Journal from September 15, 2015:

President Barack Obama plans to nominate the prominent cardiologist and medical researcher Robert Califf as the next commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, the White House said Tuesday.

Dr. Califf had been named the FDA’s deputy commissioner for medical products and tobacco—effectively the No. 2 post—in February. He joined the FDA from Duke University, where he had served as a professor of medicine, a leading pharmaceutical researcher and the vice chancellor for clinical and translational research.

The new nomination got some rave reviews. For example, from the WSJ article,

Francis Collins, director of the National Institutes of Health and a scientist who has worked with Dr. Califf for years, called this 'a fantastic nomination.'

Then this in the NY Times (Sept 15, 2015):

'He’s never forgotten that at his core he’s a doctor, and he cares deeply about providing evidence to help people take better care of patients,' said Dr. Robert Harrington, professor and chairman of the department of medicine at the Stanford University School of Medicine, who worked with Dr. Califf at Duke.

Also, a MedPage Today article was entitled, "Califf Nomination for FDA Chief Gets Most High Marks," and included such testimonials as,

'He has a very good understanding of industry and academia, and think that will serve him well,' Caleb Alexander, MD, co-director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Drug Safety and Effectiveness in Baltimore, told MedPage Today....

Also, this from Dr Harlan Krumholz,

He's a broad thinker and a very creative and visionary individual. He will be an outstanding choice.

And this from Dr Sanjay Kaul,

I can't think of a more qualified person than Dr. Califf to lead the FDA at the present time. He is an accomplished leader in cardiovascular disease research whose work has resulted in therapies that save lives and improve the quality of life for millions of patients.
Is it time to break out the confetti yet?

Conflicts of Interest a Fly in the Ointment?

The only fly in the ointment was the matter of Dr Califf's ties to industry. The WSJ article included,

Diana Zuckerman, president of the National Center for Health Research, a Washington-based group focusing on medical-product safety, questioned his ties to the drug industry.

'Dr. Califf’s expertise and his close ties to the pharmaceutical industry are both well-known,' she said. 'His ties to industry have been a source of great concern to public-health experts when he was previously considered for FDA commissioner, and those ties raise important questions about this nomination.'

The MedPage Today article noted that Public Citizen's Health Research Group stated,

'During his tenure at Duke University, Califf racked up a long history of extensive financial ties to multiple drug and device companies, including Amgen, Astra-Zeneca, Eli Lilly, Johnson & Johnson, Merck Sharpe & Dohme and Sanofi-Aventis, to name a few,' Michael Carome, MD, the group's director, said in a statement. 'Strikingly, no FDA commissioner has had such close financial relationships with industries regulated by the agency prior to being appointed.'

The MedPage Today article, however, then went on to undermine those concerns, implying that only fringe people like those at Public Citizen were really worried. 

Most experts contacted by MedPage Today seemed to think Califf would not have a problem getting Senate confirmation. 'I expect him to be confirmed," said [Dr. Steven] Nissen. 'He is very well liked by people ... in both parties, and I would expect the nomination to go well.'

'All signals suggest that Dr. Califf is well-respected on both sides of the political aisle,' Jay Wolfson, DrPH, JD, senior associate dean at the University of South Florida's Morsani College of Medicine, in Tampa, said in an email.

'There are some who believe his relationship with [the drug industry] may be a problem, but most see it as a value-added factor in building a functional, more streamlined relationship with the industry in order to improve the speed with which truly effective and quality drugs and devices are made available, mitigate the excessive costs associated with pharmaceuticals, and influence policies and practices intended to improve health status.'

Note that the experts were not all named, or their expertise described, the first two paragraphs were really about Dr Califf's political support, and the third paragraph clearly reflected the views of someone who thought that the FDA needs to have a lighter regulatory touch. 

There was additional reporting about Dr Califf's conflicts of interest, but again with the effect of minimizing their importance.  The Wall Street Journal published a second article on September 18, 2015 which first reported,

From 2009 through early 2015, Dr. Califf received consulting fees of roughly $205,000 from companies including Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Co., GlaxoSmithKline PLC and one medical-device maker, records show. The payments are documented by the federal Open Payments database, and PharmaShine, a database of pharmaceutical disclosures operated by Obsidian Healthcare Disclosure Services LLC. Drug makers spent an additional $21,000 on travel, meals and other expenses for Dr. Califf, data show.

But the article provided this counterpoint,

Kevin Griffis, a spokesman for the Department of Health and Human Services, said Dr. Califf had ceased all work with drug makers once he was hired by the FDA and that he has gone through a rigorous screening process for potential conflicts of interest. Mr. Griffis said Dr. Califf had donated all the consulting fees he has received since the mid-2000s to nonprofit groups.

'Dr. Robert Califf’s professional career has been dedicated to advancing biomedical research, including the rigorous evaluation of the safety, efficacy and appropriate use of both new medical products and those already on the market,' said Mr. Griffis, assistant secretary for public affairs at HHS.

Note that Dr Califf already is at the FDA, in a position that I do not believe required Senate confirmation.  It is striking, however, how the agency's own public relations people have jumped to his defense now as a nominee who has to be confirmed by the Senate.  However, I suppose that had Dr Califf donated all this fees to a local soup kitchen, they could not be called much of a conflict of interest.  But Mr Griffis said "nonprofit groups," without specification, not "soup kitchens." And continue reading to find out more. 

A simultaneous NY Times article enlarged a bit on Dr Califf's industry relationships,

He has written scientific papers with pharmaceutical company researchers, and his financial disclosure form last year listed seven drug companies and a device maker that paid him for consulting and six others that partly supported his university salary, including Merck, Novartis and Eli Lilly. A conflict-of-interest section at the end of an article he wrote in the European Heart Journal last year declared financial support from more than 20 companies.

However the NYT article also quoted Mr Griffis about the donations to "nonprofits," and added,

A résumé studded with industry funding is not unusual in academic medicine, Dr. Califf’s supporters note. Doctors are paid consulting fees all the time, and universities routinely conduct clinical trials on behalf of companies. Those contracts help support university researchers’ salaries, a standard practice. Many emphasize that it does not imply an inherent conflict.

His supporters contend that Dr. Califf’s vast experience in the clinical science world could be a major asset in his new post.

Furthermore,

Supporters and former colleagues say Dr. Califf’s background makes him perfectly suited to the job of commissioner. He has spent years improving the way clinical trials are conducted, coming up with groundbreaking trial designs for medicines against blood clots.

'His integrity in scientific matters is impeccable, and his innovation in clinical trial design is legendary,' said Dr. Steven Nissen, a cardiologist at the Cleveland Clinic, who has been an outspoken critic of both the F.D.A. and drug companies.

Even better,

Dr. Califf is often in the gym on the StairMaster before 6 a.m., said a former colleague at Duke, Dr. Adrian Hernandez. He often invites younger doctors to join him in golf and has a passion for Duke basketball that he expresses by wearing the team colors on game days.

How could anyone criticize a man who is at the gym at 6 AM?

More seriously, note that while the recent reporting may bring up questions about Dr Califf's conflicts of interest in terms of financial relationships with drug, device and biotechnology companies when he was on the Duke faculty, all the reporting also included passages minimizing the importance of these conflicts.  To minimize the issue of conflicts of interest, articles cited unnamed experts, suggesting the logical fallacy of an appeal to authority; noted that the financial ties that were criticized are standard practice in academic health care, suggesting the logical fallacy of an appeal to common practice.  The articles also cited Dr Califf's positive attributes which may have been relevant to his work at the FDA, like knowledge of research, but were not related to the question of conflicts of interest. This suggests another appeal to authority, or something of a reverse ad hominem (pro hominem?) fallacy.  It seems odd that what appear to be straightforward journalistic reports of a presidential nomination included such attempts to defend the candidate.  Note further that many of these logical fallacies appeared not in quotes from Dr Califf's supporters, but in text apparently written by journalists (e.g., "industry funding is not unusual," "in the gym on the Stairmaster," etc.)

Nonetheless, this is the state of play as of this moment.  The thrust of the media coverage suggested that Dr Califf is a brilliant physician and researcher, and while he as some ties to industry, they do not amount to much of a problem, except in the eyes of the likes of Public Citizen.


If one digs deeper, however, there is more. When Dr Califf was appointed to his current FDA position in February, 2015, and years earlier when his name was first mentioned as a possible candidate to run the FDA, evidence appeared that his ties to pharmaceutical, biotechnology and device companies were much more serious than what the recent accounts suggested.  

Where Does the Money from Industry Sponsored Research Grants Go? 

The recent coverage of Dr Califf's nomination in the NY Times dismissed his multiple corporate research grants as common practice.  Yet in the TIME coverage of  his original appointment to the FDA in February, 2015, this reminder of the significance of corporate sponsored research grants appeared.

Califf says his salary is contractually underwritten in part by several large pharmaceutical companies, including Merck, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly and Novartis.

Note that apologists for physician and academician interaction with industry often claim that industry funding of research grants that does not go directly to individuals does not cause important conflicts of interest. In one sentence, however, this article underlined how these grants support academic salaries, and hence lead to the dependency that is at the heart of conflicted relationships.

As we posted in 2007, academic medical institutions now depend on "external," including corporate research funding to support their research faculty's salaries, and via "overhead," their overall budgets.  Dr Lee Goldman, then Dean and Executive Vice President at Columbia University, called faculty who bring in a lot of grant money "tax payers," who earn gratitude, and likely bonuses and perks.  Thus Dr Califf's multiple large corporate research grants cannot be completely dismissed as conflicts of interest. 


A More Extensive List of Industry Relationships

Furthermore, a relatively obscure February, 2015, report from MDDIOnline noted that Dr Califf had more industry relationships than were reported this month,

Conflict of interest disclosures dating back to 2007 made public by the DCRI show that Califf has been paid for consulting or other services provided to a number of medical device pharmaceutical, and biotech companies, including Medtronic, Acumed, Bayer Healthcare, Merck, Novartis, Roche, GlaxoSmithKline, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Sanofi-Aventis, and Eli Lilly & Co. Califf also disclosed that he held equity in two pharmaceutical companies—Boulder-based N30 Pharmaceuticals and South San Francisco, CA-based Portola Pharmaceuticals—as recently as 2014. Califf retired from Portola’s board of directors January 26, according to a press release from the company.
A somewhat more obscure commentary by Martha Rosenberg in OpEdNews provided even more extensive listings of Dr Califf's industry relationships. And it suggested having a look at the disclosures he has made in the past in medical journal articles. A statement in a 2013 JAMA commentary was particularly telling,


Dr Califf receives research grants that partially support his salary from Amylin, Johnson & Johnson, Scios, Merck/Schering-Plough, Schering-Plough Research Institute, Novartis Pharma, Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation, Aterovax, Bayer, Roche, and Lilly; all grants are paid to Duke University. Dr Califf also consults for TheHeart.org, Johnson & Johnson, Scios, Kowa Research Institute, Nile, Parkview, Orexigen Therapeutics, Pozen, WebMD, Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation, AstraZeneca, Bayer/Ortho-McNeil, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Boehringer Ingelheim, Daiichi Sankyo, Gilead, GlaxoSmithKline, Li Ka Shing Knowledge Institute, Medtronic, Merck, Novartis, sanofi-aventis, XOMA, University of Florida, Pfizer, Roche, Servier International, DSI-Lilly, Janssen R&D, CV Sight, Regeneron, and Gambro; all income from these consultancies is donated to nonprofit organizations, with most going to the clinical research fellowship fund of the Duke Clinical Research Institute. Dr Califf holds equity in Nitrox LLC, N30 Pharma, and Portola.

These lists of corporations from which Dr Califf got salary support and consulting fees are much longer than previous lists.  He acknowledged 13 commercial research sponsors, and consulted for 32 organizations, most of which were pharmaceutical companies.  Again, given that the salary support and overhead likely supplied by corporate research grants do suggest conflicts of interest, Dr Califf may have had many more of these sorts of conflicts than current reports implied  

A Seat on a Pharmaceutical Company Board of Directors

Note that the MDDIOnline article mentioned that Dr Califf was a member of the board of directors of Portola Pharmaceuticals. That was a significant source of income.  According to the Portola Pharmaceuticals 2015 proxy statement, Dr Califf received $259,623 in cash and stock options from the company in 2014.  I cannot find anything to suggest that this payment did not go directly to him.  This position, and the money it paid were not mentioned in the recent coverage. That payment alone seems to represent a major conflict of interest.

However, being on the board of directors of a health care corporation presents a deeper conflict than that produced by a simple payment of money or stock options, no matter how large. In 2006, we discussed corporate directorships as a new and important species of conflict of interest for medical academics.  As we have previously posted, corporate directors have fiduciary responsibilities to the company and its shareholders to support its financial success.  They are supposed to "demonstrate unyielding loyalty to the company's shareholders" [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.]   Thus corporate directors have a much more significant commitment to the corporation than do corporate consultants, or researchers supported by corporate grants. 

Where Did Those Donated Consulting Payments Go?

Also note that the disclosure statement in the JAMA article mentioned that most of the consulting payments Dr Califf received went to the clinical research fellowship of the Duke Clinical Research Institute (DCRI).  Dr Califf was the first director of DCRI, 

So, while Dr Califf apparently did donate the consulting fees to a non-profit organization, that organization actually was part of Duke, and an organization that Dr Califf once led. It appears likely that Dr Califf benefited at least indirectly in terms of institutional gratitude and reputation from these consulting fees that he donated to his own institution.  So it appears that Dr Califf's donations of his consulting fees did not reduce the conflicts of interest generated by these fees to the extent suggested by the current FDA spokesperson and current media reports. 

Payments for "Educational Activities" 

Finally, perusal of disclosures of Dr Califf's commercial relationships made by the Duke Clinical Research Institute for the years 2010-2015 showed that he received payments for "educational activities" in 2011 from Amylin.  Information about earlier years is not available on this site, but in 2009, Dr Daniel Carlat wrote this about Dr Califf's then rumored candidacy for leadership of the FDA in the Carlat Psychiatry Blog,

look at these industry disclosures. He took money—lots of money--from 18 different pharmaceutical or device firms. Most of this was not for research, but for consulting and speaking, including CME. If Dr. Califf believes that it is ethical for physicians to help drug companies market their products, that’s his own business. But to elevate him to a position in which he is the country’s chief watchdog over unsafe medications and foods seems a dangerous move. With money from 18 drug companies padding his bank account, he will presumably spend most of his FDA career recusing himself from crucial decisions. Not a good idea.


There has been no mention of Dr Califf being a paid speaker for pharmaceutical companies in any of the recent reporting.  Dr Carlat implied that Dr Califf was paid to speak to further marketing objectives of pharmaceutical companies, that is, was giving "drug talks."  Since the publication of "Dr Drug Rep" in the New York Times in 2007, authored by Dr Carlat, the public has learned that such talks mainly include content provided by the pharmaceutical companies, and are meant by the companies as marketing exercises.  From that case we also learned that physicians who deviate from the marketing message do not last long on speakers' bureaus.  (See posts here and here.)

Paid speakers may be regarded by pharmaceutical companies as paid "key opinion leaders," KOLs, who serve a marketing function in the guise of academics. As noted here and here, the companies buying their services may believe they have bought the services of sales people.    Evidence about key opinion leaders actually performing like marketers has come from documents revealed during litigation (e.g., see this recent example of a huge monetary settlement made of charges that GlaxoSmithKline, a major multinational drug company committed fraud among other things, and in the course of its unethical activities used key opinion leaders as marketers).   Also, see the Neurontin marketing plan (see post here), and the Lexapro marketing plan (see post here) for examples of how company keaders view key opinion leaders as marketers.

So the revelation that Dr Califf received corporate payments for "education" suggests a bigger commitment to corporate marketing objectives than has previously been revealed.  

Summary

So, looking at not only current media reports, but media reports from earlier this year, and also proxy statements, the fine print of journal articles, and old blog posts, it appears that Dr Robert Califf really did have very substantial financial interactions with the drug, device and biotechnology industry.  These interactions likely underwrote his salary and his standing with the leaders of his former employer, Duke University.  Dr Califf seemed to be a paid speaker for drug companies on at least two occasions, suggesting that the companies may have put him in a covert marketing role, or viewed him as a paid key opinion leader.  Finally,  Dr Califf served on the board of directors of one drug company, a much deeper commitment than being a sponsored researcher or consultant.

Thus Dr Califf really appears to be one of the most, if not the most drug, device and biotechnology industry connected individual ever nominated to lead the agency that is the most important regulator of the US drug, device and biotechnology industry.  Some of his connections, particularly his previous membership on a pharmaceutical company board, and his previous roles as a paid pharmaceutical speaker, suggested not only financial relationships, but commitments to companies' financial and marketing goals.  These appear to be major conflicts of interest vis a vis Dr Califf's current leadership position at the FDA, and his nomination to be the ultimate leader of this regulatory agency.  This is the revolving door writ large.

As we have said very recently,  the revolving door can be veiwed as a species of conflict of interest.  Government officials who can look forward to extremely lucrative employment in health care industry may be much more inclined to seem friendly to the industry while in office.  Government officials who just came from industry are likely to maintain their industry mindset and be mindful of their industry friends.

Worse, some experts have suggested that the revolving door is in fact corruption.  As we noted here, the experts from the distinguished European anti-corruption group U4 wrote,


The literature makes clear that the revolving door process is a source of valuable political connections for private firms. But it generates corruption risks and has strong distortionary effects on the economy, especially when this power is concentrated within a few firms.
Furthermore, the ongoing and increasing revolving door phenomenon clearly suggests excess coziness between industry and government, now to the extent that industry and government leaders of health care are becoming interchangeable.  This suggests that health care is increasingly run by this cozy ingroup, who very likely put their own interests ahead of those of patients and the public.

The continuing egregiousness of the revolving door in health care shows how health care leadership can play mutually beneficial games, regardless of the their effects on patients' and the public's health.  Once again, true health care reform would cut the ties between government and corporate leaders and their cronies that have lead to government of, for and by corporate executives rather than the people at large.

ADDENDUM (28 September, 2015) - This post has been republished on the Naked Capitalism blog,  and OpEdNews.

ADDENDUM (28 September, 2015) - See also more detail on Dr Califf's activities on the Portola board on the PEU Report blog
5:28 PM
Who is watching the watchers?  A story this week involving "speed" like drugs added to "dietary supplements" suggests how far the once respected US Food and Drug Administration has fallen.

An Amphetamine-Like Drug Spiking "Nutritional Supplements"

The story began with a paper by Cohen and colleagues published a relatively obscure medical journal, and then picked up by the news media.(1)  The main points of the article were:

BMPEA (beta-methylphenylethylamine) is a compound first synthesized in the 1930s as a "potential replacement" for amphetamines.  Animal tests revealed amphetamine-like properties.  The compound was never tested on humans, and never marketed.

But,

BMPEA remained known only as a research chemical until early 2013 when the FDA identified BMPEA in multiple supplements labelled as containing ‘Acacia rigidula’, even though the stimulant has never been identified or extracted from Acacia rigidula, a shrub native to Texas.

However,

More than two years after the FDA's discovery, the FDA has yet to warn consumers about the presence of the amphetamine isomer in supplements.

So Cohen et al undertook to identify "nutritional supplements" said to contain acacia rigidula and test them for BMPEA.  They found 21 such supplements, all of which tested positive. The authors then recommended,

that supplement manufacturers immediately recall all supplements containing BMPEA, and that the FDA use all its enforcement powers to eliminate BMPEA as an ingredient in dietary supplements. Consumers should be advised to avoid all supplements labelled as containing Acacia rigidula. Physicians should remain alert to the possibility that patients may be inadvertently exposed to synthetic stimulants when consuming weight loss and sports supplements.
Note that while the power of the FDA to regulate "nutritional supplements" is limited by a 1994 law, Cohen and colleagues wrote that it

is tasked with identifying and removing mislabelled, adulterated, and dangerous dietary supplements from the marketplace.

Since BMPEA is apparently not found in nature, and was not sold prior to 1994, putting BMPEA in a "dietary supplement" appears to be adulteration. 


The Risks of BMPEA in Nutritional Supplements

The study was then picked up by the media.  In the Los Angeles Times, Pieter Cohen, the lead author of the journal article,

said that while the effects of BMPEA are unknown, the compound is potentially dangerous. He said the FDA's failure to act is 'completely inexcusable.'

Furthermore, in a CBS report,


BMPEA has not been tested in humans, but led to increased blood pressure in cats and dogs.

'These are things that are signals that in humans will later turn into heart attacks, strokes and maybe even sudden death,' Cohen said.


The point is that while it has never been tested fully on humans, there is every reason to suspect that BMPEA acts very similarly to amphetamine, colloquially called "speed."  Amphetamines, as we discussed here, have dangerous side effects, including severe blood pressure elevations, and increased risks of stroke, myocardial infarction (heart attack), and other cardiac events.  The drugs also have a high potential for abuse. 


Why Did the FDA Do Nothing? 

Despite the likely riskiness of BMPEA, the FDA did nothing when it found it in numerous dietary supplements in 2013, and has not indicated that it will do anything now.  According to the LA Times,


FDA spokeswoman Juli Putnam acknowledged that the agency published research on the occurrence of BMPEA in Acacia rigidula supplements in 2013.

'While our review of the available information on products containing BMPEA does not identify a specific safety concern at this time, the FDA will consider taking regulatory action, as appropriate, to protect consumers,' she said.

In a Consumers Report item, Dr Cohen responded to that,

'It’s mind boggling,' said Pieter Cohen, M.D., the Harvard physician who is the lead author of the new study, published online in the journal Drug Testing and Analysis. 'The companies think they have complete impunity. They assume the FDA will do nothing about it. And they’re right.'

A post in the NY Times Well blog reiterated, 

Under federal law, dietary supplements — with some exceptions — can contain only ingredients that are part of the food supply or that were already on the market before 1994. Dr. Cohen said that BMPEA has never been sold as a food or supplement, and as a result any product that contains it is considered adulterated, which would give the F.D.A. the authority to send warning letters to companies that add it to their supplements.

Yet while the FDA had authority to do something, it did nothing.

Was the Revolving Door the Reason?

Back in 2014, we posted about two transitions through the revolving door by the FDA official in charge of the regulation of nutritional supplements.  We reproduce the relevant section of the post below:

This round trip through the door was noted rather obliquely in a New York Times article in late April, 2014, focused on how slowly the FDA has reacted to apparently dangerous "dietary supplements,"

Before joining the F.D.A. in 2011, Dr. [Daniel] Fabricant was a top executive at an industry trade group, the Natural Products Association.

The article had previously identified Dr Fabricant as

the director of the division of dietary supplement programs in the agency’s Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition.

But,

The F.D.A. recently announced that Dr. Fabricant is leaving the agency this month to return to the trade group as its chief executive.

While the NY Times article thus mentioned as an aside that a government official with major responsibility for regulating dietary supplements had these relationships with the dietary supplement industry, it did not then question whether that relationship had anything to do with slow responses by the FDA to reports of toxic dietary supplements. 

In 2014, the Times drew no conclusions about Mr Fabricant's career trajectory.  However, this time

But public health experts contend that the F.D.A.’s reluctance to act in this case is symptomatic of a broader problem. The agency is not effectively policing the $33 billion-a-year supplements industry in part because top agency regulators themselves come from the industry and have conflicts of interest, they say. In recent years, two of the agency’s top officials overseeing supplements — including one currently on the job — were former leaders of the largest supplement industry trade and lobbying group.

Daniel Fabricant, who ran the agency’s division of dietary supplement programs from 2011 to 2014, had been a senior executive at that trade group, the Natural Products Association, which has spent millions of dollars lobbying to block new laws that would hold supplement makers to stricter standards. He left the F.D.A. last year and returned to the association as its chief executive. His current replacement at the F.D.A.’s supplement division also comes from the trade group.

'To have former officials in the supplement industry become the chief regulators of that industry at the F.D.A. is like the fox guarding the hen house,' said Michael F. Jacobson, the executive director of the Center for Science in the Public Interest, a consumer advocacy group.

Also, the new Well blog post noted 

Shortly before Dr. Fabricant left the F.D.A. in 2014 to return to the association, the F.D.A. hired another official from the group, Cara Welch. She is now the acting director of the agency’s supplement division. Dr. Cohen, who is also an internist at the Cambridge Health Alliance, said he repeatedly wrote to Dr. Welch asking what the agency was going to do about BMPEA, and that she did not respond.

Dr. Welch declined repeated requests for interviews. In a statement, Juli Putnam, an F.D.A. spokeswoman, said that the agency 'has found that hiring experienced leaders with diverse backgrounds in public health, industry, academia, and science enriches the professional environment and leads to the best health policy outcomes for the American public.'

Before joining the F.D.A., Dr. Welch was the vice president of scientific and regulatory affairs at the Natural Products Association, where she was a staunch defender of the supplement industry. When JAMA, a leading medical journal, raised concerns in a 2011 editorial that the federal law allowed the supplements industry to police itself, Dr. Welch responded that the industry had 'an excellent safety record.'

'The industry itself supports and has implemented strong self-regulatory mechanisms,' she said in an industry news release at the time.

Summary

To summarize, from 2011 to now, the leadership of the part of the FDA that is supposed to regulate dietary supplements was dominated by former top executives of the Natural Products Association, the trade organization for dietary supplement manufacturers.  In 2013, FDA scientists found that multiple dietary supplements contained BMPEA, a compound closely related to amphetamines, and hence potentially dangerous and addictive, although it had never been tested on or previously used by humans.  Although the FDA had authority to do something about this apparent adulteration of these products, it so far had done nothing.  Thus it appears that the currently legal revolving door that allows government regulation to be run by people who come directly from the industries that government is supposed to regulate could be responsible for exposing people to dangerous, addictive drugs.

Remember, BMPEA is a first cousin of amphetamine, amphetamine is "speed," and as the drug epidemics of the 1960s and 1970s showed us, "speed kills."  So a plausible argument is that the revolving door, as relevant to FDA, has enabled manufacturers of nutritional supplements to become the "pusher man," a la the Steppenwolf sound track of Easy Rider,


As we noted here, some experts consider the revolving door per se to be corruption, not merely conflict of interest.  The current case plausibly suggests not only that the revolving door is corrupt, but that when applied to health care can pose dangers to patients, not merely danger to government finances, government ethics, and the integrity of representative democracy.  Nonetheless, up to now, a few people have decried the revolving door (and very occasionally in health care), but nothing has been done about it.   

So it is surprising that today (13 April, 2015), the New York Times published an editorial inspired by the BMPEA case, which concluded

consumer advocates are surely right that putting the industry in charge of supplement regulation is like appointing the fox to guard the henhouse. Clearly, the F.D.A. should not allow industry insiders to fill key positions. A permanent solution is for Congress to enact conflict-of-interest laws forcing employees above a certain grade level at any agency to recuse themselves from official actions that affect a former employer or client, including trade associations and their members.

As a minimum, that would be a good start.  Unfortunately, even a NY Times editorial hardly guarantees action.  At least, however, the problem of the revolving door as a danger to patients has gotten a little less anechoic.

As we last wrote, the continuing egregiousness of the revolving door in health care shows how health care leadership can play mutually beneficial games, regardless of the their effects on patients' and the public's health.  Once again, true health care reform would cut the ties between government and corporate leaders that have lead to government of, for and by corporate executives rather than the people at large.

ADDENDUM (20 April, 2015) - This post was republished on Naked Capitalism


Reference

1.  Cohen PA, Bloszies C, Yee C, Gerona R. An amphetamins isomer whose efficacy and safety in humans has never been studied, beta-methylphenylethylamine (BMPEA), is found in multiple dietary supplements.  Drug Testing Analysis 2015; DOI: 10.1002/dta.1793  Link here.
8:58 AM
Every day seems to bring the latest breathlessly touted innovation in modern health care.  The endless hawking of new health care wonders is beginning to inspire some skepticism, but maybe not enough.

The Promotion of Vyvanse for Binge Eating Disorder


For example, at the end of January, 2015, reports of the first ever drug therapy for binge eating disorder appeared.  For example, see Jonathan Rockoff writing in the Wall Street Journal

Shire PLC’s drug Vyvanse became the first drug approved for sale in the U.S. to treat some of the estimated 2.8 million adults who have a binge-eating disorder.

Rather ominously, the article described this disorder thus,

Patients regularly eat more food than they need, often when they aren’t hungry and until they feel uncomfortably full, the FDA said. The condition can lead to weight gain, obesity and related health problems.

Furthermore, it appears to be common,

An estimated 2.8 million adults in the U.S. are binge eaters, two times more than those who have the eating disorders anorexia and bulimia combined, according to Shire.

However, now there is a pharmaceutical solution!

In two pivotal studies, binge eating episodes declined to an average of one day a week among patients taking Vyvanse capsules for 12 weeks, down from an average of five days a week, Phil Vickers, Shire’s head of research and development, said in an interview.

'The approval of Vyvanse provides physicians and patients with an effective option to help curb episodes of binge eating,' Mitchell Mathis, director of the FDA’s division of psychiatry drug products, said in a statement.

Because the disease is common, that may mean a lot of money for Shire

For Shire, the approval could eventually add 'several hundred million' dollars in sales, and help the company reach its goal of $10 billion in yearly sales by 2020, said Flemming Ornskov, the company’s chief executive. Vyvanse is the company’s top-selling drug, notching $1.1 billion of the company’s $4.3 billion in total sales during the first nine months of last year.

The only hitch is that all those long suffering victims of binge eating disorder have to be found, and presented with this wonderful new alternative:

One challenge: increasing the numbers of patients diagnosed as binge eaters. Shire estimates that just 3% of Americans with the disease have been diagnosed under the mental-disorder criteria, Dr. Ornskov said.


Brief coverage of the initial approval of Vyvanse appeared in the NY Times. Bloomberg also weighed in, adding to the urgency by underlining how seriously the FDA had handled this:

'Binge eating can cause serious health problems and difficulties with work, home and social life,' Mitchell Mathis, director of the Division of Psychiatry Products in the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, said in a statement.

The FDA gave Vyvanse priority review, a designation for drugs with promise to 'provide a significant improvement over available therapies,' the agency said.

Among the major media covering the rollout, only Reuters noted a potential fly in the ointment in this  article,

Vyvanse is an amphetamine which, like other amphetamines, carries the potential for abuse and addiction. They also have been associated with increase blood press sure and heart rate, sudden death, stroke, heart attack, insomnia and psychiatric side effects such as hallucinations and mania.

What Really is the Clinical Evidence Supporting Vyvanse for Binge Eating Disorder?


So Vyvanse is actually lisdexamfetamine, and having been a child when the slogan "speed kills" referred to methamphetamine, not driving automobiles fast,  I thought it might be worth looking into the evidence that this somewhat new amphetamine, a relative of that infamous "speed," was now deemed a wondrous treatment for eating too much.

In particular, a recent article in JAMA Psychiatry reported results of one of the two trials Shire did of Vyvanse for binge eating disorder.(1)  The study by McElroy et al randomized patients with binge eating disorder to one of four groups, to receive the drug at dosages of 30, 50, or 70 mg/ day or placebo.  The investigators followed patients for 11 weeks.  The main outcome variable was the number of binge eating days per week reported by the patients.

Patients in all groups were binge eating during approximately 4.5 days/ week at the beginning of the study.  At 11 weeks, the average number of binge eating days/ week declined in all groups, dropping 3.3 days/ week for the placebo group, 3.5 for the 30 mg group, 4.1 for the 50 mg group, and 4.1 for the 70 mg group.  Thus, by this measure, the difference between patients given placebo versus patients given maximum dosage of the drug was an average decrease of 0.8 binge eating days a week.  That does not seem like a very big effect size, or in other words, it seems that the drug had only a small effect on binge eating compared to placebo.

That impression was reinforced by looking at some other study outcomes.  The average numbers of binge eating episodes per week at 11 weeks were 1.1 for placebo, 1.2 for the 30 mg group, 0.5 for the 50 mg group, and 0.5 for the 70 mg group.  Again, patients given the maximum dose of the drug had only a slightly smaller number of binge eating episodes than those given placebo, reinforcing the impression that the drug is not very effective.

A graph of binge eating days/ week measured over time makes things clearer.  It showed that all groups, including patients given placebo, markedly reduced their reported binge eating over the 11 week period.  Since the study did not allow any patients to get any other treatment for binge eating other than placebo or the study drug, this again suggests that the drug was not much better than placebo.  Further, the apparent reduction in binge eating by patients given placebo suggests a number of possibilities:
-  Just paying more attention to patients by putting them in a trial could lead to marked decreases in binge eating, or
-  People in binge eating trials could tend to report they are improving, whatever treatment they get, or
-  Binge eating may not be a stable phenomenon, and its intensity could vary over time, or
-  It may be difficult to make a reliable diagnosis of binge eating disorder.

In summary, at best, the trial showed that Vyvanse only caused small reductions in binge eating, and that binge eating may decrease spontaneously, or at least when patients are given more attention or scrutiny.  Thus, even putting the best face on the evidence from a trial done by the maker of Vyvanse does not greatly support the benefits of this drug.

In addition, according to evidence-based medicine advocates, the benefits of a treatment must be balanced with its potential harms.  In this study, about 5% of patients given any dosage of Vyvanse had to discontinue its use because of adverse effects.  3/196 patients initially randomized to Vyvanse had serious adverse effects, and one patient died, apparently of an amphetamine overdose.  Oddly, the article declared that the one death, due to methamphetamine overdose, was thought by a study investigator not to be related to treatment with another amphetamine, lisdexamfetamine.  That makes little sense, given that in a randomized controlled trial, the presumption is that differences in groups given different treatments were caused by these treatments.

In addition, patients given Vyvanse (lisdexamfetamine) had higher rates of various symptoms that are commonly associated with amphetamines, including insomnia, nausea, constipation or diarrhea, anxiety, feeling jittery, palpitations, and sleep disorder.

This suggests that the relatively small apparent benefits of the drug must be weighed against rates of adverse events that are not negligible, especially given the short amounts of time patients were followed. So this study did not show that the benefits of Vyvanse clearly outweigh its harms.

Finally, there were many problems with this trial that further cloud its validity, or applicability to patients (generalizability):
-  Patients were diagnosed using DSM-4 criteria, rather than the new DSM-5 criteria
-  Patients with any other psychiatric illness were excluded, limiting the applicability of its results.
-  Patients with an ostensibly chronic disease were only followed for 11 weeks, so the effects of this drug given for the treatment duration that might be needed to treat a chronic problem are unknown
-  The loss to follow-up rate, about 5% for treated patients decreases precision of the results given the relatively small effect size
-  The study was done at a large number of sites, initially 32, given the size of the patient population (starting at 260), and one site was dropped because of an "investigation," raising questions about the quality of the study implementation and data collection

So, in my humble opinion, even this Shire sponsored study, which was responsible for half the evidence used to support the approval of Vyvanse for binge eating disorder, provided only weak and questionable evidence that the benefits of the drug outweigh its harms in the short term, and no evidence about long-term use of the drug.  

However, no media coverage so far has addressed the weakness of the clinical evidence supporting the use of Vyvanse.  I have yet to see any other attempts at a rigorous, skeptical review of the clinical trial evidence supporting Vyvanse in this application.  Instead, the media reporting so far seems to have accepted the word of the manufacturer's executives, who obviously have an interest in promoting the drug.  (See the WSJ article above which just repeats assertions by a Shire executive.

Why So Much Enthusiasm about a Type of Drug with Such a Bleak Past?

This lack of skepticism was particularly baffling given the nature of the drug that was being promoted, and its long and unfortunate history.  As I noted, the amphetamines have proved to be dangerous drugs when abused, and they are abused frequently.

The beginnings of widespread amphetamine abuse grew out of previous efforts to promote these drugs for obesity (which can be, of course, a consequence of eating too much).  As documented by Cohen and colleagues(2),

The discovery of amphetamine energized the weight loss industry. Introduced as the Benzedrine inhaler in 1932 by venerable Philadelphia firm Smith, Kline, and French, the American Medical Association (AMA) soon recognized Benzedrine as a  treatment of narcolepsy, postencephaletic Parkinsonism, and certain depressive psychopathic conditions. Several clinical studies first published in the late 1930s demonstrated amphetamine’s anorectic effect. The Clark & Clark Company of Camden, NJ, established in 1941, was one of the earliest manufacturers of diet pills combining amphetamine sulfate and thyroid along with phenobarbital, aloin, and atropine sulfate to counteract untoward effects.

These rainbow pills were used with great enthusiasm, however,

adverse events, including deaths, began to be reported to the FDA as early as the 1940s. In the early 1950s, additional adverse reactions including deaths prompted a detailed investigation by the agency.

By the 1960s, the problem was acute,

Efforts had been in place at least since the 1965 Drug Abuse Control Amendments to increase accountability of the use of amphetamine in medical practice. Diversion of the drug for recreational use and the concomitant public health concerns had been recognized as a serious problem by the 1950s, but prescribing amphetamine— whether alone, as part of the rainbow regime, or for indications other than weight loss—continued to rise in the 1960s.  Under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, which established different schedules for certain drugs based on their medical value vis-á-vis their abuse potential, amphetamine was relegated to Schedule II. This status mandated even greater hurdles for the prescribing and dispensing of the drug as well as production ceilings. In the 1970s, FDA also reconsidered obesity as a safe and effective use of amphetamine and its congeners, ruling that amphetamines were effective but only safe for short-term use, which essentially 'marginalized the anorectics and contributed to the eventual decline in their use.'

That is, until they were resurrected as a treatment for attention deficit disorder in children, and then their use was extended to adult patients with so-called adult ADHD, and now to patients with binge eating disorder.


Given this history, the rapid approval of Vyvanse by the FDA, without the benefit of an expert panel, especially given that it was for a supposedly common disorder of adults, is very curious, and worrisome.  As Dr Daniel Carlat said (quoted on the WBUR CommonHealth blog),

 
'I’m concerned that the FDA’s approval of Vyvanse for binge eating disorder is going to worsen our problems with stimulant abuse,' Carlat says.

'Vyvanse is a derivative of Dexedrine. We’ve seen epidemics of Dexedrine abuse in the past when it was used to help people diet. I predict that the FDA has just opened the gates to another similar epidemic – after all, binge eating disorder is a subjective diagnosis that could be potentially expanded to cover many millions of people.'



Why So Much Enthusiasm about Treating Such a Doubtful Diagnosis?

As Dr Carlat noted above, it is not so obvious that binge eating disorder should be considered to be a disease.  Starting with first principles, its definition is very vague and subjective.  According to the Alliance for Eating Disorders, the DSM-5 criteria for it are:

  • Recurrent episodes of binge eating. An episode of binge eating is characterized by both of the following:
    • eating, in a discrete period of time (for example, within any 2-hour period), an amount of food that is definitely larger than most people would eat in a similar period of time under similar circumstances
    • a sense of lack of control over eating during the episode (for example, a feeling that one cannot stop eating or control what or how much one is eating)
  • The binge-eating episodes are associated with three (or more) of the following:
    • eating much more rapidly than normal
    • eating until feeling uncomfortably full 
    • eating large amounts of food when not feeling physically hungry 
    • eating alone because of feeling embarrassed by how much one is eating
    • feeling disgusted with oneself, depressed, or very guilty afterwards
  • Marked distress regarding binge eating is present.
  • The binge eating occurs, on average, at least once a week for three months.
  • The binge eating is not associated with the recurrent use of inappropriate compensatory behavior (for example, purging) and does not occur exclusively during the course Anorexia Nervosa, Bulimia Nervosa, or Avoidant/Restrictive Food Intake Disorder.
"An amount of food that is definitely larger than most people would eat in a similar period of time under similar circumstances?"  In this case, how are "larger," "most people," and "similar circumstances" defined, and by whom?  If I go out to eat with friends, and am the only one who has desert, or soup, for that matter, does that qualify?  Similarly subjective are "a sense of lack of control," and "eating more rapidly than normal."

In fact, the DSM-5 which ordained the new binge eating disorder diagnosis has been roundly criticized for embodying "diagnostic hyperinflation," turning aspects of the human condition, symptoms, and behavioral variants into disease.  Dr Allen Frances, who has been one of its prime critics, described "binge eating disorder" thus,

 Excessive eating 12 times in 3 months is no longer just a manifestation of gluttony and the easy availability of really great tasting food. DSM-5 has instead turned it into a psychiatric illness called Binge Eating Disorder.

Perhaps the enthusiasm to make binge eating disorder a disease had to do more with the financial relationships among the authors of DSM-5 and pharmaceutical companies that wanted to market drugs for the problem.  An article by Cosgrove and colleagues(3) noted that members of the DSM-5 work group that approved binge eating disorder as a disease included three people with financial relationships with Eli Lilly, maker of Cymbalta, three people with relationships with GlaxoSmithKline, maker of Lamictal, and one person with a relationship to Shire, maker of Vyvanse.  

Yet the discussion of Vyvanse in the big media outlets did not address these past questions about the validity of the binge eating diagnosis for which it is now being promoted. 

The Over-Marketing of Binge Eating Disorder to Promote Vyvanse

This week, however, at least some skepticism about other aspects of Vyvanse's promotion appeared in a major media outlet.  Just a few weeks after that initial coverage, the NY Times published a somewhat more skeptical take on the promotion of Vyvanse.  It noted that Shire was underwriting celebrity endorsements without disclosing its financial backing of them,

The retired tennis player Monica Seles spent this month making the rounds of television talk shows, appearing on everything from 'Good Morning America' to 'The Dr. Oz Show' to share her personal struggle with binge eating.

'It took a while until I felt comfortable talking about it,' she said in a People magazine interview, explaining that she secretly devoured food for years while she was a professional athlete. 'That’s one of the reasons I decided to do this campaign: to raise awareness that binge eating is a real medical condition.'

But that is not the only reason. Ms. Seles is a paid spokeswoman for Shire, which late last month won approval to market its top-selling drug, Vyvanse, to treat binge-eating disorder,...

Shire also was funding patient groups as part of its promotional efforts,

And patient advocacy groups — freshly infused with donations from Shire — began driving social media traffic to a company website that provides advice on how to raise the issue of binge eating with a doctor.

Furthermore, Shire has been trying to raise awareness of the new binge eating disorder diagnosis in ways that obfuscate its promotional interests,

Shire appeared to be following a familiar drug industry playbook by promoting awareness of a disorder, in this case binge eating, before more directly marketing its treatment. A company website, BingeEatingDisorder.com, makes no mention of Vyvanse but provides detailed information about how to talk about the disorder with a doctor, including a printable symptom checklist and sample opening lines to start the conversation. The site also tells patients 'don’t give up' if a doctor initially resists.

Some experts in prescription-drug abuse said the content was troubling because it appeared to coach patients about how to receive a diagnosis for a relatively uncommon condition, or shop for a new doctor if they were not successful.
Note Shire's use of undisclosed payments to celebrity spokespeople and patient advocacy groups and a disease awareness website whose connection to the company's drug was obscured suggests the operation of a stealth marketing campaign.  Furthermore, the article noted that Shire has been accused of deceptive marketing in the past, and specifically for its marketing of Vyvanse and another stimulant.

In 2011, the F.D.A. cited Shire, which is based in Dublin, for misleading advertising, and last fall the company paid $56.5 million to settle federal charges that it improperly promoted Vyvanse, Adderall and other drugs. Among the allegations, which Shire denied, was that the company played down Vyvanse’s addiction potential and said it would prevent car accidents, divorce, arrests and unemployment.

 We posted about that settlement here

The article also emphasized concerns about this new pushing of amphetamines,

 With the approval of Vyvanse for binge eating, 'now we have another reason for the public to learn about the glories of amphetamine — it’s very worrisome,' said Dr. Lawrence H. Diller, a behavioral pediatrician in Walnut Creek, Calif., who has written about A.D.H.D. drugs. 'My hat’s off to Shire. They’ve done it again.'

Also,


Several drug safety and addiction experts said the approval was of particular concern because of amphetamines’ troubled history as a treatment for weight loss. Vyvanse is converted by the body into an amphetamine when it is swallowed. 

From the 1940s through the 1970s, the drugs were commonly prescribed to overweight people who then became addicted. After public outcry and tighter government controls, companies stopped selling amphetamines as obesity treatments and their use is now tightly restricted. In 2012, the F.D.A. approved Qsymia, a drug combination that treats obesity and contains the amphetamine phentermine, although unlike Vyvanse, it is classified by the federal government as having a low potential for abuse.

The F.D.A. expressly forbade Shire from promoting Vyvanse as an obesity drug, but some drug safety experts said they worried its weight-loss attributes could be attractive to people who habitually overeat. The company says about 80 percent of people with the disorder are overweight or obese. Weight loss and appetite suppression are a common side effect of amphetamines.

'There’s so many reasons to be concerned about this,' said Dr. Andrew Kolodny, the chief medical officer of Phoenix House, a drug treatment organization.

He questioned why the F.D.A. approved the new use of Vyvanse so swiftly and said that given amphetamines’ troubled past, more caution was necessary.  'We had a horrible experience with amphetamines in this country, so the fact that this would just get rushed through without even bringing it before an advisory committee is especially concerning,'  he said.

However, the NY Times article still did not address the lack of good evidence that the drug provided a substantial benefit even in terms of just reducing binge eating, and questions raised whether binge eating disorder is a valid diagnosis. 

Summary

Once again we see the overenthusiastic promotion of the latest wonder drug, starting with uncritical media reports that parroted drug company executives.  At least this time some skepticism appeared about how an apparent stealth marketing campaign was organized, and about how the drug's riskiness was soft-pedaled. 

However, so far there has been little skepticism about the efficacy of the drug.  In fact, close reading of the report of one major trial showed that at best it has minimal efficacy, and even the evidence for that is weak and sketchy.  Furthermore, major news media have been hesitant to cite the real questions that have been raised about the nature of the disease for which the drug was advocated.

Most concerning is that this promotion was of an amphetamine, a type of drug with a very dark past, a type of "hard drug" responsible for major abuse problems, and known to cause particularly bad side effects, a type of drug whose illicit use has been previously sparked by over-enthusiastic marketing for dubious indications.

So once again I get to say that physicians need to be much more skeptical about the new "innovations," often promoted as miracle cures, that seem to appear weekly.  Attempts to educate physicians about clinical epidemiology, the principles of evidence based medicine, and just simply how to read a clinical research article with an appropriately skeptical and critical eye seem to have fallen by the wayside.  Furthermore, the diminishing number of health care journalists with diminishing resources may not be able to sufficiently skeptical of the marketing and public relations hype surrounding new drugs and devices.  Physicians and journalists need to have the courage to be more skeptical, and the public, who may trust journalists and physicians to cut through the bloviation, need to advocate for better training of physicians and journalists.

Finally, health care professionals and the public at large have been told to trust government regulators to only approve medicines that are safe and effective.  Yet the US Food and Drug Administration increasingly seems too cowed to challenge the pharmaceutical industry, and did not seem to exert much critical thinking before approving an amphetamine for over-eating.  The public and health care professionals ought to be advocating intensely for regulators that are less captured by the industry they are supposed to oversee.

As we have said until blue in the face, true health care reform would bring some skeptical thinking and regard for evidence and logic into the health policy discussion.

For our closing musical inspiration, or warning, note the chorus in "Amphetamine Annie" by Canned Heat...




"Speed Kills"

References

1.  McElroy SL, Hudson JI, Mitchell JE et al.  Efficacy and safety of lisdesamfetamine for treatment of adults with moderate to severe binge eating disoder: a randomized clinical trial.  JAMA Psychiatry 2015;   Link here.
2.  Cohen PA, Goday A, Swann JP. The return of rainbow diet pills.  Am J Pub Health 2012; 102: 1676-1686. Link here.

3.  Cosgrove L, Krimsky S, Wheeler EE et al.  Tripartite conflicts of interest and high stakes patent extensions in the DSM-5.  Psychother Psychosom 2014; 83: 106-113.   Link here.
11:09 AM
Last week, we noted  we again discussed the web of conflicts of interest that is draped over medicine and health care, and seems responsible for much of our current health care dysfunction.  We have discussed examples of conflicts of interest affecting clinical research, clinical teaching, clinical care, and health care policy.  Each time I think we must have cataloged all the useful examples, a striking new one appears.

Only a few days later, yet another new variant has in fact appeared.

A New Kind of Revolving Door

A new version of the "revolving door" apparently was first noted by Public Citizen, and then reported by Ed Silverman at Pharmalot. 

The usual version of the revolving door occurs when a person transitions from a full-time job in industry to a government position which has regulatory authority or other influence over that same industry, or vica versa.  We have discussed various health care manifestations of that revolving door here.

The new version, as described by Mr Silverman, in its manifestation at the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is:

the agency allows some experts who serve on its advisory panels to also make presentations at other meetings of these same panels on behalf of drug makers. By allowing some people to wear different hats within a short amount of time, the advocacy group charges the FDA creates the potential for bias to creep into the proceedings.

The Public Citizen letter to the FDA summarized the problem,

In particular, a sponsor’s use of an individual who serves, or has recently served, as a voting member of an FDA advisory committee to present its case before that member’s colleagues on the committee takes advantage of the special collegiality existing among members in order to improve a company’s chances of a favorable vote. Furthermore, such a revolving door raises concerns about the objectivity of committee members who accept such paid arrangements, with FDA’s approval, at future hearings involving the same or a rival company.

Someone Familiar Going Round and Round

The Public Citizen letter used as an example one well-known academic physician who seemed to have made many revolutions in this sort of revolving door.  As summarized in the PharmaLot post,

As an example, Public Citizen cites a meeting this past March 27 of the FDA’s Cardiovascular and Renal Drugs Advisory Committee, which was held to review an application for a Novartis drug called serelaxin to treat acute heart failure. And Milton Packer, who chairs the department of clinical sciences at UT Southwestern, appeared as a paid speaker on behalf of Novartis.

In his opening remarks, Packer disclosed that Novartis paid for his time and travel, according to the advocacy group. But because he is also considered to be a ‘special government employee,’ which is how advisory panel members are classified, he obtained permission from the FDA to participate as a paid speaker for Novartis (see page 31 here).

However, Packer served as a temporary voting member of the same FDA advisory committee less than two months earlier. Moreover, Public Citizen says this was the sixth time, since Packer first presided as chair of this committee in 1997, that he had 'spoken on behalf of and/or served as a (presumably) paid consultant' to drug makers whose meds were being reviewed at those meetings.

The other occasions in which Packer appeared before the Cardiovascular and Renal Drugs Advisory committee involved speaking on behalf of Bristol-Myers Squibb in 2002; acting as a consultant and speaker for GlaxoSmithKline in 2003; appearing as a speaker for NitroMed in 2005; appearing as a speaker for Sanofi in 2009 and acting as a consultant on behalf of Pfizer in 2010.

In fact, the Public Citizen letter also asserted that

Dr. Packer’s presence as an FDA advisory committee member at hearings extends beyond the CRDAC, as he has also participated in at least three meetings of the Arthritis Advisory Committee and served at least once on the Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs Advisory Committee since 2005.

We note with concern that, as with his revolving-door tenure at CRDAC, Dr. Packer has similarly worked with industry in the following capacities at non-CRDAC advisory committees while intermittently serving as a recurring member of some of these same committees:

- As a consultant to Centocor for its presentation on infliximab (Remicade) to the March 4, 2003, meeting of the Arthritis Advisory Committee;
- As an 'external expert' cited by GlaxoSmithKline at the July 30, 2007, joint meeting of the Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs and Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committees to discuss the cardiac ischemic risks of the thiazolidinedione diabetes drugs, with a focus on rosiglitazone (Avandia); and
- As a consultant to Boehringer Ingelheim for its presentation concerning the drug tiotropium (Spiriva HandiHaler), made before the November 19, 2009, meeting of the Pulmonary-Allergy Drugs Advisory Committee.

Summary

Dr Milton Packer served as a presumably paid spokesperson for six different pharmaceutical companies advocating for six different drugs at meetings of the FDA Cardiovascular and Renal Drugs Advisory Committee.  Over roughly the same time period he served as the chair, acting chair, or voting member of that same committee in numerous instances.  Also, Dr Packer served as a presumably paid spokesperson for one of the same drug companies, and for two additional drug companies advocating for another three drugs at meetings of three other FDA advisory committees.  On various occasions he had also served as a member of these three committees.  Parenthetically, one of the drugs for which Dr Packer, a cardiologist, advocated, Avandia, to a non-cardiologic committee was subsequently pulled from the market because of concerns about excess cardiologic complications (look here). 

Dr Packer repeatedly went back and forth between roles as a paid advocate for drug companies and as a member or chair of federal advisory committees which could influence FDA decisions about the drugs for which he advocated and which were made by the companies that employed him.


It certainly seems that Public Citizen was right in that the sorts of transitions Dr Packer made constituted multiple conflicts of interest, and that his work for multiple drug companies was likely to have distorted the recommendations of the committees on which he served.  Rapid transitions between temporary committee memberships and paid advocacy positions before such committees does seem to be a new version of the revolving door, and newly discovered type of conflict of interest.  It seems that conflicts of interest now pervade every aspect of health care, with huge cumulative effects on clinical and health policy decision making.

Note also that the person whose conflicts of interest were used as examples by Public Citizen just appeared in Health Care Renewal in another capacity.  Earlier this month we discussed a study (PARADIGM - HF) of a new drug for congestive heart failure (sacubitril) which received prominent media attention.  After various people, not limited to yours truly, pointed out that this study seemed to have multiple flaws which undercut claims that the new drug would be a "game changer," the principal investigator of the study delivered a written whupping to a critic whose writing appeared prominently on a cardiology web-site .  The scathing comeback, however, seemed based on a volley of logical fallacies, including repetitive ad hominem attacks on the critic (look here).  The PARADIGM - HF Principal Investigator was none other than the same Dr Milton Packer whose revolving door cycles were discussed above.  Note that the company that sponsored, and largely ran and designed PARADIGM - HF, and which paid Dr Packer to serve as Principal Investigator, was the same Novartis for whom Dr Packer was a spokesperson in the first example above. 

We wondered whether Dr Packer's conflicts of interest contributed to confused, illogical thinking and his apparently logically fallacious response to his critic.  Now it appears that Dr Packer has been immersed much more deeply in conflicts of interest than were apparent a few days ago.  So should he be regarded mainly as a heart failure "expert," or mainly as a paid marketer and public relations man for drug companies?  Obviously, he is both, but the mixture is not so clear.  The concern is all the more important because Dr Packer has become such a prominent medical academic.

So once again, again, again,...  we call for all conflicts to be disclosed in the interests of honesty.  Beyond that, as we have been saying for years, patients' and the public's health would benefit from an aggressive effort to reduce conflicts of interest affecting clinical and health policy decision making.    


12:24 PM