Round and Round It Goes - Former US Secretary of Health and Human Services Joins Humacyte Board

The latest example of the health care revolving door was made barely public just before the US Labor Day holiday.  Per the Triangle Business Journal,

Humacyte Inc., a biotechnology company based in Research Triangle Park, has beefed up its board of directors by adding former U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius and life sciences industry veteran Dale Sander.

The 11-year-old Humacyte develops novel human tissue-based investigational products that are being developed for potential commercialization for applications in regenerative medicine and vascular surgery. Sebelius adds a significant amount of heft to the company’s now eight-person board.

From 2009 to 2014, she served as the 21st Secretary of the HHS, leading the effort to pass and implement the Affordable Care Act. She’s also been named by Forbes as one of the 100 most powerful women in the world.

Prior to serving as secretary of HHS, Sebelius served as governor of Kansas, two terms as the Kansas insurance commissioner and four terms in the Kansas legislature.

'Secretary Sebelius is undoubtedly one of the most distinguished health care industry leaders of our time and we are honored to have her join our organization,' said Carrie Cox, chair and chief executive officer of Humacyte, in a statement. 'Her tenure in the public sector, and deep understanding of the rigors of the regulatory process and policy will provide unique perspective and insight to support our goals to improve care for Humacyte’s first application for patients with End Stage Renal Disease.'

Comments

I will just raise a tired, ironic eyebrow in response to a lawyer, politician, and government leader with no direct biomedical or health care training or experience, and no apparent health care industry experience being called a "distinguished health care industry leader."

The big issue here is, of course, the revolving door.

It now seems that any randomly selected top US government official who has responsibilities directly related to health care could turn out to be a past or future health care corporate lobbyist, consultant, board member, or executive.  The revolving door is now well established between the US government and the country's huge and growing corporate health care sector.  Recent (2015) examples include:
-  a former Director of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services who was a Columbia/ HCA executive and who became the CEO of America's Health Insurance Plans (a trade and lobbying group) (look here)
-  various officials involved trade agreements (that heavily affect health care) who came from or went to industry (look here).
-  some US Food and Drug Administration officials who were involved in the lax regulation of amphetamines in "natural" products who came from or went to the "natural" supplements industry (look here).
- Etc, etc, etc

But the latest example is a big one, since it involves the top US health care official, the Secretary of the DHHS.

As we have said endlessly, the ongoing and increasing revolving door phenomenon clearly suggests excess coziness between industry and government, now to the extent that industry and government leaders of health care are becoming interchangeable.  This suggests that health care is increasingly run by this cozy ingroup, who very likely put their own interests ahead of those of patients and the public.

This is at best crony capitalism, and makes a mockery of that famous sentence in President Lincoln's Gettysburg Address:

government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.

The revolving door is clearly a kind of conflict of interest.  Government officials who can look forward to extremely lucrative employment in health care industry (regardless of their actual experience in health care or the health care industry) may be much more inclined to seem friendly to the industry while in office.  Government officials who just came from industry are likely to maintain their industry mindset and be mindful of their industry friends.

Worse, some experts have suggested that the revolving door is in fact corruption.  As we noted here, the experts from the distinguished European anti-corruption group U4 wrote,

The literature makes clear that the revolving door process is a source of valuable political connections for private firms. But it generates corruption risks and has strong distortionary effects on the economy, especially when this power is concentrated within a few firms.

Finally, the revolving door on its currently massive scale starts to look like corporatism (or corpocracy), "the organization of society by major interest groups."  One variant of corporatism prominent in the last century was fascism (on the model of Mussolini in Italy).  Of course, many of us in the US ought to see corporatism as antithetical to how our government and society is supposed to function - supposed to function.

Thus, the revolving door in health care seems like it ought to bear scrutiny.    Yet most examples of the revolving door are very anechoic, being noted mainly in the business media, and usually barely there.  I have seen almost no notice of it in the health care, health policy, or medical literature.  (For example, so far Ms Sebelius' new job has appeared in a corporate press release and a single article in a local business newspaper, as far as I can tell.)

So once more with feeling...  The continuing egregiousness of the revolving door in health care shows how health care leadership can play mutually beneficial games, regardless of the their effects on patients' and the public's health.  Once again, true health care reform would cut the ties between government and corporate leaders that have lead to government of, for and by corporate executives rather than the people at large

9:17 AM

Turn, Turn, Turn - Another Health Care Revolving Door Update

It has been a while since our last revolving door update, so it's time to take another spin.


Summary of the Revolving Door Phenomenon

Before we get to some cases, though, let me summarize an important article on the revolving door that came out since.  This was published by U4, the "anti-corruption resource center" NGO based in lovely Bergen, Norway.  The title was "The Revolving Door Indicator: Estimating the distortionary power of the revolving door."  Although it's main point was to summarize a new measure the importance of the revolving door in a particular economic sector, it started with a very useful summary of the revolving door phenomenon.  It included a useful definition

According to Transparency International UK, the term 'revolving door' refers to 'the movement of   individuals between positions of public office and jobs in the private sector, in either direction.'

To expand,

The revolving door involves two distinct types of movement.  The first is from the public to the private sector, as regulators (ministers, cabinet secretaries, legislators, high-level officials, advisers) leave the public sector to enter the private sector they have regulated. The second is from the private to the public sector, as high-level executives of regulated companies enter the executive branch, the legislature, or key regulatory agencies.

It also included some idea of prevalence

The revolving door is particularly common in countries where explicit bribes cannot be paid safely, and thus regulators look forward to future employment with the regulated firms

We will discuss what the U4 report said about the implications of the revolving door after a quick review of the cases we have run across since May, 2014, involving the US government.  They will be listed in order of their appearance in the news.

Former National Coordinator for Health Information Technology and Colleague at ONC to Aledade (Company Supporting Accountable Care Organizations)

In June, 2014, various versions of this story appeared.  The Modern Healthcare version stated,

Dr. Farzad Mostashari, former head of the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, is starting a new firm, Aledade, to help independent primary-care physicians form accountable care organizations. The startup has $4.5 million in seed funding from venture capital firm Venrock.

Independent practices looking to form ACOs have to expend money 'to hire the people, to get the agreements, to get the licenses, to do the legal work, to hire the executive director, and a medical director, practice transformation, the analytics software, the data warehousing, the EHR interfaces,' he said. 'All of that takes money,' often $1 million to $2 million.

Note that the current concept of the "accountable care organization" [ACO] includes heavy dependence on the electronic health records (EHRs) and other health information technology that Dr Mostashari had been so vigorously promoting as head of the ONC, so this transition seems to fit the revolving door rubric.

It also turns out that one of Dr Mostashari's former ONC colleagues was already at Aledade  

Mostashari will be joined by Mat Kendall, a former leader with the regional extension center program at ONC, who will be executive vice president

Former US Senators to Lobby for Medtronic and Covidien

In August, 2014, per Bloomberg,

Former U.S. Senators Trent Lott and John Breaux are part of a lobbying effort by companies that want to preserve the option of reducing their corporate taxes by moving their legal addresses overseas.

Nine U.S. companies that have sought cross-border mergers for tax reasons, are considering doing so or are targets of such deals have been pressuring lawmakers since April on legislation to stop the practice, federal disclosure reports show.

They include Medtronic Inc., the Minneapolis-based company that is seeking to acquire Dublin-based Covidien Plc. Medtronic paid Breaux-Lott Leadership Group $200,000 in June to block legislation from moving forward. Breaux, a Democrat, was once a member of the Senate Finance Committee. Lott, a Republican, is a former Senate majority leader.

Note that as Senator, Breaux had an important role in health policy, particularly the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).

Former Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services to Drinker Biddle & Reath (Lobbying Firm)

In August, 2014, per the Washington Post,

District Policy Group, the lobbying unit of law firm Drinker Biddle & Reath, is experimenting with a new model of using outside consultants to capture new business in the health-care field.

The group, which lobbies primarily on health-care policy, has taken the unusual step of forming an advisory board that includes external consultants. The outside advisers are not employees of the firm and instead receive a consultant’s fee, which means the firm does not have to pay their salary or benefits, but can still tout their services to clients.

The board was formed in July and is made up of four Drinker Biddle attorneys and two outside consultants, Tracy Sefl, a Democratic communications strategist, and Michael O’Grady, a health economics specialist and former Health and Human Services assistant secretary under President George W. Bush. Both Sefl and O’Grady have day jobs running their own consulting shops.

This seems to require no further comment.

Former Federal Trade Commissioner to Herbalife

In October, 2014, per the Hill,

Herbalife has hired a former federal regulator to run its compliance program as it deals with allegations of running a pyramid scheme.

Pamela Jones Harbour, who served at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) from 2003 to 2010, has been named the company’s senior vice president of global member compliance and privacy, according to media reports.

The FTC opened a probe into Herbalife’s business practices earlier this year after lobbyists, interest groups and policymakers asked for a review.

Shortly after the FTC announced its investigation, the FBI began looking into how the direct-selling company recruits new distributors.

Herbalife is best known for its meal-replacement shakes and dietary supplement products. Harbour says she has been a Herbalife customer since 2004, according to Reuters, favoring the company’s Formula 1 shake mix.

Note that the FTC devotes considerable energy to health care issues, and Herbalife styles itself a "a global nutrition company" which makes "weight management" and "energy and fitness" products.

Director of US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to Merck as President of Merck Vaccines, then Executive Vice President for Strategic Communications, Global Public Policy and Population Health

In December, 2014, per a news release on BusinessWire,

Merck (NYSE:MRK), known as MSD outside the United States and Canada, today announced the appointment of Dr. Julie Gerberding, 59, as executive vice president for strategic communications, global public policy and population health, effective Dec. 15. In this newly created Executive Committee position, Gerberding, who most recently served as president of Merck Vaccines, will be responsible for Merck’s global public policy, corporate responsibility and communications functions, as well as the Merck Foundation and the Merck for Mothers program.

Note that

Prior to joining Merck, Gerberding served as director of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) from 2002-2009 and before that served as director of the Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion.

From UnitedHealth (Optum Subsidiary) Executive to Administrator of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) of the Department of Health and Human Services

In January, 2015, per the Business Journals,

Marilyn Tavenner's replacement at the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services is a former executive at one of the contractors for the initially botched HealthCare.gov insurance exchange.

Andy Slavitt, former group executive vice president of United Health Group's Optum unit, joined CMS last June to help fix HealthCare.gov. Now he'll be acting administrator of CMS.

An Optum subsidiary, Quality Software Services Inc., was one of the original contractors for HealthCare.gov. QSSI developed the exchange's data services hub and a registration tool that allows users to create secure accounts.

Apparently nothing succeeds like failure.


Discussion

I apologize for the somewhat desultory way I have been summarizing health care revolving door cases.  My excuse is that such cases are almost never publicized as such.  Most of the stories above were found when looking for something else.  Despite its potential importance, the revolving door phenomenon gets little consistent coverage in the news media, and the particular issue of the revolving door affecting health care is particularly anechoic.  (If one searches for "'health care revolving door," one finds discussion of patients who are frequently re-admitted to the hospital.)  There is one website devoted to the revolving door affecting the US government, (OpenSecrets.org has a database here.)   However, it is not searchable by sector, and seems not to be complete (that is, for example, it fails to contain most of the cases I listed above). 

None of the cases above got more than minimal media coverage, yet they all involved people who at one time held high government positions, including US Senators, director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) commissioner, the director of Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) within the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), an Assistant Secretary of DHHS, and the National Coordinator for Healthcare Information Technology. So the anechoic effect persists regarding this issue.

Yet the revolving door is a significant issue.  As discussed in the U4 article, 

The literature makes clear that the revolving door process is a source of valuable political connections for private firms. But it generates corruption risks and has strong distortionary effects on the economy, especially when this power is concentrated within a few firms.

Also, the principal way the revolving door can benefit a company is...

The rent-seeking channel: The revolving door is used to capture public resources, through legal and illegal means, rather than to increase production or efficiency.  Transparency International UK (2011) and the OECD (2009) point out that the revolving door may lead to various schemes involving conflicts of interest, both during and after a regulator’s term in public office. This in turn generates undue bureaucratic and political power for firms using such schemes

Furthermore,

The revolving door is also related to lawful behaviours (Brezis 2013), termed 'legal corruption' by Kaufmann and Vicente (2011). This phrase refers to 'efforts by companies and individuals to shape law or policies to their advantage, often done quasi-legally, via campaign finance, lobbying or exchange of favors to politicians, regulators and other government officials. […] In its more extreme form, legal corruption can lead to control of entire states, through the phenomenon dubbed ‘state capture,’ and result in enormous losses for societies'

So,

Firms connected through the revolving door may therefore derive undue advantages by legally and illegally influencing the formulation, adoption, and implementation of laws, regulations, and public policies. For example, when firms are connected to (former) members of Parliament [or the legislature], they may influence the enactment of laws and regulations in their favour. When firms are connected to (former) ministers [or in the US, cabinet secretaries] and their advisers, they may influence the upstream formulation and implementation of policies and regulations in their favour. When firms are connected to (former) high-level officials, they may influence the downstream implementation of regulations in their favour.

Finally,

Empirical studies suggest that the revolving door gives firms political and bureaucratic power that enables them to divert state resources by biasing public procurement processes (Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2013; Cingano and Pinotti 2013), obtaining preferential access to public finance (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell 2006; Boubakri et al. 2012), and unduly benefiting from tax exemption, arrears, and subsidies (Faccio 2010; Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya 2005; Johnson and Mitton 2003).

Therefore, firms politically connected through the revolving door tend to shape laws and regulations in their favour and to divert state resources to their own benefit. They are unlikely to gain a productivity advantage, and indeed may reduce productivity in the private and the public sectors. The literature on state capture and political influence (Hellman and Kaufmann 2004; Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2003; Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya 2005) supports the thesis that such distortions result from the high concentration of political and bureaucratic power among a few powerful firms.

That all suggests that the revolving door in health care ought to get attention beyond posts in Health Care Renewal, but so far there has been precious little of that.  The continuing egregiousness of the revolving door in health care shows how health care leadership can play mutually beneficial games, regardless of the their effects on patients' and the public's health.  Once again, true health care reform would cut the ties between government and corporate leaders that have lead to government of, for and by corporate executives rather than the people at large

10:46 AM

A Little Sunshine Peeking Through the Clouds? - the Sunshine Act is Finally Implemented, Sort of

"Conflicts of interest" is probably the most frequently used Health Care Renewal tag.  We believe conflicts of interest are a major causes of health care dysfunction.  Therefore, I felt that one of the truly reformative aspects of the US Accountable Care Act (ACA, "Obamacare") could be the "Sunshine Act," a provision championed by Iowa Senator Grassley (R) and his staff investigator, Paul Thacker, that would require public reporting of most financial interactions among health care corporations and health care professionals and hospitals.

The roll-out of Sunshine Act implementation occurred this week, and not unexpectedly, was very rocky.   As reported by the Wall Street Journal,

it hasn't been a smooth process. First, CMS delayed the public reporting of the data by a year to give companies more time to prepare. The Open Payments online system has experienced technical problems, including a data mix-up that resulted in some doctors being linked to payment records for other doctors with the same surname. The preview function for doctors had a cumbersome registration process, some doctors said, and was taken offline at times in recent weeks.

The first batch of data is incomplete. CMS in August said it removed about one-third of the payment records from the physician-preview database because it said some of the state medical-license numbers that companies reported for doctors didn't match a database that the agency was using for verification, among other problems. CMS now is releasing those records but without identifying the physicians tied to them. It will update the database to include the physicians' names for those records next year. Also, CMS isn't immediately releasing payments related to proprietary research-and-development; those will be reported at a later date.

 But why should we have expected anything else, given the parties involved?

Drug, Device and Biotechnology Companies

As reported by the NY Times,

all manufacturers of drugs, medical devices and medical supplies that have at least one product covered by Medicare or Medicaid must report payments or gifts they make to doctors and teaching hospitals. This can be as seemingly trivial as a bag of bagels — all payments above $10 are included — or as lofty as a research grant. It also includes meals, travel expenses and speakers’ fees. Group-purchasing organizations, which serve as middlemen between health care providers and manufacturers, also must disclose doctors’ ownership and investment interests in their companies.

Presumably such reporting actually was quite burdensome to the companies.

Furthermore,company executives might not be exactly thrilled about putting all this information out there.  As we have frequently discussed, to serve their own interests, such companies make all sorts of payments to physicians, other health care professional, and hospitals and other non-profit health care organizations.  In particular, payments to health care professionals may foster companies' marketing and public relations goals.

While some payments are made for technical and clinical consulting, many are to support "education" that may serve marketing or public relations.  In particular, many payments are for "drug talks," that is, talks sponsored by the drug companies, usually through speakers' bureaus, and given probably not as part of formal, accredited continuing medical education.  Since the publication of "Dr Drug Rep" in the New York Times in 2007, it became evident that such talks emphasize content provided by the pharmaceutical companies, and are intended to be corporate marketing exercises.  From that case we also learned that physicians who deviate from the marketing message do not last long on speakers' bureaus.  (See posts here and here.)

In addition, pharmaceutical companies often pay physicians deemed to be "key opinion leaders," whose opinions are promoted supposedly for their brilliance and erudition.  However, as noted here and here, the companies buying their services think of KOLs as sales people.    Evidence about key opinion leaders actually performing like marketers has come from documents revealed during litigation (e.g., see this recent example of a huge monetary settlement made of charges that GlaxoSmithKline, a major multinational drug company committed fraud among other things, and in the course of its unethical activities used key opinion leaders as marketers).   Also, see the Neurontin marketing plan (see post here), and the Lexapro marketing plan (see post here) for examples of how corporate managers view key opinion leaders as marketers.

Pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and device companies protest that much of the money they pay goes to support research.  But the clinical research they sponsor has been shown to be frequently subject to manipulation designed to increase the likelihood of results favorable to these companies' products.  When manipulation fails to provide sufficiently favorable results, corporations may simply  suppress it.  Academic institutions desperate for more external funding, and physicians whose continued gainful employment at such institutions requires external funding may not be too quick to protest manipulation and suppression by those paying the bills.

Vox just summarized some of the relevant evidence:

Research for decades has shown that relations with industry — from industry-sponsored education to encounters with pharmaceutical-company sales representatives, and even drug samples provided by those companies — can bias a doctor's judgment in all sorts of ways. It can color the medical education they give to future doctors, cause them to inappropriately prescribe drugs, to push for the FDA approval of medicine, or for drugs to be included on their hospital formularies. Industry-funded studies are also four times more likely to lead to favorable and positive results than independent research.

The side-effects of this 'Bad Pharma' behavior range from waste in the health system, to mistreatment of patients, and even avoidable patient death.

So is it any surprise that industry may not have been enthused or comfortable about complying with the Sunshine Act?  Instead of admitting that, of course, they have complained, as reported by the NY Times,

the website is being questioned by the industry, which says that technical problems and data inaccuracies limit its value.

But it seems that industry may have created the sorts of data problems about which they now complain.  Note that when ProPublica made this first assessment of the database,

Many drug and device companies attributed payments to multiple subsidiaries, rather than reporting them under the name of a single parent company. Johnson & Johnson, for instance, submitted payments under at least 15 subsidiaries. The device maker Medtronic reported payments by at least six subsidiaries. So did the drug maker Novartis. On first blush, that makes it tough to calculate how much each company spent overall.

Similarly, companies reported payments associated with particular drugs in different ways. The expensive drug Acthar, which is marketed for a variety of different conditions, is listed under at least eight different name variations. The diabetes drug Januvia is reported as both 'Januvia' and 'Januvia Diabetes.' There is one drug simply listed as 'KNEES' and another as 'Foot and Ankle.'

So it appears that the companies reported data in a confusing, perhaps deliberately confusing manner, obfuscating the relationships between companies and subsidiaries, and between essentially similar drugs with different names.  It is hard to believe that all, or even most of these problems were due to mishandling by the government.  So it is a little hard to take the companies' criticisms of the quality of the data seriously.

Physicians and Organized Medicine

"We have met the enemy and he is us." - Pogo

On the other hand, news articles suggested some physicians were also unhappy with the data release.  For example, per the WSJ article,

Some doctors disputed details of the payment data. The database shows John LeDonne, a surgeon from Baltimore, as having received about $78,200 in payments for food and beverage for the five-month period from medical-device maker Dr. LeDonne acknowledged he performs paid consulting work for health-care companies including Teleflex, but that he rarely received free meals. He said the total payment amount was in the right 'ballpark,' but should not have been classified in the food-and-beverage category. 

That seems to be a bit of quibble.  The amount he received, and its source, seem more important than whether it was labelled "consulting," or "food and beverage" payments.

More importantly, a few doctors were worried, as reported by the Minneapolis Star-Tribune, that the information may reflect negatively on them,

 'Overwhelmingly, the interaction between industry and physicians is positive,' said Dr. Robert Harbaugh, chairman of neurosurgery at Penn State and president of the American Association of Neurological Surgeons.

Maybe Dr Harbaugh should realize that there already are a lot of reasons to think about the negative aspects of physician - industry paid interactions, as summarized above. And Vox reported,

 Dr. Thomas Stossel, known as Harvard's 'pro-industry professor,' says 'doctors' work with industry is necessary and beneficial.' He worries that the Sunshine Act could make it embarrassing and difficult for doctors to do work like developing medical devices or designing clinical trials, and that industry may start avoiding working with American doctors because of the time and investment disclosure will require.  

Dr Stossel did not provide evidence to explain the necessity or benefits of the work for industry, nor why doctors could not design clinical trials outside of industry relationships. 
Doctors also complained about data quality, but I am not aware that the medical profession rushed to help with improving the data for the Sunshine Act.  Obviously, there are some physicians who have personally profited quite a lot from their relationships with drug, device, and biotechnology companies but who may not be comfortable having the figures booted around in public, e.g., per the WSJ,

Among individual physicians, Stephen Burkhart was one of the top recipients of non-research payments from industry. The San Antonio orthopedic surgeon received $7.4 million in non-research payments or transfers of value for the five-month period, mostly from device manufacturer Arthrex Inc. for payments identified as 'royalty or license.'

Dr. Burkhart couldn't be reached for comment. Arthrex said in a statement that it has 'financial relationships with a number of orthopedic surgeons and teaching hospitals,' like many manufacturers, for their advice and expertise.

Chitranjan Ranawat,a New York orthopedic surgeon, received about $4 million in nonresearch payments or transfers of value, mostly from DePuy Synthes unit for 'royalty or license,' according to the database. 

 Dr. Ranawat couldn't be reached for comment.

And those were payments made in a five month period.  Maybe the doctors have a reason to be uncomfortable.

Furthermore, ProPublica reported that 21% of the $3.5 billion in payments, approximately $735 million, reported by the system were for "promotional talks," a la "drug talks" as noted above.  Since "Dr Drug Rep," such talks have gotten something of a bad reputation, but are obviously lucrative, so those who got paid to give them may not be happy with their detailed disclosure.

The US Department of Health and Human Services

The Sunshine Act was but a small part of the huge ACA, most of which the US DHHS, and particularly the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) was charged with implementing, but probably with proportionately insufficient funding and time.  So no wonder that the Sunshine Act never seemed to find a vocal champion within DHHS.

Most likely money concerns, and the constant din of outside criticism of "government bureaucrats" by those demanding more "business-like" government lead CMS to outsource the work on the Sunshine Act database, as described by another ProPublica article,

While the payments database is a far cry from Healthcare.gov — and less complex – it's reasonable to expect some glitches. CGI Federal, the company that led what turned out to be the botched launch of Healthcare.gov, is also responsible for the release of the payment data.

Massachusetts also outsourced operation of its Health Connector to CGI Federal, with equally bad results.  The state had to terminate the contract (look here.)

So if lackadaisical bureaucrats outsourced the Sunshine Act to contractors of questionable competence, what result should have been expected?

Why the present administration, and the bureaucrats it supposedly commands, seemed so uninterested in this particular aspect of the ACA is not clear, but perhaps we should peer around some revolving doors for the answer.  (For example,  John Podesta, a current White House adviser, worked for non-profits funded by drug company Eli Lilly and device company Synthes [look here]; and Nancy-Ann DeParle, former White House "health czar," had previously served on the boards of of Boston Scientific, Cerner and Medco [look here], and now is involved in health care investments made by private equity, and is on the board of CVS [look here]).

Of course, the sort of conflicts of interest that were supposed to be revealed by the Sunshine Act are highly beneficial to the parties directly involved, whatever embarrassment they may cause.  Given the power of those parties, plus the lukewarm, outsourced effort by government perhaps influenced by government officials with their own "revolving door" conflicts of interest, is it any wonder that the Sunshine Act implementation was "rocky?"

Summary

Nonetheless, because of the Sunshine Act, we do now know a bit more about conflicts of interest involving drug, device, biotechnology and related companies on one hand, and physicians, other health care professionals and hospitals on the other.

Maybe throwing even veiled sunshine on some of these relationships will inspire some people to rethink whether they want to continue them.  There are other reasons they should do so.

We have called endlessly for full, detailed disclosures of all conflicts of interest, for honesty's sake if for no other reason.  We have also called for severe curtailment of all conflicts affecting clinical decision making, health care education, clinical and health care research, and health policy making.  But Health Care Renewal can easily be dismissed as a voice crying out in the wilderness.  However, we are really not alone.

The 2009 Institute of Medicine report set relatively tough standards for managing conflicts of interest affecting clinical research and teaching, which unfortunately since have largely been ignored.  It did call for senior institutional officials to disclose their conflicts of interest, and for institutional boards of trustees to form conflicts of interest committees that would exclude conflicted individuals, but otherwise did not address conflicts of interest affecting academic leaders or institutional trustees.  The 2013 Pew Charitable Trusts Conflicts-of-Interest Policies for Academic Medical Centers suggested restrictions on conflicts affecting faculty, trainees, and students, but again did not mention senior institutional leaders or boards of trustees.  Implementing even some of these recommendations would be true health care reform.

Maybe more publicity about the web of conflicts of interest that drapes of over health care will lead to some further steps in the needed direction. 

9:02 AM

Now Politico Tries RUC Raking

It has been a year since we wrote about the RUC, the American Medical Association's Relative Value System Update Committee.  There is only one thing new since then.  Politico just made another attempt to shed some light on this obscure committee and its outsize effect on health care. 

To summarize the events so far, all I need to do is cut and paste from our last post on the topic, from July, 2013...

In 2007, readers of the Annals of Internal Medicine could read part of the solution to a great medical mystery.(1)  For years, health care costs in the US had been levitating faster than inflation, without producing any noticeable positive effect on patients.  Many possible reasons were proposed, but as the problem continued to worsen, none were proven.

Prices are High Because They are Fixed That Way

The article in the Annals, however, proposed one conceptually simple answer.

The prices of most physicians' services, at least most of those that involved procedures or operations for Medicare patients, were high because the US government set them that way. Although the notion that prices were high because they were fixed to be so high was simple, how the fixing was done, and how the fixing affected the rest of the health system was complex, mind numbingly complex.

Perhaps because of the complexity of its implementation, the simplicity of the concept has not seemingly reached the consciousness of most American health care professionals or policy makers, despite the publication of several scholarly articles on the subject, efforts by humble bloggers such as yours truly, a major journalistic expose in the Wall Street Journal in 2010,  another major expose in Washington Monthly in 2013, and congressional hearings in 2013.  The lack of much public discussion of this issue despite its importance and the above attempts to start discussion seemed to be a prime example of what we have called the anechoic effect, that important causes of health care dysfunction whose discussion would discomfit those who are currently personally profiting from the current system rarely produce many public echoes.  (For a review of what is known to date about how the offputtingly named Resource Based Relative Value Scale Update Committee (RUC) works, and previous attempts to makes it central role in fixing what US physicians are paid public, see the Appendix.)


Politico's Turn


Now an article by Katie Jennings in Politico brings up some of the issues about the RUC that we have dealt with again and again. These included six of seven major points discussed in the Washington Monthly article, and that have been discussed multiple times on Health Care Renewal.  I will list the seven points, with supporting quotes for the first six from the Politico article.  (Our post in 2013 on the Washington Monthly article had supporting quotes for the last point.) 


The RUC is Well Hidden

 And yet even many doctors are not aware of the hidden hand of the AMA-run committee in perpetuating this costly crisis. The panel, with very little transparency or public discussion, continues....

Also

RUC meetings were closed, invitations had to be approved by the AMA, the charter had not been made public and there were no minutes or public documentation of what was said at the meetings. (Last year, under pressure, the RUC announced it would post meeting minutes on the AMA website.)

The RUC Fixes Prices

a secretive committee run by the American Medical Association (AMA) ..., with the assent of the government, has enormous power to determine Medicare prices by assessing the relative value of the services that physicians perform.

The Government Enables the RUC to Fix Prices

the role of the AMA’s secret committee [dates] back to 1992, when the U.S. government sought to overhaul the entire Medicare fee system and decided it didn’t have the right personnel to conduct extensive surveys of physicians. So the federal agency tasked with overseeing the program, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, enlisted the AMA and the committee it had formed to determine what’s known as the relative value of physician work, meaning the amount of time, effort and skill that goes into performing a procedure. Each procedure had a corresponding code in the AMA’s Current Procedural Terminology coding system, which the government had already adopted nearly a decade before, in 1983, as the standard for physician billing and reimbursement for Medicare.

Also,

Above all, the RUC appeared to be dictating solutions to the government. Since 1992, the RUC has submitted more than 7,000 recommendations to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The agency has accepted 87.4 percent of the recommendations, according to a study published in Health Affairs.

The Government Fixed Prices are Endorsed by the Private Sector

Because Medicare fees are the baseline for the rest of the pricing in the health care system, this has had a broad effect,...

The Price Fixing Drives Up Costs and the Use of Services

For decades the committee has ... [set prices] done so in a way that has skewed Medicare fees in favor of expensive specialists over ordinary general practitioners like Fischer, who are the nation’s first line of defense against serious illness. Because Medicare fees are the baseline for the rest of the pricing in the health care system, this has had a broad effect, contributing to a situation where primary care doctors are in general underpaid, underappreciated — and in critically short supply as medical students flock to where the money and opportunity are.

These Incentives Cripple Primary Care

And because the 31-member committee was – and still is — made up of a majority of specialists who typically sought to maximize their own share of the pie (26 of the 31 are appointed by the major national medical associations), it was no surprise who the losers turned out to be. 'The specialists know what the game is,' said Dr. Robert Berenson of the Urban Institute in DC, who was a member of the RUC in the early 1990s. 'The [RUC’s] basic method of relying on a specialty society to give a non-biased appraisal … is fundamentally a flawed concept.' Dr. Grant Rodkey, the first chair of the committee that came to be known as the RUC, described the scene of the inaugural meeting as 'reminiscent of a group of dogs on leash eyeing a platter with a not-too-generous bone,' in a 1997 interview in the Bulletin of the American College of Surgeons.

These Incentives Benefit Big Corporations, not just Medical Specialists


This was the only issue not directly addressed in the 2014 Politico article.  (But see our 2013 post.)


What to Do and What Will Happen?


The Politico article concluded on an optimistic note, suggesting that increased transparency about what Medicare pays physicians might help.

One key moment came in a court ruling this year: For 35 years until last April, all the Medicare billing practices of physicians had been kept private by a court injunction granted to the AMA. But after an appeals court ruled that such information must be made public, the 2012 billing data was released, showing that the top 1 percent of doctors, mostly specialists, accounted for an outsized portion —14 percent — of Medicare billing.

Or perhaps Congress might ride to the rescue,

Today ironically, the renegade primary care doctors see hope on Capitol Hill—and in the Obamacare law that so many on Capitol Hill have demonized. In April, seeking to avoid impending cuts to physician Medicare reimbursements, Congress passed the “Protecting Access to Medicare Act.” The new law expands on a provision already included in the Affordable Care Act that gives the secretary of Health and Human Services greater authority to identify and correct misvalued Current Procedural Terminology codes. Spurred by Congressman McDermott — who told me in an email that he still wants “major changes that make the RUC’s process more transparent” — Congress also commissioned a report from the Comptroller General to study the process by which the RUC provides recommendations to the government on Medicare fees.

And there is even one - one out of very many - health care insurance companies that might finally deviate from the Medicare fee schedule as influenced by the RUC,

Even some medical insurers, like CareFirst in the Washington, D.C. region, have begun to rebel against the old system and to push the savings that might come from paying primary care physicians more. As long as I can remember, family physicians and general internists have been financially at the low end of the totem pole,' even though they’re the ones who perform the critical if unglamorous work of preventing serious illnesses, former CareFirst Chairman Michael Merson told The Washington Post recently.

But there have been only tiny changes in the RUC since the Washington Monthly article last year, and actually since we first wrote about the RUC in 2007.

The AMA, of course, fails to see anything wrong with the RUC.  On the AMA Wire blog appeared an  anonymous but apparently official post that sought to refute most of the the points made in the Politico article.

Well Hidden

The title of the blog post included the phrase "and it's no secret," but as far as I can tell, the AMA post never directly addressed the secrecy issue, especially involving the secrecy of RUC proceedings, whose location on the AMA website is not obvious to me.  I must admit that the list of members of the RUC is no longer secret, but can be found here (with a log-in, but no subscription required, and minus any biographical information, or conflict of interest disclosures).

Price Fixing

The AMA blog post stated

the RUC does not control the Medicare payment system, nor does it set rates for medical services

That is true as far as it goes, but totally ignores how the RUC's determination of the relative values indirectly sets payment rates.

Government's Uncritical Acceptance of the RUC's Recommendations

The AMA blog post included,

The RUC's recommendations are thoroughly reviewed by government officials who have the final say.

That failed to acknowledge how rarely the government officials have altered the RUC's findings in the past.

Effects on Primary Care

The AMA blog post stated

The RUC values all physicians’ cognitive work and role tackling the growing number of Americans with long-term health problems that need continuous care. The committee’s work reflects the continued importance of services that all doctors—including primary care physicians—perform.

Again, this ignores the small representation of primary care physicians, and of physicians who perform only cognitive, as opposed to procedural services on the RUC, and the data, starting with the Annals of Internal Medicine article from 2007, that suggests the RUC's updates favor procedural services.

Presumably as long as the leadership of the AMA sees no problems with the RUC, not much is likely to change.    

Summary

So since 1992, the RUC has had an outsize role controlling what Medicare pays physicians, and hence physicians' pay in general.  Over this time, the playing field has become increasingly tilted in favor of procedural services and away from cognitive services, especially primary care.  The result is that the US has the most expensive health care system in the world, but hardly the best health care or health care results in the world. 

Economists have beaten us over the head with idea that incentives matter.  The RUC seems to embody a corporatist approach to fixing prices for medical services to create perverse incentives for physicians to do more procedures, and do less conversing with and examining patients, examining the best clinical research evidence about their problems, and rigorously thinking about how best to help them.  More procedures at higher prices helps physicians who do procedures.  It may help even more the corporations that provide the devices and drugs whose use is necessitated by such procedures, and the hospitals who can charge a lot of money as sites for performance of procedures.  It may even help insurance companies by driving ever more money through the health care system, and thus allow rationalization for higher administrative expenses as a function of overall money flow.

Yet incentives favoring procedures over all else may lead to worse outcomes for patients, and more costs to patients and society.  If we do not figure out how to make incentives given to physicians more rational and fair, expect health care costs to continue to rise, while access and quality continue to suffer.

Since we started writing about the RUC in 2007,  there have been some small changes in the RUC.  It has slightly more primary care representation, and its membership is no longer secret.  That is, however, about it.

As I wrote last time, hopefully the Politico article, added to all the other attempts to shine light on the RUC, will succeed in increasing awareness of the RUC and its essential role in making the US health care system increasingly unworkable.  Of course, such awareness may disturb the many people who are making so much money within the current system.  But if we do nothing about the RUC, and about the ever expanding bubble of health care costs, that bubble will surely burst, and the results for patients' and the public's health will be devastating.


ADDENDUM (28 August, 2014) - This post was re-posted on the Naked Capitalism blog, and on the NBCH Newsletter blog. 

APPENDIX - Background on the RUC

 We have frequently posted, first here in 2007, and more recently here,  here, here, and here, about the little-known group that controls how the US Medicare system pays physicians, the RBRVS Update Committee, or RUC.

Since 1991, Medicare has set physicians' payments using the Resource Based Relative Value System (RBRVS), ostensibly based on a rational formula to tie physicians' pay to the time and effort they expend, and the resources they consume on particular patient care activities. Although the RBRVS was meant to level the payment playing field for cognitive services, including primary care vs procedures, over time it has had the opposite effect, as explained by Bodenheimer et al in a 1997 article in the Annals of Internal Medicine.(1) A system that pays a lot for procedures, but much less for diagnosing illnesses, forecasting prognoses, deciding on treatment, and understanding patients' values and preferences when procedures and devices are not involved, is likely to be very expensive, but not necessarily very good for patients.
 
As we wrote before, to update the system, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies almost exclusively on the advice of the RBRVS Update Committee. The RUC is a private committee of the AMA, touted as an "expert panel" that takes advantage of the organization's First Amendment rights to petition the government. Membership on the RUC is allotted to represent specialty societies, so that the vast majority of the members represent specialties that do procedures and focus on expensive, high-technology tests and treatments.
 
However, the identities of RUC members were opaque for a long time, and the proceedings of the group are secret.  As Goodson(2) noted, RUC "meetings are closed to outside observers except by invitation of the chair." Furthermore, he stated, "proceedings are proprietary and therefore not publicly available for review."
 
In fact, the fog surrounding the operations of the RUC seems to have affected many who write about it. We have posted (here, here, here, and here) about how previous publications about problems with incentives provided to physicians seemed to have avoided even mentioning the RUC. Up until 2010, after the US recent attempt at health care reform, the RUC seemed to remain the great unmentionable. Even the leading US medical journal seemed reluctant to even print its name.
 
That changed in October, 2010.  A combined effort by the Wall Street Journal, the Center for Public Integrity, and Kaiser Health News yielded two major articles about the RUC, here in the WSJ (also with two more spin-off articles), and here from the Center for Public Integrity (also reprinted by Kaiser Health News.) The articles covered the main points about the RUC: its de facto control over how physicians are paid, its "secretive" nature (quoting the WSJ article), how it appears to favor procedures over cognitive physician services, etc.
 
In 2011, after the "Replace the RUC" movement generated some more interest about this secretive group, and its complicated but obscure role in the health care system, the current RUC membership was finally revealed.  It was relatively easy for me to determine that many of the members had conflicts of interest (beyond their specialty or sub-specialty identity and their role in medical societies that might have institutional conflicts of interest, and leaders with conflicts of interest).  
 
Then that year a lawsuit was filed by a number of primary care physicians that contended that the RUC was functioning illegally as a de facto US government advisory panel.  It appeared that things might change.  However, it was not to be.  A judge dismissed the lawsuit in 2012, based on his contention that the law that set up the RBRVS system prevented any challenges through the legal system to the mechanism used to set payment rates.  The ruling did not address the legality of the relationship between the RUC and the federal government.  The eery quiet then resumed, only punctuated briefly in early 2013, when a Senate committee held hearings with no obvious effect.      

References
1. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. (Link here.)
2. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310. (Link here.)

11:17 AM

Merging Finance and Health Care Leadership - Robert Rubin Proteges Running DHHS, Spouse of Hedge Fund Magnate Running the FDA

Hidden between the lines of some not very prominent news stories were reminders of how close health care and financial leadership have become in these times of continuing economic unrest after the global financial collapse/ great recession.

After the events of 2008, it became more apparent that the dysfunction in academics and health care  paralleled that seen in finance.  One reason may have been the overlapping leadership of finance and health care.  For example, in 2008 we first posted about how Robert Rubin, who was then a Fellow of the Harvard Corporation, the top group responsible for the governance of that great academic and medical institution, bore responsibility for the global financial collapse/ great recession.  Mr Rubin as Treasury Secretary was a proponent of financial deregulation in the Clinton administration.  Later, he became a top leader of Citigroup, whose near collapse helped usher in the crisis of 2008 (look at our 2008 post here and our 2010 post here.  Rubin just stepped down from his Harvard position this year,)  Since 2008 we found many other links among the leadership of Wall Street and of academic medicine and of big health care corporations.  These links, if anything, seem to be getting stronger. 

From the Department of Health and Human Services to Citigroup and then back to the Department of HHS

A tiny, four sentence Reuters story noted an apparently routine appointment to upper management at the US Department of Health and Human Services.  The first three sentences were:

U.S. Health Secretary Sylvia Burwell named Citigroup Inc executive Kevin Thurm as senior counselor of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which is implementing the controversial U.S. Affordable Care Act.

Thurm has served in a number of roles at Citi since joining the bank in 2001, including senior adviser for compliance and regulatory affairs and deputy general counsel.

Before joining Citi, Thurm, a former Rhodes scholar, was the deputy secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

Why is that significant?  First, the near bankruptcy of the huge, badly led Citigroup was widely acknowledged to be a cause of the global financial collapse.  A 2011 New Yorker article on the role of the revolving door between Washington and Wall Street ("Revolver," by Gabriel Sherman) summarized the plight of Citigroup and the role of Robert Rubin in it,

Citigroup was the most high-profile of Wall Street’s basket cases, the definitionally too-big-to-fail institution. With massive exposure to the housing crash and abysmal risk management, the firm cratered, surviving as a virtual ward of the state after the government injected billions and took a 36 percent ownership position. Along with AIG and Fannie and Freddie, Citi came to be seen as a pariah institution, felled by management dysfunction and heedless greed in pursuit of profits. Complicating matters for Citi, the wounded bank found itself tangled in the populist vortex that swirled in the crash’s wake. On the left, there were calls that Citi should be outright nationalized, stripped down, and sold off for parts. Pandit was called before irate congressional-committee members to answer for Citi’s sins, an ignominious inquisition captured on live television. In January 2009, under pressure, Citi canceled an order for a new $50 million corporate jet.

There was plenty of blame to go around at Citi. Chuck Prince, a lawyer by training who succeeded Citi’s outsize former CEO Sandy Weill, had little grasp of the complex mortgage securities Citi’s traders were gambling on. As late as the summer of 2007, when the housing market was in free fall, Prince infamously told the Financial Times that 'as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.'

Bob Rubin himself pushed the bank to take on more risk in order to increase its profitability, a move that Citi’s dismal risk management was ill-equipped to handle. Pandit, whom Rubin had helped to recruit in 2007 just as the economy began to unravel, was tasked with cleaning up the mess when he became CEO in December of that year, and his early tenure had a deer-in-headlights character. Eventually, he realized that the asset class Citi lacked most was human capital, of the blue-chip variety.  

The article also summarized Rubin's role in the fervor of deregulation in service of market triumphalism that lead to the financial collapse,

In tapping Rubin to run Treasury, Clinton was sanctioning a revolution in the Democratic Party, one that fundamentally redefined the party’s relationship with Wall Street. Rubin, along with Alan Greenspan and Larry Summers, believed in an enlightened capitalism, which would spread prosperity widely. This enchantment with the beneficence of markets became the dominant view in Democratic Washington, hard to argue with when the economy was booming, as it was in the second half of the nineties. Rubin recognized that derivatives posed a risk but effectively blocked efforts to regulate them and pushed for the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, the Depression-era legislation that prevented commercial banks from merging with investment and insurance firms (the new law essentially legalized the $70 billion merger in 1998 of Citicorp and Travelers Group that created Citigroup).

Circling back to recent events, Once he got to Citigroup, Rubin assembled a team, partially from his old associates in the Clinton administration,

He also recruited several former Clinton aides to Citi, including former Health and Human Services deputy secretary Kevin Thurm....

So Kevin Thurm became something of a Robert Rubin protege at Citigroup. In fact, he rose to an important leadership position at the same time Citigroup was getting ready to become a "basket case," in part apparently because of the advice of Robert Rubin.  According to a 2013 version of Mr Thurm's official Citigroup bio,

Kevin L. Thurm is Senior Advisor for Compliance and Regulatory Affairs at Citigroup.

Previously, Thurm served as the Chief Compliance Officer of Citi. In that role, Thurm led Global Compliance which protects Citi by helping the Firm comply with applicable laws, regulations, and other standards of conduct, and is responsible for identifying, evaluating, mitigating and reporting on compliance and reputational risks and driving a strong culture of compliance and control. Since joining Citi in 2001, Thurm has also served as Deputy General Counsel of Citi, where he led the Corporate Legal group, overseeing a number of Company-wide Legal functions and providing support on day to day matters, including issues involving the Board, senior executives, and regulators; Chief  Administrative Officer of Consumer Banking North America, where he helped lead the business group and was responsible for a variety of functions including Community Relations, Compliance, Legal and Public Affairs; Director for Administration in the Corporate Center; Chief of Staff to the President and Chief Operating Officer of Citigroup; and as the Director of Consumer Planning in the Global  Consumer Group.

To recap, Mr Kevin Thurm was a top compliance executive of Citigroup while the company was imploding, and being a protege of Robert Rubin, an architect of the financial deregulation that led to the global financial collapse, and a leader of Citigroup responsible for the risky behavior of that company that led to its near collapse, which was another precipitant of the global financial collapse or great recession.  It is not obvious that these are great qualifications to be Senior Counselor at DHHS.

Moreover, Mr Thurm's responsibilities at DHHS would not be limited to compliance or financial leadership.  According to the official DHHS press release announcing his appointment,

As a Senior Counselor, Thurm will work closely with the Department’s senior staff on a wide range of cross-cutting strategic initiatives, key policy challenges, and engagement with external partners.

Yet, there is nothing in Mr Thurm's public record to indicate that he has any actual experience in health care, medicine, public health, or biologic science.  So it is not obvious why he should be entrusted with leading "cross-cutting strategic initiatives, [and] key policy challenges."

On the other hand, Mr Thurm might be simpatico with the new Secretary of DHHS, Ms Sylvia Burwell.  According to a Washington Post article at the time of the hearings about her nomination,

despite her Washington experience, ... is not well known in health-policy circles, and, during her confirmation hearings, she gave little concrete sense of the direction in which she will take the complex department she will inherit.

This seems to be a polite way to see she also has no actual experience in health care, medicine, public health, or biologic science.   Her official biography lists no such experience.  However, she was also a Robert Rubin associate, and perhaps protege, during the Clinton administration,

During the Clinton administration, Burwell held several economic roles — as staff director of the White House National Economic Council, as chief of staff under then-Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin,...

To summarize so far, the new Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and now her new Senior Counselor, were both closely associated with Robert Rubin, who seems to bear major responsibility for the global financial collapse, and the new Senior Counselor worked with Rubin at Citigroup, whose near bankruptcy helped accelerate that collapse.  On the other hand, neither of these leaders has any experience in health care, public health, medicine, or biological science. 

Hedge Funds, Tax Avoidance, and the US Food and Drug Administration

This story is even less obvious.  A July, 2014, report in Bloomberg recounted plans for a Senate hearing on tax avoidance by huge, lucrative hedge funds.  The basics were,

A Renaissance Technologies LLC hedge fund’s investors probably avoided more than $6 billion in U.S. income taxes over 14 years through transactions with Barclays Plc and Deutsche Bank AG, a Senate committee said.

The hedge fund used contracts with the banks to establish the 'fiction' that it wasn’t the owner of thousands of stocks traded each day, said Senator Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat and chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. The maneuver sought to transform profits from rapid trading into long-term capital gains taxed at a lower rate, he said.

An accompanying Bloomberg/ Businessweek story described testimony at a Senate hearing by the Renaissance co-Chief Executive Officer Peter F Brown,

Renaissance was founded by the mathematician James H. Simons, whose fortune is now estimated by Bloomberg Billionaires Index at about $15.5 billion.

Brown became co-CEO with Robert L. Mercer in 2010 after Simons retired and became non-executive chairman. Before joining the firm in 1993, he was a language-recognition specialist at International Business Machines Corp.

Mr Brown testified that the company was not so much trying to avoid taxes by the complex strategy but simply to make even more money.    But, per the New York Times, Senator Levin

focused on the lucrative nature of the transactions, most of which took place using Renaissance employees’ money. Between 1999 and 2010, the fund used basket options to produce profits of more than $30 billion, Mr. Levin said. Barclays and Deutsche Bank together made more than $1 billion in revenue.

Mr Brown's firm seems, unlike Citigroup, to have a record of financial success, and no one is accusing Mr Brown or his firm of being responsible for the global financial collapse.  However, Mr Brown is certainly a very rich Wall Street insider.  Also, as we noted in 2009, his firm clearly has had major involvement in health care investments.   And the current hearings emphasize concerns that his firm has been executing questionable tax avoidance strategies.

Mr Brown has one other very major tie to health care.  As  noted in 2009 on Health Care Renewal, but apparently only parenthetically by one recent news article, (again from Bloomberg, written before the Senate hearing),

Brown lives in Washington with his wife, Margaret Hamburg, the commissioner of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. She was appointed by President Barack Obama in 2009.

In 2009, we noted that as a condition of Dr Hamburg's leadership of the US FDA, her husband, Mr Brown, would have to divest his shares of four Renaissance funds.  However, it is obvious that he remained at and became the co-CEO of Renaissance since. 

While the current leader of the FDA clearly has medical and health care experience, she is also steeped in the culture of finance and Wall Street.

Summary

Thus we have two recent stories of how top health care leadership positions in the US government are held by people with strong ties to the world of finance, but not always with any direct health care or public health experience.  Why was the wife of a hedge fund magnate the best person to run the FDA?  Why was a person not known in "health policy [or health care] circles" the best person to run the Department of Health and Human Services?  Why was a Robert Rubin protege from Citigroup the best person to be a Senior Counselor at DHHS?  Presumably there were many plausible candidates for these government positions.  Why was it not possible to find people to fill them who were not tied to Wall Street?  Why was it not possible to find people with profound understanding of and sympathy for the values of health care and public health to fill all of them?   

The leadership of health care and finance continue to merge.  This seems to be one broad explanation for why both fields continue to be notably dysfunctional.  While Wall Street has spread around plenty of money to influence public opinion and political leaders, many still remember how its foolish and greedy leadership nearly caused another great depression.  It is likely that the influence of Wall Street culture on the leadership of health care organizations, be they governmental, academic, other non-profit, or commercial, has fostered the continuing financialization of health care, with its focus on "shareholder value," that is, putting short-term revenue ahead of patients' and the public's health.

I strongly believe health care would be better served by leadership that puts patients' and the public's health first.  Occasionally people with such values may come from a finance or economics background.  However, in an era where many people continue to believe "greed is good," we at least ought to confirm that health care leaders really are about health care first, and money a distant second.

ADDENDUM (20 August, 2014) - This was re-posted on the Naked Capitalism blog.

8:27 AM

The Scientific Justification for Meaningul Use, Stage 2: The NWB Methodology

The Final Rule for Meaningful Use Stage 2 has been released.  It is at this link (PDF).  It is a mere 672 pages in length, a quick read during one's evenings of leisure.

Here is, from page 18 verbatim, the scientific justification for the program.  The finest scientific methods were used to achieve these criteria in justification of spending of $15 billion of taxpayer money in "incentives" (probably a low estimate), not counting the additional hundreds of billions the buyers themselves will spend that is diverted from your healthcare to the IT sector:

3. Summary of Costs and Benefits

This final rule is anticipated to have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more, making it an economically significant rule under the Executive Order and a major rule under the Congressional Review Act.

Accordingly, we have prepared a Regulatory Impact Analysis that to the best of our ability presents the costs and benefits of the final rule. The total Federal cost of the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs between 2014 and 2019 is estimated to be $15.4 billion (these estimates include net payment adjustments for Medicare providers who do not achieve meaningful use in 2015 and subsequent years in the amount of $2.1 billion).

In this final rule we have not quantified the overall benefits to the industry, nor to EPs, eligible hospitals, or CAHs participating in the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs. Information on the costs and benefits of adopting systems specifically meeting the requirements for the EHR Incentive Programs has not yet been collected and information on costs and benefits overall is limited. 

Nonetheless, we believe there are substantial benefits that can be obtained by eligible hospitals and EPs, including reductions in medical recordkeeping costs, reductions in repeat tests, decreases in length of stay, increased patient safety, and reduced medical errors. There is evidence to support the cost-saving benefits anticipated from wider adoption of EHRs.

There's no truly robust evidence of generalizable benefit, no randomized trials, there's significant evidence to the contrary (that, incidentally, is deliberately being ignored), there's risk to safety that this disruptive technology causes in its present state (but the magnitude is unknown, see quotes from 2012 IOM study here) that MU and "certification" do not address, there's a plethora of hair-raising defect reports from the only seller that reports such things, but CMS justifies the program with the line:

"Evidence [on benefits] is limited ... Nonetheless, we believe there are substantial benefits that can be obtained by eligible hospitals and EPs ... There is evidence to support the cost-saving benefits anticipated from wider adoption of EHRs."

I am deeply impressed by the level of rigorous science here.  We are truly in a golden age of science.

I recommend NIH, NSF, FDA and all other research and regulatory agencies immediately adopt this rigorous HHS methodology (called the "NWB" methodology for "nonetheless we believe") in their professional pursuits and research grant approval processes.

-- SS

6:53 PM